Chullin 115: לֹא אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה ״שַׁלַּח״ לְתַקָּלָה

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 115

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Aside from the prohibition against cooking meat and milk together, there is also a prohibition against eating them once they were cooked or deriving any benefit from the mixture whatsoever. 

An approach is offered by Rav Ashi, who says that we learn that it is forbidden to eat meat cooked with milk from the passage in Sefer Devarim (14:3) that prohibits eating “any abominable thing.” Rav Ashi interprets that to mean that anything considered “abominable” by the Torah – i.e. anything produced from an activity that the Torah prohibits – may not be eaten.

Based on this logic the Gemara wonders why other prohibited activities do not forbid what they produce. The Gemara even offers a mnemonic list of such actions including:

‘Sending the mother bird away from the nest’ refers to the law forbidding someone from taking the eggs or hatchlings from a nest without first chasing away the mother bird (see Deut 22:6-7).

We explore this paradoxical commandment including Rabbi Forman’s dazzling interpretation as “Parent Trap.”

Chullin 114: כֹּל שֶׁתִּעַבְתִּי לָךְ הֲרֵי הוּא בְּבַל תֹּאכַל

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 114

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In reference to neveilah, the Torah (Devarim 14:21) says that it may not be eaten, but, instead, it should be “given to an alien resident or sold to a stranger.”

The alien resident in the verse is a person who is not fully Jewish, so he is not observant of the entire Torah, but he has accepted upon himself to fulfill the seven Noachide laws.

There is a disagreement regarding how to understand the Torah’s directives regarding the meat of a neveilah. R’ Meir holds that the meat may be either given as a gift or sold to either an alien resident or to a stranger. R’ Yehuda says that the verse is specific in its categorization.

The mitzvah is that if it is provided for the alien resident, it must be given as a gift, for free. If the meat is furnished to the stranger, it should be sold to him.

We explore Deut 14:3 and the definition of “toevah” abomination.

Chullin 113: בְּעָלְמָא אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר

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Shmuel explains that the repetition of the word "Gedi" in the verses of the prohibition against cooking meat with milk teaches that the Isur applies also to cooking Chelev with milk, and to cooking Neveilah with milk. The principle of "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur" does not apply, because Shmuel does not agree with that principle; he maintains that "Isur Chal Al Isur" (according to the Gemara's first version).

However, even according to the opinion that maintains "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur," it should be prohibited to cook Neveilah with milk. The Isur of meat and milk includes an Isur Hana'ah; it is prohibited to benefit from a mixture of meat and milk. Accordingly, the Isur of Basar b'Chalav is an "Isur Mosif" which adds an element of Isur to the existing Isur of Neveilah, because the Isur of Neveilah only prohibits the meat to be eaten, while the Isur of meat with milk prohibits deriving benefit from it.

We explore the galactic ramifications of this principle.

Chullin 112: עַד שֶׁיִּכְלֶה כׇּל מַרְאֵה אַדְמוּמִית שֶׁבּוֹ

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 112

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The Mishnah explicitly indicates that the prohibition of blood divides into two categories: organ blood (dam eivarim), for which one violates a negative commandment, and lifeblood (dam ha-nefesh), for which one incurs karet.

At first glance, one might understand these as two separate prohibitions: the prohibition of organ blood, punishable by lashes, and the prohibition of lifeblood, punishable by karet. Yet all the enumerators of the commandments count the prohibition of organ blood and that of lifeblood as a single prohibition. We must therefore investigate the relationship between organ blood and lifeblood.

Chullin 111: וְלִיטְעֲמֵיהּ קַפִּילָא אֲרַמָּאָה

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 111

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After discussion about the matter the Gemara cites Chizkiyah in the name of Abaye who rules that one may eat fish with dairy even after the fish had been placed on a meat plate while yet hot.

This is called “nosen ta’am bar nosen ta’am” or “nat bar nat” and refers to a circumstance in which a taste has been transferred twice. In the Gemara’s case it refers to the meat taste that was transferred to the plate and then from the plate to the fish.

Tosafos (1) relates that Rivan explained in the name of Rashi that if the fish was cooked in a pot that had been used for meat one may not eat the fish with dairy.

The reason to distinguish between fish placed hot on a meat plate and fish cooked in a meat pot assumes that cooking transfers more taste than contact between a hot food and a cold pot.

Chullin 110: אַיְיתוֹ לֵיהּ כַּבְדָּא שְׁלִיקָא

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The Liver as a Special Halakhic Category

The laws of liver are unusually revealing because they demonstrate that halakhah does not simply attach a prohibition to a chemically identifiable substance called “blood.” Rather, it distinguishes between blood according to its location, state, movement, and halakhic history. The same material may be permitted while incorporated within one structure and prohibited after it emerges from that structure.

“It is all blood, yet the Torah permitted it”

That is quite different from ordinary meat. With ordinary meat we tend to say that blood contained in the tissue has not yet acquired the operative status of prohibited dam; once it separates—* פירש*—the prohibition takes effect. Liver presents almost the reverse phenomenon: according to Rabbeinu Tam and the authorities following his conceptual direction, what is inside the liver was already identifiable as blood, yet the Torah specifically permitted it. Consequently, its subsequent emergence creates the difficult question: how can something that was permitted as blood suddenly become forbidden simply because it moved?

Chullin 109: אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ יַלְתָּא לְרַב נַחְמָן

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 109

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The Mishna teaches that to prepare udder for eating; it must be opened so that the milk can be removed. In the Gemara Rav Yehuda teaches that the requirement is for the udder to be cut crosswise and pressed against the wall.

The Gemara follows this by relating a story about Yalta, Rav Naḥman’s wife:

Yalta once said to Rav Naḥman: ‘Observe, for everything that the Divine Law has forbidden us it has permitted us an equivalent:

it has forbidden us blood but it has permitted us liver;

it has forbidden us intercourse during menstruation but it has permitted us the blood of purification;

it has forbidden us the fat of cattle but it has permitted us the fat of wild beasts;

it has forbidden us swine’s flesh but it has permitted us the brain of the shibuta fish;

it has forbidden us the married woman but it has permitted us the divorcee during the lifetime of her former husband;- it has forbidden us the brother’s wife but it has permitted us the levirate marriage;

it has forbidden us the non-Jewess but it has permitted us the beautiful woman taken in war.

I wish to eat flesh in milk, where is its equivalent?’

To satisfy her request, Rav Naḥman asked the butchers to prepare roasted udders for her. The Gemara asks how he could do so, given the requirement to cut it crosswise and press it against the wall and explains that that requirement is limited to situations where the udder was to be cooked, but that it does not apply when the udder was roasted.

Rav Naḥman’s wife, Yalta, was a member of the family of the Exilarch. From the stories related in the Gemara about her, she was a strong-willed woman, who expected to be treated with respect by her husband and by the other Sages. Furthermore, the stories show that she was learned in her own right and that she participated in the discussions that Rav Naḥman had with his contemporaries and peers.

Chullin 108: גְּדִי אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה וְלֹא חָלָב

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As we have learned (daf 97), if a small amount of non-kosher food fell into a large amount of kosher food, the mixture will remain kosher if the ratio is 60:1 such that the taste of the non-kosher food is nullified. This same rule applies to meat and milk. Thus, if a small amount of milk falls into a large amount of meat, if the ratio of meat to milk is at least 60:1 the milk is considered nullified and the mixture is kosher.

The Mishna on our daf distinguishes between two different cases where a small amount of milk becomes mixed into a pot of meat. According to the Mishna, if the milk fell on a single piece of meat, we gauge the possibility of nullification solely on the relationship between the milk and that piece of meat. If, however, the milk fell into the pot and then the pot was mixed up, the question will be whether the entire mixture has a 60:1 ratio of meat to milk.

We explore the role of milk in antiquity with specific reference to Galenic medicine, known the Rabbis.

Chullin 107: כׇּל הַסְּרִיקִין אֲסוּרִין

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There is a moment near the bottom of our daf (Ḥullin 107b) where the Talmud produces, almost casually, one of the most disquieting inversions in the entire halakhic corpus [1]. Two brothers wish to eat at one table. One has meat before him, the other cheese. The question is whether the rabbinic decree against a shared table applies to them. And the answer turns — or seems about to turn — on whether they love one another.

If they are estranged, if each guards his portion and would not tolerate the other's hand reaching across, the concern that animates the decree evaporates. Nothing will pass between them. The decree exists to prevent transfer, and where there is no affection there is no transfer. The law should therefore be lenient with the brothers who hate each other.

However the halakhah appears to reward estrangement and penalize intimacy.

It appears to say: your generosity toward your brother is a legal liability; your coldness is a legal asset. Which we will explore.

Chullin 106: וְכׇל דָּבָר שֶׁחוֹצֵץ בִּטְבִילָה בַּגּוּף – חוֹצֵץ בִּנְטִילַת יָדַיִם לְחוּלִּין

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 106

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While the Gemara on yesterday’s daf discusses ritual hand washing during and after the meal, on today’s daf the Gemara turns to the question of ritual hand washing that must be done before the meal begins.

In the Gemara, Ḥizkiyya is quoted as prohibiting the use of hot water for ritual hand washing before meals, as well as the use of water from the hot springs in Tiberias – although he can dip them in the water as in a mikveh.

Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with both of these statements.

With regard to hot water, Rabbi Yoḥanan testifies that he asked Rabbi’s son, Rabban Gamliel, who said that all of the Sages of the Galilee use it for ritual hand washing. Regarding the hot springs of Tiberias, Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that it can be used as a mikveh for the entire body, but not to wash one’s face, hands and feet.

According to Torah law, ritual impurity cannot take effect upon only one of a person’s limbs. Nevertheless, the Sages determined that there are circumstances in which a person’s hands become impure, and that, in order to touch sacred food or terumah, one must purify them through washing or immersion.

Because it is possible, by rabbinic law, for the hands alone to become impure, the Sages established that hands are always to be regarded as impure.

Chullin 105: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ מַיִם אַחֲרוֹנִים חוֹבָה

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 105

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Our Daf turns its attention to the need to wash hands both during the meal, for reasons of kashrut, and after the meal, for reasons of safety.

1. Mayyim emtza’iyim – washing during the meal

Rav Naḥman explains that one is not obligated to wash between different dishes in the course of the meal, unless both a cooked (meat) dish and cheese are both being served, in which case washing would be necessary.

2. Mayyim aḥaronim – washing after the meal

Rav Yehuda the son of Rabbi Ḥiyya explains that it is essential to wash hands after the meal, as the salt – Melaḥ Sodomit – could blind you if there is any left on your fingers. Abaye adds that even if a small amount of this type of salt would become mixed with ordinary salt it would pose a serious danger.

We explore hand washing in late antique period.

Chullin 104: שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 104

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The Torah said, "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk." Since it repeated this again and again, then only only cooking, but eating such mixture or selling it is also prohibited. At this the Torah prohibition stops. For example, eating cold meat with cold milk would be allowed. However, the Sages extended the prohibition with safeguards.

Thus, the rule: all kinds of meat should not be cooked with milk, except for the meat of fish and locusts. It is also forbidden to serve meat and milk or cheese on the table together.

Beit Shammai allows to place chicken and cheese on the same table, provided that they are not eaten together. Rabbi Yose says that this is one of the unusual leniences of Beit Shammai over Beit Hillel. In truth, Rabbi Yose is the author of this complete ruling, but initially it was taught anonymously.

When the teacher learned who was its author, he added Rabbi Yose's name, because one who transmits a teaching in the name of the one who said it saves the world - just as Esther did when she told the king about a plot against him in the name of Mordechai.

We explore recent scholarship on the historical schools.

Chullin 103: כׇּל הַבָּשָׂר אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 103

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Three times in the Torah we find the prohibition repeated “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk” (see Shemot 23:19, 34:26 and Devarim 14:21).

Although it appears that the Torah limits this prohibition to a specific case – a kid in its mother’s milk – nevertheless the Sages had a long-standing tradition that these passages refer to a general prohibition against cooking milk and meat together. The fact that this prohibition is repeated three times is understood as forbidding not only cooking milk and meat together but also eating them cooked together and deriving any benefit from such a mixture.

The eighth perek of Massekhet Ḥullin begins on our daf and its focus is on these laws. Given the enigmatic presentation of the prohibition of cooking meat and milk together, there are many issues that need to be clarified by the Sages, the most basic of which is how we define the terms “milk” and “meat.” Is all meat included? Is there a difference between meat from domesticated animals (behemot) and wild animals (ḥayyot)? What is the status of the meat of kosher birds, fish or insects? Similarly, is the prohibition limited to actual milk, or are other milk products forbidden, as well?

Chullin 102: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲבָל בְּבֶן נֹחַ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּזְהָר עַל הַטְּמֵאִין כַּטְּהוֹרִין

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 102

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Reb Yochanan learns that the verse (Devarim 12:23) which states “do not eat the soul (הנפש) with the flesh,” teaches us the prohibition not to eat eiver min hachai— not to eat from a limb of an animal while the animal is still alive.

The verse from Shemos (22:30) which states, “And flesh, in the field, which is torn you shall not eat,” teaches the halacha not to eat tereifah. This includes eating from an animal that had a physical defect, or from a limb of an animal after it has died, but where it did not die due to shechita.

Rashi explains that “eiver min hachai” is referred to as “the soul” because after a limb is cut from its source it will not grow back, just as when life is taken it will not be regenerate. The lesson is that the limb should not be eaten while the animal’s life is still intact.

We explore ever min vs Bassar min…and the case of foie gras.

Chullin 101: וּשְׁנֵיהֶן מִקְרָא אֶחָד דָּרְשׁוּ

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Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and says that the sciatic sinew of a non-kosher animal is also forbidden - because it was prohibited since the time of Jacob, when non-kosher animals were still permitted.

The Sages replied to Rabbi Yehudah, "The sciatic sinew prohibition was first given to Moses on Sinai, and it did not apply before then. However, when Moses recorded and arranged the Torah, he recorded this prohibition in the context of Jacob's encounter with the angel, to teach that this incident was the reason for the prohibition.”

Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Elazar rule that the prohibition applies to domesticated animal, wild animal, and bird, to non-kosher and kosher species without distinction.

The Sages restrict it to kosher species alone. Then Rabbi Yoḥanan, the Tiberian master whose academy shaped the Palestinian amoraic tradition, interposes a single observation: u-shneihen mikra eḥad darshu

— both of them expounded one and the same verse.

We explore how, without embarrassment, a single scriptural clause has generated two mutually exclusive legal universes:

for Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Elazar, the prohibition of ever min ha-ḥai extends to every species, kosher and non-kosher alike;

for the Sages, it applies only to those species whose flesh shecḥitah can render permissible.

Chullin 100: שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּרוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּבְנֵי נֹחַ

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 100

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As we have learned (see above, daf 90), the gid ha-nasheh – an animal’s sciatic nerve – is prohibited based on the passage in Sefer Bereishit (32:33). Following his wrestling with an angel, Ya’akov limps back towards his camp and the Torah concludes “Therefore the children of Israel eat not the sinew of the thigh-vein, which is upon the spoon of the thigh, unto this day; because he touched the spoon of Jacob’s thigh, even in the sinew of the thigh-vein.”

The Mishna on our daf limits the prohibition to kosher animals; Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, arguing that before the Torah was given – when Ya’akov’s children were still allowed to eat unclean animals – they refrained from eating the gid ha-nasheh. The response quoted in the Mishna is that the commandment prohibiting the gid ha-nasheh was given at Mount Sinai, where it was then placed in context in Sefer Bereishit. It does not indicate, however, that Ya’akov’s children kept this tradition prior to receiving the Torah.

In the Mishnah, Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim disagree about whether the Isur of Gid ha'Nasheh was given to Bnei Noach at the time of Yakov Avinu, or whether it was given only at the time the Torah was given at Sinai.

Chullin 99: וְהִלְכְתָא: אֵין בְּגִידִין בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 99

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The Mishna (96b) teaches that if the gid ha-nasheh had not been removed, and an animal’s thigh was cooked together with the sciatic nerve such that there was so much of the nerve as to impart a flavor to the meat of the thigh, it is forbidden. The Mishna continues by asking “How does one measure this?” and explains that we view it as though the meat had been cooked with turnips.

On our daf, Rav Huna explains the meaning of the Mishna. If, when meat and turnips are cooked together in the same proportions as is found in the sciatic nerve and the thigh respectively, the meat imparts its flavor to the turnips, then the thigh would be forbidden on account of the taste of the forbidden nerve. As we have learned (above, daf 97), the Sages estimate that meat cannot impart its taste to any substance that is cooked with it if the latter is sixty times as large in bulk as the meat.

Chullin 98: לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 98

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We learned on yesterday’s daf that when something non-kosher falls into a pot with kosher food, the mixture will be permitted if the kosher food is at least 60 times the volume of the non-kosher food.

However, if the prohibited food is the type whose taste prevails even when outnumbered by sixty times its amount, the prohibited food remains prohibited, no matter what the proportions may be.

The Gemara on our daf tells stories that appear to raise doubts about that ruling.

In several places in the Torah, the Gemara discusses whether only the physical prohibited substance is forbidden, or whether its taste is likewise prohibited. This principle is known as ta'am ke-ikkar ("taste is like the substance"), meaning that the flavor of a prohibited food has the same legal status as the prohibited food itself.

We explore this doctrine through the Talmudic discussions and the interpretations of the medieval commentators (the Rishonim), focusing on five biblical contexts in which it appears.

Chullin 97: סָמְכִינַן אַקַּפִּילָא אֲרַמָּאָה

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 97

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According to Jewish law, if the amount of kosher food is so overwhelming that the non-kosher food does not affect its taste, we apply the concept of bittul – nullification – and the food is deemed kosher.

The Gemara on today’s daf suggests two methods that will allow us to determine whether the non-kosher food has become nullified –

• kefeila – by having an expert, non-Jewish cook tastes the food

• shishim – by measuring the mixture and ascertaining that there is 60 times more kosher food than non-kosher food.

Different suggestions are offered to explain why we rely on a non-Jewish expert cook in this case, while we ordinarily only trust Jews with regard to issues of kashrut.

We explore Bishul Akuma and bits be-shishim halachot.

Chullin 96: בְּרִיָּה (בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ) הִיא

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In Jewish law, in order for food to be considered significant, we ordinarily assume that the person must eat at least a ka-zayit – an olive’s size amount of food. This is true, for example, with regard to the prohibition of eating the gid ha-nasheh – the sciatic nerve.

The Mishna teaches that in order to be liable to receive lashes as punishment, the person must eat at least a ka-zayit. At the same time, the Mishna continues and teaches that if the person ate the entire gid ha-nasheh he is liable, even if the gid ha-nasheh was small and did not contain a full ka-zayit.

The Gemara explains the reasoning behind this ruling. Since the nerve is a beriah bifnei atzmah – it is viewed as a significant, free-standing creation – that gives it independent significance with regard to halakha.

Tosafot suggest that once the Torah singles out something as forbidden, it is as if it stated that the Torah specifically forbids that thing, whether it is large or small, as long as the entire thing is eaten. According to this approach, even though only part of the gid ha-nasheh is prohibited by the Torah – on our daf Shmuel teaches that only the part of the sciatic nerve that is “upon the spoon (rounded protrusion) of the thigh” is forbidden (see Bereishit 32:33) – nevertheless, since that is what the Torah refers to as the gid ha-nasheh, that is what is considered a beriah bifnei atzmah.