For the source text click/tap here: Shavuot 34
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R’ Acha’s opinion is that a court may judge a case using strong indications of fact, even without solid proof.
For example, the Gemara cites the case of R’ Shimon ben Shetach, who one time saw a person chasing after another with a knife to kill him. As the two ran into an abandoned building, R’ Shimon ben Shetach chased after them, only to find the pursuer coming out carrying the knife dripping with blood, and the victim still laying in death throes on the ground.
R’ Shimon ben Shetach cried out, “You evil one! You killed this person, but I cannot judge you, because the Torah requires two witnesses to bring someone to justice. Nevertheless, Hashem will avenge this person’s blood from you!”
The story concluded with R’ Shimon’s words coming true, as a snake came and bit the murderer and killed him. In any case, if R’ Acha’s approach was accepted, we would have judged a case similar to that of R’ Shimon ben Shetach, where the circumstances were those of strong indications of guilt.
Though he is clearly disturbed by the scene, R. Shimon ben Shetah does not actually kill the murderer, and we need not read his story as implying that he should have. Instead, we can read him as arguing that the problem is the willingness to just accept the legal restrictions without a word of moral dismay.
We explore the enduring tension between moral certainty and legal proof through the lens of both ancient rabbinic jurisprudence and contemporary legal philosophy.