Ketubot 39: Seduction vs. Rape

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The Mishna on our daf teaches the differences between punishments for rape and for seduction.

Seducers must pay a fine, pay for humiliation and degradation, pay when he releases her but not immediately, and he must release her only if he wants to release her.

Rapists must pay a fine, pay for humiliation and degradation. But he also must pay for pain. He must pay immediately, and he must marry her with the consent of the woman and her father.

Is there pain when a woman is seduced? Or only when she is raped? What causes the pain in rape? Is the pain of intercourse different if a woman is consenting? Does the pleasure derived from consenting intercourse override the experience of pain?

We explore compensation for pain (Rav Shmuel Shimoni), and the differences in punishment for rape in Assyrian codes vs the Bible (Dr Eva Levavi Feinstein).

Lastly Judith Hauptman and Gail Labovitz’ analysis of consent and agency in the talmud.

Ketubot 38: עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן

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In the course of discussing whether a person who commits an act that will theoretically obligate him to receive two separate punishments will only receive the more severe one, 

the Gemara quotes the teaching of Tanna dvei Rabbi Hizkiyya that a person who kills another as a consequence of poking out his eye will not be responsible for the eye and the murder. 

The source brought for this is the famous passage, “Ayin tahat ayin – an eye for an eye” (Shemot 21:24) – which is interpreted to limit the punishment. “An eye for an eye,” but not “a life and an eye for an eye.”

We explore the history of the biblical command and its non literal interpretation comparing with the Roman Law of the 12 tablets and Rabbinic vs Roman Laws of personal Injury (Pomeranz) and Milgrom’s essay on Lex Talionis and the Rabbis.

Ketubot 37: Precautions

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In the Beraisa, Rebbi Yehudah states that a Nochris who converted, a female captive who was redeemed, and a Shifchah (maidservant) who was set free when they were over the age of three years and one day are required to wait three months before they may marry. The Chachamim enacted this period of waiting in order to distinguish between a child conceived from a Nochri and a child conceived from a Jew. If one of these women fails to wait three months, the fatherhood of her baby born soon afterwards is in doubt. Rebbi Yosi disagrees and rules that they may marry immediately and do not have to wait three months.

The Gemara explains that Rebbi Yosi does not share the concern of Rebbi Yehudah because he maintains that a woman who has illicit relations uses a Moch (cloth) to prevent pregnancy, and thus she may marry a Jew immediately after her conversion, redemption, or emancipation.

We explore the use of contraception in antiquity and in Halacha form different denominational perspectives.

Ketubot 36: No Reparations

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A new Mishna details those whose fathers get no fine if they are raped or seduced: a convert, a emancipated captive woman, and a redeemed gentile maidservant who were converted or freed when they were older than three years and one day.

The assumption is that they must have had sexual intercourse.

Rabbi Yehuda argues that the captive woman might still be a virgin.

Girls and women who were raped by their father, grandfather, step-father, or step-grandfather.

This is because the perpetrator is liable to the death penalty and thus he does not pay a fine.

Justin Jaron Lewis reviews cases of rape, where one might expect the rabbis to punish the transgressors, even if they could not be convicted under the stringent Talmudic rules of evidence.

However, in the responsa of three late 18th century women the issue of punishment does not arise. Moreover, the halakhic process, in these cases, has proven capable only of solving problems of its own creation and incapable of listening to women or answering their calls for help.

Ketubot 35: אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״

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Where does the Torah compare one who is Chayav Malkus with one who is Chayav Misah? Abaye answers that there is a Gezeirah Shavah, "Rasha Rasha." With regard to capital punishment the Torah says, "... he is a Rasha who must die" (Bamidbar 35:31). With regard to Malkus the Torah states, "If the Rasha deserves to be beaten..." (Devarim 25:2).

Rava disagrees with Abaye and suggests a different source. The verse uses a form of the word "Makeh" -- "one who strikes" -- both when it discusses one's obligation to compensate for damage he caused to someone else's animal (Vayikra 24:21) and when it discusses the punishment of Malkus (Devarim 25:2).

The usage of the word "Makeh" in the verse of the Hekesh (Vayikra 24:21) teaches that Malkus is included in the Hekesh.

We explore the concept of peshawar and midrash halacha that makes use of this leg theory called “hekesh"

and the biblical vs rabbinic notion of the Rasha specifically the portrayal of Edom in Midrash and some meditations on the four sons….from rabbinic and Hassidic perspectives.

Ketubot 34: Schechitah Musings

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Steinsaltz summarizes our daf as follows:

In the context of discussing how halakha deals with actions that will lead to a person being responsible on two different levels – e.g. he will deserve both a death penalty and to pay as a consequence of what he did,

our daf quotes a Mishna from Massekhet Ḥullin (14a) which teaches that a person who performs shehitah (ritual slaughter) of an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur will receive the death penalty; nonetheless his shehitah will be considered good – the animal will be deemed kosher and can be eaten.

Although this ruling is presented as a straightforward halakha, the rishonim are disturbed by the fact that we ordinarily deem a Shabbat transgressor as a meshumad – an apostate – whose shehitah should be considered invalid!

We explore a number of references to Shechitah and modernity.

Ketubot 33: אילמלי נגדוה לחנניה מישאל ועזריה

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The fact that in the case of one who injures another as well he pays money and is not flogged is derived not by means of a verbal analogy but from the verse: Ex 21:22

“If men quarrel and hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and yet no harm follow, he shall be punished as imposed upon him by the woman’s husband”

And Rabbi Elazar said: The verse is speaking of a quarrel that involves death, i.e., they sought to kill each other,

as it is written: “And if any harm follow, then you shall give a soul for a soul”

from where do you ascertain that the death penalty is a more severe punishment than lashes?

Perhaps the punishment of lashes is more severe, as Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah (see Daniel ch.3)

instead of casting them into the fiery furnace, these three would have been induced to worship the graven image.

Apparently, the punishment of lashes is more severe than death. Rav suggests that had they been whipped, they would have relented and bowed to the idol.

Thus it appears that malkot was deemed a more severe punishment than mittah.

We explore the narrative of the furnace into which the three were cast and the narrative history and midrashic interpretation of Daniel 3.

Ketubot 32: הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה

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Even according to Rabbi Yohanan, however, there are cases in the Torah where an individual will be required to pay and will not receive malkot.

Appropriate punishment in the case of hovel ba-haveiro – personal injury – which includes both malkot and mamon – will be to pay the damages.

Only in a case where the damage was less than the value of a peruta (an amount so small that it cannot be returned) will malkot be given.

Poskim discuss the issue of providing patients with pain relief medication like morphine in order to alleviate the suffering of patients even though it could potentially damage the patient’s health or even hasten death.

We explore the halachic ramifications of end-of-life decision making, and the ethical ramifications of Withholding and Withdrawing of Therapy, even physician assisted suicide.

Ketubot 31: וְקָרַע שִׁירָאִין The History of Silk

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One who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat, thereby performing a prohibited labor for which he is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and the arrow ripped silk as it proceeds, is exempt from the obligation to pay for the silk because he is liable for the more severe punishment for desecrating Shabbat.

Although the silk was ripped prior to completion of the prohibited labor, as the arrow had not yet come to rest, he is nevertheless exempt, as lifting is a prerequisite for placement.

The prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat is comprised of lifting of the object and placement.

Once he shot the arrow, its movement through the air is a continuation of his act of Shabbat desecration, for which he is liable to be executed.

We explore the history of silk in antiquity and the intersection of the silk trade routes and the Jews, concluding recent finds in the Cairo Geniza as well as from Afghanistan.

Ketubot 30: Heavenly vs Earthly Punishment

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On our daf the rabbis consider the argument about karet, death at the hand of heaven, vs. capital punishment, death at the hand of man.

Verses from Exodus 21:23 and Genesis 42:38 help us to understand each concept.

Since we know that fines are not honoured if they accompany capital punishment, do we extrapolate this to the payment of fines in other circumstances?

Perhaps these verses refer to what is controlled by G-d and what is controlled by man.

The rabbis describe tzinim pachim, cold and heat, which are argued to exist at the hand of Heaven and alternatively at the hand of man.

“Cold and heat are on the path of the crooked, he who guards his soul shall keep far from them” (Prov 22:5)

We explore the differences between death by court vs death by heaven, and Itamar Eldar’s analysis of the fear of heaven in the writings of Rebbe Nachman.

Ketubot 29: Consequences (Or Lack Thereof) For Rape

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According to the Torah, in the event that a na’ara betula – a young woman who was a virgin – was seduced (mefuta) or raped (ones), if the father agrees, the perpetrator will be obligated to marry the girl. There also is a monetary payment that is made to the father (in the case of seduction it is only if the father chooses to refuse the possibility of marriage; in the case of rape it is in addition to the marriage, which the rapist will not be allowed to end by means of divorce).

The first Mishna in the perek lists women who will receive kenas (the penalty mentioned in the Torah) if she is raped or seduced, which includes even women who the perpetrator cannot marry, like a mamzeret or an immediate relative or a Bibeonite (Netina)

Who were these Gibeonites ? and why were they eligible? We explore the scholarly work and the notion of their being a late talmudic construction.

We explore the recent discussions regarding marital rape and the consequences of the overturning of Roe on victims of rape.

Ketubot 28: False Memory

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The Mishna presents a list of statements about which an adult can testify based on what he witnessed as a child.

For example, a person can say that he recognizes the signature of his father, his teacher or his brother.

He is also believed to attest to the fact that someone would leave school to immerse in the mikveh so that he could eat teruma that is permitted only to a kohen, or that he received teruma that was distributed at the granary.

We explore the reverse , the testimony of minors, then the concept of false memories and the science behind eyewitness testimony and memory biases.

In light of the above, how do we represent trauma and memory, and their influence on history and testimony specifically in relation to the Shoah.

Ketubot 27: Sexual Violence During Shoah

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The Gemara had presented an inconsistency regarding how we evaluate the actions of enemy soldiers during war.

Our Mishnah taught that the women in the city which was overrun by enemy soldiers are all disqualified from marrying any kohanim, as we are concerned that the non-Jewish soldiers had relations with them.

We see that even during war, the soldiers find time to indulge in “other" actions.

We explore the use of sexual violence during the Shoah and the way Rashi interpreted Rav Yitzchok bar Elazar's answer (that the difference is whether the invading army is from a local area or from a distant country.)

Rashi explains that if the attackers are from a nearby country, they have an interest in preserving the property of the local residents, as the invaders wish to have the local residents continue with their commerce in order to pay taxes and tribute to the new rulers.

After the Shoah and the behavior of the Nazis this distinction seems naive.

Ketubot 26: Hostages

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A woman was imprisoned by non-Jews: if for the sake of money, she is permitted to her husband, and if in order to take her life, she is forbidden to her husband.

Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-katzav said: “By this temple! Her hand did not move out of my hand from the time that the non-Jews entered Jerusalem until they departed.”

When a woman is imprisoned by non-Jewish authorities, there may be a fear that she had relations with one of them. According to our mishnah, if she was taken in order to collect money, the captors assumedly did not have relations with her, because they will fear that if they rape her they will not get the money they want. In this case, she is not prohibited to her husband, even if he is a priest.

However, if they took her and intended to execute her, and then she somehow escapes or is let free, she is prohibited to her husband, even if he is an Israelite.

We explore the history of hostage taking and wartime rape in the Roman Empire including Josephus’ War, The First Jewish revolt...

Ketubot 25: Challah

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But if we can't allow men who call themselves priests to claim their priestly lineage, then what good is the notion of presumptive status?

The rabbis argue about the determining factors.

What is decreed by Torah law and what is decreed by the rabbis?

Are we only speaking about the very special parts of an animal, or are we referring to access to all teruma?

And what about in other places, where taking challah from bread or raising ones hands offers priest full access to priestly benefits?

We explore the mitzvah of taking challah , the appropriate nature of a Kohein taking challah and the deeper mystical meanings for women.

Ketubot 24: Kohein Credentials

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One of the subjects our daf addresses is how we can establish a person’s lineage.

How can we be certain that someone is a kohen, for example?

If he regularly eats teruma, does that prove that he is a kohen?

If he does nesi’ut kapayim – blesses the people with birkat kohanim – will that prove that he is a kohen?

And what if we have a shtar – a document signed by witnesses – in which an individual is referred to as a kohen?

Will that document be accepted as proof that he is a kohen?

We explore all manner of items concerning the kohein, duchening and the halachot of non kohein who duchens.

And the reliability of lineage.

Ketubot 23: נִשְׁבֵּיתִי וּטְהוֹרָה אֲנִי

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Following the principle of ha-peh she-asar hu ha-peh she-hitir the Mishna (our daf) teaches that a Jewish woman who was held captive is believed when she says, “Nishbeti u’tehorah ani –

I was held as a prisoner, but I am pure [I was never sexually molested].”

We explore the representation of molestation in the Bavli and more recently by Prof Tamar Herzig who exposed previously unknown evidence of the organized gang rape of a group of enslaved Moroccan Jewish girls and women in Livorno – a port city on the Ligurian Sea – at the beginning of the 17th century.

Ketubot 22: Credibility

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The Mishna on our daf introduces us to the halakhic argument: “Ha-peh she-asar hu ha-peh she-hitir – the voice that forbade is the voice that permitted.”

In other words, when we are only aware of a potentially problematic situation because of someone’s admission, we trust that person to explain why the situation is, in fact, not a problem at all.

Thus, if a woman walks into court and says “I was married, but have received a divorce,” we will accept her story and allow her to marry with no need for her to prove that she is now single.

If, however, we knew that she was married based on other evidence, we cannot accept her word that she is divorced without some proof to that effect.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that goes one step further. The baraita teaches that a woman who says “I am married” can come to court afterwards and say “I am single” and will be believed if she gives an amatla – a convincing rationale for why she originally said what she did.

We continue our exploration of the credibility of women to give testimony with Prof Judith Hauptman’s work, followed by a review of the conservative movement’s struggle between tradition and change allowing for more latitude when it comes to women’s rights and equal participation in the legal process.

Ketubot 21: Notarizing Documents

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On our daf we struggle with the following issues: If a person testifies that a signature on a document is indeed his/her own, is s/he simultaneously testifying to the monetary agreement written into the contract? And if one witness dies, can the surviving witness testify to the validity of both signatures? Can a witness sign a shard of earthenware in the court to demonstrate the validity of his signature? In a pinch, can a judge and one witness combine their testimony so that the case can move forward? IF there are three judges, can the third judge ratify the testimony of the other two judges if they affirm that they recognize a witness' signature?

We explore the history of notarizing documents and notaries as well as the attitude to women’s testimony in Jewish law (By Ilan Fuchs).

Ketubot 20: Forgeries

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In the next mishnah we continue the struggle with the validity of documents and signatories.

If a shtar is fundamentally testimony, then the laws of testimony will apply to it, including the rule of ‘if one of the witnesses was found to be a relative or invalid, their testimony is cancelled’;

while if a shtar is not testimony, but rather an obligation of one party to another, it seems that there is less to apply the rule of ‘if one of the witnesses was found to be a relative or invalid...,’

since this rule is embedded in the creation of a set of witnesses with the authority of testimony.

We explore the history of forged documents, paintings and antiquities including the talmud itself.