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Although we have learned that a sacrifice must be brought lishmah – with the proper intention – the first Mishna (2a) teaches that if a sacrifice were brought she-lo li-shmah – with the wrong intention in mind, e.g. the animal had been set aside for one type of sacrifice but was slaughtered for a different sacrifice – it remains a valid sacrifice, although it does not count and the owner will need to bring another sacrifice to fulfill his obligation.
Reish Lakish is disturbed by this ruling, and argues that if the korban can be brought, it should serve its purpose, and if it does not serve its purpose, then why should it be brought? That is to say, if the need for lishmah is only an ideal, but the sacrifice remain valid, then why would it not fulfill its purpose? And if it is essential to have the sacrifice brought lishmah, then a korban without proper intent should be disqualified entirely.
Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis on the following verse :
“That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above.
In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.
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