Gittin 54: אַזְכָּרוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ לֹא כְּתַבְתִּים לִשְׁמָן

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Our Daf discusses a person who tells Rabbi Ami that he wrote a Torah scroll without having the proper intention when writing G-d's name. The scroll was now in the hand sof the buyer. Rabbi Ami said that his wage should be forfeited but the Torah scroll is permitted.

The Gemara asks if he can't just rewrite those words with more ink while maintaining intention. This is not accepted by the rabbis.

Even if it were possible to do so, they argue that the scroll would appear speckled, which is unacceptable.

We review the halachot of scribal errors and the history of Mashes Soferim.

Gittin 53: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה – אֶחָד שׁוֹגֵג, וְאֶחָד מֵזִיד

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The first two sections of this mishnah deal with certain responsibilities that guardians have in taking care of orphans. The final section deals with damages that are done to food or sacrifices that cannot be seen.

Our new Mishnah states: With regard to one who renders another’s food ritually impure, or one who mixesteruma with another’s non-sacred produce, or one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, in each of these cases causing the other a monetary loss, if he acted unintentionally, he is exempt from paying for the damage. If he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay.

There are three types of invisible damage mentioned in this first clause. If one causes someone else’s terumah to become impure, it has to be thrown away. If someone mixes in terumah with another person’s normal produce it must be sold to priests at the price of terumah which is lower than the price of normal produce. Finally, if someone makes an idolatrous libation with someone else’s wine, the wine must be thrown away. Similarly, if one mixes already libated wine with non-libated wine it must all be thrown away. In all of these cases the damage is done but the object has not physically changed at all. The bottom line halakhah holds that damage that cannot be seen is not considered damage.

We explore the notion of culpability for invisible damages and fraud.

Gittin 52: אַחְווֹ לֵיהּ בְּחֶלְמֵיהּ ״אֲנִי לַהֲרוֹס וְאַתָּה לִבְנוֹת

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It is related that there was a certain steward who was in Rabbi Meir’s neighborhood who was selling land belonging to the orphans and purchasing slaves with the proceeds, and Rabbi Meir did not allow him to do this, as the practice is contrary to halakha. They showed him in his dream the words: I wish to destroy and you build? He understood this as a sign that God wanted the orphans to suffer financial collapse, and therefore it would be preferable to allow the steward to continue his practice. Even so, Rabbi Meir paid no heed to his dream, and said: Words appearing in dreams do not bring up and do not take down; they should not be taken into consideration.

The Talmud contains many theories about the content of dreams. In Berachot (10b) Rabbi Hanan taught that even if a dream appears to predict one's imminent death, the one who dreamed should pray for mercy. R. Hanan believed that dreams may contain a glimpse of the future, but that prayer is powerful enough to changes one's fate.

Later in Berachot (55b), R. Yohanan suggests adifferent response to a distressing dream: let the dreamer find three people who will suggest that in fact the dream was a good one (a suggestion that is codified in שולחן ערוך יורה דעה 220:1).

In contrast, Rabbi Yonatan suggests that dreams do not predict the future: rather they reflect the subconscious (Freud would have been proud). "R. Yonatan said: a person is only shown in his dreams what he is thinking about in his heart..." (Berachot 55b).

And from our daf , we learn that Rabbi Meir believed dreams were of no consequence whatsoever.

Gittin 51: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ

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The Gemara asks: Does the claim of a minor have any substance? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): One does not take an oath in response to the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, as the claim of one who lacks halakhic competence has no significance whatsoever. According to this, if a minor brought a claim against the borrower, it is as though there were no claim at all but only the borrower’s admission, and so the borrower should be exempt from taking an oath.

In further exploration of minors we look at the notion of the visiting of the sins of the fathers on the sons.

Gittin 50: שְׁטַר חוֹב הַיּוֹצֵא עַל הַיְּתוֹמִין

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A guarantor of the Ketubah obligation is not obligated to pay - he is just encouraging the couple to marry.

A creditor collecting from the deceased father's estate is entitled to the

worst land only. If orphans are minors, they are protected by not having to deal with selling the worst land. If adults, they do not know the affairs of their father, so an oath that the debt was not paid is required.

Creditors collecting from the estate first collect from available property, and only then proceed to repossess from purchasers those fields on which there is a prior lien.

We explore the status of orphans in antiquity.

Gittin 49: הָאִשָּׁה רוֹצָה לִינָּשֵׂא

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Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It can be collected from intermediate-quality land. Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason did the Sages say that a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land? It is because more than a man wants to marry a woman, a woman wants to become married to a man.

Consequently, she will agree to marry even if she knows that she will not be able to collect payment of the marriage contract from superior-quality land.

We explore the nature of this difference in attitudes to marriage, and recent sociological studies that suggest differing structural reasons.

Gittin 48: בְּעִידִּית or בְּזִיבּוּרִית

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The fifth perek of Massekhet Gittin – perek ha-nizakin – begins on our daf. There are no discussions of divorce law in this perek;

it is a continuation of the previous perek which dealt with cases of rabbinic enactments established mipnei tikkun ha-olam.

The first Mishnah states: The court appraises land of superior quality [iddit] for payment to injured parties. And a creditor collects his debt from the debtor’s intermediate-quality land.

And payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from her husband’s inferior-quality land.

Rabbi Meir says: Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is also collected from intermediate-quality land.

The Gemora asks: Is this halachah (that we collect from the damager’s superior quality land) only an ordinance to benefit the public?

It is a Biblical law, as it is written: The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay!?

We explore the Talmud’s Economic Behavior, and the Study of Behavioral Economics.

Gittin 47: זַבֵּין נַפְשֵׁיהּ לְלוּדָאֵי

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If a person has been taken captive and is at risk of dying, s/he must be redeemed. The rabbis walk us through a number of circumstances where we might make this conditional.

Our Daf speaks of Reish Lakish who sold himself as a gladiator. He brought a rock in a bag with him. His captors asked him for his last wish, and he asked to hit them each one and a half times with the rock. They complied. The first captor was killed at once, but Reish Lakish pretended to converse with him so that the others would not flee. After Reish Lakish retired home, his daughter offered him a pillow to sleep on. Reish Lakish said that his stomach was his pillow. We learn later that Reish Lakish wished to leave this life with nothing, and he lamented that he still owned a kav of saffron when he died.

We explore negotiating with terrorists and the recent halachic arguments in and out of Israel by poskim.

Gittin 46: שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל פְּרוּצוֹת

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It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 3:4) Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: For what reason did they say that a man who divorces his wife due to her bad reputation may not remarry her, and one who divorces his wife due to a vow may not remarry her? So that Jewish women will not be licentious with regard to forbidden sexual relations or lax with regard to vows.

(The reason for this halacha is as follows: According to one opinion, it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Chacham the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and he might claim that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed. Consequently, this might impair the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that “he may not remarry her,” a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then claim that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion, the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows.)

We review Approaches to the Representations of Women in Rabbinic Literature from various scholars.

Gittin 45: אֵין פּוֹדִין אֶת הַשְּׁבוּיִין

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that a Jewish person who is being held captive should not be ransomed for more than his worth, mipnei tikkun ha-olam.

The Gemara offers two possibilities in an attempt to understand why this rule was established. Was it tikkun ha-olam inasmuch as the community would find it difficult to pay larger sums than normal, or was it to discourage kidnappers from capturing more people by ensuring that they would not find it lucrative enough?

We explore the historical aspects of pidgin sh’vuyim from the Maham Mi'Rotenburg to hostage taking in modern day Israel.

Gittin 44: לֹא בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא בְּדִינֵי אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם

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The rabbis consider what should be done if a slave runs to serve with another army. They also consider the differences between slaves and animal who have been purchased by someone other than the rightful master.

Captives must be redeemed, even at a greater cost than market value.

However, a slave or an animal do not necessarily have to be redeemed.

The rabbis also consider whether or not a master who dies passes on to his son the responsibility of redeeming a slave.

We further explore slavery in Palestine.

Gittin 43: אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּךְ

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A new Mishna teaches that a slave who is sold outside of Israel to Jews, or inside of Eretz Yisroel, is emancipated. The Gemara tells us that this is proven by Torah texts.

It goes on to teach that one who borrows on the bases of that slave also emancipates that slave. The rabbis attempt to understand how such a transaction might have worked.

They speak about the exemption from tithing, and about the notion of "time" as a defining measure for a slave's move to another household.

We explore the deeper notions of morality slavery and modern issues regarding homosexuality and how we are to relate to others with differing worldviews, looking to the writings of the Klausenberger Rebbe.

Gittin 42: הוֹאִיל וּמִדְרַשׁ חֲכָמִים הוּא

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A slave can be freed through a letter of manumission. But we learn about half-slaves.

What happened to them? They might have been bought by two people.

Alternatively, an owner might have freed half of a slave to facilitate a negotiation with someone else.

Regardless, it is clear that the rabbis have concerns about a half-freed slave. Would he work for his master one day and for himself the next?

How could he marry (other than marrying another slave and relegating himself to slavery for the rest of his life)?

We explore further Jewish slavery during Roman times.

Gittin 41: נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם אֶלָּא לִפְרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה

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Someone who is half-slave and half-free man (he was owned by two partners, and one of them emancipated him), he works for his master one day and for himself one day; these are the words of Beis Hillel.

Beis Shamai, however, says: You have created a solution for the master (for he does not lose out through this division), but you have not solved anything for the slave. He may not marry a slavewoman, for he is half-free. He cannot marry a free woman for he is half-slave.

If you will say that such a person should refrain from marrying, that cannot be, for the world was created for the purpose of propagation, as it is written: He did not create it to be desolate; He formed it to be inhabited. Rather, to benefit the public (this slave), we force his master to make him a free man, and the slave writes a document for his value. Beis Hillel later retracted and ruled in accordance with Beis Shamai.

We explore the mitzvah of procreation…

Gittin 40: אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי

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A new Mishnah states: A slave whose master pledged him to others as an apotiki (A person may designate any type of property as security to the creditor without placing it in the possession of the creditor. The creditor has a lien on this property, and if the debt is not otherwise repaid, the creditor can collect his debt from the security. This security is called an apotiki.) and freed him, according to the letter of the law, the slave is not liable for anything, but for the benefit of the public, they force his master to make him a free man, and the slave writes a document for his value. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slave does not write it, but rather, the one who frees him.

We explore bills of manumission in history.

Gittin 39: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת

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The rabbis consider what happens when a slave is freed by his master who then dies. Is this like other cases of death before one is released, like a man who has written a get for his wife but has not yet delivered it to her hand when he then dies?

We are given an example of one of their questions via the rabbi's story of a maidservant whose master was dying. She came to him in tears, begging to be freed from servitude. He threw his hat to her and said that she should acquire the hat and with it her freedom. Sounds terrific -- except that a court denied the relevance of his actions: "He did nothing". This is because he act was one of transfer of ownership, which is different from an act releasing one from ownership.

We explore acts of manumission in history.

Gittin 38: עֶבֶד שֶׁבָּרַח מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִים

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Rav Shemen bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A Canaanite slave who (was imprisoned after being captured by idolaters) escapes from prison becomes a free man, and not only that, but his master is also forced to write an emancipation document for him.

The Gemora asks from our Mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: It makes no difference what the purpose of the ransom was for; he can anyway be enslaved.

Our daf notes according to Abaye (that the Mishna is referring to a case where the master has not yet given up hope of recovering the slave, there is no difficulty), we can answer that the case of the escaped slave is referring to a master who has given up hope on recovering his slave (and that is why he gains his freedom).

We explore escaped slaves prior to emancipation.

Gittin 37: וּמַפְקִיעַ עַצְמוֹ מִיָּד רַבּוֹ

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Our new Mishnah states: If a Canaanite slave was taken captive and a Jew ransomed him, if he was ransomed for the purpose of being a slave, he is enslaved. If, however, he was ransomed for the purpose of becoming free, he is not enslaved. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: It makes no difference what the purpose of the ransom was for; he can anyway be enslaved.

The Gemara wonders if the slave's owners are despairing over their slave. They wonder about ownership at all if this person was captured. They note that it is a mitzvah to redeem both slaves and freemen. Different rabbis share different opinions about whether or not this man should be a slave; whether or not he should belong to the first or second owner.

We examine the history of slave emancipation.

Gittin 36: פְּרוֹסְבּוּל אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט

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The remainder of our daf focuses on the prosbol initiated by Rabbi Hillel the Elder. Although lending and borrowing was excused for individuals over the Sabbatical year, shemita, courts could continue to demand payment of loans. If loans were granted to those who were very poor/needy close to shemita, lenders were afraid that they would not receive back their payments. Thus, the prosbol allowed the courts to continue paying out/following up with the poor close to shemita.

The Gemara goes on to discuss whether Hillel instituted the prosbol only for his generation or for all generations. To this end, the rabbis discuss what is done with ownerless property, when courts can nullify the decisions of other courts (when they are greater in number and in wisdom), and whether or not courts are collecting money when that is in fact prohibited.

We explore the rabbinic loophole subverting the Shmittah Mitzvah.

Gittin 35: הַנּוֹשֵׂא נָשִׁים בַּעֲבֵירָה

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The Mishna states that a widow who comes to collect the money guaranteed to her by her late husband in the ketuba, can only do so if she takes a shevu’a – an oath that she had not received any payment up until that point.

As the Gemara points out, this is the normal rule for anyone who wants to collect money from the orphans. The Mishna teaches that at some point the courts refused to allow widows to takes oaths, and replaced them with a neder that the widow would accept upon herself not to partake of something that was important to her if she had already been paid the ketuba.

We continue our exploration of Tikkun Olam and how different groups have interpreted and appropriated the term for different meanings way beyond its biblical or mystical intent.