Zevachim 11: הַפָּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ

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A new Mishnah discusses whether or not the pascal lamb is permitted if it was not brought at the right time. It might be valid because it is like another offering that was kosher even though it was brought at the wrong time. Another argument is that the pascal lamb must be offered at a very specific time to be permitted. We continue to think about what is permitted and what is not permitted before the official start of Pesach.

Is the daily afternoon offering in the afternoon allowed to be offered any time during the day as well? This is successfully challenged, again by considering other practices that might be dependent on a particular period of time - an example is the menorah, where the lighting actually lasts for the day.

We discuss the two Talmuds and their differences.

Zevachim 10: חוֹזְרַנִי חֲלִילָה

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On our daf, a baraita is brought where we find an expanded version of this argument. Rabbi Yehoshua responds to Rabbi Eliezer that a korban ḥattat and a korban asham are not similar and cannot be compared, since the blood from the sin-offering is sprinkled on the upper part of the altar.

The altar was divided into two – an upper half and a lower half. As Rashi explains, in the mishkan the altar had a ledge halfway up (see Shemot 27:5) while in the Temple the altar was divided by ḥut ha-sikra – a red line that was drawn in order to divide the top half of the altar from the bottom half in order to show where the blood of the different sacrifices had to be sprinkled.

We explore the Asham sacrifice and Milgrom’s analysis.

Zevachim 9: אֵין כַּפָּרָה לְמֵתִים

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If a sin-offering is brought for the purpose of being a ḥattat Naḥshon – i.e. to be like one of the sin-offerings brought by the princes on the occasion of the consecration of the Tabernacle in the desert (see Sefer Bamidbar chapter 7) – it remains a valid sacrifice that serves its original purpose. Rashi explains that since the sacrifice was not brought in order to affect atonement for anyone (the original sin-offerings at the consecration of the Tabernacle were more of a gift than an ordinary sin-offering), we view them as a standard ḥattat that remains valid.

We explore the literary figure of Nachshon and how that operated Midrashically and the fascinating paradox how Nachshon's offering creates a unique typological framework that challenges conventional understandings of sacrificial efficacy, particularly regarding the relationship between death, atonement, and the classificatory boundaries of different korbanot.

Zevachim 8: כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל

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The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Korban Pesach slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban Shelamim, as long as it was not slaughtered with intent that it serve as a Korban Pesach. The Gemara at one stage suggests that this law is derived from the verse, "If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hash-m, is from the flock..." (Vayikra 3:6). Using the method of "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal," the words "l'Zevach" and "la'Hashem" are general terms, and the word "Shelamim" is a specific term. Accordingly, the verse teaches that just as a Korban Pesach which was slaughtered to be a Shelamim is a valid Korban, it is a valid Korban if it is slaughtered with intent to be any other type of Korban, with one exception. The only time it should not be valid is when it was slaughtered, on any day other than Erev Pesach, with intent that it be a Korban Pesach.

The Gemara asks that if a law is being derived from the "Prat," then the law should be that only if the Pesach is slaughtered in the name of a Korban which can be offered voluntarily is it a valid Korban, but not if it is slaughtered in the name of a Chatas or Asham (which cannot be offered voluntarily). The Gemara answers that the word "l'Zevach" is a "Ribuy" (inclusive). How does this answer the Gemara's question?

We explore rule of klal ufrat as one of the 13 middot she HaTorah nidreshet.

Zevachim 7: תּוֹדָה קְרוּיָה שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין שְׁלָמִים קְרוּיִין תּוֹדָה

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There are four circumstances that generate a need for one to offer a Todah offering. The four circumstances are:

1. Travelling by sea,

2. Travelling through the desert,

3. Recovering from illness and

4. Being released from prison.

Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner (1), author of Teshuvas Shevet HaLevi, was asked whether a person who experiences a miracle is obligated to offer a Korban Todah or perhaps it is only a voluntary korban.

Rashi (2) in his commentary to the Torah uses language which indicates that one is obligated to bring a Korban Todah when he emerges from one of these four experiences.

Pri Megadim, however, asserts that when Rashi uses the term “obligatory” he meant that it is Rabbinically mandatory. Biblically it is appropriate for one to offer a Todah offering following these four incidents but it is not mandatory.

We explore the notion of gratitude.

Zevachim 6: לֹא כִּיפֵּר – קַמֵּי שְׁמַיָּא

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When someone violates a negative commandment, the Torah offers various punishments when it was done on purpose, and, under certain circumstances, requires a korban ḥattat – a sin offering – as atonement when it was done by accident. For neglecting to perform most positive commandments we do not find any punishment in the Torah, nor is there any requirement to bring a sacrifice for atonement. Nevertheless, the Sages suggest that the korban olah – the burnt offering – serves to atone for the neglect of a positive commandment.

The Gemara on our daf asks whether this sacrifice would atone even for missing positive commandments after the animal was set aside to be an olah, or is it limited to those transgressions that took place prior to the animal’s consecration.

We explore the notion of expiation and divine favor following the Olah.

Zevachim 5: מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ

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Although we have learned that a sacrifice must be brought lishmah – with the proper intention – the first Mishna (2a) teaches that if a sacrifice were brought she-lo li-shmah – with the wrong intention in mind, e.g. the animal had been set aside for one type of sacrifice but was slaughtered for a different sacrifice – it remains a valid sacrifice, although it does not count and the owner will need to bring another sacrifice to fulfill his obligation.

Reish Lakish is disturbed by this ruling, and argues that if the korban can be brought, it should serve its purpose, and if it does not serve its purpose, then why should it be brought? That is to say, if the need for lishmah is only an ideal, but the sacrifice remain valid, then why would it not fulfill its purpose? And if it is essential to have the sacrifice brought lishmah, then a korban without proper intent should be disqualified entirely.

Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis on the following verse :

“That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above.

In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.

We explore the notion of truth telling and when is it allowed to lie according to Halacha and moral theory.

Zevachim 4: וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקַבָּלָה

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In the previous dapim of Massekhet Zevaḥim we have seen the importance of the idea of lishmah – that the sacrifice must be brought with the appropriate intent, so that at the time when it is sacrificed the owner has in mind what the sacrifice is and why it is being brought. The Gemara on today’s daf searches for a source for that law.

The passage that is brought as a source is from Sefer Vayikra (3:1) where the Torah commands ve-im zevaḥ shelamim korbano – that if the sacrifice being brought was a korban shelamim – indicating that the sacrifice must be slaughtered with the specific intention that it was a shelamim. The Gemara continues with a discussion of how we can learn that each of the other avodot – activities of the sacrificial service aside from Sheḥita (slaughtering the animal) – also must be done with the proper intent, and finds specific sources for:

Kabalat ha-dam – collecting the blood at the time of slaughter

Holakah – carrying the sacrifice to the altar

Zerikat ha-dam – sprinkling the blood on the altar.

Zevachim 3: ״תּוֹכוֹ״ וְלֹא תּוֹךְ תּוֹכוֹ

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf one of the essential elements of a sacrifice is that all the parties involved have the appropriate thoughts at the time that the sacrifice is brought. Therefore, if the owner thinks that the sacrifice is being brought for a different korban than the one it was set aside for, the sacrifice does not count, and he must replace it with another.

On our daf the Gemara brings a statement made by Rav Yehuda quoting Rav who taught that although switching sacrifices would invalidate the korban, if the owner’s intent was that the animal would be slaughtered for ḥullin – not for a korban but for mundane purposes – then the sacrifice would remain valid. Apparently only a similar use will invalidate the korban; a totally dissimilar use will allow the sacrifice to remain valid.

We review the seder kodshim and explore intentionality in Korbanot.

Zevachim 2: מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר

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The sacrificial service in the Temple – referred to by the Sages simply as avoda, or “service” – is one of the foundations of the Torah and is considered one of the spiritual pillars upon which the world stands (see the Mishna in Massekhet Pirkei Avot 1:2). Even after the destruction of the Temple, when the laws of the sacrificial service became relevant only for Messianic times, the Sages continued to discuss these topics to the extent that we have an entire Order of Talmud – Seder Kodashim. Although we only have Gemara on Seder Kodashim in the Talmud Bavli, there is evidence from the works of the rishonim that there was Talmud Yerushalmi on it, as well, that was not preserved and appears to have been lost entirely.

Massekhet Zevaḥim offers a broad explication of the laws of sacrifices that are brought from live animals – that is, fowls and animals – while meal offerings have a tractate, Massekhet Menahot, devoted to those laws. The main topics discussed are the sacrifices themselves – how they are prepared, where they are brought, what would disqualify them – but not what animals are brought for each sacrifice. That topic is dealt with in other tractates, and not only in Seder Kodashim. For example, Yoma and Pesaḥim introduce the sacrifices of Yom Kippur and Pesaḥ; Nazir introduces the sacrifices brought by a Nazirite, etc. Our tractate also does not discuss the order of the sacrificial service in the Temple, neither on a daily basis (those laws appear in Massekhet Tamid) nor on holidays (those appear in tractates devoted to individual holidays).

Horayot 14: חַד אָמַר: סִינַי עֲדִיף, וְחַד אָמַר: עוֹקֵר הָרִים עֲדִיף

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On yesterday’s daf we learned of the differences of opinion between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on the one hand and Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Natan on the other hand. The Beit Shmuel explains that the following discussion in the Gemara offers some background to their disagreement.

Rabbi Yoḥanan taught: On the following point there is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages. One view is that “Sinai” – a well-read scholar – is superior to an “oker harim,” literally “one who uproots mountains,” i.e. a sharp dialectician and the other view is that the sharp dialectician is superior. Rav Yosef was a well-read scholar; Rabba was a sharp dialectician. A question was sent up to the scholars in Israel: Who of these should take precedence? They sent them word in reply: ‘A well-read scholar is to take precedence’; for the Master said, ‘All are dependent on the owner of the wheat’.

Horayot 13: זוֹ הָיְתָה בְּחֶזְקַת שָׁמוּר

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A new Mishnah states: "A Kohen takes precedence over a Levi (in every matter of honor); a Levi takes precedence over a Yisroel, a Yisroel takes precedence over a mamzer (product of forbidden relations upon punishment of death or kares); a mamzer takes precedence over a Nasin (descendants of the Gibeonites; people who fooled Yehoshua into allowing them to convert; Dovid HaMelech prohibited them from marrying into the congregation); a Nasin takes precedence over a convert; and a convert takes precedence over a freed Canaanite slave.”

We explore the relative wight given to Torah study and the position of the proselyte.

Horayot 12: כֹּל דִּתְדִירָה קָדְמָה

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As we learned, the shemen ha-mish’ḥa was used to anoint kings and high priests. The Rosh points out that the need to anoint the high priest is a clear passage in the Torah (see Ex 30:30), but there is a prohibition to use the oil on any other person (see Ex 30:32), whose punishment is karet (see above, daf 9). How was the decision made to use this oil on kings, as well?

He answers that the Gemara in Megilla understands that it is only forbidden to use this oil on a normal person. The king is not simply an adam (man) and therefore he does not fall into the category of the prohibition.

We explore the priest anointed for war in other military traditions and the origins of military chaplaincy.

Horayot 11: הוּא שַׁלּוּם הוּא צִדְקִיָּהוּ, הוּא יוֹחָנָן הוּא יְהוֹאָחָז

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Steinsaltz says:The word mashi’aḥ is invariably connected with Messianism and the end of days, but its actual meaning is “the anointed one” – that is, the one who has been anointed with anointing oil. In our context the term ha-kohen ha-mashi’aḥ (Vayikra 4:2) refers to the anointed priest who errs and sins. The Mishna teaches that this excludes a High Priest who is merubeh begadim – who serves with the additional vestments of the kohen gadol, but who has not been anointed, which was the case throughout most of the Second Temple period.

What was this shemen ha-mish’ḥa, this anointing oil?

The Torah teaches that a unique anointing oil must be prepared to consecrate the mishkan and its vessels as well as the High Priest, Aharon ha-kohen and his children.

Our Daf teaches that the kings of Israel were also anointed, although there was no need to anoint a king who replaced his father in peaceful succession.

We explore the ritual of anointing kings of Israel.

Horayot 10: אַשְׁרֵיהֶם לַצַּדִּיקִים שֶׁמַּגִּיעַ אֲלֵיהֶם כְּמַעֲשֵׂה הָרְשָׁעִים

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The Gemora relates an incident: Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua were once traveling on a ship. Rabban Gamliel had with him some bread while Rabbi Yehoshua had with him bread and flour. When Rabban Gamliel’s bread was consumed, he relied on Rabbi Yehoshua’s flour.

Rabban Gamliel asked him, “How did you know that we would be so much delayed that you brought flour with you?” Rabbi Yehoshua answered him, “There is a certain star that rises once every seventy years and leads the sailors off course, and I suspected that it might rise and lead us astray.” Rabban Gamliel said to him, “You possess so much knowledge and yet you must travel on a ship (in order to earn a livelihood)!”

Rabbi Yehoshua knew that a comet would likely be visible during his sea voyage, and that its light would confuse the sailors who navigated by the stars. That comet returned about once every 70 years.

We explore Jeremy Brown’s on the Jewish reception of the Copernican Revolution and Halley’s comet.

Horayot 9: כָּאן – בְּדַלּוּת, כָּאן – בְּדַלֵּי דַלּוּת

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The Mishnah earlier (8b) records an argument between Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili and Rebbi Akiva. Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili maintains that the Beis Din and the Nasi are not obligated to bring a Korban for transgressing the Isurim which mandate a Korban Oleh v'Yored -- the Isur of Shemi'as Kol, the Isur of Bituy Sefasayim, and the Isur of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. Rebbi Akiva maintains that the Nasi is obligated to bring his special Korban for transgressing these Isurim, except for the Isur of Shemi'as Kol, since the Nasi is never called upon to give testimony as a witness.

An anointed priest and a court are exempt; just as a court is exempt from all of the sliding-scale offerings, so too, an anointed priest is exempt from all of them, not only from the offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is not difficult, as there is a distinction between the rulings. Here, in the passage that deems the anointed priest liable in cases other than the defiling the Temple, it is in the case of an offering brought due to poverty, whereas there, in the latter clause, it is in the case of an offering brought due to extreme poverty. And Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to one halakhaand disagrees with him with regard to one other halakha. He holds in accordance withthe opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the case of extreme poverty that the anointed priest is exempt from bringing that meal-offering. And he disagrees with Rabbi Akiva in the case of poverty, as he does not hold that the anointed priest is completely exempt from bringing a sliding-scale offering.

This text reveals not merely technical legal distinctions but profound theological and social perspectives on poverty, religious obligation, and communal hierarchy. The passage's reference to Rabbi Akiva's position on dalei dallut (extreme poverty) provides a window into understanding how one of the most influential Talmudic sages approached questions of economic disparity and religious duty.

Horayot 8: ״אָנֹכִי״ וְ״לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ״ מִפִּי הַגְּבוּרָה שְׁמַעְנוּם

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§ In any event, everyone agrees that where these verses are written, it is with regard to idol worship that they are written. The Gemara asks: As the verse does not mention idol worship explicitly, from where is this inferred. Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, and some say that the statement is unattributed, that the verse states:

“And when you act unwittingly, and do not perform all these commandments [kol hamitzvot] that the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). Which is the mitzva that is the equivalent of all the mitzvot? You must say: It is the prohibition against idol worship.

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that the verse states:

“That the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22), and it is written:

“That the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Numbers 15:23). Which isthe mitzva that was introduced in the speech of the Holy One, Blessed be He, heard by the Jewish people, and which He commanded in the Torah by means of Moses? You must say: This is idol worship, as Rabbi Yishmael taught concerning the first two commandments:

“I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3): We, the Jewish people, heard them from the mouth of the Almighty.

We examine the fundamental theological paradox embedded within Talmudic discussions of divine revelation, specifically focusing on the tension between direct divine speech and mediated prophetic transmission. The Talmudic passage from Horayot 8a, attributed to the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, highlights a critical interpretive problem: while Scripture presents Moses as the mediator of divine law, it simultaneously suggests that Israel heard certain commandments directly from God.

Horayot 7: אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that the cases of the High Priest and the High Court are parallel. When the High Court rules erroneously and that decision is acted upon by the majority of the Jewish community, the High Court will be obligated to bring a sin-offering on behalf of the community. Similarly, when the High Priest made a decision on Jewish law in error and acts upon his ruling, he will bring a unique sin-offering.

In both of these cases it is not the forbidden act itself that creates an obligation to bring the sacrifice, rather it is specifically the mistaken ruling that precipitates the forbidden act that creates that obligation.

We explore the tension between public responsibility and private culpability has been a central concern of political philosophy since antiquity. When leaders act, do they act as individuals or as embodiments of institutional authority?

How should societies balance the need for effective governance with demands for accountability? These questions, which animate contemporary debates about executive power, political immunity, and democratic responsibility, find their earliest systematic treatment in an unlikely source: the Talmudic discussion of the Anointed Kohen's liability for sin.

Horayot 6: מָשִׁיחַ בְּפַר וְאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי

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The first Mishna opens with the kohen gadol, teaching that he will bring his sin-offering only if both the decision and the forbidden action were made in error. The Mishna teaches specifically that if either were done purposefully – if the decision to permit a forbidden action were done intentionally, but the act was done accidentally or if the decision was made by accident, but the act was done on purpose – then the sacrifice would not be brought.

In the Bible, sacrificial offerings are meticulously detailed, revealing a structured hierarchy among animals used in these rites.

This hierarchy is not merely practical but imbued with symbolic significance, reflecting broader cultural values, economic considerations, and theological emphases.

Horayot 5: שֵׁבֶט אֶחָד דְּאִקְּרִי קָהָל

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The Gemara asks how Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon derive that each tribe is considered to be a kahal – a community – in itself, which obligates them in individual community sin-offerings.

One suggestion is that the source is a passage in Sefer Divrei HaYamim II, or Chronicles II (20:5) that refers to King Yehoshafat standing in the midst of kahal Yehuda – the community of the tribe of Yehuda – in Jerusalem. Although only a single tribe was there, nevertheless they were called a kahal.

The Gemara rejects this source, arguing that Jerusalem cannot be brought as a proof, since the tribe of Binyamin was there, as well. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov suggests another source, pointing out that the patriarch Ya’akov refers to a promise made by God to grant him a kahal (see Bereshit 48:4, as well as 35:11) and only a single child, Binyamin, was yet to be born.

We explore the transition from tribalism to kehillah.