Zevachim 16: מָה לְטָמֵא, שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא

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As we learned on our daf the second perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim deals with situations where there is some problem with the person who brings the sacrifice. One of the examples that appears in the Mishna is the case of an onen who sacrifices. An onen is someone who has a close relative who has passed away but has not yet been buried. Generally speaking, Jewish law anticipates that such a person is supposed to focus entirely on tending to the deceased and is free of all other mitzvot.

We explore the relation between anoint and the priest’s access to sacred space in Lev 21:12.

Zevachim 15: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתְּרוּ בְּבָמָה

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Our second Perek begins as follows:

All sacrifices whose blood was received by a non-Kohen, an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet), a tevul yom (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah; he is considered a tevul yom until nightfall), a mechusar kippurim (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah, and has waited until nightfall; he is just lacking atonement until he brings his offerings the next day), one who lacked the priestly vestments, one who did not wash his hands or feet, one who is uncircumcised, one who is tamei, someone who is sitting, someone who either is standing on vessels, an animal, or the feet of his friend, the sacrifice is invalid. If he received the blood with his left hand, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says it is valid.

We explore the blemished priest and how the talmud privileges the Talmud Chacham over the cultic.

Zevachim 14: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּהוֹלָכַת חַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת

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We learned on yesterday’s daf that according to Rabbi Shimon, holakha – carrying the blood – is not an essential avoda. The argument that he made was that the sacrifice cannot be brought without slaughtering the animal, collecting its blood or sprinkling its blood. Nevertheless if the sacrifice is slaughtered next to the altar, near the ulam (the hall leading to the Temple), then carrying the blood may not be necessary since the sprinkling can be done from there.

Reish Lakish points out on our daf that Rabbi Shimon would admit that in cases of sin-offerings that must have their blood sprinkled on the inner altar, holakha is an essential avoda. Since the animal cannot be slaughtered inside the Temple itself, the act of carrying the blood inside cannot be done in any other way.

We examine the complex relationship between temporal consciousness and ritual validity in rabbinic sacrificial discourse, focusing on a passage from Tractate Zevachim concerning piggul(ritual abomination) and temporal transgressions.

Zevachim 13: אֲקַפֵּחַ אֶת בָּנַיי, אִם לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי לְהַבְחִין הֶפְרֵשׁ

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A recurring theme throughout the first perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim has been that some sacrifices will become invalid if there are improper thoughts at the time that they are brought, while other sacrifices will remain valid korbanot, although they will not count towards their purpose and if their owner was obligated to bring that sacrifice, he will have to bring another.

During which activities will improper thoughts affect the sacrifice?

The Mishna on our daf mentions four parts of the avoda – of the sacrificial service – where proper intent is essential .

Zevachim 12: לֹא אֲמָרָהּ אֶלָּא לְחַדֵּד בָּהּ תַּלְמִידָיו

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This article examines the contemporary challenges and opportunities facing Judaism as it navigates the complexities of the 21st century. Drawing on recent warnings from public intellectuals like Yuval Noah Harari about a potential "spiritual catastrophe" in Judaism, this study integrates perspectives from modern Jewish philosophy, mystical theology, demographic trends, and emerging forms of Jewish identity. The analysis reveals that Judaism stands at a critical juncture where traditional categories of belonging are being redefined while core ethical and spiritual commitments face both internal and external pressures. Through examination of diaspora-sovereignty tensions, technological disruption, generational shifts, and theological innovation, this article argues that Judaism's future depends on its capacity to maintain creative tension between tradition and transformation, presence and absence, particularity and universality. A special addendum examines the crisis of moral injury among Israeli soldiers in contemporary warfare, analyzing how this phenomenon both reflects and contributes to Judaism's broader spiritual challenges.

Zevachim 11: הַפָּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ

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A new Mishnah discusses whether or not the pascal lamb is permitted if it was not brought at the right time. It might be valid because it is like another offering that was kosher even though it was brought at the wrong time. Another argument is that the pascal lamb must be offered at a very specific time to be permitted. We continue to think about what is permitted and what is not permitted before the official start of Pesach.

Is the daily afternoon offering in the afternoon allowed to be offered any time during the day as well? This is successfully challenged, again by considering other practices that might be dependent on a particular period of time - an example is the menorah, where the lighting actually lasts for the day.

We discuss the two Talmuds and their differences.

Zevachim 10: חוֹזְרַנִי חֲלִילָה

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On our daf, a baraita is brought where we find an expanded version of this argument. Rabbi Yehoshua responds to Rabbi Eliezer that a korban ḥattat and a korban asham are not similar and cannot be compared, since the blood from the sin-offering is sprinkled on the upper part of the altar.

The altar was divided into two – an upper half and a lower half. As Rashi explains, in the mishkan the altar had a ledge halfway up (see Shemot 27:5) while in the Temple the altar was divided by ḥut ha-sikra – a red line that was drawn in order to divide the top half of the altar from the bottom half in order to show where the blood of the different sacrifices had to be sprinkled.

We explore the Asham sacrifice and Milgrom’s analysis.

Zevachim 9: אֵין כַּפָּרָה לְמֵתִים

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If a sin-offering is brought for the purpose of being a ḥattat Naḥshon – i.e. to be like one of the sin-offerings brought by the princes on the occasion of the consecration of the Tabernacle in the desert (see Sefer Bamidbar chapter 7) – it remains a valid sacrifice that serves its original purpose. Rashi explains that since the sacrifice was not brought in order to affect atonement for anyone (the original sin-offerings at the consecration of the Tabernacle were more of a gift than an ordinary sin-offering), we view them as a standard ḥattat that remains valid.

We explore the literary figure of Nachshon and how that operated Midrashically and the fascinating paradox how Nachshon's offering creates a unique typological framework that challenges conventional understandings of sacrificial efficacy, particularly regarding the relationship between death, atonement, and the classificatory boundaries of different korbanot.

Zevachim 8: כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל

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The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Korban Pesach slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban Shelamim, as long as it was not slaughtered with intent that it serve as a Korban Pesach. The Gemara at one stage suggests that this law is derived from the verse, "If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hash-m, is from the flock..." (Vayikra 3:6). Using the method of "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal," the words "l'Zevach" and "la'Hashem" are general terms, and the word "Shelamim" is a specific term. Accordingly, the verse teaches that just as a Korban Pesach which was slaughtered to be a Shelamim is a valid Korban, it is a valid Korban if it is slaughtered with intent to be any other type of Korban, with one exception. The only time it should not be valid is when it was slaughtered, on any day other than Erev Pesach, with intent that it be a Korban Pesach.

The Gemara asks that if a law is being derived from the "Prat," then the law should be that only if the Pesach is slaughtered in the name of a Korban which can be offered voluntarily is it a valid Korban, but not if it is slaughtered in the name of a Chatas or Asham (which cannot be offered voluntarily). The Gemara answers that the word "l'Zevach" is a "Ribuy" (inclusive). How does this answer the Gemara's question?

We explore rule of klal ufrat as one of the 13 middot she HaTorah nidreshet.

Zevachim 7: תּוֹדָה קְרוּיָה שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין שְׁלָמִים קְרוּיִין תּוֹדָה

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There are four circumstances that generate a need for one to offer a Todah offering. The four circumstances are:

1. Travelling by sea,

2. Travelling through the desert,

3. Recovering from illness and

4. Being released from prison.

Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner (1), author of Teshuvas Shevet HaLevi, was asked whether a person who experiences a miracle is obligated to offer a Korban Todah or perhaps it is only a voluntary korban.

Rashi (2) in his commentary to the Torah uses language which indicates that one is obligated to bring a Korban Todah when he emerges from one of these four experiences.

Pri Megadim, however, asserts that when Rashi uses the term “obligatory” he meant that it is Rabbinically mandatory. Biblically it is appropriate for one to offer a Todah offering following these four incidents but it is not mandatory.

We explore the notion of gratitude.

Zevachim 6: לֹא כִּיפֵּר – קַמֵּי שְׁמַיָּא

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When someone violates a negative commandment, the Torah offers various punishments when it was done on purpose, and, under certain circumstances, requires a korban ḥattat – a sin offering – as atonement when it was done by accident. For neglecting to perform most positive commandments we do not find any punishment in the Torah, nor is there any requirement to bring a sacrifice for atonement. Nevertheless, the Sages suggest that the korban olah – the burnt offering – serves to atone for the neglect of a positive commandment.

The Gemara on our daf asks whether this sacrifice would atone even for missing positive commandments after the animal was set aside to be an olah, or is it limited to those transgressions that took place prior to the animal’s consecration.

We explore the notion of expiation and divine favor following the Olah.

Zevachim 5: מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ

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Although we have learned that a sacrifice must be brought lishmah – with the proper intention – the first Mishna (2a) teaches that if a sacrifice were brought she-lo li-shmah – with the wrong intention in mind, e.g. the animal had been set aside for one type of sacrifice but was slaughtered for a different sacrifice – it remains a valid sacrifice, although it does not count and the owner will need to bring another sacrifice to fulfill his obligation.

Reish Lakish is disturbed by this ruling, and argues that if the korban can be brought, it should serve its purpose, and if it does not serve its purpose, then why should it be brought? That is to say, if the need for lishmah is only an ideal, but the sacrifice remain valid, then why would it not fulfill its purpose? And if it is essential to have the sacrifice brought lishmah, then a korban without proper intent should be disqualified entirely.

Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis on the following verse :

“That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above.

In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.

We explore the notion of truth telling and when is it allowed to lie according to Halacha and moral theory.

Zevachim 4: וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקַבָּלָה

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In the previous dapim of Massekhet Zevaḥim we have seen the importance of the idea of lishmah – that the sacrifice must be brought with the appropriate intent, so that at the time when it is sacrificed the owner has in mind what the sacrifice is and why it is being brought. The Gemara on today’s daf searches for a source for that law.

The passage that is brought as a source is from Sefer Vayikra (3:1) where the Torah commands ve-im zevaḥ shelamim korbano – that if the sacrifice being brought was a korban shelamim – indicating that the sacrifice must be slaughtered with the specific intention that it was a shelamim. The Gemara continues with a discussion of how we can learn that each of the other avodot – activities of the sacrificial service aside from Sheḥita (slaughtering the animal) – also must be done with the proper intent, and finds specific sources for:

Kabalat ha-dam – collecting the blood at the time of slaughter

Holakah – carrying the sacrifice to the altar

Zerikat ha-dam – sprinkling the blood on the altar.

Zevachim 3: ״תּוֹכוֹ״ וְלֹא תּוֹךְ תּוֹכוֹ

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf one of the essential elements of a sacrifice is that all the parties involved have the appropriate thoughts at the time that the sacrifice is brought. Therefore, if the owner thinks that the sacrifice is being brought for a different korban than the one it was set aside for, the sacrifice does not count, and he must replace it with another.

On our daf the Gemara brings a statement made by Rav Yehuda quoting Rav who taught that although switching sacrifices would invalidate the korban, if the owner’s intent was that the animal would be slaughtered for ḥullin – not for a korban but for mundane purposes – then the sacrifice would remain valid. Apparently only a similar use will invalidate the korban; a totally dissimilar use will allow the sacrifice to remain valid.

We review the seder kodshim and explore intentionality in Korbanot.

Zevachim 2: מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר

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The sacrificial service in the Temple – referred to by the Sages simply as avoda, or “service” – is one of the foundations of the Torah and is considered one of the spiritual pillars upon which the world stands (see the Mishna in Massekhet Pirkei Avot 1:2). Even after the destruction of the Temple, when the laws of the sacrificial service became relevant only for Messianic times, the Sages continued to discuss these topics to the extent that we have an entire Order of Talmud – Seder Kodashim. Although we only have Gemara on Seder Kodashim in the Talmud Bavli, there is evidence from the works of the rishonim that there was Talmud Yerushalmi on it, as well, that was not preserved and appears to have been lost entirely.

Massekhet Zevaḥim offers a broad explication of the laws of sacrifices that are brought from live animals – that is, fowls and animals – while meal offerings have a tractate, Massekhet Menahot, devoted to those laws. The main topics discussed are the sacrifices themselves – how they are prepared, where they are brought, what would disqualify them – but not what animals are brought for each sacrifice. That topic is dealt with in other tractates, and not only in Seder Kodashim. For example, Yoma and Pesaḥim introduce the sacrifices of Yom Kippur and Pesaḥ; Nazir introduces the sacrifices brought by a Nazirite, etc. Our tractate also does not discuss the order of the sacrificial service in the Temple, neither on a daily basis (those laws appear in Massekhet Tamid) nor on holidays (those appear in tractates devoted to individual holidays).

Horayot 14: חַד אָמַר: סִינַי עֲדִיף, וְחַד אָמַר: עוֹקֵר הָרִים עֲדִיף

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On yesterday’s daf we learned of the differences of opinion between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on the one hand and Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Natan on the other hand. The Beit Shmuel explains that the following discussion in the Gemara offers some background to their disagreement.

Rabbi Yoḥanan taught: On the following point there is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages. One view is that “Sinai” – a well-read scholar – is superior to an “oker harim,” literally “one who uproots mountains,” i.e. a sharp dialectician and the other view is that the sharp dialectician is superior. Rav Yosef was a well-read scholar; Rabba was a sharp dialectician. A question was sent up to the scholars in Israel: Who of these should take precedence? They sent them word in reply: ‘A well-read scholar is to take precedence’; for the Master said, ‘All are dependent on the owner of the wheat’.

Horayot 13: זוֹ הָיְתָה בְּחֶזְקַת שָׁמוּר

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A new Mishnah states: "A Kohen takes precedence over a Levi (in every matter of honor); a Levi takes precedence over a Yisroel, a Yisroel takes precedence over a mamzer (product of forbidden relations upon punishment of death or kares); a mamzer takes precedence over a Nasin (descendants of the Gibeonites; people who fooled Yehoshua into allowing them to convert; Dovid HaMelech prohibited them from marrying into the congregation); a Nasin takes precedence over a convert; and a convert takes precedence over a freed Canaanite slave.”

We explore the relative wight given to Torah study and the position of the proselyte.

Horayot 12: כֹּל דִּתְדִירָה קָדְמָה

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As we learned, the shemen ha-mish’ḥa was used to anoint kings and high priests. The Rosh points out that the need to anoint the high priest is a clear passage in the Torah (see Ex 30:30), but there is a prohibition to use the oil on any other person (see Ex 30:32), whose punishment is karet (see above, daf 9). How was the decision made to use this oil on kings, as well?

He answers that the Gemara in Megilla understands that it is only forbidden to use this oil on a normal person. The king is not simply an adam (man) and therefore he does not fall into the category of the prohibition.

We explore the priest anointed for war in other military traditions and the origins of military chaplaincy.

Horayot 11: הוּא שַׁלּוּם הוּא צִדְקִיָּהוּ, הוּא יוֹחָנָן הוּא יְהוֹאָחָז

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Steinsaltz says:The word mashi’aḥ is invariably connected with Messianism and the end of days, but its actual meaning is “the anointed one” – that is, the one who has been anointed with anointing oil. In our context the term ha-kohen ha-mashi’aḥ (Vayikra 4:2) refers to the anointed priest who errs and sins. The Mishna teaches that this excludes a High Priest who is merubeh begadim – who serves with the additional vestments of the kohen gadol, but who has not been anointed, which was the case throughout most of the Second Temple period.

What was this shemen ha-mish’ḥa, this anointing oil?

The Torah teaches that a unique anointing oil must be prepared to consecrate the mishkan and its vessels as well as the High Priest, Aharon ha-kohen and his children.

Our Daf teaches that the kings of Israel were also anointed, although there was no need to anoint a king who replaced his father in peaceful succession.

We explore the ritual of anointing kings of Israel.

Horayot 10: אַשְׁרֵיהֶם לַצַּדִּיקִים שֶׁמַּגִּיעַ אֲלֵיהֶם כְּמַעֲשֵׂה הָרְשָׁעִים

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The Gemora relates an incident: Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua were once traveling on a ship. Rabban Gamliel had with him some bread while Rabbi Yehoshua had with him bread and flour. When Rabban Gamliel’s bread was consumed, he relied on Rabbi Yehoshua’s flour.

Rabban Gamliel asked him, “How did you know that we would be so much delayed that you brought flour with you?” Rabbi Yehoshua answered him, “There is a certain star that rises once every seventy years and leads the sailors off course, and I suspected that it might rise and lead us astray.” Rabban Gamliel said to him, “You possess so much knowledge and yet you must travel on a ship (in order to earn a livelihood)!”

Rabbi Yehoshua knew that a comet would likely be visible during his sea voyage, and that its light would confuse the sailors who navigated by the stars. That comet returned about once every 70 years.

We explore Jeremy Brown’s on the Jewish reception of the Copernican Revolution and Halley’s comet.