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On our daf we find that not all of the Sages agree with Rav’s ruling.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish rules that in such a case the meal offering remains valid and the kometz – the fistful of flour taken from the minḥa – can be offered on the altar.
Nevertheless, the rest of the flour cannot be eaten by the kohanim until a second minḥat ha-omer is brought, since the first one did not fulfill the necessary requirement and the new grain has not yet been permitted. Rav Pappa explains that this is based on the fact that Reish Lakish believes that the new grain becomes permitted automatically with dawn of the morning of the 16th day of Nisan (see the first part of the passage in Vayikra 23:14), although bringing the special minḥat ha-omer is required if the sacrifice can be brought (see the continuation of the abovementioned passage).
Rava disagrees with both Rav and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, and rules that the minḥat ha-omer is valid and succeeds in permitting the new grain even if the kohen had improper intentions at the time that he took the kometz. He argues that the minḥat ha-omer really is unique inasmuch as it is the only meal offering brought from barley (all others are brought from wheat), so the ordinary sacrificial rules do not apply.
We examine the relative epistemological weight accorded to kal va-ḥomer (a fortiori reasoning) versus direct scriptural citation in classical rabbinic jurisprudence. Through analysis of Talmudic sugyot, medieval commentaries, and modern scholarship, I argue that the rabbis consistently subordinated logical inference to explicit textual authority, not from intellectual timidity but from a sophisticated understanding of the limits of human reason when applied to divine command.