Chullin 134: ״צֹאנְךָ״, וְלֹא צֹאן שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ

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The eleventh perek of Chulin discusses the mitzvah of reishit ha'gez. Broadly speaking, this mitzvah obligates one to give the first of the shearing from a flock of sheep to a kohen. Consequently, we find that reishit ha'gez is one of the many gifts given to the kohanim. We shall probe its classification by determining exactly what type of gift it is.

Two different understanding of reishit ha'gez come to the fore in the first Mishnah. The Mishnah teaches that reshit ha'gez applies both inside and outside Israel. The Bartenura notes that R' Ilay disagrees, arguing that it only applies in Israel. The Gemara (135a) explains that R' Ilay has a tradition of a gezeira shava that connects reishet ha'gez with teruma; the Torah uses the language of netina when describing both mitzvot. Consequently, since the teruma only applies in Israel, the same is true for reishit ha'gez. Whether reishet ha'gez is simply another gift or is compared to terumah touches on the essence of this mitzvah.

One explanation offered for this mitzva is suggested by the Rambam (see Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Bikkurim 10:5) who argues that since kohanim did not receive a share in the land of Israel, the Torah obligates the community to concern itself with their welfare.

We explore the word “reishis” as a leitwort on other contexts especially Gen 1:1.

Chullin 133: כׇּל הַשּׁוֹנֶה לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁאֵינוֹ הָגוּן – נוֹפֵל בְּגֵיהִנָּם

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A teacher must first ascertain the character of a student to determine if he is worthy of learning Torah before teaching him. The Rambam rules that if a student is found to be lacking in his religious and/or ethical behavior, the teacher would be obligated to first bring him to repentance. Only after he is found worthy will he be welcomed into the traditional house of study to learn Torah (see Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 4:1).

This ruling notwithstanding, the Ba’al HaTanya writes in the Shulḥan Arukh HaRav that if it appears impossible to lead the student in the path of repentance, if he still desires to study Torah the teacher must “push him away with his left while drawing him near with his right,” in contrast with the behavior of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Peraḥyah who “pushed away” Yeshu HaNotzri with both hands (see Hilkhot Talmud Torah 4:17).

This idea comes up in the Gemara in the following context:

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: Anyone who teaches Torah to an unworthy student is like one who throws a stone to Markulis, for it is written: “As a small stone in a heap of stones, so is he that gives honor to a fool” (Mishle 26:8).

We explore the type of methodology employed in talmudic education in comparison to modern theory of education.

Chullin 132: מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשׁוֹ

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The Mishnah states that when a Bechor becomes mixed with a herd of cows and all of them are slaughtered by a single Shochet, Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah must be given from all the cows except for one. RASHI (DH v'Im Echad) explains that Matnos Kehunah are not given from a Bechor, because "Ein Kedushah Chal Al Kedushah" -- one form of Kedushah (Kedushas Matnos Kehunah) cannot take effect on an object that already has Kedushah (Kedushas Bechor).

Ulla used to give kohen's gifts to a kohenet - a daughter of a kohen. Why? When the Torah told to give the gifts to a kohen, we understand that a kohenet is excluded.

However, when it said the word "kohen" again, this is a double exclusion, which always means an inclusion, and a kohenet is now included. Rav Pappa was married to a kohenet, and people would bring him kohen's gifts.

We explore the levitical status and gifts thereof,,,,

Chullin 131: הָהוּא לֵיוָאָה דַּהֲוָה חָטֵף מַתְּנָתָא

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Our daf elaborates upon the halachos listed in a Baraisa.

“Four of the gifts for the kohen apply to vineyards, three of the halachos apply to grain, and two of the halachos apply to trees.”

The two halachos which apply to trees are שכחה ( the law of “forgetting”) and פאה (the law of “corner”). D’vei R’ Yishmael learns these halachos from the verse in Devarim (24:20), “When you beat your olive tree do not remove the splendor behind you. It shall be for the resident convert, the orphan and the widow.”

We compare the tone and temperament of the Levitical vs Deuteronomical texts regarding the gifts of the vineyard.

Chullin 130: חוּלִּין, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין בְּמַתָּנוֹת, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁחַיָּיבִין בְּחָזֶה וָשׁוֹק

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Just as Jewish farmers are commanded to offer tithes to the kohanim from their produce, similarly sections of animals are to be given to them, as well. According to the Torah (Devarim 18:3), whenever an animal is slaughtered for food, the owner must give to the kohen three sections of the animal – the zero’a (foreleg), leḥayayim (jaw) and kevah (maw, or stomach).

Although the Torah is clear about the types of animals involved in this mitzva, as well as what must be given and to whom it is given, nevertheless there are many questions that need to be clarified. These issues are the focus of the tenth perek of Massekhet Ḥullin, which begins on our daf.

The first Mishna opens by teaching that the requirement to give the zero’a, leḥayayim and kevah to the kohen applies in both Israel and the Diaspora, whether the Temple is standing and is limited only to ordinary animals, not to sanctified ones.

We explore the notion of Chullin be’azara.

Chullin 129: ״פִּסְחָא זְעִירָא דְּלָא לְמִסְפַּד״

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To prove his point regarding a question of ritual defilement, Rabbi Yehoshua points to a rule that appears in Megillat Ta’anit.

In Megillat Ta’anit we find the tradition taught that on “Minor Passover” – that is, on the 14th day of Iyyar when the Passover sacrifice was brought by those who were impure or were situated such that they could not bring the sacrifice on the 14th of Nisan as required (see Bamidbar Chapter 9) – no mourning or eulogies were permitted. Rabbi Yehoshua concludes by means of an a fortiori argument that on the Pesaḥ holiday itself there is no question that eulogies are forbidden.

We explore how does halakhah merely regulate the objects of the world, or does it partly constitute what those objects are? Posed that way it invites a clean answer, and the cleanest answers on offer are both wrong.

The instrumentalist answer — law is a management system laid over a finished world — cannot account for the way the Talmud talks about meat that has become something, about taste that carries, about a vessel that acquires a handle it did not have a moment before.

The maximalist answer — halakhic speech reweaves matter — cannot account for why the same tractate spends hundreds of columns worrying about volumes, ratios, doubts, and the precise physical mode by which flavor moved from one pot to another. If the loom were really a loom, why the ledger?

Chullin 128: חֵלֶב שְׁחוּטָה בַּכְּפָרִים

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As we have noted, the laws of tum’at okhalin – ritual defilement of food – will only apply if two basic requirements are met:

The item must be perceived as food appropriate for human consumption, and

The item must have been made wet with one of seven liquids, e.g. water or blood (see Vayikra 11:37-38).

Our Gemara quotes a Tosefta from Massekhet Okatzin (3:1) where Rabbi Yehuda relates that Rabbi Akiva taught:

The ḥelev – forbidden fat – of a slaughtered animal, in villages, needs intention to be used for food, but does not need to be made susceptible to impurity, since it has already been made susceptible by the blood of the slaughtering.

The two explanations cited by Rashi express diametrically opposed assessments of the status of ḥelev. According to the first explanation, ḥelev is an inferior food, eaten only in circumstances of need, in places where there is insufficient ordinary meat. According to the second explanation, however, ḥelev is a luxury food, consumed only by the wealthy.

These two explanations may serve as the basis for two different understandings of the essential nature of the Torah’s prohibition against eating ḥelev.

Chullin 127: הַמְדוּלְדָּלִין בִּבְהֵמָה וּמְעוֹרִין בְּחוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה

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A new Mishnah states The limb of an animal, with flesh, sinews, and bones, and the flesh of an animal, that werepartially severed and remain hanging from the animal do not have the halakhic status of a limb severed from a living animal, which imparts impurity like an unslaughtered carcass, or of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure, respectively. If one had intent to eat the limb or the flesh, the limb or flesh becomes impure if it comes in contact with a source of impurity, and they impart impurity as food to other foods and liquids, although they remain in their place attached to the animal. But in order for them to become impure, they need to be rendered susceptible to impurity through contact with one of the seven liquids that facilitate susceptibility.

We explore differences between Roman and Rabbinic views on dismemberment as expressed in poetry and prose claiming it moves the discussion from a “rhetoric of dismemberment” to what I would call a rabbinic hermeneutics of the fragment: the persistent Jewish insistence on asking how much of the whole survives in the part.

Chullin 126: כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ עַכְבָּר, אָבִיא עַכְבָּר שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ בָּשָׂר וְחֶצְיוֹ אֲדָמָה

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While discussing the laws of impurity imparted by creeping creatures (sheratzim), our sugya cites a passage from the Torat Kohanim dealing with animals belonging to the turtle family. In the middle of the baraita, Rabbi Akiva expresses his wonder at the marvels of creation:

“When Rabbi Akiva would reach this verse, he would say: ‘How manifold are Your works, O Lord!’ You have creatures that grow in the sea and creatures that grow on dry land. Those of the sea—were they to come up onto land, they would immediately die; those of the land—were they to descend into the sea, they would immediately die. You have creatures that grow in fire and creatures that grow in the air. Those of the fire—were they to come up into the air, they would immediately die; those of the air—were they to descend into the fire, they would immediately die. ‘How manifold are Your works, O Lord!’”

Rashi explains that Rabbi Akiva’s amazement is focused primarily upon the salamander, which is mentioned in the baraita together with several other species of the turtle family:

The salamander therefore does not need to have existed as the Rabbis imagined it for the passage to remain intellectually significant. Its historical importance lies precisely in seeing how an ancient culture takes what it believes nature to be and makes that nature exegetically meaningful.

And that, perhaps, makes Rabbi Akiva's mah rabbu ma'asekha Hashem even more interesting after historical criticism, not less.

For the modern reader, the wonder is no longer only the diversity of God's creatures.

It is also the astonishing diversity of ways human beings have made the natural world speak Torah.

Chullin 125: מוֹחַ מִבִּפְנִים מַעֲלֶה אֲרוּכָה מִבַּחוּץ

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Although the word kulit refers specifically to the thighbone, in fact the same rule would apply to any marrow bone, since the marrow is deemed edible, which changes our view of the bone from “bone” to “meat” about the laws of ritual defilement. Furthermore, while the Mishna groups the cases of a human corpse and that of a consecrated animal together, their rules are not the same. In the case of a human bone, the bone itself becomes tameh on a biblical level based on the passage in Sefer Bamidbar (19:16). This stands in contrast to the case of a consecrated animal that only becomes tameh on a rabbinic level (see Pesaḥim daf 120b), and whose bones only impart impurity if they contain marrow.

We explore how Noam describes Qumran law as a kind of historical waystation between Bible and Mishnah.

Chullin 124: אֵין נוֹגֵעַ וְחוֹזֵר וְנוֹגֵעַ

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Not all situations of tum’ah are created equal.

Depending on the source of the tum’ah, bones may or may not transfer ritual defilement. For example, according to the Mishna, someone who touches the bones of a dead person or of defiled sacrifices will always become ritually defiled; someone who touches the bones of a neveila (see above, daf 73) or of a sheretz (see above, daf 122) will become ritually defiled only if the bone contains edible marrow and the bone has a crack or opening in it.

This is because human bones are deemed tameh (see Bamidbar 19:16) while regarding animals only edible flesh – including bone marrow – will give off tum’ah (see Vayikra 11:36, 39).

The Gemara relates that there are also differences between ways that ritual defilement can be contracted. For example, aside from coming into physical contact with the dead animal, tum’ah can also be transferred by carrying the animal, even if one does not touch it (see Vayikra 11:40).

We continue our exploration of different scholars regarding the purity legislation in bible and talmud.

Chullin 123: שֶׁהֲרֵי קַרְקִפְלוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל מוּנָּח בְּרֹאשׁ מְלָכִים

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The Gemara on our daf quotes a Tosefta that teaches:

Our Rabbis taught: If a Roman legion which passes from place to place enters a house, the house is impure, for there is not a legion that does not carry with it several scalps. And you should not be surprised at this; for Rabbi Yishmael’s scalp was placed upon the head of kings.

Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha served as one of the last High Priests during the Second Temple period. As one of the Ten Martyrs murdered by the Romans, he was taken to be killed together with his friend and colleague Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel the Elder.

According to the Rabbinic tradition, when he was taken to be killed the Caesar’s daughter was smitten with his beauty and asked that the skin of his face be removed while he was still alive. The Romans preserved his skin in Persimmon oil, and it was worn on occasion as a mask during Roman festivals.

We explore the history of rabbinic martyrology and roman military dismemberment.

Chullin 122: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם עוֹרוֹת אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ שְׁטִיחִין

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Our Mishnah states that the ritual impurity of human skin is more stringent than that of the skins of other animals: its impurity does not disappear even if the skin has undergone tanning or other processing. The Gemara explains that, according to the strict letter of biblical law, human skin should have had a more lenient status than other skins. The Sages, however, imposed a special decree upon it:

Ulla said: “By Torah law, human skin is pure. Why, then, did they declare it impure? It was a decree lest a person make the skins of his father and mother into carpets.”

Ulla’s statement raises several questions. The main one concerns the meaning of the extraordinary case he describes, in which a person makes carpets from the skins of his father and mother.

We explore this reading against modern sensibilities — the law of property in human tissue, museum and anatomical collections and their repatriation, plastination and display, the twentieth-century history of artefacts made from human skin, and the contemporary technologies of retained presence, from memorial jewellery to synthetic reanimation of the dead.

Chullin 121: יָצְתָה מִכְּלַל חַיָּה, וְלִכְלַל מֵתָה לֹא בָּאת

For the source text click/tap here: Chullin 121

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If a Jew slaughters a non-kosher animal, then while it is convulsing, it cannot be eaten by anybody: by a Jew, because it is non-kosher, and by a non-Jew, because slaughter does not make it permitted for him, and he must wait till the animal completely dies. Nevertheless, if a Jew slaughters a non-kosher on behalf of a non-Jew, then, since the Jew's intention is to prepare it as food for the non-Jew, it, too, is susceptible to ritual impurity of foods while it is convulsing. Thus, paradoxically, it cannot be eaten, but it is already considered food. The same would be if a non-Jew slaughters a kosher animal.

We discuss the halachic vs pathologic definitions of death:

Biologically, dying is a continuum; ontologically, halakhah recognizes a real transition from living organism to corpse; juridically, however, different areas of halakhah may locate their operative thresholds at different points in that transition.

Hence the mefarkeset is neither simply alive nor simply dead for every purpose. It is the paradigmatic demonstration that a single biological reality can sustain multiple, non-identical halakhic predicates without reducing those predicates to arbitrary legal fiction.

Chullin 120: בְּכֹל דְּהוּ מְיַתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ

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The Gemara on our daf teaches that the prohibition on both blood and forbidden fats remains in force even if the form is changed. Thus, even if blood was processed so that it became solid, or even if the forbidden fat was melted so that it became liquid, nevertheless the same rules apply.

Regarding solidified blood, the Gemara recognizes that the prohibition should remain in force, since now the blood would be considered a food, and the prohibition to eat blood (see, for example, Vayikra 3:17) applies. Forbidden fats in liquid form, however, appear to the Gemara to present a problem, for the Torah specifically forbids eating these fats, and there is no clear source prohibiting them from being drunk. Ultimately, Reish Lakish suggests a source that would include drinking in the prohibition, as well.

We explore the history of tallow.

Chullin 119: בִּמְלַאי שֶׁבֵּין הַמְּלָאִים

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The opening sugya of Ha-Or Veha-Rotev is therefore far more than a technical discussion of stems, husks, bones, and peels.

It asks what constitutes an object before the law.

The categories of yad and shomer demonstrate that the halakhic boundary of a thing need not coincide with the boundary of its edible material. Function and protection can extend legal identity outward.

Yet that extension is not limitless.

Rav insists upon thresholds. Rabbi Yoḥanan grants greater independence to the underlying relation. Rashi and Ramban sharpen the disagreement by revealing that protection and handling need not obey identical principles.

The intervention of beriah then destabilizes a purely quantitative account.

Chullin 118: וְטוּמְאָה יוֹצְאָה מִגּוּפָהּ

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Our Mishna contrasts between two different kinds of ritual defilement. While the laws of tuma’t okhlin (ritual defilement of food) will allow parts of the animal that are related to the meat but are not themselves meat (e.g., skin, solidified meat juice, bones, sinews, horns or hooves) to supplement its bulk so that it reaches the minimum size required to become ritually defiled, the laws of tum’at neveila (ritual defilement of an animal that was killed by a predator or died on its own) do not allow these parts of the animal to be included.

The Gemara on our daf quotes a Mishna in Massekhet Okatzin (1:1) that teaches the concept of yad (literally “hand,” in this case a handle) and shomer (“protection”). If meat or food has connected to it something that serves as a handle, or something that is necessary because it protects the food, then it may be viewed as an integral part of the food, even though it is separate from it.

The handle, which serves to allow the object to be picked up or used, may not supplement the volume of the meat, but if someone were to pick up a neveila by means of its bones, sinews, horns or hooves, they would be viewed as coming into contact with the ritually defiled meat.

Chullin 117: וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִים הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין

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The command Leviticus 7:22–27 opens with a doubled formula of speech— “The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, saying.” This suggests that the command had been given to Moses at some point and was incorporated here because of its connection with eating the peace offering. This point must be remembered, because one of the heated questions surrounding the interpretation of these verses concerns precisely this issue: does the prohibition of ḥelevpresented here apply only to sacrificial animals, or is it a general prohibition applying to all animals of species that may be offered as sacrifices—even when the individual animal has never actually been consecrated?

The Sages interpreted the verses as prohibiting the consumption of ḥelev—and blood—from all kosher domesticated animals.

We explore the implications of blood and fat in today’s Daf.

Chullin 116: אֵין מַעֲמִידִין בָּעוֹר קֵבַת נְבֵלָה

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Our Mishnah discusses the laws of milk that is found in the stomach of an animal that is shechted.

Rashi and Meiri understand that the question is regarding milk that has congealed and contains the enzyme rennin, and the issue is whether it is permissible to use this to culture cheese.

The Mishnah rules that congealed milk found in the stomach of an animal of a non-Jew (even shechted) or in a neveilah is prohibited. This substance has the status of the animal in which it is found.

The rennin found in the stomach of a kosher, shechted animal may be used to process cheese, but only as long as the meat of the stomach is outnumbered and does not contribute its taste into the milk or cheese.

We explore the halachot of rennet and its history in cheese production.

Chullin 115: לֹא אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה ״שַׁלַּח״ לְתַקָּלָה

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Aside from the prohibition against cooking meat and milk together, there is also a prohibition against eating them once they were cooked or deriving any benefit from the mixture whatsoever. 

An approach is offered by Rav Ashi, who says that we learn that it is forbidden to eat meat cooked with milk from the passage in Sefer Devarim (14:3) that prohibits eating “any abominable thing.” Rav Ashi interprets that to mean that anything considered “abominable” by the Torah – i.e. anything produced from an activity that the Torah prohibits – may not be eaten.

Based on this logic the Gemara wonders why other prohibited activities do not forbid what they produce. The Gemara even offers a mnemonic list of such actions including:

‘Sending the mother bird away from the nest’ refers to the law forbidding someone from taking the eggs or hatchlings from a nest without first chasing away the mother bird (see Deut 22:6-7).

We explore this paradoxical commandment including Rabbi Forman’s dazzling interpretation as “Parent Trap.”