Zevachim 31: שְׁחִיטָה בְּזָר כְּשֵׁרָה

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On our daf, the first Mishna in the third perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim teaches that although sheḥita is one of the requirements in the sacrificial service, it need not be performed by a kohen and will be considered valid if performed by an ordinary Jew.

According to the Mishna, it can even be done by a woman, a slave or a tameh – someone who is in a ritually defiled state.

With regard to women performing ritual slaughter, Tosafot point out that the statement in this Mishna is clear proof that women can act as ritual slaughterers, in contradiction to a teaching presented in the book Hilkhot Eretz Yisrael, which precludes them from acting as shoḥatim because nashim da’atan kalot – that halakha perceives women as being “lightheaded.” That work includes a number of other restrictions in the act of sheḥita; for example, sheḥita performed by someone who was not properly dressed or someone who did not recite the appropriate benediction at the time of slaughter will be invalid. Tosafot argue that in all of these cases, these are ḥumrot – stringencies – established by the author of that work that are not actually requirements of Jewish law.

We explore agency, authority Halacha and women.

Zevachim 30: הוּא שָׁאַל בִּי דְּבַר חָכְמָה, וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ מִשְׁנָתֵינו

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The Mishnah and Gemara in Zevachim 29–30 explore sacrifices brought with mixed or shifting intent: when a priest begins the act of slaughter or sprinkling with one purpose (e.g., for a sin-offering) but completes it with another (e.g., for a burnt-offering). The Rabbis recognize this as a liminal state — what Abaye calls beyn beyn (“in between”).

This “double consciousness” unsettles the clear categories that Halacha depends upon.

For Rabbi Meir, the first intention dominates; once the act has begun under a certain frame of mind, the subsequent change cannot retroactively purify or corrupt it. Rabbi Yose, however, insists that the decisive intention is the one present at the completion of the act. Both agree, however, that the sacrifice’s validity hinges on coherence of intent, revealing the halakhic need for unity between inner and outer action.

We explore the notion of akrasia versus ambivalence.

Zevachim 29: חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל

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The sugya in Zevachim 29b probes one of the most conceptually difficult corners of sacrificial law: how the intention (machshavah) of the officiant transforms or invalidates a korban. It does so by comparing two legal structures—temurah, the forbidden substitution of sanctity from one animal to another, and pigul, the invalidation of an offering through improper intention regarding time or place. Both appear, at first glance, to concern human interference with holiness. Yet only temurah incurs malkot (lashes), while pigul, though metaphysically severe, does not. The discrepancy invites a profound question about the boundaries of culpability in halakhic thought.

Reb Chaim Soloveitchik’s reading of this sugya, preserved in his Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi (1), provides a foundational model for what would become the derekh ha-Brisk—a method that conceptualizes halakhic phenomena through analytic dichotomies which we discuss.

Zevachim 28: כּוּלְּהוּ מִקְּרָא אֲרִיכָא אָתַיִין

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The primary biblical text states: "And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity" (Leviticus 7:18).(33) A seemingly parallel verse appears in Leviticus 19:7: "And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted."

The rabbinic tradition understood these verses not as addressing literal consumption on the third day but as legal categories concerning priestly intention (machshavah) during sacrificial rites.(34) Two types of improper intent were distinguished:

1. Temporal intent: Intending to consume the offering beyond its designated time (chutz li-zemano)

2. Spatial intent: Intending to consume the offering outside its designated area (chutz li-mekomo)

We explore the hermeneutics of interpretation.

Zevachim 27: עוֹר אַלְיָה כְּאַלְיָה דָּמֵי

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A new Mishnah states: If one slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of sprinkling its blood outside, or part of its blood outside, to burn its sacrificial parts outside, or part of its parts outside, to eat its meat outside, or an olive’s bulk of its meat outside, or to eat an olive’s bulk of the skin of the tail outside, it is invalid, but one does not incur kares (if he eats from it).

We explore the Halachot of cheilev and imurim.

Zevachim 26: מִשּׁוּם דִּפְסִיל בְּמַחְשָׁבָה

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Our new Mishna discusses cases where the blood was poured incorrectly, which renders the sacrifice invalid. Among the possible cases are

If the blood was placed on the kevesh – the ramp leading up to the altar, which is not part of the altar and is not a place for sprinkling blood for any sacrifice.

If the blood that should have been placed on the upper part of the altar was placed on the lower part or vice versa.

If the blood should have been placed on the inner altar and was placed on the outer altar or vice versa.

The Talmudic passage from our daf presents a sophisticated legal discussion concerning the validity of sacrificial offerings when procedural errors occur in the application of blood to the Altar. At its core lies a fundamental theological question: what constitutes the essential element that renders a sacrifice valid—the physical act performed correctly, or the proper intent accompanying that act? This question resonates powerfully with the first-century controversy between Paul and certain Pharisaic traditions regarding the relative importance of works (actions) versus faith (intentions, beliefs, and inner disposition) in achieving righteousness before God.

Zevachim 25: מִדַּם הַפָּר – מִדַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ

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Our Mishna is focused on the initial kabbalat ha-dam, and the Gemara quotes a baraita that teaches that the blood that is collected and used for sprinkling can only be dam ha-nefesh – the life-blood – and not blood of the skin or the draining blood. This is derived from the repeated use of the term middam happar – the blood of the bull – (see, for example, Vayikra 4:5) which is understood to mean that the requirement is the blood that comes directly from the bull at the moment of slaughter.

When an animal is slaughtered, the very first blood is dam ha-or – blood of the skin – meaning the blood that is part of the small blood vessels that carry nutrients to the skin. Once the slaughterer’s knife reaches the main arteries, the dam ha-nefesh – the life blood that flows as long as the pumping action of the heart continues – will be spilled. This blood is called dam ha-nefesh because it is the blood that keeps the animal alive and with its loss will bring about cessation of the activity of the heart and ultimately, death.

We explore the blood ritual and the transition from Bible to Talmud.

Zevachim 24: הוֹאִיל וְלֹא נֶאֶמְרָה יָד בְּקַבָּלָה – קִיבֵּל בִּשְׂמֹאל כָּשֵׁר

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Rabbah bar bar Chanah quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that anytime the verse uses the term “finger” and “Kohen,” it must be done with the right hand. The Gemora first assumes that both terms must be present to require the right, as the verse about the chatas uses both – and the Kohen will take from the chatas blood with his finger – and we learn that verse from the verse about a metzora, which explicitly refers to the right finger.

The Gemora challenges this, since kemitzah – scooping the minchah only mentions “Kohen,” yet the Mishna states that if a Kohen did it with his left hand it is invalid. Therefore, Rava says that Rabbi Yochanan means any verse that uses either term implies the right.

We explore handedness in Halacha and mythology of antiquity.

Zevachim 23: שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד

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One of the examples that appear in the Mishna is the case of yoshev – when the kohen is sitting at the time that the sacrifice is brought.

What is wrong with sitting while performing sacrificial service?

Rava quotes Rav Naḥman as saying that this is based on the passage (Devarim 18:5) that teaches that the kohanim were chosen by God to “stand and serve” in His name. We can conclude that only when they are standing are they chosen to serve as priests.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that suggests that this pasuk would only serve as a positive commandment; the requirement to do so that teaches that the sacrifice will be invalid if the kohen was not standing stems from the continuation of that discussion where the need to stand is repeated (see Devarim 18:7).

We explore this levitical priesthood role.

Zevachim 22: עָרֵל מְנָלַן

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The Mishna stated that an uncircumcised person invalidates a Temple service. The Gemora asks: How do we know this? Rav Chisda says: We did not learn this from the Torah of Moshe Rabbeinu but did learn it from the words of Yechezkel ben Buzi. The verse states: Any stranger, one of uncircumcised heart or flesh shall not come to My Temple to serve me. How do we know that they cause the service to be invalid?

This is as the verse says: When you bring strangers, the uncircumcised of heart or flesh to be in My Sanctuary, to desecrate My House.

The braisa states: Any stranger. One might think this is literally referring to a gentile. This is why the verse states: Uncircumcised of the heart (a sinner). Why, then, does it say any stranger?

This is referring to someone whose actions have become strange to his Father in Heaven. We only know this refers to someone with an uncircumcised heart. How do we know this also applies to someone of uncircumcised flesh? The verse states: And one of uncircumcised flesh. Both of these verses are needed.

We explore the status of the uncircumcised and the influence of jewish Christian polemics.

Zevachim 21: כִּיּוֹר שֶׁלֹּא שִׁקְּעוֹ מִבָּעֶרֶב

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf there was a daily requirement for the kohanim to begin their day of Temple service with ritual washing of the hands and feet every morning.

The Gemara on our daf asks whether it would suffice if a kohen bathed his hands and feet in the basin of the kiyor, rather than using the water from the faucets. While the passage commanding the kohanim to wash says that Aharon and his sons should wash their hands and feet mimenu – from it, from the kiyor (see Shemot 30:19) – perhaps placing hands and feet into the kiyor would accomplish the same thing.

We explore the unique status of the laver and the way midrash derives women’s resistance and power from the mirrors plating it.

Zevachim 20: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזוֹ כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזוֹ

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R’ Yochanan states that a kohen who washed his hands and feet to remove the ashes is not required to wash them again after daybreak since he already washed them for that day’s service even though the washing occurred at night.

A similar circumstance is mentioned in Shulchan Aruch. Shulchan Aruch (1) writes that in the morning one should wash his hands and recite the beracha of

In a second ruling, Shulchan Aruch (2) states that it is not clear whether a person who was awake all night is required to wash in the morning in order to remove the from his hands.

We explore the halachot of ritual washing.

Zevachim 19: שָׁאנֵי צִילְצוֹל קָטָן, דַּחֲשִׁיב

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The Mishna states there (in Eiruvin 103b): If a Kohen was wounded in his finger, he can wrap reed-grass on it on Shabbos when he is in the Temple (as it is unseemly for his wound to be exposed during the service), but not when he is in the city (for the Rabbis forbade healing in order that people won’t grind herbs). If he intends to squeeze blood out of this wound when doing so, it is forbidden in the Temple as well (for this act constitutes making a wound, which is Biblically forbidden).

Rabbi Yochanan argues: Additional garments are only a concern when the extra garment is being worn on a place where the priestly garments are usually worn. Being that this is on the finger, it is not regarded as an additional garment.

The Gemora asks: Why isn’t this considered a chatzitzah (interposition) between his hand and whatever service he is performing? [He is required to perform the service without having anything between his hand and the items upon which the service is being performed.]

We explore the Halacha of chatztizta.

Zevachim 18: הֲוָה קָאֵימְנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּאִיזְגַּדַּר מַלְכָּא

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The Gemara quotes a baraita that teaches that although the bigdei kehuna are supposed to be fit properly for each individual kohen, nevertheless the Temple service is still valid if the garments were a little bit long and touched the floor, or if they were a little bit short and raised a bit from the floor, or for that matter, if they were a little bit worn out. (The Gemara also quotes the opinion of Rav, which is accepted as the halakha, that if they are too short the service is invalid, but if they were too long and the kohen shortened them by means of the belt on his uniform, then it would be valid.)

If, however, they were dirty or torn, then the service that was performed is invalid.

A wonderful story occurs when Rav Ashi says: Huna bar Natan said to me: Once, I was standing before Izgadar, kingof Persia, and my belt was raised above its appropriate height, and he lowered it into place and said to me:

“A kingdom of priests, and a holy nation” (Exodus 19:6), is written about you; therefore, you should always look dignified. When I came before Ameimar and recounted this incident, he said to me: With regard to you, God’s promise to Israel:

“And kings shall be your foster fathers” (Isaiah 49:23), was fulfilled.

We explore the connection between

Talmudic Rabbis and Persian Kings: Rituals of Recognition, Power, and Self-Definition in Late Antiquity.

Zevachim 17: בִּזְמַן שֶׁבִּגְדֵיהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם, כְּהוּנָּתָם עֲלֵיהֶם

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According to the Mishna (15b) one of the people whose sacrificial service would be invalid is a meḥusar begadim – a kohen who is missing one of the four unique articles of clothing that the priests are commanded to wear. The Gemara on our daf seeks to find a source for this law.

Rabbi Avuh quotes Rabbi Yoḥanan as offering a teaching from Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon who suggested that the source is Sefer Shemot (29:9) that teaches that Aharon and his sons should be dressed in these unique garments and that they would serve as kohanim – as priests.

We explore the relation between priestly vestments and divine service.

Zevachim 16: מָה לְטָמֵא, שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא

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As we learned on our daf the second perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim deals with situations where there is some problem with the person who brings the sacrifice. One of the examples that appears in the Mishna is the case of an onen who sacrifices. An onen is someone who has a close relative who has passed away but has not yet been buried. Generally speaking, Jewish law anticipates that such a person is supposed to focus entirely on tending to the deceased and is free of all other mitzvot.

We explore the relation between anoint and the priest’s access to sacred space in Lev 21:12.

Zevachim 15: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתְּרוּ בְּבָמָה

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Our second Perek begins as follows:

All sacrifices whose blood was received by a non-Kohen, an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet), a tevul yom (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah; he is considered a tevul yom until nightfall), a mechusar kippurim (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah, and has waited until nightfall; he is just lacking atonement until he brings his offerings the next day), one who lacked the priestly vestments, one who did not wash his hands or feet, one who is uncircumcised, one who is tamei, someone who is sitting, someone who either is standing on vessels, an animal, or the feet of his friend, the sacrifice is invalid. If he received the blood with his left hand, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says it is valid.

We explore the blemished priest and how the talmud privileges the Talmud Chacham over the cultic.

Zevachim 14: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּהוֹלָכַת חַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת

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We learned on yesterday’s daf that according to Rabbi Shimon, holakha – carrying the blood – is not an essential avoda. The argument that he made was that the sacrifice cannot be brought without slaughtering the animal, collecting its blood or sprinkling its blood. Nevertheless if the sacrifice is slaughtered next to the altar, near the ulam (the hall leading to the Temple), then carrying the blood may not be necessary since the sprinkling can be done from there.

Reish Lakish points out on our daf that Rabbi Shimon would admit that in cases of sin-offerings that must have their blood sprinkled on the inner altar, holakha is an essential avoda. Since the animal cannot be slaughtered inside the Temple itself, the act of carrying the blood inside cannot be done in any other way.

We examine the complex relationship between temporal consciousness and ritual validity in rabbinic sacrificial discourse, focusing on a passage from Tractate Zevachim concerning piggul(ritual abomination) and temporal transgressions.

Zevachim 13: אֲקַפֵּחַ אֶת בָּנַיי, אִם לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי לְהַבְחִין הֶפְרֵשׁ

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A recurring theme throughout the first perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim has been that some sacrifices will become invalid if there are improper thoughts at the time that they are brought, while other sacrifices will remain valid korbanot, although they will not count towards their purpose and if their owner was obligated to bring that sacrifice, he will have to bring another.

During which activities will improper thoughts affect the sacrifice?

The Mishna on our daf mentions four parts of the avoda – of the sacrificial service – where proper intent is essential .

Zevachim 12: לֹא אֲמָרָהּ אֶלָּא לְחַדֵּד בָּהּ תַּלְמִידָיו

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This article examines the contemporary challenges and opportunities facing Judaism as it navigates the complexities of the 21st century. Drawing on recent warnings from public intellectuals like Yuval Noah Harari about a potential "spiritual catastrophe" in Judaism, this study integrates perspectives from modern Jewish philosophy, mystical theology, demographic trends, and emerging forms of Jewish identity. The analysis reveals that Judaism stands at a critical juncture where traditional categories of belonging are being redefined while core ethical and spiritual commitments face both internal and external pressures. Through examination of diaspora-sovereignty tensions, technological disruption, generational shifts, and theological innovation, this article argues that Judaism's future depends on its capacity to maintain creative tension between tradition and transformation, presence and absence, particularity and universality. A special addendum examines the crisis of moral injury among Israeli soldiers in contemporary warfare, analyzing how this phenomenon both reflects and contributes to Judaism's broader spiritual challenges.