Horayot 9: כָּאן – בְּדַלּוּת, כָּאן – בְּדַלֵּי דַלּוּת

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 9

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishnah earlier (8b) records an argument between Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili and Rebbi Akiva. Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili maintains that the Beis Din and the Nasi are not obligated to bring a Korban for transgressing the Isurim which mandate a Korban Oleh v'Yored -- the Isur of Shemi'as Kol, the Isur of Bituy Sefasayim, and the Isur of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. Rebbi Akiva maintains that the Nasi is obligated to bring his special Korban for transgressing these Isurim, except for the Isur of Shemi'as Kol, since the Nasi is never called upon to give testimony as a witness.

An anointed priest and a court are exempt; just as a court is exempt from all of the sliding-scale offerings, so too, an anointed priest is exempt from all of them, not only from the offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is not difficult, as there is a distinction between the rulings. Here, in the passage that deems the anointed priest liable in cases other than the defiling the Temple, it is in the case of an offering brought due to poverty, whereas there, in the latter clause, it is in the case of an offering brought due to extreme poverty. And Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to one halakhaand disagrees with him with regard to one other halakha. He holds in accordance withthe opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the case of extreme poverty that the anointed priest is exempt from bringing that meal-offering. And he disagrees with Rabbi Akiva in the case of poverty, as he does not hold that the anointed priest is completely exempt from bringing a sliding-scale offering.

This text reveals not merely technical legal distinctions but profound theological and social perspectives on poverty, religious obligation, and communal hierarchy. The passage's reference to Rabbi Akiva's position on dalei dallut (extreme poverty) provides a window into understanding how one of the most influential Talmudic sages approached questions of economic disparity and religious duty.

Horayot 8: ״אָנֹכִי״ וְ״לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ״ מִפִּי הַגְּבוּרָה שְׁמַעְנוּם

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 8

To download, click/tap here: PDF

§ In any event, everyone agrees that where these verses are written, it is with regard to idol worship that they are written. The Gemara asks: As the verse does not mention idol worship explicitly, from where is this inferred. Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, and some say that the statement is unattributed, that the verse states:

“And when you act unwittingly, and do not perform all these commandments [kol hamitzvot] that the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). Which is the mitzva that is the equivalent of all the mitzvot? You must say: It is the prohibition against idol worship.

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that the verse states:

“That the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22), and it is written:

“That the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Numbers 15:23). Which isthe mitzva that was introduced in the speech of the Holy One, Blessed be He, heard by the Jewish people, and which He commanded in the Torah by means of Moses? You must say: This is idol worship, as Rabbi Yishmael taught concerning the first two commandments:

“I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3): We, the Jewish people, heard them from the mouth of the Almighty.

We examine the fundamental theological paradox embedded within Talmudic discussions of divine revelation, specifically focusing on the tension between direct divine speech and mediated prophetic transmission. The Talmudic passage from Horayot 8a, attributed to the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, highlights a critical interpretive problem: while Scripture presents Moses as the mediator of divine law, it simultaneously suggests that Israel heard certain commandments directly from God.

Horayot 7: אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 7

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf teaches that the cases of the High Priest and the High Court are parallel. When the High Court rules erroneously and that decision is acted upon by the majority of the Jewish community, the High Court will be obligated to bring a sin-offering on behalf of the community. Similarly, when the High Priest made a decision on Jewish law in error and acts upon his ruling, he will bring a unique sin-offering.

In both of these cases it is not the forbidden act itself that creates an obligation to bring the sacrifice, rather it is specifically the mistaken ruling that precipitates the forbidden act that creates that obligation.

We explore the tension between public responsibility and private culpability has been a central concern of political philosophy since antiquity. When leaders act, do they act as individuals or as embodiments of institutional authority?

How should societies balance the need for effective governance with demands for accountability? These questions, which animate contemporary debates about executive power, political immunity, and democratic responsibility, find their earliest systematic treatment in an unlikely source: the Talmudic discussion of the Anointed Kohen's liability for sin.

Horayot 6: מָשִׁיחַ בְּפַר וְאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 6

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The first Mishna opens with the kohen gadol, teaching that he will bring his sin-offering only if both the decision and the forbidden action were made in error. The Mishna teaches specifically that if either were done purposefully – if the decision to permit a forbidden action were done intentionally, but the act was done accidentally or if the decision was made by accident, but the act was done on purpose – then the sacrifice would not be brought.

In the Bible, sacrificial offerings are meticulously detailed, revealing a structured hierarchy among animals used in these rites.

This hierarchy is not merely practical but imbued with symbolic significance, reflecting broader cultural values, economic considerations, and theological emphases.

Horayot 5: שֵׁבֶט אֶחָד דְּאִקְּרִי קָהָל

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 5

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara asks how Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon derive that each tribe is considered to be a kahal – a community – in itself, which obligates them in individual community sin-offerings.

One suggestion is that the source is a passage in Sefer Divrei HaYamim II, or Chronicles II (20:5) that refers to King Yehoshafat standing in the midst of kahal Yehuda – the community of the tribe of Yehuda – in Jerusalem. Although only a single tribe was there, nevertheless they were called a kahal.

The Gemara rejects this source, arguing that Jerusalem cannot be brought as a proof, since the tribe of Binyamin was there, as well. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov suggests another source, pointing out that the patriarch Ya’akov refers to a promise made by God to grant him a kahal (see Bereshit 48:4, as well as 35:11) and only a single child, Binyamin, was yet to be born.

We explore the transition from tribalism to kehillah.

Horayot 4: עָשׂוּ כָּל הַקָּהָל שׁוֹגְגִין – מְבִיאִין פַּר

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 4

To download, click/tap here: PDF

In the previous mishnah we learned that if the court issued an errant ruling and everyone acted erroneously in accord with that ruling, they bring a bull, as it says in Leviticus 4:14, “The congregation shall offer a bull of the herd as a sin offering.”

Our mishnah discusses who the “congregation” is that brings the bull. Throughout this mishnah we will read that there is a distinction made between sins involving idol worship and all other sins.

In the introduction to the tractate, we explained that the rabbis understood Leviticus 4 as referring to regular sins and Numbers 15:22-29 as referring to idol worship.

If the sin was idol worship, then the congregation brings a bull and a goat (Numbers 15:24). עָשׂוּ כָּל הַקָּהָל שׁוֹגְגִין – מְבִיאִין פַּר

We explore communal culpability in Biblical and Talmudic traditions.

Horayot 3: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – דָּבָר, וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 3

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The rabbis continue their conversation about responsibility. When the beit din errs in its judgement and a person follows the beit din, is he liable? If he does not follow the ruling of the beit din, is he liable for not following their ruling? While the rabbis are clear in their exoneration of the individual, they question what should happen when a group of people are involved.

Are none of them liable? What if the beit din is comprised of dozens of Sages, but only one person disagrees with the ruling. Is that judge excluded from liability, as well, when his colleagues are held responsible for their error?

What about representation of the Jewish people? The rabbis wonder about a majority of Jews, and what this might mean.

We explore modern notions of egalitarianism form Rav Lichtenstein’s sensitivities and beyond to the embracing of LGBTQ in Halacha.

Horayot 2: אוֹ תַּלְמִיד וְהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה

For the source text click/tap here: Horayot 2

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Massekhet Horayot deals with mistakes made by Jewish courts and by Jewish leaders, and the atonement sacrifices that are brought as a consequence of those errors.

Although the focus of the tractate deals with the sacrificial service, and it would appear that the proper place for it would have been in Seder Kodashim, it appears in Seder Nezikin because it, too, serves as a continuation and completion of Massekhet Sanhedrin. After learning the rules and regulations that apply to the Jewish court system, and specifically to the Great Sanhedrin that legislates and rules on capital crimes, it is important to also address the issue of how to deal with mistakes. It is impossible to avoid all circumstances of errors and mistakes, so we must be prepared for such situations, including arranging for atonement for them.

Avodah Zarah 76: אִידְּכַר מַאי עֲבַדְתְּ בְּאוּרְתָּא

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 76

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Shevor Malka – Shapur – was the name of a number of Persian kings. Our final Daf in Avodah Zara appears to be referring to the first king Shapur, who continued his father’s success in wars against the Roman Empire, capturing the city of Netzivim and arriving at the border of Syria.

In the course of a number of attacks, he not only defeated the Roman emperor Valerian, but he captured him and held him until his death.

With regard to internal matters, he was an open-minded leader and allowed a good deal of freedom of religion. As is apparent from our Gemara, he was knowledgeable regarding Jewish customs.

We explore the figure of Shapur in rabbinic literature who represents far more than historical documentation; he functions as a multifaceted character through whom the rabbis explored, articulated, and transmitted their sophisticated understanding of minority survival strategies. Through carefully crafted narratives involving this Persian monarch, the Talmudic sages encoded lessons about diplomatic finesse, the preservation of religious integrity under foreign rule, and the transformation of apparent powerlessness into moral authority.

Avodah Zarah 75: מְלַבְּנָן וּמַטְבִּילָן וְהֵן טְהוֹרִין

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 75

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Utensils that are made by non-Jews and purchased by Jews must be dipped in a kosher mikveh prior to their use.

The source for this halakha is the passage in Sefer Bamidbar (31:23) that describes how after the war with the Midianites, all metal vessels that were taken as booty in the war needed to be washed be-mei nidda – in a kosher mikveh containing 40 se’a of water. This is not a requirement connected to the laws of kashrut; the Torah requires this even if the utensil had been made kosher by means of heat in fire beforehand.

We explore the halachic ramifications of toveling keilim.

Avodah Zarah 74: סְתָם יַיִן אֲפִילּוּ יַיִן בְּיַיִן — מוּתָּר

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 74

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishnah's treatment of bitul (nullification) in our daf Avodah Zarah 74a presents a fascinating paradox within halakhic reasoning. While Jewish law generally operates on quantitative principles—most notably the rule that forbidden substances become nullified when diluted in sixty times their volume (batel b'shishim)—the Mishnah systematically enumerates a series of exceptions where any amount of contamination renders the entire mixture forbidden.

We explore the possible commonality of the diverse forbidden objects of our mishnah’s exception to the rule of batel beshishim.

Avodah Zarah 73: הִגְדִּילוּ בְּאִיסּוּר — אָסוּר, הִגְדִּילוּ בְּהֶיתֵּר — מוּתָּר

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 73

To download, click/tap here: PDF

When we have mixtures of foods that are forbidden with foods that are permitted, can the forbidden food ever be perceived as so insignificant that it is nullified so that the mixture can be eaten?

The Mishna on our daf teaches that yayin nesekh – wine that has been poured off as a libation to pagan gods – that is mixed with other wine – can never be nullified. Similarly, water that has been sacrificed in that way that has been mixed with other water can never be nullified. Water mixed with wine or wine mixed with water, however, will become nullified if the volume of the permitted liquid overwhelms the forbidden liquid to the extent that it can no longer be tasted.

The general principle is that min be-mino – in a mixture where the two things are similar – one cannot nullify the other; min shelo be-mino – when the mixture is two dissimilar things – one can nullify the other.

In the intersection of ancient religious law and modern scientific understanding often reveals surprising parallels and illuminating contrasts. Few areas demonstrate this more clearly than the Talmudic laws of mixtures (ta'arovet) and contemporary fluid mechanics and chemistry. Both traditions grapple with fundamental questions about identity, boundaries, and the persistence of essential properties when substances combine.

Avodah Zarah 72: הַנִּצּוֹק וְהַקָּטַפְרֵס וּמַשְׁקֶה

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 72

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf is concerned whether when wine is poured into a barrel containing forbidden wine, perhaps the connection between the liquids will cause the permitted wine to become prohibited, as well. This theme leads to a number of warnings made to Jews who dealt with wine, as described by the Gemara.

Steinsaltz remarks "We find many pictures from the ancient world that show groups of people drinking from a single vessel by means of tubes and siphons. Some suggest that the words used in the Gemara to describe this – gishta and bat gishta – are related to the Persian word “to suckle” although the philological evidence is not clear.”

we explore the concepts of nitsok (stream), katafres (descending water), and mashkeh tofe’ach (moistening liquid)—and compares these ancient understandings with modern scientific knowledge of fluid dynamics, microbiology, and contamination theory.

Avodah Zarah 71: הָנֵי פָּרְסָאֵי מְשַׁדְּרִי פַּרְדָּשְׁנֵי לַהֲדָדֵ

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 71

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf discusses how one can sell wine to a non-Jew, since the wine will become stam yeinam as soon as it is poured into his container. The Mishna teaches that if the non-Jewish buyer and the Jewish seller came to an agreement regarding the price of the wine before it was measured out into the non-Jew’s container, then the money is permitted. If, however, the wine was first measured out and only afterwards the price was discussed, then the Jew cannot make use of the money since the wine had already become stam yeinam before the sale took place.

We explore the use of wine in other ancient traditions and it transforming properties in their myths.

Avodah Zarah 70: לְנַסֵּךְ אֵין פְּנַאי, לִבְעוֹל יֵשׁ פְּנַאי

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 70

To download, click/tap here: PDF

According to the Mishna on our daf, when a boleshet – an army unit – entered the city, during peacetime we are concerned about open barrels of wine but not about closed barrels of wine. During wartime we rule that all barrels of wine are permitted – whether open or closed – since we assume that the soldiers will not have time for libations to their gods, since they are occupied with their fighting.

When Rav Mari declared on our daf that soldiers "do not have time to pour libations, as their passion for idolatry is not pressing at that time, but they have time to engage in intercourse, because their lust is great even during wartime," he articulated a psychological insight that would not be fully understood by Western science for nearly two millennia.

This remarkable statement, found in Avodah Zarah 70b, represents one of the earliest systematic attempts to understand the differential psychology of human drives under military stress—a topic that has only recently become the subject of rigorous scientific investigation.

We explore The Limits of Virtue: Moral Psychology and Military Conduct.

Avodah Zarah 69: בְּבָא לָהֶם דֶּרֶךְ עֲקַלָּתוֹן

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 69

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf describes several cases where barrels of wine are left in a place where a non-Jew has access to them and the Jew who is in charge of the wine leaves.

We explore the complex halakhic framework governing when and under what circumstances Jewish law permits trust in gentiles, particularly in matters of wine supervision and commercial relationships.

We discover a sophisticated criteria for evaluating gentile trustworthiness based on factors including supervision, time constraints, legal status, and situational context. Rather than blanket prohibition or permission, the halakhic system creates nuanced categories that reflect both practical concerns about idolatrous wine and broader principles of inter-group relations.

We end with the scholarship of Jacob Katz and his groundbreaking work on the fraught Jewish Gentile relationships during the medieval and modern period.

Avodah Zarah 68: הֲלֹא עוֹלֶה עַל שֻׁלְחָן שֶׁל מְלָכִים

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 68

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Rav Sheishes answered: Usually, Rav holds that if a forbidden item imparts a detrimental taste to the mixture, it is permitted. However, a mouse is a novel law, as people think it is repulsive, yet even so, the Torah specifically forbids it. It therefore forbids other things as well even though it imparts a detrimental taste to the mixture. The Rabbis asked Rav Sheishes: If this is so, whether it is moist or dried out it should transmit tumah!? However, the Mishna says that it only transmits tumah if it is moist (i.e. alive in normal conditions) and not if it is dried out!?

The Gemora replies: According to this, semen should also transmit tumah both when it is moist and dry. However, the Mishna says it only transmits tumah when it is moist. It therefore must be that the Torah only said it transmits tumah when it is in a form where it can fertilize, as opposed to when it is dry.

We explore the transition from Bible to Talmud in attitudes to semen and seminal emission.

Avodah Zarah 67: גִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם לָאו נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם הוּא

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 67

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemora had stated regarding the emissions of utensils used by idolaters that have been used within twenty-four hours, it is impossible that the absorption is not deemed slightly bad, and although with respect to all prohibitions, such a taste would be permitted, nevertheless, the Torah states that one is prohibited from using such a pot unless it is first scalded. The Ramban asks: If in regard to those utensils used by idolaters, the flavor is regarded like the substance, how is it possible to say that with respect to other prohibitions, the flavor is not forbidden like the substance?

Are the emissions from the idolaters’ utensils a distinct class of prohibition, different from any other prohibitions? The Midianite utensils were forbidden out of the concern that there were nonkosher foods cooked inside of it!

We explore the particular offense of Midian in bible and its transformation in talmud.

Avodah Zarah 66: רֵיחֵיהּ חַלָּא וְטַעְמָא חַמְרָא

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 66

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara discusses a case in which a Nochri made holes in the top of his wine barrel in order to determine the amount of time it would keep fresh. Is a Jew allowed to smell this wine for the Nochri, or is that considered having benefit from Yayin Nesech?

TOSFOS (DH Yisrael) points out that the Gemara must be referring to a case in which the Jew smells the wine for free, and the Nochri does not consider this as a favor from the Jew for which he owes his gratitude, because otherwise this act would be forbidden (the Jew would be receiving tangible benefit for working with Yayin Nesech).

Abaye answers that smell is included in the prohibition against deriving benefit from Yayin Nesech. Rava argues that smelling the wine is permitted, because smell is not considered a benefit, and thus the Jew who smells the wine does not benefit from Yayin Nesech.

We explore the Halacha of smell.

Avodah Zarah 65: וּמִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם

For the source text click/tap here: Avodah Zarah 65

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Msihnah: If yen nesekh falls on other types of foods, such as dates or figs, the food becomes prohibited only if the wine improves the flavor of the food. The mishnah mentions a story of a person who carried figs and yen nesekh on a ship. When one of the casks of wine broke on the figs, he asked the Sages if the figs were still permissible, and they permitted them. Since the wine does not improve the flavor of the figs, the person has not derived benefit from the wine and therefore the figs are permitted.

We explore the halachic ramifications of nosein taam as well as the science and history of food coloring.