Menachot 18: מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה עֲבוֹדוֹת

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The individual bringing the sacrifice would bring a measure of fine flour and a measure of oil, and a bit of the oil would be put into an ordinary vessel and covered with the flour. Some more of the oil would be poured on and then these ingredients would be mixed together. After the mixing, the ingredients would be transferred to a keli sharet – a sanctified Temple vessel – and the rest of the oil would be poured on the mixture (some say that the mixing had to be done in one of the Temple vessels), and the frankincense would be added.

Menachot 17: מִדְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא לְהַקְטָרָה בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה

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The Mishnah (17a) records a dispute between the Rabanan and Rebbi Eliezer in the case of one who has improper intent about an item that is not normally eaten. The Rabanan maintain that when a Kohen performs the Kemitzah of a Minchah with intent to eat or to burn, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the Minchah that is not normally eaten or burned, the Korban remains valid. Rebbi Eliezer says that the Kohen's intent invalidates the Korban.

The Gemara explains that Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning is based on the verse, "v'Im He'achol Ye'achel" -- "And if he plans to eat..." (Vayikra 7:18). The verse's usage of two words for "eat" ("He'achol Ye'achel") implies that it refers to two "eatings." One eating is the Mizbe'ach's consumption of the Korban, and the other is man's act of eating the meat of the Korbam. A thought about either one constitutes a thought of "eating" which renders a Korban invalid. Accordingly, if one has intent to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, limbs that are normally burned on the Mizbe'ach, the Korban is invalid.

Menachot 16: כְּגוֹן שֶׁפִּיגֵּל בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, וְשָׁתַק בַּשְּׁנִיָּה, וּפִיגֵּל בַּשְּׁלִישִׁית

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The rule with regard to meal offerings is that the parts of the offering that are eaten by the kohanim are permitted to them only after both the kometz – the fistful of flour taken for sacrifice – and the levona – the frankincense – are placed on the altar.

The Mishna on our daf discusses whether having an inappropriate thought about eating the meal offering – that is, planning to eat it when it is forbidden to do so – will disqualify the offering if it happened only when sacrificing just one of these elements. According to the Ḥakhamim, it is only if the inappropriate thought occurred during both the sacrifice of the kometz and that of the levona that the offering will become piggul and the person who eats of it will be liable to receive karet – excision (a Heavenly punishment). Rabbi Meir rules that an inappropriate thought during either one of those times will suffice to disqualify the offering.

Menachot 15: הוּקְבְּעוּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, כְּלַחְמֵי תוֹדָה

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The Mishnah teaches that when one slaughters a Korban Todah with intent to eat the Korban Chutz l'Zemano, the Lechem and the Korban become Pigul. When one slaughters the Korban with intent to eat its accompanying Lachmei Todah Chutz l'Zemano, the Lechem becomes Pigul but not the Korban. The Gemara asks what the Halachah is in a case in which a person slaughters a Todah with intent to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, half of a k'Zayis of the meat and half of a k'Zayis of the Lechem. Will the Lechem become Pigul in such a case? Rav rules that the Lechem becomes Pigul.

The Gemara asks, why should the Lechem become Pigul? It should not become Pigul due to the following Kal va'Chomer: If something that causes Pigul ("Mefagel") does not become prohibited itself as Pigul, then something that attempts to cause Pigul but fails to do so certainly should not become Pigul itself.

We continue our analysis of the three mishnayot on our daf.

Menachot 14: הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט עַל מְנָת לִשְׁפּוֹךְ שִׁירַיִים לְמָחָר

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In a situation where part of the Temple service became ritually defiled, e.g. when one of the two loaves brought on Shavuot becomes ritually defiled, or one set of the leḥem ha-panim – the shewbread (see above daf 7) becomes impure, can the remaining bread be eaten? Rabbi Yehuda rules that they must all be destroyed, since a communal offering cannot be divided into parts. The Sages of the Mishna disagree and rule that what has become ritually defiled must be destroyed, but that the rest remains unaffected and can be eaten.

We explore intentionality piggul and how piggul functions not merely as a technical halakhic category but as a moral and metaphysical grammar through which the Rabbis articulated fundamental claims about human agency, divine service, and the architecture of religious consciousness.

Menachot 13: אֵין מַתִּיר מְפַגֵּל אֶת הַמַּתִּיר

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The second perek of Massekhet Menaḥot begins on our daf.

Perek HaKometz et HaMinḥa continues the discussion of the problems associated with improper thoughts when bringing a meal offering. As we saw on yesterday’s daf, menaḥot are similar to animal sacrifices in that the offering will become invalid if someone has improper thoughts during key parts of the sacrificial service, regarding when or where the offering would be sacrificed or eaten.

There are, however, differences between meal offerings and animal sacrifices. While in an animal sacrifice, the single activity that permits the sacrifice to be eaten is the service of sprinkling the blood of the sacrifice, there are two essential elements that must be done in order for a meal offering to be permitted. Those two elements are the placing on the altar of the kometz – the flour-oil mixture removed by the kohen – and the levona – the frankincense.

We continue our analysis of levonah.

Menachot 12: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַמִּזְבֵּחַ

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As we learned regarding animal sacrifices in Massekhet Zevaḥim (see, for example, daf 13b) inappropriate thoughts that take place at key moments during the preparation of a sacrifice will cause that sacrifice to become invalid. Improper thoughts about where the sacrifice might be eaten or sacrificed will cause it to be considered notar – “left over” – which invalidates the sacrifice; improper thoughts about the time that the sacrifice was to be eaten or sacrificed will cause it to be considered piggul – “abhorrent.” Such a sacrifice is invalid; eating such a sacrifice also entails the punishment of karet – excision – a Heavenly death penalty.

The Mishna on our daf teaches that these laws apply to meal offerings, as well. The source for this law is the parallel that exists between the rules of animal sacrifices and meal offerings. According to Rashi this is based on the Torah’s placement of all sacrifices in a single passage in Lev (7:37).

Which are the “key moments” that are the times when the thoughts of notar or piggul will affect the validity of the meal offerings?

Menachot 11: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּלְבוֹנָה הַבָּאָה עִם הַמִּנְחָה

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As we have learned, one of the central practices that must be done to meal offerings brought to the Temple is kemitza – when the kohen takes a fistful of the flour-oil-frankincense mixture – and places it in a keli sharet – one of the Temple vessels – as preparation for sacrifice on the altar. Kemitza is described on our daf where we learn that it was considered one of the most difficult of the sacrificial services.

Rava suggests that kemitza was done by taking a full handful of the meal offering mixture in a normal manner. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita that names each of the five fingers on a person’s hand; they are zeret (pinky), kemitza (ring finger), amah (middle finger), etzba (index finger) and gudal (thumb). The placement of the kemitza in this list seems to indicate that a kemitza is not performed with all five fingers.

We explore the world of frankincense historically and literary.

Menachot 10: קִבֵּל בִּשְׂמֹאל פָּסַל

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According to the Mishna, if the kemitza – taking a fistful from the meal-offering for placement on the altar – was done by the kohen with his left hand, the sacrifice is invalid.

In the Gemara on our daf Rava presents the source for this law. Regarding the laws of a metzora – someone suffering from biblical leprosy – who recovers from his condition and brings various sacrifices, we find that the blood of the sacrifice as well as the oil brought together with the sacrifice is to be placed by the kohen on the body of the recovered metzora on three specific places – on his right ear, the thumb of his right hand and the big toe on his right foot

We explore the privileging of the right in bible and talmud.

Menachot 9: עַל־תְּנ֞וּךְ אֹ֤זֶן הַמִּטַּהֵר֙ הַיְמָנִ֔ית וְעַל־בֹּ֤הֶן יָדוֹ֙ הַיְמָנִ֔ית וְעַל־בֹּ֥הֶן רַגְל֖וֹ הַיְמָנִ֑ית

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The purification ritual of the metzora in Leviticus 14 presents one of the most anatomically precise ceremonies in the Hebrew Bible, requiring the application of sacrificial blood and anointing oil to the right ear, right thumb, and right big toe of the individual undergoing purification.

We examine the rabbinic expansion of this priestly ritual as developed in the Talmud (particularly Tractate Negaim), explores ancient Near Eastern parallels that may illuminate the selection of these specific body parts, surveys the speculative interpretations offered by classical commentators from Philo of Alexandria through the medieval exegetes, and investigates the mystical dimensions of the ritual as elaborated in Kabbalistic literature.

The analysis reveals that the ear-thumb-toe triad functions as a symbolic representation of the complete human person—encompassing perception, action, and direction—while simultaneously encoding deeper theological meanings related to divine-human encounter, consecration, and the restoration of sacred wholeness.

Menachot 8: חֲבִיתֵּי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל

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Rebbi Yochanan maintains that sanctifying half of the flour of the Kohen Gadol's daily Minchas Chavitin in one vessel, and half in another vessel, is ineffective. The entire amount must be sanctified in one vessel, even though it will be divided later and half offered in the morning and half towards evening. The Gemara asks that Rebbi Yochanan seems to contradict himself, because he rules elsewhere that if a person separates half of the minimum amount of a Minchah with intention to add to it later, that half is sanctified.

The Gemara answers that when the person intends to add more flour later ("Da'ato l'Hosif"), the law is different. In such a case, half of the flour may be sanctified by itself. The Gemara proves this from the ruling of Rebbi Yosi who says that although a Kli Shares must be full in order to be Mekadesh its contents, when the person has intention to add to it later, it is Mekadesh its contents even when it is not yet full.

We explore the Minḥat Ḥavitin, the daily grain offering of the High Priest, which receives only sparse treatment in the biblical text yet becomes a site of extensive rabbinic elaboration in Mishnah and Talmud.

We argue that the rabbinic tradition does not merely clarify biblical ambiguities but fundamentally reconstructs the meaning, status, and theological function of the offering.

Menachot 7: הַזָּאָה שֶׁבַע פְּעָמִים מֵעִיקָּרוֹ

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We explore the sugya on our daf concerning the sanctification of the kometz (handful) from meal offerings and its derivation from the laws governing sacrificial blood. The sugya, framed by Rava's pivotal question regarding the conceptual classification of the kometz, establishes fundamental principles concerning ritual validity, wholeness, and the phenomenology of sanctification in Temple service. Through close reading of the primary sources, engagement with medieval commentators including Rashi, Tosafot, and Maimonides, and integration of contemporary academic scholarship, we show how the rabbis constructed a theology of sacred presence that demanded perpetual renewal and ritual readiness. We argue that the sugya's insistence on wholeness, elevation, and continuous sanctification reflects deeper theological commitments regarding the nature of divine-human encounter in sacrificial worship.

Menachot 6: זָר שֶׁקָּמַץ – יַחְזִיר

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that when taking the kometz – the fistful of flour – from a meal offering, it must be done properly.

The Mishna offers a list of situations that are considered to be improper and would render the offering invalid.

These include a non-priest, a priest who was in mourning or was not wearing the official priestly robes, who had not washed his hands and feet, or who was uncircumcised or ritually defiled, or who was sitting at the time or who removed the handful with his left hand. The Mishna continues that if when taking the kometz he picked up a small stone or a grain of salt or a drop of frankincense it also invalidates the offering, since he has taken “too little”.

The reason for this last rule is that the kometz has a specific size that must be taken – the first of the kohen – and if he picks up a foreign substance it is clear that he has taken less than the full amount of the required kometz.

Menachot 5: מְפַטֵּם הַקְּטֹרֶת יוֹכִיחַ

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On our daf we find that not all of the Sages agree with Rav’s ruling.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish rules that in such a case the meal offering remains valid and the kometz – the fistful of flour taken from the minḥa – can be offered on the altar.

Nevertheless, the rest of the flour cannot be eaten by the kohanim until a second minḥat ha-omer is brought, since the first one did not fulfill the necessary requirement and the new grain has not yet been permitted. Rav Pappa explains that this is based on the fact that Reish Lakish believes that the new grain becomes permitted automatically with dawn of the morning of the 16th day of Nisan (see the first part of the passage in Vayikra 23:14), although bringing the special minḥat ha-omer is required if the sacrifice can be brought (see the continuation of the abovementioned passage).

Rava disagrees with both Rav and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, and rules that the minḥat ha-omer is valid and succeeds in permitting the new grain even if the kohen had improper intentions at the time that he took the kometz. He argues that the minḥat ha-omer really is unique inasmuch as it is the only meal offering brought from barley (all others are brought from wheat), so the ordinary sacrificial rules do not apply.

We examine the relative epistemological weight accorded to kal va-ḥomer (a fortiori reasoning) versus direct scriptural citation in classical rabbinic jurisprudence. Through analysis of Talmudic sugyot, medieval commentaries, and modern scholarship, I argue that the rabbis consistently subordinated logical inference to explicit textual authority, not from intellectual timidity but from a sophisticated understanding of the limits of human reason when applied to divine command.

Menachot 4: בִּשְׁלָמָא מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא – ״חַטָּאת״ קַרְיַיהּ רַחֲמָנָא

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Our Mishnah taught that any of the menachos is still valid if its kemitza was removed by a kohen who had in mind a different type of minchah, but it does not allow its owner to fulfill his obligation.

The exception to this rule is the minchah of a sinner (those enumerated in Vayikra 5:1-4) or the minchah of a sotah. In these two cases, the minchah is disqualified if the kemitzah was taken having in mind the wrong type of minchah.

In the Gemara, Rav adds that a minchah of the omer offering is also disqualified if it is brought having in mind the wrong minchah. The reason he gives is that the omer is specifically brought in order to permit the new grain for the entire nation, and because it fails in this regard, it is no longer valid as a minchah.

We continue our exploration of the hermeneutic distance the rabbis travelled between the plain biblical meaning (peshat) of the meal offering (minchah) and its radical reconfiguration in rabbinic literature. Through careful attention to the Talmudic discussion in our daf we trace how the rabbis transformed simple grain oblations into complex legal instruments governed by intention (lishmah), verbal analogy (gezerah shavah), and categorical assimilation.

Menachot 3: זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה

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As we learned in the Mishna on yesterday’s daf when the kometz – the fistful of flour was taken from the meal offering she-lo lishmah – with improper intentions – the meal offering remains a valid sacrifice, although it is not credited to the owner of the offering and he will have to bring a replacement for it.

According to the Gemara, it appears that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this ruling and rules that such a meal offering would be credited to the owner. He explains that a meal offering is qualitatively different than an ordinary animal sacrifice. Animal sacrifices all have the same act of slaughter, the same collection of blood, etc. In a meal offering, however, the preparation of the sacrifice makes it evident whether the sacrifice has oil or does not and whether it is to be fried in a pan or cooked in a pot so the kohen‘s intentions are less important, and the minḥa will remain perfectly valid.

Yet from another baraita it seems that Rabbi Shimon accepts the ruling of the Mishna!

We explore how the concept of lishmah (proper sacrificial intent) functions not merely as a subjective mental state but as a structural principle embedded within Scripture itself. Through careful attention to Rava's hermeneutical method, we try to show how rabbinic jurisprudence constructs legal categories through textual totalization, wherein the presence or absence of unifying formulae in the Torah determines the permissibility of cross-intent substitution.

Menachot 2: מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר

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Massekhet Menaḥot and Massekhet Zevaḥim should be viewed as “sister tractates.” Both of them focus on the rules and regulations associated with the sacrificial service, although Massekhet Zevaḥim deals with sacrifices brought from living creatures that are slaughtered (animals and fowl), while Massekhet Menaḥot is about sacrifices that originate in the plant world – menaḥot – meal offerings brought from grains (wheat and barley) and libations of wine and oil.

Just as is the case regarding animal sacrifices, we find a variety of different sacrifices in the general category of menaḥot. There are those that are voluntary, those that are obligatory and those that come to effect atonement for sin; there are those brought by individuals and those brought on behalf of the community. Another parallel to animal sacrifice is the fact that while some parts are burned on the altar, other parts are given to the kohanim to eat. Nevertheless, there are differences, as well. For example, all menaḥot are considered kodashei kodashim – the highest level of holiness and they can only be eaten by male kohanim in the Temple courtyard.

The sacrificial service that we find for the minḥa is similar to that of an animal sacrifice. After preparing the meal-offering the kohen takes a kometz – a fistful – from the mixture, places it in one of the Temple vessels to sanctify it, carries it to the altar and burns it on the altar. From that time the remnants are permitted to the kohanim to eat.

Zevachim 120: דְּבָרִים שֶׁשָּׁוְותָה בָּמָה גְּדוֹלָה לְבָמָה קְטַנָּה

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During the time periods when a bamat yaḥid – a private altar – was permitted (see above daf 112) even as the Tabernacle was operating, how were sacrifices brought?

Were the rules and regulations associated with sacrifice the same in private settings as they were in the bama gedola – the great altar – in Gilgal, Nov or Givon? This is the question on which our daf – the closing page in Massekhet Zevaḥim – chooses to focus.

Some laws are clear. For example, the Gemara quotes a baraita that teaches that the time limitations regarding sacrifices that must be eaten on the day of sacrifice or, at most, on the day following sacrifice, apply to a bamat yaḥid just as they apply to the bama gedola. This law is derived from the passage in Lev (7:11) that equates the laws of all sacrifices to each other.

We explore the passage regarding King Saul as a typology for what was permissible and how the Rabbis used narrative as a basis for subsequent law.

Zevachim 119: אֶל הַמְּנוּחָה וְאֶל הַנַּחֲלָה

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The Gemara presents four different interpretations of the verse, "El ha'Menuchah v'El ha'Nachalah" -- "to the resting place and the inheritance" (Devarim 12:9). One opinion says that "Menuchah" refers to the Mishkan in Shilo, while "Nachalah" refers to the Beis ha'Mikdash in Yerushalayim. A second opinion says that "Menuchah" refers to the Beis ha'Mikdash in Yerushalayim, while "Nachalah" refers to Shilo. Another opinion says that both words refer to Yerushalayim, while a fourth opinion maintains that they both refer to Shilo.

The Gemara in a number of places (see Zevachim 60b, Megilah 10a) records a dispute about whether the Kedushah of Yerushalayim remains in place after the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. This dispute has many practical ramifications (for example, whether or not one may offer Korbanos nowadays; see Insights to Zevachim 61a). Is the dispute about the Kedushah of Yerushalayim also relevant to the Kedushah of Shilo? Is there an opinion which maintains that the Kedushah of Shilo is permanent and still remains?

“For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance” (Deuteronomy 12:9).

We explore the etymological midrashic and talmudic references to the differences between “menuchah” vs “Nachalah.”

Zevachim 118: בֵּן פֹּרָת יוֹסֵף בֵּן פֹּרָת עֲלֵי עָיִן

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Following the description of the places where public altars were established during biblical times that appeared in the Mishna (112b), Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as teaching that there were three places where the Shekhina– the Holy Spirit of God – rested on the Jewish people, in Shiloh, in Nov and Givon, and in the permanent Temple in Jerusalem.

Four places are mentioned in Rav Dimi’s teaching, and, in fact, the Ein Ya’akov’s version of the Gemara is that there were four places where the Shekhina rested on the Jewish people. Nevertheless, Rashi explains that Nov and Givon are viewed as a single period when private altars were permitted, separating between the two periods of Shiloh and the Temple when private altars were forbidden.

We explore the typology of Joseph in the centralization of the cult.