Chullin 12: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן

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Rav Naḥman quotes Rav as teaching that if someone watches a person perform sheḥita – ritual slaughter – from the beginning to the end, the animal can be eaten, but if he does not see the entire process, it cannot be eaten. The Gemara explains that if the slaughterer was a known professional there is no need to watch him throughout, and this statement refers to someone who was not knowledgeable in the laws of sheḥita.

I might have thought that if we see him perform half of the slaughter properly we can assume that the rest was done properly, as well, so Rav Naḥman teaches us that we cannot make that assumption and must watch the entire process.

We explore the notion of the presumption of expertize in schechita and other halachot.

Chullin 11: זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא

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One of the basic principles in Jewish law is that we follow the rov – the majority. The Gemara onour daf searches for a source for this rule, and distinguishes between two different types of majorities:

Ruba d’ita kaman – when the majority is clearly defined, before us. The Gemara’s examples are cases like the Sanhedrin, where the Sages would vote and the majority opinion would be accepted or a case where there are nine stores that sell kosher meat and one that sells non-kosher meat, and unidentified meat is found between them.

Ruba d’leta kaman – when the majority is undefined, that is, where we know what the majority is but it is not something before us that we can count. The Gemara’s examples are a young boy and girl who fall to each other in a situation of levirate marriage, and we assume that neither are sterile, since the vast majority of the population is not sterile.

We explore the rule of the majority.

Chullin 10: כל סָפֵק בִּשְׁחִיטָה לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי

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Our daf concerning a knife found nicked after shechita presents one of the most subtle and revealing disputes in the halachic imagination. At first glance, the question appears technical: if the knife is discovered to be defective only after the act of slaughter, do we assume that the defect existed at the time of the cut—thereby invalidating the shechita—or do we attribute the defect to subsequent use, preserving the animal’s kashrut? Yet beneath this legal problem lies a profound inquiry into how halacha understands time, presumption, and the moral demand for certainty in sacred action.

We continue our introduction to shechita and its laws.

Chullin 9: בְּהֵמָה בְּחַיֶּיהָ בְּחֶזְקַת אִיסּוּר עוֹמֶדֶת

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On our daf Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as teaching that a talmid chacham – a scholar – must know three things:

ketav (writing),

shechita (kosher slaughter) and

milah (circumcision).

Rav Chananiah bar Shelemia quotes Rav as teaching three additional things:

kesher shel Tefillin (phylactery knots)

birkat chatanim (blessings made at weddings)

tzitzit (ritual fringes).

The Me’iri explains that although we expect that a Torah scholar would devote his energies to learning theory, still there are certain practical things that he must learn to do. These are things about which people run to ask the scholar questions, and if he is unable to respond, his reputation will be tarnished. Others suggest that a scholar must take an interest in community affairs and these are basic issues that he must deal with.

We explore the qualifications of a Talmid Chacham.

Chullin 8: מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָלְעָה אִיסּוּרָא

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On our daf, Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as teaching that a Kosher butcher needs a number of special utensils in order to avoid halakhic problems.

A butcher needs to have two separate tubs of water – one where he washes the meat and the other where he washes the forbidden fats.

Similarly, a butcher needs to keep three separate knives – one for slaughter, one for cutting meat and one for cutting off forbidden fats.

The reason that the butcher needs a separate knife for slaughter seems clear. Since we do not want the shehitah knife to develop nicks or other deficiencies that would render it unfit for slaughter, we do not want the butcher cutting meat that might have bones that may ruin the blade. Rashi explains that although the butcher should really check the knife before using it for shechita so he would, theoretically, discover any problems with the knife, nevertheless the Sages feared that if he is in a hurry he may neglect to do so.

We explore the world of knives and criteria for schechita.

Chullin 7: ״אֵין עוֹד מִלְּבַדּוֹ״ – אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: וַאֲפִילּוּ כְּשָׁפִים

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The Gemara mentions in passing that we can be certain that God would not allow a tzaddik – a righteous person – to sin by eating forbidden foods, since He even prevents the animals of such people from doing so. In explanation of this statement, the Gemara relates the story of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair and his donkey.

The aggada consists of three parts, or “acts,” each taking place in a different location. The three acts collectively create a single continuum, whose framework is R. Pinchas b. Yair’s journey to redeem captives. Each act presents an event or challenge along the way.

The question arises: what unifies the various parts of the aggada? Is this merely a series of events that happen to take place over the course of a single journey, or is there a common theme that connects them conceptually and not only chronologically?

The Gemara relates other statements of Rabbi Ḥanina: With regard to the verse:

“There is none else beside Him” (Deuteronomy 4:35), Rabbi Ḥanina says: And even sorcery is ineffective against the will of God. The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who would try to take dust from beneath the feet of Rabbi Ḥanina in order to perform sorcery on him and harm him. Rabbi Ḥanina said to her: Take the dust, but the matter will be ineffective for you, as it is written: “There is none other beside Him.”

We explore the history of "Ein od milvado" from Deut to our daf until the split between the Gra and Alter Rebbe as to the meaning of the Tzimtzum.

Chullin 6: מִכָּאן לְתַלְמִיד חָכָם שֶׁאָמַר דְּבַר הֲלָכָה, שֶׁאֵין מְזִיחִין אוֹתוֹ

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Few principles in the rabbinic corpus carry the weight—and the latent danger—of the assertion that tzaddikim ein ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu mevi takalah al yadam, that the Holy One does not bring about a mishap through the righteous. The doctrine appears in several places in the Bavli, but nowhere more prominently than in the opening sugyot of Tractate Chullin, where it functions as a procedural tool for the recovery of halakhic conclusions from the observed conduct of sages (1). On its face the principle is consoling: it expresses confidence that providence accompanies moral seriousness, that the divine attention that hovers over the world will not allow those who strive for righteousness to inadvertently fall into transgression. Beneath this consolation, however, lies a network of ethical, epistemological, and theological problems that the our explorationaims to bring into view.

Chullin 5: ״אָדָם וּבְהֵמָה״ מְעַלְּיוּתָא הִיא

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We learned on daf 3) Abayye understands the Mishnah as teaching that shehitah – ritual slaughter – performed by a Kuti is valid.

According to him, the Mishnah follows the opinion that accepted the conversion of the Kutim, even though they did not keep all of the mitzvot that were not clearly stated in the Torah. Since shechita was one of the commandments that they did accept, they can be relied upon.

On our daf we learn that Rabban Gamliel and his court voted about the trustworthiness of the Kutim and decided that shechita performed by a Kuti is forbidden.

We explore the social typology of the Schochet and how in the last century the historical strife between schochetim and the rabbinate devolved in the US.

Chullin 4: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֲוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ

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Previously we learned that a Jew who habitually eats non-kosher meat can still be trusted with kosher slaughter, since, given the choice, he will expend the minimal effort required, and the kosher slaughter is still significant in his eyes.

Rav Anan said that even a Jew who worships idols - which is considered as an abandonment of the whole Torah - can still do shechitah. We know this because Yehoshaphat, the righteous king of Judah, partook of the feast of idol worshiping Ahab, who thus enticed him to join forces in battle.

Our daf constructs the figure of the mumar (transgressor, apostate) through a remarkable juridical proof that draws not from precedent or principle but from the narrative of Ahab's banquet for Jehoshaphat (II Chronicles 18:2).

We trace the rabbinic typology of apostasy across its biblical antecedents and tannaitic-amoraic developments, arguing that the Bavli's surprising leniency regarding the meshumad la-avodah zarah — that one may eat from his slaughter — emerges not as a doctrinal claim but as a hermeneutic position generated through narrative exegesis.

Chullin 3: מוּמְחִין וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין

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"All may slaughter and their slaughter is valid" was explained by Rav Ashi as referring to a non-observant Jew. If he eats non-kosher meat to satisfy his appetite or to save money, but will eat kosher meat when it is available, then if he is handed a sharpened knife that was properly examined and found free of nicks, he will presumably not squander the opportunity to make the meat kosher.

However, if he does not have an examined knife, then he cannot be trusted, for he will not bother to sharpen it. If he went ahead and slaughtered with his knife - which he should not have done - one can examine the knife afterwards, and if the knife was found to be fine, one can eat from his shechitah.

Ravina said that "all" refers to those who take upon themselves to do shechitah, because most of them know the laws - provided that they already did shechitah a few times without fainting.

We explore how non sacrificial slaughter in Devorim allowed for meat consumption.

Chullin 2: מֵבִיא סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה וְשׁוֹחֵט בָּהּ

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Performing shechita – ritually slaughtering an animal for the purpose of eating it – is fulfillment of a Biblical commandment (see Devarim 12:21 with Rashi‘s commentary).

The first Mishna in Masechet Chullin teaches that this mitzvah can be performed by anyone, excluding people who are viewed as incompetent, like a cheresh (a deaf-mute, who was considered to be uneducable in the time of the Mishnah), shoteh (an “imbecile”) and a minor, who has not yet reached the age of maturity.

We explore a number on introductions to our new masechta.

Menachot 110: אֶעֱשֶׂה רְצוֹנוֹ וְיַעֲשֶׂה רְצוֹנִי

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In the closing daf of Massekhet Menaḥot, the Gemara discusses the state of Diaspora Jewry and quotes a passage from Sefer Malakhi (1:11) where the prophet discusses how God’s Name is known throughout the world, where

We end the Masechta with some “pure offerings” are presented to Him in all places.

The “pure offering” mentioned is interpreted by the Gemara as referring metaphorically to a man who first marries and then studies Torah. Since he is married, he is not disturbed by sinful thoughts.

We end the masechta with different views of God’s love, free will and the magisterial transcribed lecture of the Rav on Jewish sovereignty.

Menachot 109: אִי סַגִּיא בְּבֵית חוֹנְיוֹ – טָרַחְנָא

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Aside from the first and second Temples in Jerusalem, the only other Jewish Temples where sacrifices were brought were built by Jewish priests in Egypt.

The Mishna on today’s daf teaches that someone who pledged to bring a sacrifice must bring it in the Temple in Jerusalem, and not in Beit Honyo – the Temple of Onias. Even if the person specifically committed to bringing the sacrifice there he cannot do so, rather he must bring it in Jerusalem.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that brings two opinions about the Temple of Onias. According to Rabbi Meir, that temple was a place of pagan idol worship; Rabbi Yehuda rules that only Jewish sacrifices to God were brought there.

According to Josephus, the Temple of Onias was built in Leontopolis in Egypt by the son of the High Priest Onias III, sometime around the year 155 BCE. This temple was modeled after the Temple in Jerusalem.

At Leontopolis, in the wake of the Seleucid persecution, the exiled Zadokite priest Onias founded a functioning sacrificial sanctuary that operated until the Roman closure.

Menachot 108: רַבִּי אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא פְּלִיג

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In the first case of the Mishnah here, when one pledges one of his sheep or bulls to Hekdesh, and he has only two sheep or two bulls, he must give the larger one to Hekdesh. The reason for this presumably is that one who is Makdish an item does so "b'Ayin Yafah," generously, and therefore it is assumed that he meant to give the larger animal.

The Gemara asks that if the person must give the larger animal because of "b'Ayin Yafah Makdish," then what is the reasoning behind the law of the next case of the Mishnah? The Mishnah states that when the person has three animals, the middle animal is Hekdesh. Why is it not assumed that he meant to be Makdish the largest animal because of the principle of "b'Ayin Yafah Makdish"?

Shmuel answers that the Mishnah, in the second case, does not mean that the second animal is certainly Hekdesh. Rather, the Mishnah is saying that we must suspect that the middle animal is the one which the owner meant. We are unsure about whether he meant the largest animal because it is considered "b'Ayin Yafah Makdish," or he meant the middle-sized animal because it is larger than the smallest animal and thus is also considered "b'Ayin Yafah Makdish."

Accordingly, Rebbi Chiya explains, the owner of the animals should wait until the middle animal develops a blemish and transfer the Kedushah that it may have onto the largest animal and bring the largest animal as the Korban.

How does this transferal of Kedushah take place?

We explore this enigmatic notion that Keisha may be transferred somehow.

Menachot 107: וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה פֵּירַשְׁתִּי״

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How do we interpret the intention of someone who commits to bringing a sacrifice, but isn’t clear about his plans?

The Mishna on our daf offers answers to that question, as well as to the question of how to deal with someone who says that he made a commitment to bring a specific sacrifice but now does not remember what he said at that time. In this second case, the Mishna tries to work out how to be sure that all possibilities are covered; in the first case, the Mishna tries to work out how we understand what the person most likely meant.

We explore the approach to pledges with an interesting article on the Jewish bankers under the Czar.

Menachot 106: וְהַגּוֹרָלוֹת הִפַּלְנוּ עַל קֻרְבַּן הָעֵצִים

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that if someone obligates himself to bring wood to the Temple, he must bring at least two pieces of wood, as are usually placed on the altar together every morning and afternoon.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that teaches that contributing wood to the Temple is considered like committing oneself to bringing an actual sacrifice. This is derived from an extra word korban that appears in the Torah (either, according to Rashi, in Vayikra 2:1, or, according to Rabbeinu Gershom, in Vayikra 1:2) and is supported by a passage in Sefer Nehemiah (10:35) that specifically talks about “the sacrifice of wood.”

We explore the unique aspects of the wood sacrifice.

We argue that the wood offering dissolves the categorical boundary between instrument and end, between fuel for the sacred and the sacred itself, and that this dissolution bears directly on the theology of sacred brokenness, the phenomenology of embodied material worship, and the clinical reading of the therapeutic encounter. 

Menachot 105: מִנְחַת הַסּוֹלֶת קָאָמַר, סִימָנָא בְּעָלְמָא

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Isn’t it taught in the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says that one must bring a fine-flour meal offering since the verse opens with it first? The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: Which meal offering is the most notable of the meal offerings, as it has no modifier? It is this, i.e., the fine-flour meal offering, with which the verse opens first. The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must bring a fine-flour meal offering is not because the verse opens with it, but because it has no modifier.

The Gemara challenges: If so, the explanation of the baraita is unnecessary; isn’t it obviousthat Rabbi Yehuda is referring to the fine-flour meal offering, as he says so explicitly? The Gemara answers: The baraita explains that the reference to the meal offering with which the passage opens merely serves as a mnemonic, so one should not forget which type of meal offering Rabbi Yehuda is referring to.

A mnemonic device is a memory trick or memory device employing any learning technique that aids information retention or retrieval in the human memory, often by associating the information with something that is easier to remember.

It makes use of elaborative encoding, retrieval cues and imagery as specific tools to encode information in a way that allows for efficient storage and retrieval. It aids original information in becoming associated with something more accessible or meaningful—which in turn provides better retention of the information.

Menachot 104: הָנָךְ לְנִדְבַת צִבּוּר אָזְלִי

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In general, when a person makes a statement that indicates that he accepts upon himself the obligation to bring a sacrifice, through the power of his stated intention the object referred to becomes sanctified. Nevertheless, since it is his statement that sanctification takes effect, we must clarify what must be said and how to deal with situations where someone’s intentions are not clearly expressed.

We explore halakhic architecture of designation: the categories, the mechanics of peh (utterance), yad(incomplete utterance requiring inference), and maḥshavah (silent intention); the problem of under-specification represented by the Menaḥot Mishnah; and the special case of hafrashah in agricultural gifts.

Menachot 103: אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן

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As we have learned throughout Massekhet Menaḥot, a standard meal offering is made up of solet – fine wheat-flour – mixed with oil and frankincense that is prepared in one of a number of different ways. There are meal offerings that are made differently – e.g., the minḥat ha-omer, brought on the second day of Passover that is made from barley or the minḥat sota, brought by a woman who was suspected of an extra-marital affair, which does not include oil and frankincense – but those are not voluntary meal offerings.

What if someone decided to bring a meal offering, but specifically stated that he wanted to bring it in a manner that was unusual?

The Mishna on our daf deals with that question. According to the Tanna Kamma, whatever statement was made must be corrected so that a proper meal offering will be brought. Thus, if someone says “I accept upon myself a meal offering of barley” he must bring a minḥa of wheat. If he said “I accept upon myself a meal offering from ordinary flour” he must bring a minḥa made of solet. If he said that he would bring a meal offering that did not include oil and frankincense, the minḥa that he brings must include them. If he said that i would bring it with solet measuring half an isaron, he must bring a full isaron, which is the normal amount of flour that is brought.

We explore the prophetic response to sacrifices and added review of the Hassidic approach to various korbanot.

Menachot 102: כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ

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When someone donates an animal to the Temple as a sacrifice, it immediately becomes fully sanctified and cannot be redeemed, that is, it cannot be exchanged for money and used for mundane purposes, since it must be brought on the altar. If, however, it developed a blemish that will not allow it to be sacrificed, the Torah permits it to be redeemed, and another animal must be purchased as a replacement (see Vayikra 27:11-12).

The Mishna that opens the twelfth perek of Massekhet Menaḥot deals with questions of redeeming other sanctified items. We learn that meal offerings and libations can be redeemed so long as they were not placed in a keli sharet – a Temple vessel that would give them full sanctity.

Once they were placed in a keli sharet, however, they cannot be redeemed even if they became ritually defiled and cannot be brought as an offering. Similarly, sacrifices brought from fowl, or wood sanctified for use on the altar or frankincense or a keli sharet that became ritually defiled and cannot be brought or used in the Temple, cannot be redeemed.