Menachot 5: מְפַטֵּם הַקְּטֹרֶת יוֹכִיחַ

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On our daf we find that not all of the Sages agree with Rav’s ruling.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish rules that in such a case the meal offering remains valid and the kometz – the fistful of flour taken from the minḥa – can be offered on the altar.

Nevertheless, the rest of the flour cannot be eaten by the kohanim until a second minḥat ha-omer is brought, since the first one did not fulfill the necessary requirement and the new grain has not yet been permitted. Rav Pappa explains that this is based on the fact that Reish Lakish believes that the new grain becomes permitted automatically with dawn of the morning of the 16th day of Nisan (see the first part of the passage in Vayikra 23:14), although bringing the special minḥat ha-omer is required if the sacrifice can be brought (see the continuation of the abovementioned passage).

Rava disagrees with both Rav and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, and rules that the minḥat ha-omer is valid and succeeds in permitting the new grain even if the kohen had improper intentions at the time that he took the kometz. He argues that the minḥat ha-omer really is unique inasmuch as it is the only meal offering brought from barley (all others are brought from wheat), so the ordinary sacrificial rules do not apply.

We examine the relative epistemological weight accorded to kal va-ḥomer (a fortiori reasoning) versus direct scriptural citation in classical rabbinic jurisprudence. Through analysis of Talmudic sugyot, medieval commentaries, and modern scholarship, I argue that the rabbis consistently subordinated logical inference to explicit textual authority, not from intellectual timidity but from a sophisticated understanding of the limits of human reason when applied to divine command.

Menachot 4: בִּשְׁלָמָא מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא – ״חַטָּאת״ קַרְיַיהּ רַחֲמָנָא

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Our Mishnah taught that any of the menachos is still valid if its kemitza was removed by a kohen who had in mind a different type of minchah, but it does not allow its owner to fulfill his obligation.

The exception to this rule is the minchah of a sinner (those enumerated in Vayikra 5:1-4) or the minchah of a sotah. In these two cases, the minchah is disqualified if the kemitzah was taken having in mind the wrong type of minchah.

In the Gemara, Rav adds that a minchah of the omer offering is also disqualified if it is brought having in mind the wrong minchah. The reason he gives is that the omer is specifically brought in order to permit the new grain for the entire nation, and because it fails in this regard, it is no longer valid as a minchah.

We continue our exploration of the hermeneutic distance the rabbis travelled between the plain biblical meaning (peshat) of the meal offering (minchah) and its radical reconfiguration in rabbinic literature. Through careful attention to the Talmudic discussion in our daf we trace how the rabbis transformed simple grain oblations into complex legal instruments governed by intention (lishmah), verbal analogy (gezerah shavah), and categorical assimilation.

Menachot 3: זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה

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As we learned in the Mishna on yesterday’s daf when the kometz – the fistful of flour was taken from the meal offering she-lo lishmah – with improper intentions – the meal offering remains a valid sacrifice, although it is not credited to the owner of the offering and he will have to bring a replacement for it.

According to the Gemara, it appears that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this ruling and rules that such a meal offering would be credited to the owner. He explains that a meal offering is qualitatively different than an ordinary animal sacrifice. Animal sacrifices all have the same act of slaughter, the same collection of blood, etc. In a meal offering, however, the preparation of the sacrifice makes it evident whether the sacrifice has oil or does not and whether it is to be fried in a pan or cooked in a pot so the kohen‘s intentions are less important, and the minḥa will remain perfectly valid.

Yet from another baraita it seems that Rabbi Shimon accepts the ruling of the Mishna!

We explore how the concept of lishmah (proper sacrificial intent) functions not merely as a subjective mental state but as a structural principle embedded within Scripture itself. Through careful attention to Rava's hermeneutical method, we try to show how rabbinic jurisprudence constructs legal categories through textual totalization, wherein the presence or absence of unifying formulae in the Torah determines the permissibility of cross-intent substitution.

Menachot 2: מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר

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Massekhet Menaḥot and Massekhet Zevaḥim should be viewed as “sister tractates.” Both of them focus on the rules and regulations associated with the sacrificial service, although Massekhet Zevaḥim deals with sacrifices brought from living creatures that are slaughtered (animals and fowl), while Massekhet Menaḥot is about sacrifices that originate in the plant world – menaḥot – meal offerings brought from grains (wheat and barley) and libations of wine and oil.

Just as is the case regarding animal sacrifices, we find a variety of different sacrifices in the general category of menaḥot. There are those that are voluntary, those that are obligatory and those that come to effect atonement for sin; there are those brought by individuals and those brought on behalf of the community. Another parallel to animal sacrifice is the fact that while some parts are burned on the altar, other parts are given to the kohanim to eat. Nevertheless, there are differences, as well. For example, all menaḥot are considered kodashei kodashim – the highest level of holiness and they can only be eaten by male kohanim in the Temple courtyard.

The sacrificial service that we find for the minḥa is similar to that of an animal sacrifice. After preparing the meal-offering the kohen takes a kometz – a fistful – from the mixture, places it in one of the Temple vessels to sanctify it, carries it to the altar and burns it on the altar. From that time the remnants are permitted to the kohanim to eat.

Zevachim 120: דְּבָרִים שֶׁשָּׁוְותָה בָּמָה גְּדוֹלָה לְבָמָה קְטַנָּה

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During the time periods when a bamat yaḥid – a private altar – was permitted (see above daf 112) even as the Tabernacle was operating, how were sacrifices brought?

Were the rules and regulations associated with sacrifice the same in private settings as they were in the bama gedola – the great altar – in Gilgal, Nov or Givon? This is the question on which our daf – the closing page in Massekhet Zevaḥim – chooses to focus.

Some laws are clear. For example, the Gemara quotes a baraita that teaches that the time limitations regarding sacrifices that must be eaten on the day of sacrifice or, at most, on the day following sacrifice, apply to a bamat yaḥid just as they apply to the bama gedola. This law is derived from the passage in Lev (7:11) that equates the laws of all sacrifices to each other.

We explore the passage regarding King Saul as a typology for what was permissible and how the Rabbis used narrative as a basis for subsequent law.

Zevachim 119: אֶל הַמְּנוּחָה וְאֶל הַנַּחֲלָה

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The Gemara presents four different interpretations of the verse, "El ha'Menuchah v'El ha'Nachalah" -- "to the resting place and the inheritance" (Devarim 12:9). One opinion says that "Menuchah" refers to the Mishkan in Shilo, while "Nachalah" refers to the Beis ha'Mikdash in Yerushalayim. A second opinion says that "Menuchah" refers to the Beis ha'Mikdash in Yerushalayim, while "Nachalah" refers to Shilo. Another opinion says that both words refer to Yerushalayim, while a fourth opinion maintains that they both refer to Shilo.

The Gemara in a number of places (see Zevachim 60b, Megilah 10a) records a dispute about whether the Kedushah of Yerushalayim remains in place after the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. This dispute has many practical ramifications (for example, whether or not one may offer Korbanos nowadays; see Insights to Zevachim 61a). Is the dispute about the Kedushah of Yerushalayim also relevant to the Kedushah of Shilo? Is there an opinion which maintains that the Kedushah of Shilo is permanent and still remains?

“For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance” (Deuteronomy 12:9).

We explore the etymological midrashic and talmudic references to the differences between “menuchah” vs “Nachalah.”

Zevachim 118: בֵּן פֹּרָת יוֹסֵף בֵּן פֹּרָת עֲלֵי עָיִן

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Following the description of the places where public altars were established during biblical times that appeared in the Mishna (112b), Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as teaching that there were three places where the Shekhina– the Holy Spirit of God – rested on the Jewish people, in Shiloh, in Nov and Givon, and in the permanent Temple in Jerusalem.

Four places are mentioned in Rav Dimi’s teaching, and, in fact, the Ein Ya’akov’s version of the Gemara is that there were four places where the Shekhina rested on the Jewish people. Nevertheless, Rashi explains that Nov and Givon are viewed as a single period when private altars were permitted, separating between the two periods of Shiloh and the Temple when private altars were forbidden.

We explore the typology of Joseph in the centralization of the cult.

Zevachim 117: לְעוֹלָם כּוּלְּהוּ תְּלָתָא הָווּ

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We have already learned the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who ruled that upon entering the Land of Israel and erecting the Tabernacle temporarily in Gilgal, the people could not bring obligatory sacrifices until the Tabernacle was established in Shiloh in a more permanent manner (see above, daf 114). This position was disputed by other Sages, as we learn on our daf.

The Ḥakhamim rule that all sacrifices that were brought in the desert were brought on the altar in Gilgal as well, and in both places individual sacrifices were limited to a korban ola (a burnt-offering) or a korban shelamim (a peace-offering).

We explore further the transition of the three camps...

Zevachim 116: יְהֵא מָחוּל לִי בִּשְׂכַר חֶבֶל חַלּוֹן וּפִשְׁתִּים

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According to our daf the revelation at Sinai produced cosmic trembling. The nations of the world, perceiving the extraordinary character of this event, gathered before Balaam to inquire about its meaning. Balaam explains that God is giving Torah to Israel, and the nations, reassured that the upheaval does not signal a second flood, pronounce a blessing upon Israel. This narrative framework establishes the theological context within which Rahab's testimony will be situated: she speaks as a representative of those nations who have witnessed, from the outside, the power of Israel's God…

We explore her role in Pshat, Midrash and modern voices.

Zevachim 115: כְּלָלוֹת וּפְרָטוֹת נֶאֶמְרוּ בְּסִינַי

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According to the Mishna (112b) until the Tabernacle was established in the desert, sacrifices were brought on bamot – private altars – and the sacrificial service was performed by the bekhorim, the firstborn.

After the Tabernacle was erected sacrifices could only be brought there and the sacrificial service was performed by the kohanim – descendants of Aharon HaKohen.

According to the Mishna, the commandment to sanctify the firstborn was given at the time of the Exodus from Egypt (see Ex 13:2), and the firstborn redeemed themselves from Temple service later on, as described in Num (3:12).

According to the Talmud Yerushalmi, the reason for this was the participation of the firstborn in sacrificing to the Golden Calf, something that the members of the Tribe of Levi did not do.

We explore the transition from Firstborns to priesthood.

Zevachim 114: אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא לִזְמַנּוֹ

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The Gemara looks back to our last Mishna and examines on of its points: what was the status of the sacrifices brought to the Temple when the Israelites first entered the land?

We learned that people were not liable if they brought sacrifices at the wrong time - turtledoves that were too young; pigeons that were already too grown. But Rabbi Shimon argues that a sacrifice brought at the wrong time should receive malkot, lashes.

Rabbi Shimon boosts his argument by explaining that the Torah forbids bringing sacrifices in the same way that they were brought in the desert once the people reach Israel. The people could only bring voluntary and not communal offerings once entering the land. Voluntary sacrifices could be brought in the Tabernacle erected in Gilgal. Once the people arrived at Shiloh and Jerusalem, the obligatory sacrifices could be brought again as they were in the desert.

The Mishna discusses various cases of premature sacrifices and cites a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon whether there is a violation of slaughtering outside the Temple when at the moment it is unfit to be brought as a sacrifice inside. The implication is that if one were to consecrate an animal that is premature (either before the eighth day or the day that the mother was slaughtered) or a bird that is premature (turtledoves before they mature), the hekdesh status would be binding.

We explore time and space in korbonot and rabbinic culture.

Zevachim 113: וַהֲלֹא כׇּל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּדוּקָה הִיא

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The Gemara on our daf asks what is special about the place that was set aside for preparing the para aduma. Although the Mishna in Massekhet Para (4:2) teaches that there is a specific place that it should be prepared, the Torah makes no mention of such a requirement. Reish Lakish taught that this was a special place that had been certified as containing nothing that might ritually defile the para aduma. Rabbi Yoḥanan objects to this teaching, arguing that all the land of Israel has been checked and found to be pure of such defilement.

The Gemara explains this disagreement as being based on how these Sages viewed the destruction of the Flood.

According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the land of Israel was not affected by the flood, so there is no fear that there are bones buried in unmarked and unknown graves. Reish Lakish believes that the Flood reached the land of Israel, as well, so only places that had been scrupulously checked could be certified as pure.

Zevachim 112: וְאֵלּוּ קָדָשִׁים קְרֵבִין בַּמִּשְׁכָּן

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We analyze the Talmudic description of the five cultic transitions—Wilderness, Gilgal, Shiloh, Nov/Gibeon, and Jerusalem—as presented in Mishnah Zevachim, comparing it with the biblical narrative and the historiography of Josephus. The study demonstrates that the Talmud is not merely recording history but constructing a legal topology of sanctity. Biblical peshat presents a linear theological story of divine presence migrating toward permanence; Josephus offers apologetic-national historiography designed to present Jewish religion as venerable and rational to Roman audiences; the Talmud constructs a jurisprudential map governing liability, legitimacy, and the ontology of sacred space. By examining how each source treats the transitions between cultic centers, this essay illuminates the distinct hermeneutical purposes animating these textual traditions.

Zevachim 111: לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְמַפְרִישׁ חַטָּאתוֹ וְאָבְדָה

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The Gemara analyzes the Mishnah in order to understand the disagreement between Tanna Kamma and R’ Shimon.

Zeiri explains that the case in which they disagree is where the animal was slaughtered at night inside the Mikdash, and the animal was then removed and offered outside the courtyard of the Mikdash. Tanna Kamma is the view of R’ Yehuda (84a) who holds that an animal slaughtered at night inside the Mikdash is not valid at all, and it may not be brought as an offering.

The last daf in the The chapter HaShochet VeHaMa'aleh (Zevachim ch. 13) develops the Torah's prohibition against slaughtering or offering sacrifices outside the Temple (sheḥutei ḥutz and ha'alot ḥutz) into a dense halakhic system that specifies liability, minimum measures, the status of disqualified offerings, and the treatment of composite rites such as kometz, ketoret, and libations.

Read at the level of peshat, Leviticus 17 appears to address a historically situated problem—centralizing sacrificial slaughter to curb idolatrous practice and to locate blood-ritual within the sanctuary

The Bavli, however, generalizes and operationalizes the text through midrashic rules (ribbuy/mi'ut, gezerah shavah, semantic expansions, and systemic analogies), creating a jurisprudence that often moves beyond what a plain reading would naturally yield.

Zevachim 110: מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁפָּסַק הוּא מַתְחִיל

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As we have learned (daf 107), this perek focuses on the prohibition against bringing sacrifices outside of the Temple. In fact, not only are sacrifices forbidden outside of the Temple, but all services unique to the Temple cannot be performed outside of it. In the Mishna on our daf Rabbi Elazar teaches that someone who pours a water libation on the holiday of Sukkot outside of the Temple is liable for performing a Temple service inappropriately. (See Daf Ditty Sukkah 48)

The sugya in our daf stands at a critical intersection of ritual law, hermeneutics, and rabbinic authority. Ostensibly addressing liability for sacrificial acts performed outside the Temple courtyard, the passage becomes a sustained meditation on what constitutes an act of avodah, how partial ritual performances acquire full legal status, and—most strikingly—how the Talmud legislates binding law for a rite whose biblical basis is obscure or absent: nissukh ha-mayim, the water libation of Sukkot.

Zevachim 109: דְּמָר סָבַר: ״מְלֹא חׇפְנָיו״ דַּוְקָא

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The Mishnayot on our daf discuss different types of Temple services for which those who perform them outside of the Beit HaMikdash will be held liable.

The first Mishna on the page concludes with a ruling that if a ka-zayit – an olive size piece of the sacrifice – is brought outside the Temple, that would be sufficient to be considered a sacrifice that took place outside, with all of the associated repercussions.

In the second Mishna on the page we learn that other types of Temple services also cannot be performed outside of the Beit HaMikdash. Therefore, if a ka-zayit from one of the various types of meal-offerings were sacrificed outside of the Temple, the individual who performed the service would be held liable. In this case, however Rabbi Eliezer rules that a ka-zayit would not be enough, and only if the entire meal offering were brought outside would the service be considered to be significant.

Zevachim 108: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּסַכִּין

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The thirteenth perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim focuses on the prohibition against bringing sacrifices outside of the Temple. The Mishna on our daf discusses the question of whether a sacrifice that is brought outside the Temple must be brought on an altar in order for the person who brought the sacrifice to be deemed liable. According to Rabbi Yosei, without an altar there is no sacrifice, and it cannot be considered a korban that is brought in a forbidden manner. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, arguing that even if the sacrifice was brought on a rock or a stone it is considered an attempt to bring a korban, and the person who performed that service would be held liable.

Much of our daf centers on the interpretation of ish ish in “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that offers up a burnt offering” (Leviticus 17:8).

We explore the hermeneutic divide as to interpreting merely one repetitive word in the biblical text and the Halachic consequences thereof.

Zevachim 107: שְׁלֹשִׁים וְשֵׁשׁ כָּרֵיתוֹת בְּתוֹרָה

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Sacrifices must be brought only in the Temple. The thirteenth perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim, which began on yesterday’s daf focuses on the prohibition against bringing sacrifices outside of the Temple.

This prohibition is not connected with idol worship, for even sacrifices whose intent is to serve God can only be brought in the Temple. Slaughtering or sacrificing an animal outside of the Temple is considered to be a very severe violation of Torah law (see Lev 17:3-9), and carries with it the punishment of karet – “excision” – which is generally understood to mean premature death.

In our day, when the Temple is no longer standing, what is the status of someone who brings a sacrifice?

Zevachim 106: מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ – בִּזְבָחִים שֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁן בִּשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת וְהִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת

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The Mishnah taught that if someone unintentionally slaughters and offers an animal outside the courtyard of the Mikdash, he is liable for a chattas for slaughtering and a separate chattas for offering that animal.

The Gemara immediately identifies the source in the Torah where we find both a warning (Devarim 12:13) and a statement of punishment (Vayikra 17:8-9) for one who offers such an animal.

The Gemara then notes that although the punishment of kareis for slaughtering an animal outside the courtyard is found in Vayikra (17:3-4), it is not clear where the warning for this offense is mentioned. Rashi explains that there cannot be a chattas obligation without the Torah warning that such an act is prohibited.

We further explore the parameters of shechutei chutz.

Zevachim 105: הֵיכָן נִשְׂרָפִין? לִצְפוֹן יְרוּשָׁלַיִם

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The Gemara on our daf discusses the source for this halakha and quotes a baraita that explains that regarding the sacrifices brought on Yom Kippur the Torah sounds as if they must be removed and burned outside of a single encampment (see Lev 16:27), while regarding other such sacrifices the requirement is to burn them outside of three camps (the inner camp of the Tabernacle, the middle camp of the tribe of Levi and the outer camp of Israelites) in the desert.

From this we understand that although the sacrifices must be burned on the beit ha-deshen outside of all three camps (and in Temple times, outside the walls of the city of Jerusalem), nevertheless, the ritual defilement of the clothing of the kohanim associated with this service takes effect immediately upon leaving the encampment of the Tabernacle (or the Temple courtyard).