Shavuot 41: מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין שְׁבוּעָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לִשְׁבוּעָה דְּרַבָּנַן

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Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This sanction is no less severe than entering his property and collecting the debt; it is like grabbing him by his testicles [bekhuveseih] until he surrenders his cloak. Rather, what do we do to him? Rav Ashi said to him: We excommunicate him until the time to flog him comes, i.e., for thirty days, and if he still refuses to take an oath or reach a settlement with the claimant, we flog him and then leave him alone.

In antiquity, the testicles were imbued with deep symbolic significance, representing not merely biological reproductive power but also masculinity, social authority, and the integrity of lineage.

Shavuot 40: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין, וְקָדַם וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין

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As we learned above (daf 38) the halakha is that a kofer bakol – a defendant who totally denies a monetary claim made against him – is believed without being required to bring any further proof; if he is modeh be-miktzat – he denies that he owes all of the money, but admits that he owes part of it – then he must pay the amount that he admits to and then take an oath that he does not owe any more.

According to Shmuel, this ruling applies even in cases where the plaintiff demands two different things; for example, if he claimed that the defendant owed him wheat and barley and the defendant admitted only to the claim that he owed him wheat. Shmuel rules that he will have to pay the wheat that he owed and take an oath that he did not owe the barley.

We explore the legal ramifications of half vs full denial and plausible deniability.

Shavuot 39: וְשַׂמְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת פָּנַי בָּאִישׁ הַהוּא וּבְמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ

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Regarding all other sins he is punished, but here both he and his family are punished. Is this true? Doesn’t the verse say (regarding one who passes his children over to Molech) and I will put My face in that man and his family? The braisa states: If he sinned, why should his family be punished? This teaches that there is no family that has a tax collector (i.e. collects taxes to receive profit) which is not a family of tax collectors.

The concept of collective family punishment presents one of the most challenging theological problems in biblical literature. When Joshua 7:24-25 describes the destruction of Achan's entire household—including children who bore no direct responsibility for their father's transgression—it raises profound questions about divine justice and the nature of moral accountability. This phenomenon, where punishment extends beyond the primary offender to encompass innocent family members, appears repeatedly throughout biblical narratives and demands careful theological examination.

Shavuot 38: בָּעֵינַן שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד

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The sixth perek of Massekhet Shevuot, Perek Shevuat HaDayyanim, begins on our daf. The focus of this perek is those oaths that the beit din will impose on a defendant in situations where we do not have two reliable witnesses testifying against him.

The most common case of such an oath is when the defendant offers only a partial denial to the claim made against him.

One enigmatic rule in Jewish law is the law that distinguishes between two different responses to an accusation that one person owes money to another. The halakha is that if the defendant denies it entirely we believe him without requiring him to bring any further proof; if he denies that he owes all of the money, but admits that he owes part of it, then he must pay the amount that he admits to and then take an oath that he does not owe any more.

Why do we trust the individual who denies it all, while making the person who admits that he owes some of the money take an oath?

Shavuot 37: רַבָּנַן דָּרְשִׁי כְּלָלֵי וּפְרָטֵי

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf according to the Torah (Sefer Vayikra 5:21-26), if someone has received something to watch and denies having it when the owner asks to get it back, swearing falsely, he will be obligated not only to return the object, but he will also have to pay an additional 20% as a penalty, and bring an asham (guilt) sacrifice in addition.

This Torah law is particularly unusual because these punishments – including the 20% penalty and the asham sacrifice – will be applied even in cases where the perpetrator has taken the false oath on purpose, while sacrifices for atonement are usually brought only when the sin was done accidentally. The Gemara on today’s daf quotes Rav Kahana as asking whether in a situation where all of the requirements were in place for actual punishment – where the witnesses warned the perpetrator that his action is forbidden and that he will be punished for it – will the sacrifice to suffice, or perhaps it will be replaced by malkot – lashes – that are the ordinary punishment for such an act, or perhaps we should require both malkot and korban.

Shavuot 36: הַמְקַלֵּל עַצְמוֹ וַחֲבֵירוֹ

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This teaches that if someone curses his father and mother, he is only liable (to be killed) if he uses the Name of Hashem. The Mishna discusses someone who curses himself or a friend.

Rabbi Yannai says: Everyone agrees to this. One is liable for cursing himself, as the verse says: Just guard yourself, and watch your soul carefully. This is like the statement of Rabbi Avin in the name of Rabbi Illa that whenever the verse uses the words, “hishamer” -- “guard,” “pen” -- “lest” and “al” - - “do not” (the unconventional form of “lo”) it means that this is a negative prohibition. This is also true regarding one’s friend, as the verse says: do not curse a deaf person.

The Mishna says that saying, “Hashem should strike you down,” whether in the singular or plural (you), is the alah written in the Torah. Rav Kahana sat before Rav Yehudah and quoted this Mishna as it is written. Rav Yehudah said to him, switch the word (i.e. do not say you, as you are saying Hashem should strike me down).

We explore the biblical notion of cursing vs the rabbinic.

Shavuot 35: יש שמות שנמחקין, ויש שמות שאין נמחקין

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The verse (Vayikra 19:12) says, “Do not swear with My name falsely.”

This teaches that an oath in the Torah is generally administered using the name of God. Rashi (see Ra”n to Ri”f) and Rambam write that this applies to all types of oaths. The Mishnah presents the various forms of God’s name which effect a shariah.

The Mishnah also teaches the halacha regarding the names of God for which a person would be liable if they were used to curse another person. The halacha at the end of the Mishnah mentions that if someone says cid:clip_image001.pngGod should smite you), this is an expression of cursing.

We discuss what is shem hamalchus (Rav Lichtenstein) as well as Prof Kimelman’s landmark Birchas Haminin.

Shavuot 34: שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי

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R’ Acha’s opinion is that a court may judge a case using strong indications of fact, even without solid proof.

For example, the Gemara cites the case of R’ Shimon ben Shetach, who one time saw a person chasing after another with a knife to kill him. As the two ran into an abandoned building, R’ Shimon ben Shetach chased after them, only to find the pursuer coming out carrying the knife dripping with blood, and the victim still laying in death throes on the ground.

R’ Shimon ben Shetach cried out, “You evil one! You killed this person, but I cannot judge you, because the Torah requires two witnesses to bring someone to justice. Nevertheless, Hashem will avenge this person’s blood from you!”

The story concluded with R’ Shimon’s words coming true, as a snake came and bit the murderer and killed him. In any case, if R’ Acha’s approach was accepted, we would have judged a case similar to that of R’ Shimon ben Shetach, where the circumstances were those of strong indications of guilt.

Though he is clearly disturbed by the scene, R. Shimon ben Shetah does not actually kill the murderer, and we need not read his story as implying that he should have. Instead, we can read him as arguing that the problem is the willingness to just accept the legal restrictions without a word of moral dismay.

We explore the enduring tension between moral certainty and legal proof through the lens of both ancient rabbinic jurisprudence and contemporary legal philosophy.

Shavuot 33: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וּפִתָּה אֶת בִּתּוֹ

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According to the Mishna on our daf the halakhot of shevuat ha-eidut – the laws governing cases where a person refuses to offer testimony, swearing that he does not have information that would be useful in court – only apply to monetary cases. Thus, were someone to swear that he had no information about whether someone was a kohen or a levi, even if he was lying, the laws of shevuat ha-eidut would not apply.

A new Mishnah states "“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a Kohen, or, that I am a Levi, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a chalutzah; that so-and-so is a Kohen, or, that so-and-so is a Levi, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a chalutzah; that so-and-so violated another's daughter, or seduced his daughter; that my son injured me; that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on Shabbos,” — they are exempt “

We explore marital rape in talmud and scholarship.

Shavuot 32: שְׁנֵיהֶן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר

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The Gemora (Nedarim 87a) issues a halachic ruling: The halachah is that a statement which follows another statement within the period of an utterance is regarded as if it were made together with the first one except in the case of blasphemy, idolatry, betrothal and divorce. (If one commits blasphemy or practices idolatry, and immediately, within the period of utterance, retracts, his retraction is unavailing, and he will still incur the death penalty. If a man betroths a woman or divorces her, and immediately thereafter changes his mind, such withdrawal is invalid.)

The Ran comments that he doesn’t know why these cases are different and from where did the Rabbis derive this. It would seem, he says, that in regard to other things that are not as serious, when a person does them, he doesn’t do them with absolute intent.

We explore the Halachic and linguistic aspects of “toch kedei dibbur”

Shavuot 31: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת

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Mi-devar sheker tirḥak – “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Shemot 23:7).

The Gemara on our daf offers a series of applications of this passage.

Among them we find:

When a teacher says to his student “you know that I would not lie, even if I was offered money; I have only a single witness to a loan that I made – please join the witness in testifying on my behalf” – how do we know it is forbidden to do so?

Mi-devar sheker tirḥak

When a judge hears testimony and know that the witnesses are lying, how do we know that he should not say “since the witnesses are testifying, I will rule accordingly and the responsibility will rest on their shoulders” (the language of the Gemara is that the kolar will be hung on the necks of the witnesses – a kolar being a metal chain that was put around the neck of prisoners)?

Mi-devar sheker tirḥak

We explore oath taking and compare to its New Testament refusals.

Shavuot 30: וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים

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The fourth perek of Massekhet Shevuot begins on today’s daf, and – as its name Shevuat HaEdut (The Oath of Testimony) indicates – its focus is on oaths taken in response to a demand that someone testify about something that he witnessed, and he refuses to testify. This law is based on the passage in Sefer Vayikra (5:1).

The Mishna opens by listing who is included in this law and who is exempt from it. Thus, the law applies only to men and not to women, it does not apply to relatives who cannot testify nor to people who are removed from testimony because of forbidden acts that they committed (e.g. if they are robbers).

Shavuot 29: קַיִּימוּ כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ

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If someone takes an oath that something is different than what is known to be, this is a shevuas shav. For example, if someone takes an oath that a pillar of stone is gold, or that a certain man is in fact a woman, or that a certain woman is in fact a man, this is a shevuas shav.

It is interesting to note that although a person who takes such a shevuat shav will be liable to bring a sacrifice, had he taken a neder such as this, he would not be held responsible in any way, as we would assume that he is simply exaggerating, or speaking in a manner that is not serious.

A second new Mishna teaches us more about oaths said in vain. We are taught that vain oaths regarding oneself apply to both men and women, relatives and strangers, people who are qualified to testify and people who are not qualified to testify, inside of the beit din and outside of the beit din. If one transgresses, s/he is either lashed or s/he brings an offering. A person can put an oath on someone else if that someone answers, "amen" after the person has stated the oath.

Shavuot 28: אִישְׁתַּבַּשְׁתְּ

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Building upon previous research establishing philosophical allegories as frameworks for healing relationships and the application of tzimtzum hermeneutics to patient narratives, this paper synthesizes traditional parabolic discourse with contemporary therapeutic practice through comparative analysis of Kafka, Benjamin, and Rebbe Nachman's parabolic thought. This study extends our prior work on Plato's Cave versus Ramchal's maze metaphors and mystical hermeneutics in medical encounters by examining how classical parabolic traditions provide interpretive frameworks for understanding patients as "living parables." Drawing on established foundations of patient-as-sacred-text methodology and covenantal therapeutic relationships, we demonstrate how traditional mashal structures parallel contemporary hermeneutic approaches to clinical practice. This analysis reveals how parabolic interpretation challenges reductionist biomedicine while offering robust philosophical foundations for integrative healing practice that honors both scientific rigor and spiritual depth.

Shavuot 27: עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה תַּחְתֶּיהָ

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The Talmud often interrogates the problem of speech without sincere intent, a form of halakhic lip service. For example:

A person says, “I swear I will fast,” but says it jokingly or in anger.

Does the external form of the statement bind them, even if their heart was not in it?

Schick argues that these cases reveal the Talmud’s discomfort with legal automation—the idea that words alone, detached from context and sincerity, should generate obligation.

This leads to the idea of legal interpretation as psychoanalysis: the Beit Din must discern what was meant, not merely what was said.

Thought Without Speech: Can the Heart Alone Obligate?

The inverse question also arises: if someone intended to take a vow but never uttered it, is it binding?

The general rule in the Talmud is: “Devarim shebalev einam devarim” — “unspoken thoughts are not legally significant” (Kiddushin 49b).

We struggle between lip service and affairs of the heart.

Shavuot 26: ״בִּשְׂפָתַיִם״ וְלֹא בַּלֵּב

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What if one only thinks the oath? Is it necessary to speak the oath aloud be liable if the oath is broken? A baraita notes that an oath is not in the heart alone. If a person resolved in his heart to say an oath but never spoke it aloud, some rabbis say that he is not liable. However, the rabbis determine that an oath must be spoken.

Which leads us to the thorny issue of lip service from the semantic and metaphoric perspective.

Shavuot 25: אִם רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ

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We have already noted the basic difference between a neder and a shevua that is commented on by the Gemara. While a neder acts on an object (e.g. a person declares that meat is forbidden to him), a shevua acts on the person (e.g. he accepts upon himself a prohibition that will keep him from eating meat).

The case of the Mishna on our daf, where someone takes a shevua that he will not sleep, will only work if it is an oath, since “sleep” is not an object, and it can only become forbidden by means of a shevua (which will create a prohibition on the person keeping him from sleeping).

We explore the physiology of sleep and insomnia as a mark of asceticism.

Shavuot 24: אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל

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Can someone add shevuot on to existing shevuot? Can he “pile on” additional prohibitions to ones that exist already?

The Gemara on our daf introduces us to two concepts that may allow him to do just that: issur kollel and issur mosif.

Issur kollel means an inclusive prohibition. In a case of issur kollel we do not find an extra prohibition added, rather the new issur expands the context of the already existing prohibition so that this activity is now included under a different category at the same time that it retains its original prohibition.

An example of this is a nevela – non-kosher meat that is forbidden in-and-of itself – that is eaten on Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur creates a situation wherein all food is prohibited, the nevela will gain a second prohibition in addition to its basic prohibition.

Issur mosif means an additional, or expanded, prohibition. There are some cases where the issur does not fall under a larger category that adds a prohibition to it, rather there is an actual addition made to it that did not exist beforehand.

Shavuot 23: כִּי אָמְרִינַן אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל

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The Gemara on our daf asks why the first tanna distinguishes between food that is not edible and food that is forbidden, since from a halakhic perspective, forbidden food is also not considered edible!

We return to the prior discussion regarding the liability of the Am Haaretz vs Talmid Chacham as well as the archetype of the pious fool .

Shavuot 22: קוּנָּם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי

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If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he atethe meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable.

And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It iskonam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

We explore the possible reciprocity of the wife makes the oath

And the ascetic tendencies of the Ramban whether it might have been influenced by his disputation with the Dominicans.