Chullin 19: מַחֲזִיר סִימָנִים לַאֲחוֹרֵי הָעוֹרֶף וּמוֹלֵק

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A new Mishna teaches us that when we slaughter from the side of the throat, the slaughter is valid. If one pinches the neck of a bird offering from the side, the slaughter is not valid. It is valid to pinch from the nape of the neck or slaughters from the throat. But if one pinches from the throat, the slaughter is not valid because the entire nape is valid for pinching and the entire throat is valid for slaughter. What is valid for slaughter is not valid for pinching and what is valid for pinching is not valid for slaughter.

We explore shechita of fowl and Halacha.

Chullin 18: לִיעַיְּינוּ רַבָּנַן בְּמִלְּתֵיהּ, דִּתְלוּ בֵּיהּ טַפְלֵ

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The slaughter knife needs to be absolutely smooth, without notches. It needs be examined using the flesh and the nail of a finger. In addition, the appointed slaughterer needs to show his knife for inspection to the local Sage, as a way of expressing the honor due the Sage.

The correct place for the slaughter cut is the front of the neck of the animal, and the knife should cut more than half of the trachea and esophagus. The trachea itself is encircled by many successive rings of cartilage, which are horseshoe shaped. The uppermost ring is a complete ring, and it forms the upper limit of the cut. If he cut above the upper ring, the shechitah is not kosher.

We explore the halachot and physiology of shechitah.

Chullin 17: נְחִירָה שֶׁלָּהֶן זוֹ הִיא שְׁחִיטָתָ

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Rebbi Akiva maintains that the Jewish people were permitted to eat meat in the Midbar even without Shechitah, and even from an animal that was killed with Nechirah (cutting the animal lengthwise). Rebbi Yirmeyah asks whether leftovers from this period were permitted once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael.

How is it possible that such meat could be permitted, when the Torah explicitly prohibits meat from an animal that was not killed through Shechitah?

(a) RASHI (DH she'Hichnisu) writes that Rebbi Yirmeyah's question is solely theoretical and has no practical application. (Indeed, Rebbi Yirmeyah is known to ask such questions; see Bava Basra 23b.)

(b) The ROSH (1:23) disagrees with Rashi. He points out that the Gemara does not discuss Halachic questions which have no practical application.

We explore the halachot of meat especially during wartime.

Chullin 16: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּמוּכְנִי μηχανή שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה

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Our daf unfolds along a deceptively technical path. Beginning with the question of whether ritual slaughter may be effected through a knife attached to a turning wheel, the discussion modulates with characteristic suddenness from the mechanics of force to the metaphysics of biblical exegesis. Rav sits behind Rabbi Chiyya, who sits before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi—the very seating arrangement encoding a transmission of knowledge across three generations of the rabbinic academy—and Rebbe begins to expound. From where, he asks, do we derive that ritual slaughter must be performed with a detached blade? And he answers from the verse: "And Abraham stretched forth his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son" (Genesis 22:10).

Chullin 15: מַאן דְּכַפְתֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ וְאַשְׁקֵיל עֲלֵיהּ בִּידְקָא דְּמַיָּא וּמִית

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Regarding the implements that may be used for sheḥita – ritual slaughter – the Mishna on our daf teaches:

If one slaughtered with the smooth edge of a hand sickle, with a flint or with a reed, the slaughtering is valid. All may slaughter; at all times one may slaughter; with any implement one may slaughter, excepting a harvest sickle, a saw, teeth or a fingernail, since these strangle.

The Gemara points out that the expression used by the Mishna, that slaughtering with the abovementioned implements is valid, indicates that the sheḥita is valid ex post-facto, but that ideally it should not be used. In the case of a hand sickle, or magel yad, the Gemara suggests that the reason for this is obvious – we fear lest the slaughterer might use the wrong side of the sickle, which would be invalid. According to Rashi, the wrong side of the magel yad has a serrated edge, while according to the Ra’avad, the magel yad is a type of axe, and the wrong side is sharp, but pointed and not long enough to perform sheḥita.

We explore how our mishna and its accompanying gemara enclose a remarkable amount of conceptual machinery. They oscillate between the materiality of the cutting edge and the metaphysics of the agent who wields it; between the ancient repertoire of Iron Age and Roman-period implements and the abstract question of when an act of severance counts as a human act. Our daf has migrated from blades to mechanical contrivances — the mukhni, the potter’s wheel, the waterwheel — and from the slaughter of beasts to the killing of men, with Rav Pappa’s celebrated ruling on the bound captive and the diverted water (bidka de-maya).

Chullin 14: אֵין אָדָם מַתְנֶה עַל שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים כְּאֶחָד

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According to the Mishna on our daf if someone performs sheḥita (ritual slaughter) on an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although the act of killing an animal on those days is forbidden and the person who performs sheḥita is liable to receive a death penalty, nevertheless the animal is kosher and can be eaten.

Rav Huna quotes Ḥiyya bar Rav in the name of Rav as teaching that the animal may be kosher, but it still cannot be eaten on that day. This was understood by the Sages as an indication that Rav understood the Mishna as following the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Our Daf confronts a question whose apparent simplicity belies its conceptual depth: what is the ontological and halakhic status of a living animal during its lifetime? Is it intrinsically directed toward eventual consumption — baʽalei chayim be-chayeihem omedim le-akhilah — such that even while alive it is already, in some legally meaningful sense, prepared for the table? Or is its primary teleological orientation breeding, growth, and continued life — omedim le-giddul, or, as some authorities frame it, omedim le-velad — such that slaughter, when it occurs, constitutes a categorical disruption of the animal’s standing designation rather than its fulfilment?

We explore this them as well as Karate interpretations.

Chullin 13: אֵין מִינִין בָּאוּמּוֹת

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Our Mishna teaches us that when a non-Jew performs shechita, ritual slaughter, the animal is not kosher. Are we permitted to use that meat for purposes other than consumption? Are we assuming that a non-Jew is slaughtering animals for purposes of idolatry? Usually we do not. Although, we are taught, a min, Jewish heretic, is assumed to be slaughtering animals for purposes of idolatry.

A baraita tell us that ritual slaughter performed by a min is assumed to be intended for idolatry. His bread is the bread of Kutim, his wine is used for idolatrous purposes, his scrolls of the law are like the books of sorcerers and his fruit is untithed.

"The Master said in the mishna: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass. The Gemara challenges this: And let us be concerned that perhaps he is a heretic who is a devout idolater and deriving benefit from his slaughter is prohibited. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh says: There are no such heretics among the nations of the world."

We explore the attitudes shaping Jewish Gentile relations through the eyes of Rabbi Jonathan Sacks.

Chullin 12: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן

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Rav Naḥman quotes Rav as teaching that if someone watches a person perform sheḥita – ritual slaughter – from the beginning to the end, the animal can be eaten, but if he does not see the entire process, it cannot be eaten. The Gemara explains that if the slaughterer was a known professional there is no need to watch him throughout, and this statement refers to someone who was not knowledgeable in the laws of sheḥita.

I might have thought that if we see him perform half of the slaughter properly we can assume that the rest was done properly, as well, so Rav Naḥman teaches us that we cannot make that assumption and must watch the entire process.

We explore the notion of the presumption of expertize in schechita and other halachot.

Chullin 11: זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא

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One of the basic principles in Jewish law is that we follow the rov – the majority. The Gemara onour daf searches for a source for this rule, and distinguishes between two different types of majorities:

Ruba d’ita kaman – when the majority is clearly defined, before us. The Gemara’s examples are cases like the Sanhedrin, where the Sages would vote and the majority opinion would be accepted or a case where there are nine stores that sell kosher meat and one that sells non-kosher meat, and unidentified meat is found between them.

Ruba d’leta kaman – when the majority is undefined, that is, where we know what the majority is but it is not something before us that we can count. The Gemara’s examples are a young boy and girl who fall to each other in a situation of levirate marriage, and we assume that neither are sterile, since the vast majority of the population is not sterile.

We explore the rule of the majority.

Chullin 10: כל סָפֵק בִּשְׁחִיטָה לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי

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Our daf concerning a knife found nicked after shechita presents one of the most subtle and revealing disputes in the halachic imagination. At first glance, the question appears technical: if the knife is discovered to be defective only after the act of slaughter, do we assume that the defect existed at the time of the cut—thereby invalidating the shechita—or do we attribute the defect to subsequent use, preserving the animal’s kashrut? Yet beneath this legal problem lies a profound inquiry into how halacha understands time, presumption, and the moral demand for certainty in sacred action.

We continue our introduction to shechita and its laws.

Chullin 9: בְּהֵמָה בְּחַיֶּיהָ בְּחֶזְקַת אִיסּוּר עוֹמֶדֶת

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On our daf Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as teaching that a talmid chacham – a scholar – must know three things:

ketav (writing),

shechita (kosher slaughter) and

milah (circumcision).

Rav Chananiah bar Shelemia quotes Rav as teaching three additional things:

kesher shel Tefillin (phylactery knots)

birkat chatanim (blessings made at weddings)

tzitzit (ritual fringes).

The Me’iri explains that although we expect that a Torah scholar would devote his energies to learning theory, still there are certain practical things that he must learn to do. These are things about which people run to ask the scholar questions, and if he is unable to respond, his reputation will be tarnished. Others suggest that a scholar must take an interest in community affairs and these are basic issues that he must deal with.

We explore the qualifications of a Talmid Chacham.

Chullin 8: מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָלְעָה אִיסּוּרָא

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On our daf, Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as teaching that a Kosher butcher needs a number of special utensils in order to avoid halakhic problems.

A butcher needs to have two separate tubs of water – one where he washes the meat and the other where he washes the forbidden fats.

Similarly, a butcher needs to keep three separate knives – one for slaughter, one for cutting meat and one for cutting off forbidden fats.

The reason that the butcher needs a separate knife for slaughter seems clear. Since we do not want the shehitah knife to develop nicks or other deficiencies that would render it unfit for slaughter, we do not want the butcher cutting meat that might have bones that may ruin the blade. Rashi explains that although the butcher should really check the knife before using it for shechita so he would, theoretically, discover any problems with the knife, nevertheless the Sages feared that if he is in a hurry he may neglect to do so.

We explore the world of knives and criteria for schechita.

Chullin 7: ״אֵין עוֹד מִלְּבַדּוֹ״ – אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: וַאֲפִילּוּ כְּשָׁפִים

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The Gemara mentions in passing that we can be certain that God would not allow a tzaddik – a righteous person – to sin by eating forbidden foods, since He even prevents the animals of such people from doing so. In explanation of this statement, the Gemara relates the story of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair and his donkey.

The aggada consists of three parts, or “acts,” each taking place in a different location. The three acts collectively create a single continuum, whose framework is R. Pinchas b. Yair’s journey to redeem captives. Each act presents an event or challenge along the way.

The question arises: what unifies the various parts of the aggada? Is this merely a series of events that happen to take place over the course of a single journey, or is there a common theme that connects them conceptually and not only chronologically?

The Gemara relates other statements of Rabbi Ḥanina: With regard to the verse:

“There is none else beside Him” (Deuteronomy 4:35), Rabbi Ḥanina says: And even sorcery is ineffective against the will of God. The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who would try to take dust from beneath the feet of Rabbi Ḥanina in order to perform sorcery on him and harm him. Rabbi Ḥanina said to her: Take the dust, but the matter will be ineffective for you, as it is written: “There is none other beside Him.”

We explore the history of "Ein od milvado" from Deut to our daf until the split between the Gra and Alter Rebbe as to the meaning of the Tzimtzum.

Chullin 6: מִכָּאן לְתַלְמִיד חָכָם שֶׁאָמַר דְּבַר הֲלָכָה, שֶׁאֵין מְזִיחִין אוֹתוֹ

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Few principles in the rabbinic corpus carry the weight—and the latent danger—of the assertion that tzaddikim ein ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu mevi takalah al yadam, that the Holy One does not bring about a mishap through the righteous. The doctrine appears in several places in the Bavli, but nowhere more prominently than in the opening sugyot of Tractate Chullin, where it functions as a procedural tool for the recovery of halakhic conclusions from the observed conduct of sages (1). On its face the principle is consoling: it expresses confidence that providence accompanies moral seriousness, that the divine attention that hovers over the world will not allow those who strive for righteousness to inadvertently fall into transgression. Beneath this consolation, however, lies a network of ethical, epistemological, and theological problems that the our explorationaims to bring into view.

Chullin 5: ״אָדָם וּבְהֵמָה״ מְעַלְּיוּתָא הִיא

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We learned on daf 3) Abayye understands the Mishnah as teaching that shehitah – ritual slaughter – performed by a Kuti is valid.

According to him, the Mishnah follows the opinion that accepted the conversion of the Kutim, even though they did not keep all of the mitzvot that were not clearly stated in the Torah. Since shechita was one of the commandments that they did accept, they can be relied upon.

On our daf we learn that Rabban Gamliel and his court voted about the trustworthiness of the Kutim and decided that shechita performed by a Kuti is forbidden.

We explore the social typology of the Schochet and how in the last century the historical strife between schochetim and the rabbinate devolved in the US.

Chullin 4: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֲוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ

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Previously we learned that a Jew who habitually eats non-kosher meat can still be trusted with kosher slaughter, since, given the choice, he will expend the minimal effort required, and the kosher slaughter is still significant in his eyes.

Rav Anan said that even a Jew who worships idols - which is considered as an abandonment of the whole Torah - can still do shechitah. We know this because Yehoshaphat, the righteous king of Judah, partook of the feast of idol worshiping Ahab, who thus enticed him to join forces in battle.

Our daf constructs the figure of the mumar (transgressor, apostate) through a remarkable juridical proof that draws not from precedent or principle but from the narrative of Ahab's banquet for Jehoshaphat (II Chronicles 18:2).

We trace the rabbinic typology of apostasy across its biblical antecedents and tannaitic-amoraic developments, arguing that the Bavli's surprising leniency regarding the meshumad la-avodah zarah — that one may eat from his slaughter — emerges not as a doctrinal claim but as a hermeneutic position generated through narrative exegesis.

Chullin 3: מוּמְחִין וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין

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"All may slaughter and their slaughter is valid" was explained by Rav Ashi as referring to a non-observant Jew. If he eats non-kosher meat to satisfy his appetite or to save money, but will eat kosher meat when it is available, then if he is handed a sharpened knife that was properly examined and found free of nicks, he will presumably not squander the opportunity to make the meat kosher.

However, if he does not have an examined knife, then he cannot be trusted, for he will not bother to sharpen it. If he went ahead and slaughtered with his knife - which he should not have done - one can examine the knife afterwards, and if the knife was found to be fine, one can eat from his shechitah.

Ravina said that "all" refers to those who take upon themselves to do shechitah, because most of them know the laws - provided that they already did shechitah a few times without fainting.

We explore how non sacrificial slaughter in Devorim allowed for meat consumption.

Chullin 2: מֵבִיא סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה וְשׁוֹחֵט בָּהּ

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Performing shechita – ritually slaughtering an animal for the purpose of eating it – is fulfillment of a Biblical commandment (see Devarim 12:21 with Rashi‘s commentary).

The first Mishna in Masechet Chullin teaches that this mitzvah can be performed by anyone, excluding people who are viewed as incompetent, like a cheresh (a deaf-mute, who was considered to be uneducable in the time of the Mishnah), shoteh (an “imbecile”) and a minor, who has not yet reached the age of maturity.

We explore a number on introductions to our new masechta.

Menachot 110: אֶעֱשֶׂה רְצוֹנוֹ וְיַעֲשֶׂה רְצוֹנִי

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In the closing daf of Massekhet Menaḥot, the Gemara discusses the state of Diaspora Jewry and quotes a passage from Sefer Malakhi (1:11) where the prophet discusses how God’s Name is known throughout the world, where

We end the Masechta with some “pure offerings” are presented to Him in all places.

The “pure offering” mentioned is interpreted by the Gemara as referring metaphorically to a man who first marries and then studies Torah. Since he is married, he is not disturbed by sinful thoughts.

We end the masechta with different views of God’s love, free will and the magisterial transcribed lecture of the Rav on Jewish sovereignty.

Menachot 109: אִי סַגִּיא בְּבֵית חוֹנְיוֹ – טָרַחְנָא

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Aside from the first and second Temples in Jerusalem, the only other Jewish Temples where sacrifices were brought were built by Jewish priests in Egypt.

The Mishna on today’s daf teaches that someone who pledged to bring a sacrifice must bring it in the Temple in Jerusalem, and not in Beit Honyo – the Temple of Onias. Even if the person specifically committed to bringing the sacrifice there he cannot do so, rather he must bring it in Jerusalem.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that brings two opinions about the Temple of Onias. According to Rabbi Meir, that temple was a place of pagan idol worship; Rabbi Yehuda rules that only Jewish sacrifices to God were brought there.

According to Josephus, the Temple of Onias was built in Leontopolis in Egypt by the son of the High Priest Onias III, sometime around the year 155 BCE. This temple was modeled after the Temple in Jerusalem.

At Leontopolis, in the wake of the Seleucid persecution, the exiled Zadokite priest Onias founded a functioning sacrificial sanctuary that operated until the Roman closure.