Bechorot 24: שָׁאנֵי פָּרָה, דְּלָאו בַּת גִּיזָּה הִיא

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 24

To download, click/tap here: PDF

If one buys a nursing animal from an idolater and does not know whether it already had its first offspring, he can safely assume that the animal is nursing its own child and is therefore not subject to the law of firstborn anymore.

While there are some animals that lactate before giving birth, in general animals do not nurse a child that is not their own. Also, in a flock one can assume that each animal nurses its own child. A different point of view is that an animal will nurse a child not of its own even before it has given birth.

If one saw a young pig clinging to an ewe and nursing from it, the ewe is exempt from the law of a firstborn, because we can assume that this is not a pig but a mutant lamb. One can't eat it, because perhaps it is a pig after all. This rule seems to combine the two contradictory points of view above: does an animal feed a child that is not its own or it doesn't?

We explore how Slifkin gives us a zoological route into the much deeper question of whether סימני טהרה identify a pre-existing מין or actually constitute halakhic identity.

Bechorot 23: דְּאֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹלֶדֶת

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 23

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Rechem and Rachamim: Does Mercy Require Birth?

three theories of mercy

Our daf asks what looks like a question of animal husbandry and turns out to be a question about the nature of compassion. A nursing animal has been bought from a gentile. Is the creature at her udder her own?

The verb the Gemara uses for nursing another's young is merachemet, "she shows mercy." The word is built on rechem, womb. The sugya is asking whether that etymology is a fact of nature.Three positions emerge.

1. Mercy without birth. The tanna kamma of the baraita holds that an animal "might be merciful and nurse another animal even though it has not given birth at all." The next offspring is therefore a doubtful firstborn.

2. Birth as the gate. דְּאֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹלֶדֶת: she does not show mercy unless she has given birth. On this reading of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, birth opens the capacity and once open it may flow to a stranger's young.

3. Birth as the bond. On the second reading, she is merciful only toward her own. Mercy is not a capacity that birth releases but a tie that birth creates, and it reaches no further than the one who was born.

Bechorot 22: פִּיקָּה מִתּוֹךְ פִּיקָּה

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 22

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara quotes a Mishna from Massekhet Oholot (7:4) that teaches that when the fetus dies in its mother’s womb, it imparts ritual impurity from when the womb opens, but only when the head of the fetus is round like a skein of yarn.

If the stillborn fetus remains in the mother, there is no ritual defilement, since this is a situation of tum’ah belu’ah – “swallowed defilement” – which does not ritually defile (see Ḥullin daf 71). Once the uterus opens, we view it as if the fetus had been born and there is ritual defilement in the entire house. The Mishna teaches that this is only true in a case where the fetus had developed to the extent that its head is “the size of a skein.”

The sugya begins with the disintegrated fetus expelled as a bloody mass. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov rules that the mass must be buried and that the mother is exempt from any later offspring being treated as a firstborn, yet Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mass transmits neither impurity by touch nor by carrying. The tension is obvious. If a fetus was present strongly enough to count as the mother’s first offspring, why does its dead tissue not convey the impurity of neveilah? Rabbi Yoḥanan answers with the principle of bittul berov: the fetal flesh is a minority within the larger mass of blood and other material and is therefore nullified for purposes of impurity.

Bechorot 21: הַשִּׁלְיָא בַּבַּיִת — הַבַּיִת טָמֵא

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 21

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The expulsion of a murky discharge, which is sufficient to exempt an animal from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, prevents it from being impregnated for no less than thirty days. If an animal becomes pregnant within thirty days of expelling a murky discharge, evidently that discharge was not the sign of a fetus, and therefore the offspring will have firstborn status.

The Talmudic category of the me'uberet, the pregnant fetus, is more complicated than it first appears. Biologically, pregnancy begins at conception. Halakhically, however, the law is often concerned not simply with whether conception has occurred, but with when pregnancy has become sufficiently established to be recognized. The rabbinic phrase for that threshold is hakarat ha-ubar—הכרת העובר—the recognition of the fetus. In several passages the Talmud places this transition at approximately three months of pregnancy.

That three-month threshold is particularly interesting when we explore ancient Greek and Roman medical literature. The comparison suggests that the rabbis were working with an observational category familiar throughout the ancient Mediterranean world: the distinction between an early pregnancy that was hidden, uncertain, and known chiefly through indirect symptoms, and a later pregnancy that had become sufficiently manifest in the woman's body to be treated as an established fact.

Bechorot 20: לְתַנָּא קַמָּא אֵינָהּ יוֹלֶדֶת לִמְקוּטָּעִין

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 20

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The first Mishnah of the third chapter deals with a person who purchased an animal from a non-Jew and does not know whether it had previously given birth and was thereby exempted from the laws of the firstborn. The Mishnah specifically discusses one who purchases from a non-Jew, while the Gemara in our sugya records a dispute among the Amoraim regarding someone who purchased an animal from a Jew:

“Rav said: it is definitely a firstborn… Shmuel said: it is a doubtful firstborn… and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: it is definitely ordinary, non-sacred property.”

All three Amoraim attempt to assess the presumed intention of the seller. Rav maintains that the seller’s silence proves with certainty that the present offspring is a firstborn. Shmuel holds that his silence proves nothing conclusively and may be interpreted in different ways. Rabbi Yoḥanan, by contrast, maintains that the seller’s silence is clear evidence that the animal had already given birth previously. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his position with the principle:

“Since there is a prohibition involved, he certainly would have informed him.”

investigation falls instead upon the purchaser rather than the seller.

According to Tosafot, the position of Rav and Shmuel is grounded in the prohibition:

“You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind” (lifnei iver lo titten mikhshol) to which we explore its varying applications.

Bechorot 19: אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 19

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Suppose the mother's first offspring is delivered through the abdominal wall — יוצא דופן, essentially a Caesarean delivery — and the next offspring is delivered vaginally. Which one is the bekhor?

Rabbi Tarfon treats both as doubtful. The Caesarean offspring is first chronologically, but it is not פטר רחם, the one that "opens the womb." The second offspring really do open the womb, but it is not the mother's first offspring. Thus, each possesses only half of what we ordinarily mean by bekhor. The Gemara formulates Rabbi Tarfon's uncertainty beautifully:

בכור לדבר אחד אי הוי בכור

Is something that is a firstborn in one respect considered a firstborn?

Rabbi Akiva answers no. The first animal fails because אינו פטר רחם; the second fails because קדמואחר—another offspring preceded it. Thus, bekhorah requires the convergence of two biological/legal facts: first offspring + first emergence through the womb.

We explore What does "firstborn" mean when biological chronology and anatomical birth no longer coincide?

That is an unusually modern-sounding problem hiding in Bechoros 19. The Caesarean case forces חז"ל to distinguish chronological firstness, anatomical firstness, sexual firstness, and halakhic firstness. The body supplies several possible definitions of "first"; Torah law must determine which combination constitutes בכור.

Bechorot 18: זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 18

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Suppose the mother's first offspring is delivered through the abdominal wall — יוצא דופן, essentially a Caesarean delivery — and the next offspring is delivered vaginally. Which one is the bekhor?

Rabbi Tarfon treats both as doubtful. The Caesarean offspring is first chronologically, but it is not פטר רחם, the one that "opens the womb." The second offspring really do open the womb, but it is not the mother's first offspring. Thus, each possesses only half of what we ordinarily mean by bekhor. The Gemara formulates Rabbi Tarfon's uncertainty beautifully:

בכור לדבר אחד אי הוי בכור

Is something that is a firstborn in one respect considered a firstborn?

Rabbi Akiva answers no. The first animal fails because אינו פטר רחם; the second fails because קדמואחר—another offspring preceded it. Thus, bekhorah requires the convergence of two biological/legal facts: first offspring + first emergence through the womb.

We explore What does "firstborn" mean when biological chronology and anatomical birth no longer coincide?

That is an unusually modern-sounding problem hiding in Bechoros 19. The Caesarean case forces חז"ל to distinguish chronological firstness, anatomical firstness, sexual firstness, and halakhic firstness. The body supplies several possible definitions of "first"; Torah law must determine which combination constitutes בכור.

Bechorot 17: וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם בִּידֵי אָדָם

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 17

To download, click/tap here: PDF

If an ewe gave birth to two male lambs and their heads emerged from the womb simultaneously, then Rabbi Yose HaGlili says that both are firstborn and both are given to a kohen, since the Torah said, "The males belong to God."

However, the Sages disagree and say that it is impossible for two events to happen exactly at the same time. Therefore, one was the firstborn, only we don't know which one, and the kohen gets one animal.

Rabbi Yose then says that this Torah phrase is exactly the source teaching that simultaneous events occur. And the Sages? The say that "males" just means all males in general.

On our daf the Gemara connects this tannaitic dispute to the broader question of whether “it is possible to achieve exactness” (efshar letzamtzem): whether one may rely on sensory perception to determine that two objects are exactly equal in size, that two events occurred at precisely the same time, or that a particular object possesses an exact size, shape, or weight.

My question is what this legal discussion can contribute to an apophatic theology of encounter. In my work on divine concealment, the patient as a subject of interpretation, and therapeutic tzimtzum, I have argued that a claim to know can overreach its object We explore this.

Bechorot 16: אֵין מְקַבְּלִין צֹאן בַּרְזֶל מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא רִבִּית

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 16

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our Mishnah states:

“One who accepts tzon barzel [a fixed-value livestock arrangement] from a non-Jew — their offspring are exempt [from the law of the firstborn].”

The Rishonim disagree regarding the precise terms of the contract known as tzon barzel (see Tosafot, s.v. ein), but the basic principle is that livestock belonging to a non-Jew is placed in the possession of a Jew; the non-Jew and the Jew share in the offspring, and ultimately the Jew is expected either to pay the non-Jew the value of the livestock or to return the livestock itself to him.

The Gemara explains why such livestock is exempt from the law of the firstborn:

“For if the non-Jew comes and demands money, and [the Jew] does not give it to him, he may seize the animal.”

The non-Jew’s ability to seize the animal in the event of nonpayment is regarded as a defect in the Jew’s ownership and therefore exempts the animal from the law of the firstborn.

The rabbinic institution known as tzon barzel, literally “iron sheep,” presents an unusually sophisticated form of divided proprietary interest. Property is transferred into the economic control of one party, who enjoys its produce and frequently assumes the risk of deterioration or destruction, while another party retains a fixed capital claim secured by the property. The institution appears in several areas of rabbinic law, most famously in the law of marital property, but also in the laws of interest and, strikingly, in the second chapter of tractate Bekhorot. There the rabbis ask whether livestock received by a Jew from a non-Jew under a tzon barzelarrangement remains sufficiently connected to the non-Jewish owner to exempt its offspring from the sanctity of the firstborn.

Our discussion demonstrates that rabbinic ownership cannot always be reduced to a binary distinction between owner and non-owner. Liability, possession, economic benefit, security interests, and residual powers of seizure may be distributed among different parties.

We explore how the Roman dos aestimata makes that distinction much easier to articulate.

Bechorot 15: אַהֲנִי הֶיקֵּישָׁא וְאַהֲנִי קְרָא

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 15

To download, click/tap here: PDF

As we learned on yesterday’s daf according to the Mishna if an animal that was a ba’al mum – it had a permanent blemish that precluded it from being brought as a sacrifice – was consecrated by its owner and then was redeemed, it becomes an ordinary animal. This stands in contrast with an animal that was consecrated as a sacrifice and developed a mum – a permanent blemish – afterwards. In such a case, even though its condition does not allow it to be brought as a sacrifice and it must be redeemed, nevertheless it retains an element of holiness.

The baraita on our daf that makes this point concludes the discussion of each type of animal with a general principle. Regarding the animal that was a ba’al mum prior to being consecrated the baraita states:

The principle in this matter is: They are like non-sacred animals in all matters. They have only the mitzva of valuing them for redemption.

Regarding the animal that became a ba’al mum only after being consecrated as a sacrifice the baraita states:

The principle in the matter is that they are like consecrated animals in all matters. You have only the permission to eat them.

We explore how the mishna's distinction turns on which kind of sanctity the animal ever had. If a permanent blemish came before consecration, the animal could never go on the altar, so the consecration only attached to its monetary value (kedushat damim). When it is redeemed, that sanctity transfers fully to the redemption money, and the animal becomes ordinary ḥullin, liable to the firstborn obligation and the priestly gifts (zero'a, leḥayayim, keivah).

If the animal was consecrated while unblemished, the sanctity attached to its body (kedushat ha-guf). A later blemish and redemption let it be eaten, but they do not fully erase that bodily holiness. This is why pesulei ha-mukdashin remain forbidden to shear or work even after redemption. The animal is permitted but not fully profane, and the Torah's image for that in-between status is "as the gazelle and the hart." It is eaten the way game is eaten, not the way a flock animal is eaten.

Bechorot 14: הִקְדִּישׁ זָכָר לְדָמָיו — קָדוֹשׁ קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 14

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The second perek of Massekhet Bekhorot began on yesterday’s daf. With it the Gemara turns its attention to the laws of firstborn kosher animals that are ordinarily supposed to be brought as sacrifices in the Temple.

According to the Mishna on our daf if an animal that had a blemish that precluded it from being brought as a sacrifice was consecrated by its owner and then was redeemed, it becomes an ordinary animal. Examples of the practical effect of this include the obligation to set aside its firstborn as a bekhor and that when it is slaughtered, it is not considered kodashim ba-ḥutz – slaughtering a consecrated animal outside of the Temple courtyard.

We explore the mythical impetus behind rituals of the firstborn as well as Agnon’s Sippur Pashto as a modern day Midrash (and his influence on A.B Yehoshua).

Bechorot 13: אִם גּוּפוֹ קָנָה, מָמוֹנוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 13

To download, click/tap here: PDF

R. Oshaya said that a Jew acquires the property of a nonJew with the paying of the purchase price to the non-Jew. 

The transfer of the money effects this transaction. A Baraisa was brought which challenges this view. A Jew arranged to buy a collection of broken pieces of silver from a non-Jew. 

After paying for the box of silver, the Jew noticed that among the pieces were some items of idolatry in the box, and these items are clearly prohibited for the Jew to derive any benefit from them. 

The halacha in the Baraisa is that if the Jew had not paid the money, then even if he had pulled the silver into his possession he may still return it to the non-Jew. 

Taking possession without having paid does not constitute a legal transaction. If the Jew has paid for the silver, and then he took possession of the silver by pulling it into his property, the Jew had already acquired the silver. 

We explore the history of acquisitions between jews and nonJews in Talmud and the thorny issue of accusations by the regnant culture.

Bechorot 12: אֶלָּא זִיל בָּתַר אִימֵּיהּ — וְהַאי עֵגֶל הוּא

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 12

To download, click/tap here: PDF

One cannot use the following to redeem a firstborn donkey: a calf, a wild animal, a slaughtered animal - even a slaughtered sheep, a sick animal - terefah, a hybrid - even an offspring of a male goat and a female sheep, or a koy - an offspring of a deer and a goat. Rabbi Eliezer allows redemption with a hybrid, because both a goat and a sheep separately can be used.

Can we redeem a firstborn donkey with a live fetus found in a womb of a slaughtered sheep? Is it a live sheep, good for a redemption, or, since it does not require proper slaughter, it is considered as meat already slaughtered, not valid for redemption? Can one use a mutant - an animal that is like a different species? Is it close enough to hybrid, which is forbidden?

We explore animals and animality thanks to the work of Beth Berkowitz.

Bechorot 11: דְּמֵעִידָּנָא דְּאַפְרְשֵׁיהּ, בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּכֹהֵן קָאֵי

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 11

To download, click/tap here: PDF

We have learned that the Torah requires that a firstborn donkey be exchanged for a lamb that is given to the kohen (Shemot 13:13). According to the Mishna (daf 9a), if the lamb that was set aside to redeem the donkey were to die, it is permitted to benefit from the carcass.

The Gemara on our daf considers different possibilities regarding how to understand the case in the Mishna:

If it died in the possession of the kohen and the Mishna is teaching that he is permitted to benefit from the animal, this would appear to be obvious, since it is his own money.

If it means that it died in the possession of the owner and that the kohen is permitted to benefit from it, this too will appear obvious!

The Gemara concludes that we might have assumed that as long as the animal has not reached the kohen ‘s hands, the latter does not really possess it, so the Mishna teaches that from the time that the owner has set it aside, it is already considered to be in the possession of the kohen.

We explore the comparison between Halacha and Roman law as regards designation before delivery.

Bechorot 10: עֲרִיפָה בִּמְקוֹם פְּדִיָּיה עוֹמֶדֶת

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 10

To download, click/tap here: PDF

According to the Torah (Shemot 13:13), if the owner of a firstborn donkey does not wish to redeem it by exchanging it for a lamb, then the donkey must be decapitated.

Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in both parts of the baraita refers to a living animal, but the first part refers to monetary benefit, and the second part refers to the benefit derived from its body (its wool or its work). In both situations, Rabbi Shimon permits use of the firstborn prior to its decapitation and Rabbi Yehuda forbids deriving such benefit.

We discuss the mitzvah of decapitation and redemption.

Bechorot 9: מִין בְּמִינוֹ אֵינוֹ חוֹצֵץ

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 9

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf discusses the law requiring someone whose donkey gives birth to a firstborn male to redeem the newborn donkey by giving a lamb to a kohen (see Shemot 13:13).

According to the Mishna, if twin males were born, since one of them is certainly the firstborn, the owner must give a lamb to the kohen; if twins were born – one male and one female – the owner should set aside a lamb, but he may keep it for himself. The reason he can keep it is because his obligation to the kohen is simply financial, and whenever we are faced with a situation of financial doubt, the ruling is ha-motzi me-ḥaveiro alav ha-ra’ayah – the one who wants to claim that his fellow owes him money, must prove his case. Here, since the kohen cannot prove that the firstborn was male, even though he sets aside a lamb in case the firstborn was male, the owner is under no obligation to give that animal to the kohen.

We explore David Avon’s analysis of the definition of birth which has a wide range of ramifications in halakhah. How birth is defined is significant for the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal, the firstborn of a non-kosher animal, the human firstborn, the impurity of a woman after childbirth, circumcision, animals consecrated for the altar, corpse impurity, and more.

Anyone who tries to understand the definition of birth by examining each of these sugyot independently is likely to find himself thoroughly confused. At times the Gemara compares the various areas of law; at times it distinguishes between them; and at still other times it discusses the definition of birth required for one particular law without addressing the others at all.

Bechorot 8: אֲנַן חֲכִימִינַן מִינַּיְיהוּ

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 8

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our sugya describes an extended confrontation between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah and the “Elders of Athens” (Sabei de-Bei Atuna). The identity of these Elders of Athens is unclear, and scholars throughout the generations have already questioned whether they can be identified with the sages of Athens in Greece. In any event, what we have before us is a lengthy confrontation between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nations of the world, much of which is obscure and difficult to understand. Several later commentators attempted to interpret the story systematically and homiletically.

We explore the various scholarly views of this debate between chapel and the rose men of Athens.

Bechorot 7: הַדּוֹלְפָנִין פָּרִין וְרָבִין כִּבְנֵי אָדָם

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 7

To download, click/tap here: PDF

If a non-kosher fish swallowed a kosher fish, the kosher fish is still permitted to be eaten, and if a kosher fish swallowed a non-kosher fish, the non-kosher is prohibited to be eaten - provided that the fish inside was not spawned.

We continue our exploration of the firstborn with a n analysis of Exodus 13:11–16 which is much more than a law concerning firstborn animals and sons. From a historical-critical perspective, it is a particularly revealing example of the way the Torah takes an older cultic institution and reinterprets it through the memory of the Exodus. The final text fuses ritual law, historical narrative, family catechesis, and embodied memory. Precisely because these elements do not fit together perfectly, the passage also preserves traces of its compositional history.

Bechorot 6: שִׁמְעוֹן הָעַמְסוֹנִי הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ כׇּל ״אֵת״ וָ״אֵת״ שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 6

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our daf lists forbidden animals. When speaking of the et hagamal, the camel (Vayikra 11:4), Rabbi Shimon taught of the law that prohibits drinking milk from a non-kosher animal: the addition of the word et. Other believe that this is not a valid interpretation because they reject the notion that the word et can be used to teach Halacha. Et is not translatable to English; it is used in certain grammatical situations.

A baraita teaches that Shimon or Nechemia HaAmasoni learned the laws from every et that appeared in the Torah. Once he came to the passage HaShem Elokecha tira (Devarim 6:13), one should be in awe of G-d, he stopped his practice. He could not think of an appropriate thing to learn from the word et. His students asked what should be done with his earlier teachings, he said that they would not be rewarded for distancing themselves from his teachings.

Rabbi Akiva used the et to teach that Torah scholars themselves should be included in the list of those who are held in awe.

We explore the strongest original idea here “the hermeneutics of adjacency”: Rabbi Akiva does not place the talmid ḥakham on God's level; he locates the scholar in the grammatical space next to the divine name, making rabbinic authority simultaneously powerful and derivative.

Bechorot 5: פָּרָה שֶׁיָּלְדָה מִין חֲמוֹר

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 5

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The donkey was the only non-kosher animal which required redemption. Unlike the cow, sheep and goat, whose firstborns were given to a Priest who brought it as an offering to the Temple, a donkey obviously cannot be brought as an offering. Instead, it was traded in for a lamb or a kid, which was given to the Priest in its stead (as an ordinary gift, not to be brought as a sacrifice). See Exodus 13:11-13 and Numbers 18:15-18. As Exodus 13:13 continues, if the owner refuses to redeem his donkey, its neck is broken – as punishment to the owner for his failure to fulfill his obligation.

Why was the donkey different? The Talmud asks this question as well and explains that the donkey had a special role in the Exodus (which this mitzvah commemorates – since God spared the firstborn children and animals of the Jews at the Plague of the Firstborn). Every Jew who departed Egypt took many donkeys with him to carry all the booty the Egyptians gave him right before he left (Exodus 12:35-36; Bechoros 5b).