Bava Kamma 84: מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 84

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our daf tries to prove that “an eye for an eye” refers to monetary payment and not any other sort of restitution.

It considers the meaning of the word yitten, and whether it refers to money, giving, or something else regarding a injury/wound given to another person.

One important argument is that the monetary payment represents the value of the person who inflicted the injury as well as the person injured.

Thus a wealthy, older man’s leg would be worth more than a poor child’s damaged leg.

Any system of compensation must follow Leviticus (24:22), where we shall have only one manner of law. מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם

We explore lex talonis.

Bava Kamma 83: וְחׇכְמַת יְוָנִית מִי אֲסִירָא

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 83

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemora had brought a braisa detailing the story that led the Sages to curse anyone who taught their children Greek wisdom (Chachma Yevanis).

The Gemora now brings a braisa that seems to contradict this prohibition. The braisa quotes Rebbe and Rabbi Yosi discussing what languages are superior to Aramaic, due to their fluidity and pleasant sound.

Rebbe says that Hebrew and Greek are superior to Aramaic, while Rabbi Yosi says Hebrew and Persian are superior. [Rashi explains that Rebbe mentioned Greek, due to the Land of Israel’s proximity to Greece, while Rabbi Yosi mentioned Persian, due to Babylonia’s proximity to Persia.]

The Gemora resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between the Greek language, which is permitted, and desirable, and Greek wisdom, which was prohibited by the Sages in the first braisa.

We explore the Rabbinic approach to secular wisdom.

Bava Kamma 82: עֲשָׂרָה תַּקָּנוֹת תִּיקֵּן עֶזְרָא

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 82

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Joshua wasn't the only person with conditions for the Jews entering HaAretz. We learn that Ezra the Scribe instituted ten ordinances.

The Gemara considers whether or not Ezra in fact created some of these ordinances. Perhaps some of them originated in rabbinic literature or even in Torah text.

The Gemara then returns to our original Mishna. First - are chickens permitted in the city? What would cause a city to become idolatrous? How is Jerusalem different from all other cities? Next - pigs cannot be found anywhere in Jerusalem. How does this operate in practice? Who was in power when these rules were actually instituted - long before Ezra the Scribe?

We end our daf with a phrase said by the Sages: Cursed is one who raises pigs and cursed is one who teaches his son Greek wisdom.

We explore the history of Ezra’s institutions as well as the relationship between Jews and Jewish texts and pigs.

Bava Kamma 81: עֲשָׂרָה תְּנָאִים הִתְנָה יְהוֹשֻׁע

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 81

To download, click/tap here: PDF

As part of the Gemara’s discussion about rabbinic ordinances established in order to encourage the settlement of the land of Israel, our Gemara quotes a baraita that enumerates a number of conditions that Joshua established upon entering the land.

In his commentary to Rambam he explains that although our Gemara does not mention that Yehoshua set these rules as conditions to the division of the land, Rambam understood that this was the case based upon the discussion later (81b) regarding other conditions and stipulations that were set among the tribes regarding the division of the land.

We explore these enactments as well as the mitzvah of Aliyah in our day.

Bava Kamma 80: שֶׁהָיוּ מַרְעִין בָּחוֹרָשִׁין

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 80

To download, click/tap here: PDF

"In the meantime, while all this was going on, a cat [shunara] came and severed the hand of the baby.

Rav emerged from the house and taught: With regard to a cat, it is permitted to kill it even if it is privately owned; and it is prohibited to maintain it in one’s possession; and it is not subject to the prohibition against theft if one takes it from its owner; and, in the case of a lost cat, it is not subject to the obligation of returning a lost item to its owner."

We explore the history of cats and its role in the plague (blaming Jews) down to the disappearance of the Jerusalem cats.

Bava Kamma 79: לֹא הִשְׁוָה כְּבוֹד עֶבֶד לִכְבוֹד קוֹנוֹ

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 79

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Throughout this chapter – we focused on fines – the punishments that a thief will have to pay over and above returning the stolen object or its value.

It is important to note that these fines apply only to a ganav – a thief, who looks for an opportunity to steal when no one will see him.

A gazlan – a robber, who brazenly steals in broad daylight – is not obligated to pay kenasot.

This seeming anomaly is addressed in our Gemara, where we find the question of why the Torah was more strict with a ganav than with a gazlan presented to Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai by his students.

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai explained to them that the ganav appears to fear people, yet he has no fear of God.

Which leads us to explore a more lightheaded review of religious approaches to dogs!

Bava Kamma 78: חוּץ מִגִּיזּוֹתֶיהָ, חוּץ מִקַּרְנָהּ

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 78

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Mishnah deals with several different scenarios in which a thief will not be obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution. First of all, if he sells only part of the animal, and even if he sells is 99% of the animal, he is still exempt. Second, if he steals something that he already owns part of, for instance he steals from his partner, he is exempt. Third, if the slaughtering causes the animal to become unfit to eat, because it was not done properly, he is exempt. Piercing the animals windpipe or tearing out its gullet makes the animal not kosher and therefore the thief is only obligated for twofold restitution.

The Gemara continues to question the meaning of "an ox or a sheep". In their search to understand whether or not this refers to diverse kinds, the rabbis question which animals can mate with other animals. They understand that oxen cannot mate with sheep, but which other animals might be indicated?

We examine the the laws regarding fencing and the novel Moll Flanders that illustrates the intersection of poverty and morality in 18th century Britain.

Bava Kamma 77: וּטְבָחוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 77

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The shortest amud in the Shas, Bava Kamma 77a, has just nine words.

It continues Rabbi Shimon's argument that animals that are redeemed are as if they had always been redeemed. He argues that the Red Heifer can impart ritual impurity of food because there was a time before it was named as the Red Heifer when it was "fit for consumption”.

We are prohibited from deriving benefit from its meat, but its original status was that of 'potential food’.

Was Rabbi Shimon referring to one redeeming the Parah Adumah through its sale after it was on the pyre? Reish Lakish tries to defend Rabbi Shimon's opinion, but Rabbi Yochanan wonders about other similar situations, like unblemished sacrificial animals.

We explore the mystery of the Parah Adumah.

Bava Kamma 76: מָה לִי מְכָרוֹ לַשָּׁמַיִם

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 76

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Speaking about the ox that is stolen and consecrated, the rabbis consider the serious implications of timing. Timing determines ownership, and ownership determines liability.

The consecration could be decided before or after the animal was stolen. When does ownership actually transfer? And if the animal is consecrated, does it matter when the blood is sprinkled at the Altar?

When is the ox replaced? When is it replaced with four or fivefold payment? How does consecration change the halachic mandates?

Weexplore the work of Pro Ephraim Urbach with respect to slavery during the rabbinic period.

Bava Kamma 75: תַּשְׁלוּמֵי (אַרְבַּע) חֲמִשָּׁה אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kama 75

To download, click/tap here: PDF

As we have seen (daf 64b) in cases where a thief is obligated to pay kenas – the penalties of two, four or five times the value of the stolen object (over and above returning the object or its value to his victim) – if the thief steps forward and admits his guilt, then he will only need to return the object (or pay back its value); he will not have to pay the penalty – in the language of the Gemara, “Modeh b’knas patur.”

While this ruling is accepted by all, there is a difference of opinion whether this will be true even if other witnesses testify against him. Rav believes that even if witnesses are found who can testify about this situation, once the thief has admitted his guilt, he is free from any obligations to pay the penalty. (Steinsaltz)

We examine the Rambam’s reasoning as to the fine paid for thievery then the scholarship of Prof Joel Kraemer (d.2018) on reading the Moreh Nevuchim and its pitfalls.

Bava Kamma 74: דְּלָא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין אוֹדִי

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 74

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemora says that when Rabban Gamliel blinded the eye of Tavi his slave, he was “very happy.” Rashi explains that he was happy because he really wanted to emancipate him but was unable to do so since freeing a Canaanite slave is a violation of a prohibition, but since he blinded him, he would be free.

It seems that Rashi would disagree with the Ran (Gittin 20b b’dafei ha’rif) who says that freeing a slave follows the same rules as “lo sei’chanem,” that it is only prohibited if done for the purpose of the slave, but not if done for the need of the master.

Based on the Ra”n, it should have been permitted for Rabban Gamliel to free his slave since it brings joy to himself and is not for the benefit of the slave.

Tavi is a character who appears throughout the Gemara, identified as the slave belonging to Rabban Gamliel of Yavne. In all of these stories he is presented as someone who was well-known for his personal piety and learning.

We explore the scholarship of Prof Menachem Fish (son of mentor Harold Fish) who believes the Bavli is an essentially didactic work. It reconstructs the dynamics of the study hall in order to initiate future students into the world of Torah-study by extended example.

Bava Kamma 73: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר – כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 73

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Of all the amora’im, Abaye and Rava are presented as epitomizing the discussions that take place in the Gemara.

In all of their arguments in the Gemara, the halakha always follows Rava’s opinion, with only six exceptions. Those six are referred to by the Gemara by the acronym YAL KGM:

Abaye believes that any testimony that they gave from the time of their original statement can no longer be trusted, since from that time it is clear that they were unreliable.

Rava argues that the whole concept of zomemim is a hiddush – a new idea – established by the Torah, since logically there is no reason to trust the second group of witnesses more than the first.

We explore this wonderful relationship that kinda formed the basis for all amoraic discourse.

Bava Kamma 72: פְּסֵידָא דְלָקוֹחוֹת

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 72

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new mishnah states with regard to one who stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, based on the testimony of two other witnesses, if both these witnesses and those witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, the first set of witnesses, who testified about the theft of the animal, pay the alleged thief the double payment, which is what they had conspired to cause him to pay.

The Gemara then states: Abaye said: A zomeim witness is disqualified (for any other testimony) retroactively (from the time that he testified). Rava said: He is only disqualified from the time that he is found to be a zomeim.

The Gemora explains: Abaye said that he is disqualified retroactively, for it is at that time that he became an evildoer, for the Torah states: Do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a corrupt witness.

Rava said that he is only disqualified from the time that he is found to be a zomeim, for his disqualification is itself a novelty (so why should we stretch it). This is because the two sets of witnesses are two against two, so why should we listen to the second set more than the first?

Accordingly, we can only apply the disqualification novelty from the time that they become zomemin.

We explore differences between the Code of Hammurabi and our Torah texts applying to civil law and witnesses.

Bava Kamma 71: גָּנַב וְטָבַח בַּשַּׁבָּת

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 71

To download, click/tap here: PDF

In the context of discussing how halakha deals with responsibility for two actions, . he will deserve both a death penalty and to pay as a consequence of what he did – our Gemara quotes a Mishna from Massekhet Hullin (14a). It teaches that a person who performs shehita (ritual slaughter) of an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur will receive the death penalty; nonetheless his shehita will be considered good, and the animal will be deemed kosher and can be eaten.

We explore the issue of chilul shabbat in performing another mitzvah as well as the iconic use of sabbath observance in The Big Lebowski!

Bava Kamma 70: גָּנַב וּמָכַר בְּשַׁבָּת

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 70

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Mishnah states:If according to two witnesses he stole (an ox or a sheep) and according to them, or according to another two, he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payments. If a person stole and sold it on Shabbos; or he stole and sold it for idolatry; or he stole and slaughtered it on Yom Kippur; or he stole from his father and slaughtered or sold it and his father later died; or he stole and slaughtered it and later consecrated it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payments.

The Gemora asks from a braisa which stated that he is exempt from paying in this case!?

Rami bar Chamah answers: He is exempt in a case where the buyer said to the thief, “Cut a fig off of my tree, and I will acquire that which you have stolen.” [He is liable for death at the same time that he sold it; accordingly, he would be exempt from paying based upon the rule of kim leih bid’rabbah minei - whenever someone is deserving of two punishments, he receives the one which is more severe.]

Our Daf (and Bava Batra (56b) probes the ability of beit din to combine fragmented testimony. Often a halakha or verdict of beit din is a product of multiple fragments of information.

We explore further items like when stealing might be permitted and Klayman’s analysis of Punitive Damages.

Bava Kamma 69: הַצְּנוּעִין מַנִּיחִין אֶת הַמָּעוֹת

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 69

To download, click/tap here: PDF

In our daf Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one stole an item and the owner has not yet despaired of recovering it, neither of them is able to consecrate it. This one, the thief, cannot consecrate it because it does not belong to him, and that one, the owner, cannot consecrate it because it is not in his possession.

And there is a mishna of this kind (Ma’aser Sheni 5:1) that contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, as we learned in a mishna: (Maaseh Sheni)

The mishna continues: But the pious ones would set aside some coins and say: Anything that was picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins.These pious ones maintain that the owner can desacralize the grapes despite the fact that they are no longer in his possession. Similarly, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, they would claim that an owner can consecrate a stolen item even though it is no longer in his possession. Since this opinion is cited in the mishna without being attributed to any particular Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan should have accepted this ruling.

We explore the “pious ones” הַצְּנוּעִין with reference to the Early Medieval Hassidim and Prof Elliott Wolfson’s scholarship.

Bava Kamma 68: גְּנֵיבָה בְּנֶפֶשׁ תּוֹכִיחַ

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 68

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara asks another question with regard to the fourfold or fivefold payment…maybe this applies only in the specific case where the animal is sold after we heard that the owner despaired of its recovery (Yiush)?

The Sages respond to this and say:This cannot be since the thief’s sale of the animal must be similar to his slaughter of it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Elazar: The case of stealing a human being, i.e., kidnapping, proves that your reasoning is incorrect. The Torah states:

“And he who steals a man and sells him or if he is found in his hand, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16).

In this case there is no owner’s despair, as no one ever despairs of his own freedom. Consequently, the thief’s sale of the person he kidnapped is invalid, and yet the Torah states that he is liable to receive the death penalty for selling him.

We explore the kidnapping of the Jewish child,

Edgardo Levi Mortara and its repercussions to this day in the catholic church.

Bava Kamma 67: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּשְׁתָּרֵשׁ בַּחֵטְא

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 67

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Rebbi Akiva in a Beraisa says that the reason why a thief who slaughtered (Tavach) or sold (Machar) the animal he stole must pay back Arba'ah v'Chamishah is "Mipnei she'Nishtaresh ba'Chet" -- "because he became rooted in sin." What exactly does this mean?

(a) RASHI here writes that it means that the thief "made roots, meaning that he strengthened his sin by acquiring it and benefiting from his deeds." Rashi means that until the slaughter or sell of the animal, the thief did not acquire the animal entirely, but rather it was still considered in the possession of its original owner. (The thief has only a "Kinyan Gezeilah" which removes the animal from the "domain" (Reshus) of the owner, but not from the "ownership" (Mamon) of the owner.)

When the thief slaughters or sells the animal, he acquires it entirely. His deed removes the animal entirely from the ownership of the owner. "He strengthened his sin" refers to the sin he did initially when he stole the animal.

We explore the differences between Arba'ah v’Chamishah 4x and 5x and possible reasons.

Bava Kamma 66: יֵאוּשׁ אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 66

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A change to the stolen object effects its acquisition by a thief. He is still liable for his theft, but if he kills and sells an ox or sheep, he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment because now he slaughters his own animal.

In the phrase "...and he shall return the stolen article that he stole..." the extra words "as he stole" teach that if the article is as it was when he stole, he returns the article, but if the thief transformed it, he is not required to return the stolen article itself, but rather its value.

The rabbis debate whether or not ye'ush makes sense.

What if matzah was stolen but peach elapses by the time that the thief has been found? Why wouldn't the thief say that he will simply return the matzah? Why would the thief consider the matzah, now useless, to have been acquired?

The rabbis consider the thief's opinion and the opinion of the person who despairs the loss of the matzah. They determine that if the victim does not want their item returned, as it is useless, then the robber should pay the value of the matzah even if he no longer wishes to acquire it.

We explore the possible scenarios of the more fascinating phenomena in halakha in which a mitzva and aveira intersect.

Bava Kamma 65: כִּי נָיֵים וְשָׁכֵיב

For the source text click/tap here: Bava Kamma 65

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A thief pays the principal according to the value of the stolen article when he stole it, and he pays the twofold payment, fourfold, and fivefold payments according to the value of the stolen article when he is sued in court.

If, however, the stolen article is still in the thief's original state, he returns the article as is.

Shulchan Aruch discusses the liability of someone who stole property worth one zuz and by the time the thief was brought to Beis Din the item increased in value to four zuz. If the thief slaughtered, sold, broke, or lost the item at the time it was worth four zuz the thief will have to pay four zuz.

We explore the increase or decreased value of stolen property and how Jewish Law may have been influenced by the Sicarii robbers.