Julian Ungar-Sargon

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Daf Ditty

A wide-ranging commentary on the daily page of Talmud.

Bechorot 55: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲזַאי בְּחֶילְמָא, מִילְּתָא מְעַלְּיָא אָמֵינָא

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 13, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 55

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The final chapter of Tractate Bekhorot deals with the laws of animal tithing. Many laws are shared by the firstborn animal and the animal tithe, but there are also notable differences between them. One such difference appears in our sugya:

“If the verse does not apply to the firstborn, which is not subject to human designation, since it becomes sanctified upon emerging from the womb, apply it instead to the animal tithe.”

The Gemara emphasizes that the firstborn becomes holy automatically at the moment it emerges from its mother's womb. By contrast, animal tithing is something that involves human action. The owner passes the animals beneath the rod, and it is through this process that the tenth animal becomes consecrated.

Drawing upon Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, Prof Avidu Schvartz argues that the firstborn represents the sanctification of beginnings, while the animal tithe represents the sanctification of completion. This distinction raises a deeper question about the relationship between divine initiative, human action, and the experience of providence.

We explore this them in a more paradoxical approach whereby the deepest meaning of ma'aser behemah: the acknowledgment that the world becomes sacred not only when something is given to God, but when the human being discovers that even what is counted as one's own has never been entirely one's possession.

Comment

Jordan River near Banias

Bechorot 54: הַיַּרְדֵּן מַפְסִיק לְמַעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 11, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Brechorot 54

To download, click/tap here: PDF

We learned in the Mishnah (Bekhorot 54b):

Rabbi Meir says: The Jordan River constitutes a division with respect to the animal tithe (ma'aser behemah).

According to Rabbi Meir, a flock of sheep situated on the two banks of the Jordan River cannot be combined into a single unit for purposes of the animal tithe.

Rabbi Meir's statement leads the Gemara into a fascinating discussion concerning the Jordan River. Two central questions are addressed in this discussion.

First, what is the status of the Jordan River in relation to the Land of Israel? Is the river itself part of the Land, or is it legally regarded as territory outside the Land of Israel?

Second, where are the sources of the Jordan River? This question is significant for various halakhic matters mentioned in the Talmudic discussion. Over the generations, however, it also acquired far-reaching political and territorial importance. The struggle over control of the Jordan's headwaters arose repeatedly throughout history and as is well known, was among the contributing causes of the Six-Day War.

The discussion becomes considerably richer when placed alongside Rav Abraham Isaac Kook's theology of Eretz Yisrael.

We explore how, at the beginning of Orot, in the section devoted to the Land of Israel, Rav Kook insists that the land is not an external acquisition of the Jewish people, nor merely an instrument for political or spiritual consolidation.

Rather, the relationship between the people and the land is intrinsic. The land participates in the spiritual constitution of the nation.

Comment

Bechorot 53: דַּאֲפִילּוּ דּוּקִּין שֶׁבָּעַיִן נָמֵי פָּסְלִי

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 10, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 53

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The Mishnah states that the Mitzvah of Ma'aser Behemah applies both when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing and when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara asks that if the Mitzvah applies when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash, then why does it not apply nowadays?

The Gemara explains that the Mitzvah of Ma'aser Behemah does not apply today because, as Rav Huna says, the Rabanan enacted a decree that Ma'aser Behemah not be given because of the concern that one of the animals might be a "Yasom," an orphaned animal that was born after the death of its mother, which is not subject to the obligation of Ma'aser Behemah, as the Gemara later (57a) derives from the verse, "Tachas Imo" -- "with its mother" (Vayikra 22:27).

The institution of ma‘aser behemah occupies an unusual place within the sacrificial system. Whereas most offerings involve some degree of human selection, assessment, or intention, the animal tithe is consecrated through a ritual that deliberately restricts the owner's freedom to choose. The animal that emerges tenth becomes holy not because it is especially valuable, beautiful, healthy, or desirable, but simply because it occupies the tenth position in the sequence.

Comment

Bechorot 52: וְקוֹבְרִים אוֹתוֹ בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ, מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 9, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 52

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The remarkable passage concluding the fifth chapter of tractate Bekhorot raises a question that reaches far beyond the technical laws of inheritance: Does a person truly own his grave, or is a family burial place an inheritance held in trust for generations, including those not yet born?

The Talmud's answer is striking. A man may sell his burial plot, its approach, and even the places designated for mourning and eulogy, yet his family retains the power to reclaim the burial arrangements against the purchaser's wishes. The transaction, though apparently legitimate under ordinary property law, is overridden by a different principle: pegam mishpachah, injury to the standing and integrity of the family.

We explore the history of family burial grounds offers an unusually rich perspective on this rabbinic understanding. From biblical patriarchal tombs, through the burial caves of ancient Judah, to Roman funerary law, medieval Jewish cemeteries, and modern burial rights…

Comment

Bechorot 51: רִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט וְרִיבָּה, רִיבָּה הַכֹּל

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 8, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 51

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To redeem a firstborn one can give to a Kohen either five shekel coins or goods worth that amount. However, lands, slaves, and loan documents cannot be used for redemption. Why not? When the Torah said, "A firstborn is redeemed from one month old", it included all means of payment.

When it continued, "According to the valuation of five shekels of silver", it limited the available means somewhat, and when it again generalized, "You shall redeem", we interpret it to mean that only payments similar to the specified ones are included. Just as coins are movable and have intrinsic value, so too all similar items are included.

What's excluded? Lands, because they are not movable. Slaves, because they have the laws of the land. Loan documents, because they are pieces of paper not worth anything by themselves, but only because of the obligation recorded in them.

We explore how The Mishnah on our daf says that redemption cannot be made with land, Canaanite slaves, debt documents, or consecrated property. That list is not random. Each exclusion exposes a different boundary of the biblical expression “five shekels of silver.” Land may be valuable but cannot be picked up and handed over. A debt document can be carried, yet its financial importance lies in the obligation that it records. Consecrated property raises a separate issue of ownership and sanctity. The older status category of slaves follows special property classifications in rabbinic law; describing those classifications does not endorse human ownership.

The Gemara then presents an alternative: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is prepared to permit virtually any valuable property except debt documents. Two interpreters, reading the same biblical words, generate different answers. To understand why, we need to learn the grammar klal prat uklal.

Comment

Bechorot 50: וִירוּשָׁלַיִם הָוְיָא רוּבָּא דְּעָלְמָא

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 7, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 50

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Our daf opens with money, not with mourning. Bekhorot 50a is fixing the value of the five sela'im paid to redeem a firstborn son, and Rabbi Yohanan proposes a practical measure: the worn gold dinars of Hadrian and Trajan. The coins of the emperors who suppressed the Diaspora revolt and the Bar Kokhba rebellion become the standard by which a Jewish father redeems his child. Into this setting the Gemara inserts Rabbi Oshaya's report:

They sought to withdraw from use all the silver and gold in the world because of the silver and gold of Jerusalem, until they found a verse: "And lawless men shall enter it and profane it" (Ezek 7:22).

We explore the scale of the anxiety. The concern is not limited to Jerusalem or to Judaea. Rabbi Oshaya speaks of "all the silver and gold in the world." The plundered Temple has become, in imagination, a contaminant distributed through the whole Roman economy. The holy did not vanish when the building burned. It travelled, and it travelled as money.

Comment

Bechorot 49: וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד — אֵין מְלַמְּדִין

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 6, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 49

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When a particular law is stated in the Torah several times, it is not necessarily possible to derive that law from those passages and apply it to other cases through the recognized hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted.

The Torah has thereby indicated that the law should not be extended to other situations. Were such an extension permissible, the Torah could have stated the law in only one passage, and the second case could have been derived from the first. Since both passages were explicitly written, it follows that the second could not have been derived from the first.

The Tannaim disagree concerning this principle.

The question is not merely whether the Torah repeats itself. It is whether that repetition limits the transfer of law between distinct categories or also prevents the extension of law within a single halakhic institution.

That distinction is particularly relevant to the dispute surrounding the status of the thirtieth day in pidyon ha-ben so we explore the larger halakhic space.

Comment

Bechorot 48: דְּאָזֵיל לְגַבֵּי הַאי וּמְדַחֵי לֵיהּ

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 5, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 48

To download, click/tap here: PDF

According to this Mishna it appears that in cases where it is not clear whether or not there is an obligation to pay the five sela redemption fee to the kohen, there is no obligation to pay.

Thus, a father whose wife gives birth to twin boys knows that he must pay the kohen, even if they are unsure which child was born first. If one of the twins dies or if the twins were a boy and a girl, then it is not clear that the living boy was the firstborn, and no redemption must be paid.

We explore whether the law adjudicate monetary rights according to the actual configuration of ownership, or must it also recognize alternative legal arrangements that a litigant has the power to bring about?

Comment

Bechorot 47: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 4, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 47

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Our discussion is presented regarding a kohen who died and left behind a son who was born as a disqualified kohen, the son of a woman who was not eligible to marry a kohen.

R’ Chisda says that the son must redeem his own self. Rabba b. R’ Huna holds that this son does not have to redeem himself. The Gemara clarifies that if the father died after thirty days from the birth of the son all agree that the son would not have to redeem himself.

In classical circumstances, the woman who provided the reproductive material, carried the pregnancy, and gave birth was ordinarily one and the same. The principle of peter rechem, opening the womb, therefore operated within an apparently unified understanding of maternity.

Assisted reproduction complicates this unity. A woman may give birth to a child created from another woman's oocyte. The child has one genetic mother and a different gestational mother, raising the question of whether the legal category of firstborn depends exclusively upon the history of the woman who gave birth or whether genetic maternity bears upon the child's status.

Comment

Bechorot 46: מַאי ״רֹאשׁוֹ?״ רוּבּוֹ

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 3, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 46

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After discussing the laws of firstborn animals, Massekhet Bekhorot turns its attention to firstborn children in the eighth perek, which begins on our daf.

The Torah discusses the laws of firstborn children with regard to two different areas of halakha: redeeming a firstborn male child (see Shemot 13:2 and Bamidbar 18:15-16) and inheritance laws, where the Torah grants a double portion to the firstborn male child (see Devarim 21:15-17). Although it is possible – and even likely – that the same child will both have to be redeemed and will receive a double portion, these two situations have very different rules determining who fits into the category of “firstborn.”

The Mishnah in our sugya establishes that the child of a non-Jewish woman who conceived through her non-Jewish husband and subsequently converted to Judaism before giving birth is not genealogically affiliated with his father.

We explore notion of Paternity, Conversion, and the Creation of Halakhic Identity.

Comment

Bechorot 45: שֶׁשָּׁלְקוּ זוֹנָה אַחַת שֶׁנִּתְחַיְּיבָה שְׂרֵיפָה לַמֶּלֶךְ

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 3, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 45

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In the ancient world autopsies were not ordinarily practiced, with the exception of the medical center in Alexandria, Egypt during the period of the Second Temple. The Gemara on our daf relates a story in which students of Rabbi Yishmael perform an autopsy – perhaps in Alexandria – in order to determine the number of eivarim (limbs) in a human body.

According to the Gemara, these students obtained the body of a prostitute who had been condemned to have her body burned. They boiled the body and dissected it, finding 252 eivarim. The Gemara discusses how to reconcile this with the traditional Rabbinic teaching that there are 248 eivarim, concluding that there are differences between the physiology of men and women.

The legacy of surgery in ancient Jews included those who cared for the wounds and injuries. In light of this they were awarded the title of experts, ummanim.

We explore both the right to heal given by the torah according to Rav Kook as well as the history of the craft of surgery from biblical times throughout the talmudic period focusing on historical and medical perspectives.

Comment

Bechorot 44: שְׁמוּאֵל אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ בְּשַׁבְּתָא דְרִגְלָא

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 1, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 44

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With regard to the disqualification of priests (kohanim) who have physical blemishes, one can investigate whether the disqualification is:

(a) a technical disqualification, arising from some degree of impairment in the functioning of the blemished priest. In this context, “impaired functioning” could also include an appearance that does not appropriately dignify the Temple service, or conduct that demeans the status of the priesthood in the eyes of the people;

or

(b) a substantive disqualification, reflecting a deficiency that the Torah perceives in the blemished person himself.

Echoes of this conceptual question can be found in the different emphases woven into the words of the author of Sefer HaChinuch in his explanation of the underlying rationale for the commandments concerning the disqualification of priests with physical blemishes.

We explore the peripatetic nature of these blemishes in our 3 mishnayot.

Comment

Bechorot 43: בְּהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא, שֶׁכֵּן נִתְרַבָּה בְּמִצְוֹת

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon November 1, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 43

To download, click/tap here: PDF

We begin Perek VII with descriptions of blemishes that will prohibit kohanim from sacrificing in the Temple. Our first Mischa notes the following permanent or temporary blemishes:

· one whose head is pointed (narrow above and wide below)

· one whose head is like a hammer with a protruding forehead

· one whose head has an indentation

· one whose head protrudes at the back

Those with humped back are considered fit by Rabbi Yehuda and disqualified by the rabbis. The kere'ach, one without a row of hair encircling his head from ear, is fit for service.

The Gemara brings in other potential blemishes - warts, cataracts, scabs, those with scurvy regarding the qualification of both animals to be sacrificed and priests to perform the act of sacrifice (Leviticus 21:20; 22:22). As well, they note that one with a gibben, blemished eyebrows, or a charum, a sunken nose, might or might not disqualify a priest from service. The rabbis are concerned with what might be perceived as repulsive.

We explore the disqualifications for kehunah as well as for birkas kohanim.

Comment

Bechorot 42: מֵטִיל מַיִם בִּמְקוֹם זַכְרוּת — דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּזָכָר הוּא

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 30, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 42

To download, click/tap here: PDF

While discussing the implications of finding that a firstborn animal is a tumtum or an anderoginos, the Gemara brings support from the way these conditions are viewed by Jewish law in the context of marriage and divorce. For example, a baraita teaches that if a tumtum – who does not appear to have any external sexual organs that would identify it as either male or female – were to betroth a woman, his betrothal is valid, i.e. he must give her a divorce, since the tumtum might be male and a full marriage took place.

The importance of this sugya extends well beyond the laws of firstborn animals. It raises a fundamental question about the nature of halakhic knowledge: when the law confronts an ambiguous object, is the ambiguity merely a deficiency in our understanding, or can ambiguity belong to the very nature of the object being judged?

Ordinarily, a safek is an epistemological condition. The object itself possesses a definite status, but we do not know what that status is.

We explore how the conceptual methods of the Brisker school and particularly through an interpretation attributed to Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik by Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, reaches beyond the laws of firstborn animals.

It touches upon the character of halakhic knowledge itself, the philosophical status of categories, the relationship between language and reality.

Comment

Bechorot 41: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: אֵין לְךָ מוּם גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 29, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 41

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Continuing the discussion of what conditions establish an animal as a ba’al mum – an animal with a blemish that cannot be sacrificed – the Mishna on today’s daf teaches that there are some firstborn animals that will not be brought as sacrifices, but cannot be slaughtered as ordinary blemished animals, either. These animals have blemishes, but they are not sufficient to free them entirely of the sanctity of being firstborn animals. Included in the Mishna’s list are animals found to be either a tumtum or an anderoginos. Each of these conditions refers to a situation where the animal’s sexual identification is questionable. An anderoginos appears to have both male and female sexual organs, while a tumtum does not appear to have any external sexual organs that would identify it as either male or female.

We explore how Jewish law assumes of gender duality, and fundamental mishnaic texts indicate that this halakhic duality is not conceived symmetrically (as seen through the gendered exemptions of some commandments).

Rabbinic halakhic discourse institutes a functional gender duality, anchored in the need of reproduction of the Jewish collective body. As such, it aims to enforce and normalize a congruence between sexed bodies and gendered identities.

Furthermore, the semiotics of body surfaces produces other different and seemingly more ambiguous gender possibilities, and rabbinic discourse has widely discussed the halakhic implications of these ambiguities.

Comment

Bechorot 40: עַד מָתַי אַתָּה מְכַלֶּה מָמוֹנָן שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 28, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 40

To download, click/tap here: PDF

There are seven Mishnayot on our daf. They question whether different conditions on firstborn animals are blemishes and whether they disqualify the priests from sacrificing or consuming those animals.

In our sugya, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri disagree concerning the permissibility of eating the meat of a firstborn animal in a particular circumstance. Rabbi Akiva confronts Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, accusing him of causing financial loss to the public by prohibiting the meat from being eaten:

“How long will you continue to destroy the property of Israel?”

What was Rabbi Akiva attempting to teach? Is financial loss truly a halakhic consideration, or is this merely a rhetorical argument, while Rabbi Akiva could have maintained his halakhic position even without invoking it?

We explore how Rabbi Ben-Zvi's essay, raises a question whether the halakhic decision-maker bears responsibility not only for violations that occur because he permits too much, but also for injuries inflicted because he prohibits too much.

We explore the nature and theory behind one of the most exciting possum of our era.

Comment

Bechorot 39: כָּאן — כְּשֶׁנִּבְרְאָה בְּאַחַת מֵעִיקָּרָא

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 27, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 39

To download, click/tap here: PDF

When it states with regard to the burning of the sacrificial portions of a peace offering:

“And the two kidneys” (Leviticus 3:4), this teaches that one sacrifices only an animal that has two kidneys, but not an animal that has one kidney, nor one that has three kidneys. And it is taught in another baraita that when that verse states: “And the two kidneys…he shall take it away,” the singular form serves to include an animal that has one kidney,which may be sacrificed. Evidently, these tanna’im disagree as to whether an animal lacking a kidney is fit to be sacrificed.

We explore at what point does the sacrificial animal cease to be an animal whose anatomical perfection matters and become instead the material of a ritual process whose validity depends upon the prescribed sequence of actions?

The difficulty arises because shechitah is simultaneously an ending and a beginning.

Comment

Bechorot 38: אֵין אָדָם רוֹאֶה מוּמִין לְעַצְמוֹ

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 26, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 38

To download, click/tap here: PDF

When the Torah discusses those mumim – blemishes – that will disqualify an animal from being brought as a sacrifice (Vayikra 22:21-24), among those blemishes are problems with the eye. When talking about blemishes that will preclude a kohen from performing the Temple service (Vayikra 21:18-21) the Torah specifies several eye conditions, like someone who is tevallul be-eino.

The Mishna on our daf applies these to the case of a firstborn, teaching that “One whose eyelid is pierced, damaged, or slit, or if it has a cataract or a tevallul, ḥilazon (snail-shaped growth), naḥash (snake-shaped growth) or a berry that covers the eye, is disqualified.”

The extraordinary feature of the discussion in our daf is not simply that the rabbis recognized a remarkably varied collection of ocular abnormalities. It is that they attempted to construct a system of diagnostic judgment in which visible pathology, anatomical location, duration, prognosis, therapeutic responsiveness, and the reliability of the examiner all become relevant to a halakhic determination.

Read against the history of ophthalmology in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome, which we explore, the sugya emerges as an important witness to the development of clinical reasoning in late antiquity.

Comment

Bechorot 37: כְּגוֹן דְּזַבֵּין לֵיהּ מִמְּקוֹם מוּמָא

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 25, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 37

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishnah (37a) discusses a case in which a person sold meat under the presumption that it was permitted for consumption, but it subsequently became clear that it was prohibited:

"One who slaughters a firstborn animal, and it subsequently becomes known that he had not presented it for examination: What they have eaten, they have eaten, and he must return their money to them. As for what they have not eaten, the meat must be buried, and he must return their money.

Similarly, one who slaughters a cow and sells it, and it subsequently becomes known that it was a tereifah: What they have eaten, they have eaten; and what they have not eaten, they must return the meat to him, and he must return their money."

The Mishnah introduces a novel principle: even though the purchasers consumed the meat, they are not required to pay for it, and the seller must refund their money in full.

We explore the tension between economic benefit and religiously defined harm. The purchaser has received calories, nourishment, and perhaps considerable gastronomic pleasure. Yet the law may nevertheless treat the transaction as though no compensable benefit had been received.

This position invites us to distinguish pleasure from welfare, and welfare from holiness.

Comment

Bechorot 36: הֲרֵי זֶה יִשָּׁחֵט עַל פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי הַכְּנֶסֶת

Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon October 24, 2026

For the source text click/tap here: Bechorot 36

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our Mishnah states: With regard to a firstborn animal whose eye was blinded or whose foreleg was severed or whose hind leg was broken, all of which obviously render the animal permanently blemished, that animal may be slaughtered on the basis of the ruling of threeregular Jews who attend the synagogue, and it does not require a ruling by one of the Sages. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: Even if there is a court of twenty-three Sages there, it may be slaughtered only based on the ruling of an expert in judging blemishes.

Among the most striking features of the Mishnah in our daf is its unexpected assignment of halakhic authority to three ordinary members of the congregation. The text does not initially demand three judges, three ordained scholars, or even three individuals demonstrably proficient in the laws of firstborn animals. Instead, it employs the distinctive expression sheloshah bnei ha-knesset—three members of the assembly or synagogue.

We explore the notion of Lay Authority, Communal Trust, and the Democratization of Halakhic Judgment.

Comment
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Julian Ungar-Sargon

This is Julian Ungar-Sargon's personal website. It contains poems, essays, and podcasts for the spiritual seeker and interdisciplinary aficionado.​