Ketubot 99: Beis Din Errors

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Steinsaltz (OBM) writes:

The Jewish court has the ability to sell properties owned by an estate in order to pay debts owed by the individual who passed away. 

This includes outstanding loans, payment of the ketuba, etc.

 Generally speaking this was done by means of an announcement that the court has properties for sale – effectively a public auction – which would invite people to come and view the properties, establishing their value.

The Mishna continues and teaches that if an announcement of the auction was made, then even a wide discrepancy would not cancel the deal – property worth 100 can be sold for 200 or property worth 200 can be sold for 100. 

According to the Ramban, the Mishna mentioned these specific numbers because even in the case of an auction there are limits to the error that is acceptable, and a larger discrepancy would cancel the sale.

We explore the the methods of collecting debts by law courts as well as review of when beis Din errs and when Beis Din and secular courts face off in arbitration.

Ketubot 98: Fraudulent Conveyance

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A new Mishna teaches that the sale of property by a widow is considered void if that sale is founded on an inaccurate assessment. Even one dinar difference is is too much of a difference to allow the sale to be considered valid. If a woman sells the property in pieces, those sales can hold as long as she does not err in assessment of property value. If one of those transactions is off, only that particular sale is voided.

We explore the history of fraud as well as the church/state legal issues with recent fraud in the kashrut industry.

Ketubot 97: מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא

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Rabbi Shimon says: A widow from marriage sells when not in court, but a widow from betrothal may sell only in court, because she does not receive sustenance from her husband’s property. She receives only her marriage contract, and anyone who does not receive sustenance may sell only in court.

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, a widow from marriage may sell when not in court due to the fact that her sustenance is a pressing concern, so one does not make her wait until she finds a court that will oversee her sale.    

However, what is the reason that a widow from betrothal may sell property when not in court? Ulla said: Due to desirability. The Sages enacted several ordinances on behalf of women, so that men will want to marry them. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced by being involved in court proceedings.

We explore the notion of Chein….chinah….and what esthetics the Gemara seems to be applying…with a specific example of Sarah Imeinu….and the dazzling piece by the Noam Elimelech on the Rashi to Gen 23:1

Ketubot 96: כׇּל הַמּוֹנֵעַ תַּלְמִידוֹ מִלְּשַׁמְּשׁוֹ

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Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All tasks that a Canaanite slave performs for his master, a student performs for his teacher, except for untying his shoe, a demeaning act that was typically performed by slaves and would not be appropriate for a student to do.

Rava said: We said this only if the teacher and the student are in a place where people are not familiar with the student, and he could be mistaken for a slave. However, in a place where people are familiar with the student, we have no problem with it as everyone knows that he is not a slave. Rav Ashi said: And in a place where people are not familiar with the student, we said this halakha only if he is not donning phylacteries, but if he is donning phylacteries, we have no problem with it.

We explore current notions of “shimush talmidei chachamim”

Including anecdotes regarding Rav Aron Kotler, Rav Shlomo Freifeld and Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz…..

Ketubot 95: Widows

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Our daf ends as we begin Perek X with another new Mishna. We learn that a widow is sustained by the property of orphans. They own any earnings that she receives, and they are not responsible for her burial. Her heirs inherit her ketuba and they look after the cost of her burial.

The Mishnah states that although the heirs of the husband (the Yesomim) must support their father's widow, they do not inherit her property and therefore they are not obligated to bury her.

Instead, after she dies, her own heirs (that is, those who inherit her Kesuvah) are obligated to bury her.

RASHI explains that the Gemara earlier (47b) teaches that a woman's husband is obligated to bury her only because he inherits her Kesuvah (the "Nichsei Tzon Barzel"). 

Now that the husband is dead, he is not going to inherit her and thus his heirs do not keep the Nichsei Tzon Barzel, and "she must bury herself.”

We explore the status of widowhood from talmudic sources down to status of sephardi women,  and Avraham Grossman’s analysis of the takanot of Rabbeinu Gershon.

Ketubot 94: Repossession

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The Gemara for our last Mishna begins our daf. The Mishna speaks of a husband who marries four wives and then dies, leaving only 100 dinars to split among them according to past rules. However, each wife, from the first to the fourth, must take an oath to the next wife that she has not taken anything from the estate inappropriately. The fourth wife need not take an oath.

The Gemara begins with a discussion of that fourth wife. If a creditor returns and takes the land of the third wife, the fourth wife should relinquish some of her land in its place. Is the fourth wife going to care for her land well knowing that it might be taken from her? Shouldn't she take an oath regarding this? Ben Nanas disagrees, saying that she will take good care of the land. Abaye the Elder, noting that people to take oaths regarding transactions with orphans, wins this debate: the fourth wife must also take an oath.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Everyone agrees that what the later creditor has collected, he has not collected, i.e., it may be repossessed by the earlier creditor. Rather, they disagree here as to whether we are concerned that perhaps she will deplete the field and cause its value to depreciate.

We explore the history of repossession in antiquity and the very right to repossess in Moderna legal theory.

Ketubot 93: Curse of מי שפרע

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Tosafos on our Gemara teaches that the issue of mi sheparah, a curse pronounced on a person who backs out on a deal after money was paid but the buyer did not yet take the property into his domain, applies to the purchase of land the same as it applies to the purchase of movable merchandise. Therefore, if the buyer backs out of the sale because of mere rumors he is subject to the curse since he is not authorized to back out of the agreement. 

On the other hand, if there was a well-founded claim to the land from the protesters the buyer is within his right to reverse the sale and will thus not be subject to the curse. 

We examine the notion of Beis Din cursing and the limits of Halachah and coercion. Yishai Kiel reviews how Applying Moral Standards in the Sphere of Private Law in the Jewish Babylonian, East Syrian Christian, and Iranian Legal Traditions reveals the moral limits to galactic decision making.

Ketubot 92: (Spiritual) Debt Consolidation

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Steinsaltz records:

Jewish law recognizes that formal loans that are recorded in signed contracts create liens of the property of the borrower that effectively guarantee payment of the loan. Therefore, if a borrower cannot pay back his loan, the lender has the right to take possession of real estate that was owned by the borrower at the time of the loan – even if it had subsequently been sold to a third party. Clearly the borrower will have to make amends with the purchaser, given that the sale has effectively been nullified.

In our Gemara, Abaye teaches that in a case where “Reuven” sold property to “Shimon” – and guaranteed the sale – and Reuven’s creditor came and collected the property from Shimon as payment of Reuven’s outstanding loan, it would be appropriate for Reuven to enter negotiations with the creditor.

We examine the notion of debt consolidation and use the (timely) opportunity to discuss Spiritual debts and the history and literary analysis of the Unetaneh Tokef Prayer, whether its theology is possible today.

Ketubot 91: Ketubath Benin Dichrin

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In the previous mishnah we began to learn some rules about the “ketubath benin dichrin” which is the clause in the ketubah which states that sons inherit their mother’s ketubah above and beyond their split in their father’s inheritance.

Our mishnah teaches that this is only so when there is enough for there to be an inheritance of at least one denar after all the “ketuboth benin dichrin” have been paid out. The reason is that “ketubath benin dichrin” is an enactment of the Sages whereas inheritance laws are mandated by the Torah.

We explore debt collection from descendants and the review of family ties in the Lithuanian shtetl by Eric Goldstein.

Ketubot 90: נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים

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The tenth perek, called Mi she-hayah nassuy, deals with an issue that first appeared in the last perek: How the estate should be divided in a case where a man was married to more than one woman and has children with each wife. Clearly, if the estate has enough money to pay all its obligations, there is no problem. What happens, however, when the ketubot of the women amount to more than the money that was left?

We explore the cultural history of two wives from a biblical perspective through the Aliyah of Yemenite Jewry.

Ketubot 89: Damnatio Memoriae

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If a  woman comes to court and presents a Get with which her husband divorced her. Then she wants him to pay the amount of the Ketubah. However, she does not have the Ketubah document itself, claiming that it was lost. Normally, she should not be able to collect anybody who wants to collect a payment should present a loan document (in this case it is the Ketubah). If it is lost, his money is lost.
However, here - since the Ketubah is the enactment of the court - it has the same power as though the document was present, and so she can collect the money. Her former husband's claim that he paid the Ketubah is not believed. If he did, they should have torn the Get, given him her Ketubah or the payment receipt.

We explore the cancellation of debt in antiquity then examine the history of Damnatio memoriae and how we eradicate memory especially in monuments, coins and other art forms.

Ketubot 88: כּוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר

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According to the Mishna, in a case where a woman demands payment of her ketuba based on the fact that she was divorced, but she could not produce her geṭ, if her husband claimed that he paid it (even though he admits that he cannot produce a receipt for payment), he will not have to pay the money.

Similarly, if a man produces a promissory note but cannot produce a prosbol, and the Sabbatical year has passed, the borrower will not have to pay.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that from the time of the Roman government’s decrees against religious practice, both the wife and the lender would be believed, since it would be dangerous to keep the geṭ or the prosbol.

We explore the constitutional accommodation of Jewish contractual obligations in civil law with Jodi Solovy’s analysis.

Ketubot 87: כַרְגָא

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Our daf asks: What is the purpose of mentioning the past? What oath would they have wanted a wife to take with regard to the past? 

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is referring to a woman who became a steward during her husband’s lifetime. 

Rav Mattana said: Even concerning her actions between her husband’s death and his burial, they cannot administer an oath to her, as the Sages of Neharde’a say: For the purpose of paying head tax [karga], and for payment to provide for children’s sustenance, and for burial, we sell property inherited by orphans without an announcement. In these urgent matters, the court is not particular about a possible loss incurred by the heirs.   

In the event that a divorced woman comes to court and demands that she be paid her ketuba, but she admits that part of what was owed to her was already paid, if her husband claims to have paid the full amount we will not allow her to collect unless she takes an oath indicating how much she is still owed.

We explore the history of the poll tax in antiquity as well as the role of Jews’ status on Roman Antiquity.

Ketubot 86: Enforcing and Oath

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We begin with a conversation regarding the promissory notes that were spoken of in our last Mishna. The piece of this debate that relates directly to Masechet Ketubot is the argument that we are discussing oaths made by women when they receive their gets, divorce contracts.
What if a husband dies or divorces his wife leaving both his wife and a creditor owed money? The rabbis teach us that creditors get money and women get land in these circumstances for women don't care about whether they get money or land; they want to stay married. What if there isn't enough to pay both the creditor and the wife? The creditor gets the money or land in this case.

The Mishna on our daf teaches that this rule also applies to a wife who works in her husband’s store or is put in charge of his investments. Rabbi Eliezer extends this even to everyday household tasks. If the husband suspects that she is taking dough or wool that she is working with for herself, he can demand that she take an oath that she has not taken what does not belong to her.

We discuss the GEZERTA, term used by the geonim for the oath of imprecation that they instituted in place of the oath by God's name or by a divine attribute (kinnuy). And women’s rights in medieval society.

Ketubot 85: Single Witnessing

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Our daf begins with a case that helps to explain whether property can be seized after someone has died.  

The Gemara wonders when one witness might be sufficient to affect the outcome of a case.  The first example is not only a single witness, but that witness is a woman.  Rav Chisda's daughter, Rava's wife - and Rava was the judge listening to her opinion.  

When questioned about valuing her words as an individual witness, Rava said that he knew her well and she would not lie; he did not know another Rabbi as well and he could not comfortably trust that single witness in a case.  Other examples of single witnesses are shared in the text.

We explore the hierarchy of witnesses vis a vis women  as well as the evolution of women learning talmud over the last decades. 

Ketubot 84: Ona'ah

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Steinsaltz tells us:

An example that is brought by our is the case of ona’ah – unfair business practices. According to the Torah (See Vayikra 25:14, 17) business transactions must be fair and one side cannot take advantage of another. Thus, overcharging or underpaying is forbidden by the Torah, and the forbidden profits will need to be returned or the transaction voided. What would be the halakha if someone said to his friend “I am selling this to you on the condition that the rule forbidding ona’ah does not apply”? Here we find a disagreement between Shmuel who permits such a condition, permitting the sale and Rav who insists that ona’ah still applies.

The source for this discussion of ona’ah appears in Massekhet Bava Metzia (51a). In truth, it is not only a question of whether a person can make an agreement to dispense with the rules of the Torah about money matters, but also a more basic question of how to define the law of ona’ah. Some argue that ona’ah has two sides to it. On the one hand there is a question of money, on the other hand there are elements of issur – of forbidden practices – involved, as well. It is therefore possible that even if a person can choose to forgo the Torah rules about money, his agreement to forgo the rule of ona’ah will have no legitimacy because of the issur involved.

We review the Halacha of overreaching and the science behind deception .

Ketubot 83: בּוּצִינָא טָב מִקָּרָא

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Steinsaltz tells us:

Aside from the personal relationship that is created between husband and wife at the time of their marriage, the marriage agreement involves agreement between them in other areas, as well. The economic union that the marriage creates is largely open to definition between the two parties. Thus, for example, the husband can choose to concede some of the obligations that his wife has towards him. Ha-kotev le-ishto, the ninth chapter in Massekhet Ketubot, which begins on our daf, deals primarily with two such concessions. The first is a situation where the husband agrees to concede – entirely or partially – his rights to derive benefit from his wife’s property. The second is when he agrees not to demand an oath from her should she demand payment of her ketubah.

We explore the Halachic and legal implications of joint ownership and its iteration in Roman law (the 12 Tables).

Ketubot 82: Takkana

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The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract.

“ Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract. "
"Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that they would place it in her father-in-law’s house, i.e., in her husband’s house. And wealthy women would craft their marriage contract money into baskets of silver and of gold, while poor ones would craft it into a large vessel for the collection of urine, as their marriage contract was large enough only for a small vessel.”We look at the history of Takanot and rabbinic authority as well as Hershey Friedman’s description of how the sages of the Talmud recognized the danger of making religion rule-based and therefore came up with several legal devices to improve the law and make it more ethical.
Indeed, the Talmud blamed the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Temple by the Romans on the fact that people insisted on following the strict letter of Torah law and not doing more than the law required.

Ketubot 81: Drink or Collect!

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The Torah uses the word “wife” (alternatively translated as woman) in summarizing the laws of the Sotah. From here the rabbis deduce that she must have the status of full wife in order to drink the bitter waters. A betrothed woman does not have such a status and hence, even if her fiancé forbids her from being secluded with a certain man and afterwards she is secluded with him, she does not undergo the sotah ordeal.

Similarly, a “shomeret yavam”, a woman whose husband died childless and is waiting for either levirate marriage (yibbum) or the release from levirate marriage (halitzah), does not drink the bitter waters. This refers to a case where the yavam, her brother-in-law, warned her not to be secluded with a certain man. Both of these women do lose their ketubah, since they were secluded after being warned; however, neither is allowed to undergo the sotah ordeal.

We explore the themes of adultery and passion in the English Patient  by Michael Ondaatje, 

Ketubot 80: NAZI Loot

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Our daf focuses more deeply on the details of land brought into the marriage by the kalah. While the chatan is permitted to use the produce of her land, there are limitations on what he can do. The rabbis are concerned, for example, that a man might take care of the land carelessly because he assumes that he will be divorced.

When working with nikhsei melug – which remain the property of the wife even as her husband derives benefit from it – there is a need to protect the interests of the wife in making sure that the property will not be destroyed, as well as the interests of the husband so that he will take care of the property, even though it does not belong to him.

Our daf ends with a new Mishna that discusses how a woman's property might be inherited if that property belongs to a yevama who dies while waiting for her yavam. Does his family inherit the property? Do her heirs, i.e.. her father and his heirs inherit the property? Should it be split? The rabbis are clearly protective of a woman's property to some degree according to today's debate.

We explore the history of NAZI looted art and how cases brought by children of those murdered owners came to light and were litigated decades later.