Bechorot 14: הִקְדִּישׁ זָכָר לְדָמָיו — קָדוֹשׁ קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף

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The second perek of Massekhet Bekhorot began on yesterday’s daf. With it the Gemara turns its attention to the laws of firstborn kosher animals that are ordinarily supposed to be brought as sacrifices in the Temple.

According to the Mishna on our daf if an animal that had a blemish that precluded it from being brought as a sacrifice was consecrated by its owner and then was redeemed, it becomes an ordinary animal. Examples of the practical effect of this include the obligation to set aside its firstborn as a bekhor and that when it is slaughtered, it is not considered kodashim ba-ḥutz – slaughtering a consecrated animal outside of the Temple courtyard.

We explore the mythical impetus behind rituals of the firstborn as well as Agnon’s Sippur Pashto as a modern day Midrash (and his influence on A.B Yehoshua).

Bechorot 13: אִם גּוּפוֹ קָנָה, מָמוֹנוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן

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R. Oshaya said that a Jew acquires the property of a nonJew with the paying of the purchase price to the non-Jew. 

The transfer of the money effects this transaction. A Baraisa was brought which challenges this view. A Jew arranged to buy a collection of broken pieces of silver from a non-Jew. 

After paying for the box of silver, the Jew noticed that among the pieces were some items of idolatry in the box, and these items are clearly prohibited for the Jew to derive any benefit from them. 

The halacha in the Baraisa is that if the Jew had not paid the money, then even if he had pulled the silver into his possession he may still return it to the non-Jew. 

Taking possession without having paid does not constitute a legal transaction. If the Jew has paid for the silver, and then he took possession of the silver by pulling it into his property, the Jew had already acquired the silver. 

We explore the history of acquisitions between jews and nonJews in Talmud and the thorny issue of accusations by the regnant culture.

Bechorot 12: אֶלָּא זִיל בָּתַר אִימֵּיהּ — וְהַאי עֵגֶל הוּא

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One cannot use the following to redeem a firstborn donkey: a calf, a wild animal, a slaughtered animal - even a slaughtered sheep, a sick animal - terefah, a hybrid - even an offspring of a male goat and a female sheep, or a koy - an offspring of a deer and a goat. Rabbi Eliezer allows redemption with a hybrid, because both a goat and a sheep separately can be used.

Can we redeem a firstborn donkey with a live fetus found in a womb of a slaughtered sheep? Is it a live sheep, good for a redemption, or, since it does not require proper slaughter, it is considered as meat already slaughtered, not valid for redemption? Can one use a mutant - an animal that is like a different species? Is it close enough to hybrid, which is forbidden?

We explore animals and animality thanks to the work of Beth Berkowitz.

Bechorot 11: דְּמֵעִידָּנָא דְּאַפְרְשֵׁיהּ, בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּכֹהֵן קָאֵי

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We have learned that the Torah requires that a firstborn donkey be exchanged for a lamb that is given to the kohen (Shemot 13:13). According to the Mishna (daf 9a), if the lamb that was set aside to redeem the donkey were to die, it is permitted to benefit from the carcass.

The Gemara on our daf considers different possibilities regarding how to understand the case in the Mishna:

If it died in the possession of the kohen and the Mishna is teaching that he is permitted to benefit from the animal, this would appear to be obvious, since it is his own money.

If it means that it died in the possession of the owner and that the kohen is permitted to benefit from it, this too will appear obvious!

The Gemara concludes that we might have assumed that as long as the animal has not reached the kohen ‘s hands, the latter does not really possess it, so the Mishna teaches that from the time that the owner has set it aside, it is already considered to be in the possession of the kohen.

We explore the comparison between Halacha and Roman law as regards designation before delivery.

Bechorot 10: עֲרִיפָה בִּמְקוֹם פְּדִיָּיה עוֹמֶדֶת

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According to the Torah (Shemot 13:13), if the owner of a firstborn donkey does not wish to redeem it by exchanging it for a lamb, then the donkey must be decapitated.

Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in both parts of the baraita refers to a living animal, but the first part refers to monetary benefit, and the second part refers to the benefit derived from its body (its wool or its work). In both situations, Rabbi Shimon permits use of the firstborn prior to its decapitation and Rabbi Yehuda forbids deriving such benefit.

We discuss the mitzvah of decapitation and redemption.

Bechorot 9: מִין בְּמִינוֹ אֵינוֹ חוֹצֵץ

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The Mishna on our daf discusses the law requiring someone whose donkey gives birth to a firstborn male to redeem the newborn donkey by giving a lamb to a kohen (see Shemot 13:13).

According to the Mishna, if twin males were born, since one of them is certainly the firstborn, the owner must give a lamb to the kohen; if twins were born – one male and one female – the owner should set aside a lamb, but he may keep it for himself. The reason he can keep it is because his obligation to the kohen is simply financial, and whenever we are faced with a situation of financial doubt, the ruling is ha-motzi me-ḥaveiro alav ha-ra’ayah – the one who wants to claim that his fellow owes him money, must prove his case. Here, since the kohen cannot prove that the firstborn was male, even though he sets aside a lamb in case the firstborn was male, the owner is under no obligation to give that animal to the kohen.

We explore David Avon’s analysis of the definition of birth which has a wide range of ramifications in halakhah. How birth is defined is significant for the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal, the firstborn of a non-kosher animal, the human firstborn, the impurity of a woman after childbirth, circumcision, animals consecrated for the altar, corpse impurity, and more.

Anyone who tries to understand the definition of birth by examining each of these sugyot independently is likely to find himself thoroughly confused. At times the Gemara compares the various areas of law; at times it distinguishes between them; and at still other times it discusses the definition of birth required for one particular law without addressing the others at all.

Bechorot 8: אֲנַן חֲכִימִינַן מִינַּיְיהוּ

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Our sugya describes an extended confrontation between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananiah and the “Elders of Athens” (Sabei de-Bei Atuna). The identity of these Elders of Athens is unclear, and scholars throughout the generations have already questioned whether they can be identified with the sages of Athens in Greece. In any event, what we have before us is a lengthy confrontation between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nations of the world, much of which is obscure and difficult to understand. Several later commentators attempted to interpret the story systematically and homiletically.

We explore the various scholarly views of this debate between chapel and the rose men of Athens.

Bechorot 7: הַדּוֹלְפָנִין פָּרִין וְרָבִין כִּבְנֵי אָדָם

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If a non-kosher fish swallowed a kosher fish, the kosher fish is still permitted to be eaten, and if a kosher fish swallowed a non-kosher fish, the non-kosher is prohibited to be eaten - provided that the fish inside was not spawned.

We continue our exploration of the firstborn with a n analysis of Exodus 13:11–16 which is much more than a law concerning firstborn animals and sons. From a historical-critical perspective, it is a particularly revealing example of the way the Torah takes an older cultic institution and reinterprets it through the memory of the Exodus. The final text fuses ritual law, historical narrative, family catechesis, and embodied memory. Precisely because these elements do not fit together perfectly, the passage also preserves traces of its compositional history.

Bechorot 6: שִׁמְעוֹן הָעַמְסוֹנִי הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ כׇּל ״אֵת״ וָ״אֵת״ שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה

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Our daf lists forbidden animals. When speaking of the et hagamal, the camel (Vayikra 11:4), Rabbi Shimon taught of the law that prohibits drinking milk from a non-kosher animal: the addition of the word et. Other believe that this is not a valid interpretation because they reject the notion that the word et can be used to teach Halacha. Et is not translatable to English; it is used in certain grammatical situations.

A baraita teaches that Shimon or Nechemia HaAmasoni learned the laws from every et that appeared in the Torah. Once he came to the passage HaShem Elokecha tira (Devarim 6:13), one should be in awe of G-d, he stopped his practice. He could not think of an appropriate thing to learn from the word et. His students asked what should be done with his earlier teachings, he said that they would not be rewarded for distancing themselves from his teachings.

Rabbi Akiva used the et to teach that Torah scholars themselves should be included in the list of those who are held in awe.

We explore the strongest original idea here “the hermeneutics of adjacency”: Rabbi Akiva does not place the talmid ḥakham on God's level; he locates the scholar in the grammatical space next to the divine name, making rabbinic authority simultaneously powerful and derivative.

Bechorot 5: פָּרָה שֶׁיָּלְדָה מִין חֲמוֹר

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The donkey was the only non-kosher animal which required redemption. Unlike the cow, sheep and goat, whose firstborns were given to a Priest who brought it as an offering to the Temple, a donkey obviously cannot be brought as an offering. Instead, it was traded in for a lamb or a kid, which was given to the Priest in its stead (as an ordinary gift, not to be brought as a sacrifice). See Exodus 13:11-13 and Numbers 18:15-18. As Exodus 13:13 continues, if the owner refuses to redeem his donkey, its neck is broken – as punishment to the owner for his failure to fulfill his obligation.

Why was the donkey different? The Talmud asks this question as well and explains that the donkey had a special role in the Exodus (which this mitzvah commemorates – since God spared the firstborn children and animals of the Jews at the Plague of the Firstborn). Every Jew who departed Egypt took many donkeys with him to carry all the booty the Egyptians gave him right before he left (Exodus 12:35-36; Bechoros 5b).

Bechorot 4: חַיָּיב אָדָם לוֹמַר בִּלְשׁוֹן רַבּוֹ

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The Rambam interprets Shemot (13:11) as saying that the firstborn is sanctified if they were alive at the time of the Exodus. This celebrated that they were saved while the Egyptian firstborn was killed in the final plague. Regardless, the obligation to apply this sanctification to future generations did not take effect until after the journey into the desert had ended.

Rabbi Yochanan debates: a baraita state that before the Tabernacle was built, the sacrificial service in the desert took place on private altars by the firstborn. Reish Lakish retorts that this only refers to the firstborn who were already alive at the time of the Exodus.

Steinsaltz teaches us that the sacrificial service in the desert performed by the firstborn was based on a passage in Shemot (24:5) where we learn that when Torah was given on Sinai, there were a group of "young men" who brought sacrifices.

We explore how the tribes of Israel are counted twice, in chapters 1 and 2 of Parashat Bemidbar, and the Levites are counted twice, in chapters 3 and 4, in Parashat Bemidbar–Naso. What is the purpose of each such double census?

Bechorot 3: דִּלְמָא אָתֵי בְּהוּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה

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From the verse, “Consecrate to Me every firstborn, whatever is the first to open every womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of animal; it is Mine” (Exodus 13:2), the Sages derived that the law of the firstborn animal applies only to an animal owned by an Israelite and not to an animal owned by a gentile.

The Tannaim disagreed regarding the status of an animal jointly owned by an Israelite and a gentile: according to Rabbi Yehudah, such an animal is subject to the law of the firstborn, whereas according to the Sages, only a firstborn animal that is wholly owned by an Israelite is subject to this obligation.

The more interesting development comes with Tosafot. The Gemara appears uncomfortable with intentionally selling a piece of the fetus to a gentile simply to escape kedushat bekhor.

We explore ha ‘aramah, engineered around a halakhic category, yet its purpose is not merely convenience. It prevents a more serious halakhic failure. The artificiality of the mechanism is tolerated because the underlying concern is genuine.

Bechorot 2: כִּ֣י לִי֮ כׇּל־בְּכוֹר֒

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The first perek of Massekhet Bekhorot focuses on the laws of a firstborn donkey, which must be exchanged for a lamb and given to the kohen (see Ex 13:13, 34:20).

Even though we might expect that the tractate should begin with the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal that has intrinsic sanctity and is brought as a sacrifice, the Gemara explains that the laws of the firstborn donkey are short and relatively uncomplicated, and by placing them first, the other cases can be discussed at greater length without interruption.

The first Mishna discusses how non-Jewish ownership of a donkey would affect this law, teaching that the emphasis of the Torah on the Israelite in the context of these laws (see Num 3:13) frees such animals from the requirements of bekhor. Thus, someone who purchases a firstling from a non-Jew prior to its birth does not need to redeem it with a lamb. This halakha would also be true in a case where the fetus is sold to a non-Jew, although the Mishna comments that it is forbidden to make such a sale.

We explore the use of numbered pagination and why masechtot begin always with Daf Bet...

Chullin 142: שְׁלוּחֵי מִצְוָה אֵינָן נִזּוֹקִים

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Massekhet Ḥullin closes with a Mishna that relates how the passage regarding the mitzva of shilu’aḥ ha-ken teaches that fulfilling this simple commandment guarantees a good and lengthy life (see Devarim 22:7.)

In fact, there is another mitzva that offers a similar promise – kibbud av va-em (respecting one’s parents – see Devarim 5:15) also includes a clause guaranteeing that “your days may be long, and that it may go well with you.” Rabbi Ya’akov, however, argues that in making these statements the intention of the Torah is to guarantee a share in the World-to-Come.

This teaching was based on his own personal experience. Once he saw a child who was sent by his father to perform the mitzva of shilu’aḥ ha-ken, and during performing both this mitzva and the mitzva to honor one’s parents, the child fell and died.

We have discussed this story elsewhere so today we explore the writings of R Kook vs Hegel and Zizek and Rav Shagar comments to their theory of nihilism and heresy.

Chullin 141: כֹּל מַתְנִיתָא דְּלָא תַּנְיָא בֵּי רַבִּי חִיָּיא וּבֵי רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא מְשַׁבַּשְׁתָּא הִיא

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What if someone did not fulfill the commandment of shilu’aḥ ha-ken?

The Mishna on our daf teaches that if someone took the mother bird together with her young, Rabbi Yehuda says that he has transgressed a negative commandment from the Torah and he is liable to receive lashes, but he need not now let her go. The Sages disagree, arguing that he must let her go, but he does not incur lashes. They conclude with the general rule that leads them to this ruling – one does not receive lashes for the transgression of any negative precept which can be remedied by the subsequent fulfillment of a positive commandment.

The Gemara then relates the following story:

A man once clipped the wings of the mother bird before letting it go; let it go and then caught it again. Rav Yehuda had him flogged and ordered him: ‘Go, keep it until it grows its wing feathers again and then let it go.’

The problem with this story is that Rav Yehuda’s ruling does not seem to follow either of the two opinions in the Mishna.

We explore the metaphor of the mother bird hovering over the nest used in the Zohar as mother Schechina/Rachel.

Chullin 140: הָיְתָה מְעוֹפֶפֶת, אֲפִילּוּ כְּנָפֶיהָ נוֹגְעוֹת בַּקֵּן – פָּטוּר

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If the mother bird was hovering over the eggs or fledglings in the nest, when its wings are touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is obligated to send away the mother. When its wings are not touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is exempt from sendingaway the mother. Even if there is only one fledgling or one egg, one is obligated to sendaway the mother, as it is stated:

“If a bird’s nest happens before you” (Deuteronomy 22:6), indicating that one is obligated to send away the mother bird from the nest in any case. If there were fledglings capable of flying, or unfertilized eggs from which a fledgling will not hatch, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated in the same verse: “And the mother is resting upon the fledglings or upon the eggs.”

From the juxtaposition of the fledglings and the eggs one derives: Just as the fledglings are living, so too, the eggs must be capable of producing living fledglings. This excludes unfertilized eggs, which cannot produce a living fledgling.

We explore the mitzvah from the Minchat Chinukh who discusses together the positive and negative commandments involved here, and at the beginning of his remarks clarifies their precise definitions.

If a person takes the mother bird but sends away the young, does he violate the prohibition of “you shall not take,” or does he merely fail to fulfill the positive commandment of “you shall surely send away”?

The Minchat Chinukh maintains that the plain meaning of the verse indicates that the prohibition applies only when one takes the mother together with the young.

Chullin 139: אֶסְתֵּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה מִנַּיִן

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The people of Papunia asked Rav Mattana: “Where is Esther alluded to in the Torah?” He said to them: “And I will surely hide [haster astir] My face” (Chullin 139b).

The early commentators already noted two striking features in which the Book of Esther differs from all the other books of Scripture. The first is that there is no explicit mention of the Name of Heaven anywhere in the Megillah; the second is that there is no mention of the Land of Israel.

In truth, these omissions are not incidental or secondary. They touch upon the very inner essence of the Megillah.

The name of the Holy One, blessed be He, seems deliberately submerged, withheld from mention even at moments when the language of the verse almost calls for it. Thus Mordechai says, “Relief and deliverance will arise for the Jews from another place,” where the expression “from another place” clearly points heavenward.

We review rav Chanan Porat’s view which is doing something considerably deeper than a conventional “Purim was a hidden miracle” reading. His essay is really a theology of how one reads history when God is not visible.

Chullin 138: לְאֵתוֹיֵיהּ לְבֵי דִינָא וְקַיּוֹמֵי בֵּיהּ ״וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרַע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ״

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Once we have decided that the commandments indeed have reasons, and that it is appropriate to discuss those reasons, a new question arises: What kind of reasons do the commandments have?

The commandments may have social, ritual, mystical, psychological, and other kinds of reasons. Obviously, we cannot discuss here all the different approaches to the nature of the reasons for the commandments, but we will try to identify several central questions. It is also quite reasonable to distinguish among different types of commandments: some may have reasons of one kind and others reasons of another.

Ramban states “‘If a bird’s nest happens to be before you.’ This commandment, too, is explained by ‘You shall not slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day’ (Leviticus 22:28). For the reason for both is that we should not develop a cruel heart and become devoid of compassion; or perhaps Scripture does not permit us to engage in destruction that would eradicate a species, even though it permits slaughtering members of that species. Thus, one who kills the mother and the young on the same day, or takes them when they are free to fly away, is as though he were destroying the species.

We explore the rationale behind mitzvoth vs them as decrees.

Chullin 137: ״רְחֵלִים מָאתַיִם״

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How many sheep must be sheared for the law of Reishit HaGez – offering the first shearing to a kohen – to apply?

In the Mishna (daf 135a) we learn that this was the subject of a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai points to the passage in Sefer Yeshayahu (7:21) to conclude that there must be a minimum of two sheep; Beit Hillel brings a passage from Sefer Shmu’el (I 25:18) from which he learns that there must be at least five sheep for the obligation to take effect.

Issi bar Hini and his son were travelling from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel. They met R’ Yochanan who overheard Issi teaching his son our Mishnah, that wool of sheep is obligated in the mitzvah of the first shearings. Issi used the word “רחלים “for sheep, which is the masculine form of the plural for sheep.

In our text, the precise wording appears as “רחלות, “in the feminine form. R’ Yochanan corrected him and instructed him to teach the Mishnah with the text as we have it. Issi resisted and claimed that he was using the masculine form of the word, as it appears in the Torah, in Bereshis (32:15) when describing the two hundred sheep sent by Yaakov to Eisav. R’ Yochanan then explained that the wording used by the Torah and that used by the sages is not necessarily the same.

We explore the commentaries on Gen 32:15 as well as the gifts to the priests.

Chullin 136: אָדָם, פָּשׁוּט, לִפְנֵי הַדִּבּוּר

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The obligation of the priestly gifts applies only to a behemah—a domesticated animal such as an ox or sheep—and not to a chayah, a wild animal such as a gazelle or deer.

The Minchat Chinuch (§4), following the Talmudic discussions, considers a case that is not scientifically possible but raises fascinating theoretical questions: the offspring of a gazelle and a female goat, or of a male goat and a female gazelle.[1]

In Chullin 80a, the Talmud raises a halakhic uncertainty concerning whether “chayshinan le-zera ha-av”—whether the father’s seed is considered. In other words, does halakhah recognize paternal lineage among animals, so that the offspring is regarded as related to both parents? Or, in animals, does the offspring follow the mother alone?

We claim that Halakhic identity is domain relative. When the question is one of issur — species, prohibition, mixture, the permissibility of an act — halakhah tends toward an ontology of emergence: two sources generate a third thing that is not the sum of them. When the question is one of mamon — who owes what to whom — halakhah tends toward an ontology of partition.