Yevamot 116: קְטטָהָ בּיֵנוֹ לבְיֵנהָּ

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The Mishnah (114b) states that if a husband and his wife had been quarreling and the woman then testifies that her husband died, she is not believed. The Gemara defines a "quarrel" as any situation in which the woman exclaims, "You already divorced me," when in truth he did not divorce her. Her readiness to make such a false statement in order to get away from her husband indicates that they despise each other. Hence, if she later testifies that her husband died she is not believed.

The Amora'im disagree about why she is not believed. Rav Chanina says that Beis Din suspects that she will lie maliciously and claim that he is dead when he really is alive. Rav Shimi bar Ashi says that she convinces herself that he is dead ("bid'Dami") when he really is alive.

We explore the history of marital discord in the talmud and ancient Greece as well as the medieval notion of ‘Marital Debt” ending with modern sociological studies of ultra-orthodox marriage and the Netflix series “Shtisel” and its comfort with these mores.

Yevamot 115: Lost At Sea

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The fifteenth perek returns us to the discussion of the tenth perek and the question of what level of testimony is necessary to allow us to permit a woman to marry when her husband has disappeared.

As we have seen, the Sages found a number of ways to be lenient in such cases, both because of their desire to ease the suffering of the widow and because they rely on her to ascertain that her husband is truly dead before she marries another man.

Our daf speaks of a husband lost at sea which prompts a discussion of Yael levy’s comparison of Agunah with American Law, and a fragment from the Cairo Geniza regarding a woman whose husband was embarking on a journey and the t'shuva of the RADVAZ in the 16th century from a woman in Jerusalem whose husband went missing.

Yevamot 114: Parenting Limits

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What level of responsibility do adults have to keep children from transgressing halakhic prohibitions?

This question of whether katan okhel nevelot en bet din metzuvin lehafrisho – “if a minor is eating non-kosher food the Jewish court would not need to stop him from doing so” – is dealt with in our daf where a number of cases are brought that seem to offer different perspectives on this matter.

We explore further the halachic obligations of parenting as well as the legal parameters of parent-child privilege.

Yevamot 113: Divorcing an Incompetent Wife

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Our daf ends with a discussion about consent. We know that a competent woman is not required to consent to her divorce.

But a woman who is deaf and mute is not to be divorced at all. How does consent work in these cases, comparatively? The rabbis argue about who might be protected via consent.

Rabeinu Tam explains that inability to divorce a שוטה applies only where the insane woman has no father. If she does have a father, the divorce will be effective, because the father appreciates the value of the document, and he will also prevent her from returning to the former husband.

We further explore the notion of competence in divorce proceedings and an incapacitated spouse.

Yevamot 112: κωφὸν Deaf Wives, Then and Now

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The new perek is concerned with divorce or yibbum involving a deaf man and/or woman. As we have mentioned previously, according to the rabbis deaf-mutes lack “da’at”, which I translate as “awareness” and hence they cannot truly contract marriage. The marriage which they do contract is considered “derabbanan”, that is of rabbinic origin.

A deaf man can divorce a woman of sound senses by making gestures that make it clear that he wants to divorce her. Just as he can marry a woman by making gestures which make his intent clear, so too he can divorce her. A man of sound senses can divorce a deaf woman, even though she may not understand that she is being divorced. This is because a woman can be divorced against her will.

We explore the world of deafness in antiquity as well as Alexander graham Bell’s ambivalent views on deafness, as well as exciting new discoveries about light beams helping gerbils hear.

We end with the NAZI approach to deafness as a genetic flaw and the stories of deaf survivors.

Yevamot 111: A Woman's Voice

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A new Mishna walks right into the waters of who disqualifies whom from staying married to a yavam if that yavam has sexual intercourse with his yevama and then his rival wife.

Depending on the status, standing, etc. of the women in question, the yavam's greediness might lead him to lose his partner(s). Minor girls, deaf-mute women, and halachically incompetent women are compared to each other. If a yavam marries each one of these first and then has intercourse with the second, who is exempted from yibum? Who is encouraged to refuse? Who is told that they should divorce? Who stays married?

We explore Prof Judith Hauptman’s classical study of the status of women and THE PICTURE THAT EMERGES from many Talmudic passages, that society in the rabbinic period was both sex-segregated and patriarchal. Was it permissible, in such a society, for men and women to engage in social and intellectual exchange of ideas?

This leads us to the marvelous medieval “Sefer Ha'maasim” of The Poor Bachelor and His Rich Maiden Cousin” and its relation to the Romance of Tristan/Beroul (and it later music/operatic versions ending with Wagner’s monumental opera.

Yevamot 110: Stigma

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A new Mishna teaches about conditions for chalitza, yibum, rival wives, and divorce in cases where a man marries two minor girls, a minor girl and a "deaf-mute"(sic), a minor and a halachically competent adult woman. The Mishna suggests that consummation or chalitza will exempt the rival wife from yibum or chalitza if the wives are both minors or deaf and mute. However, if one wife is a minor or a deaf-mute and the other wife is a competent adult, chalitza/yibum cannot exempt the adult.

Part of these considerations focus on what is Torah law and what is rabbinic law.

We are discussing girls/women who were extremely vulnerable.

Today, there are many laws that have been created to protect women from these sorts of behavior, which often would lead to terrible harm.

We explore the nature of stigma, with reference to Prof jeffrey Rubinstein’s analysis of the Shaming of Avdan (see my Daf Ditty Yevamot 105) and his Ethics of Shame in the Bavli with a tribute to Prof Shama Friedman’s scholarship.

Yevamot 109: Marrying Off A Minor

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When a minor girl is married off by her mother or brothers and she refuses her husband, she is considered to be an orphan. She is no longer of her father's home, nor is she provided for by her ex-husband. In fact, because minor girls marrying and refusing is a rabbinic concept, it is subject to much debate. Does the girl who has refused and then remarried that husband partake in yibum if that husband dies?

Does that change if she is still a minor at that time?

What if her sister is married to her husband's brother?

We continue the expiration of miyun with Joshua Eater’s discussion of Jewish justice and #Me Too as well as Devorah Weisberg’s review of Rabbis and daughters in the talmud.

Yevamot 108: Underage Mi'yun

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Our Rabbis taught: What is regarded as mi’un? — If she said, ‘I do not want So-and-so my husband,’ or ‘I do not want the engagement that my mother or my brothers have arranged for me.’

Yet a minor girl can be married off by her mother or brothers. Our daf establishes the rabbis' opinions regarding her right to refuse that marriage. Her refusal can be to anyone, anywhere, any time - even after the marriage has been consummated. It is fascinating that the act of sexual intercourse, usually used to finalize the act of acquisition, is utterly meaningless in this one situation.

It is as if she were never married at all - she is able to go back to her family and partake of teruma if she was a priestess marrying an Israelite, for example.

We explore child custody in Jewish and Israeli law and how the legal rationale for the relationship between parent and child gradually evolved.

Yevamot 107: Pishon the Camel Driver

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Our daf begins Perek XIII with a new Mishna. We learn about a debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the right of refusal of a minor girl who has been betrothed through her mother or brothers to an adult male. Beit Hillel argues that she should be allowed to refuse that marriage whether she is

· betrothed or fully married

· in the presence of her husband or in his absence

· refusing her husband or her yavam

· without witnesses or the presence of a court

· refusing many times as a minor

§ It is taught in the mishna: Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in the presence of the husband, but Beit Hillel say: Either in his presence or in his absence. It is taught in a baraita: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But didn’t the wife of Pishon the camel driver refuse him in his absence? Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Pishon the camel driver measured using a defective standard, as he did not properly take care of the property she brought into the marriage, and therefore the Sages measured him with a defective standard [midda kefusha]. The marriage in that case was annulled by the Sages and the refusal was not treated as a standard refusal.

We explore the attitude to camel driving in the talmud as well as this curious fellow Pishon the camel driver, and the fake scholarship of his identity as possibly the writer of the NT!

Yevamot 106: Spitting

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We end the perek describing the actual Chalitzah ceremonial stages whereby the yevama stands and spits on the ground in front of the yavam’s face so that it can be seen by the judges.

Chalitzah requires that both parties stand when reciting their assigned parts and when she spits.

The judges must see the saliva that she expectorates.

Finally, the text from Deuteronomy 25:9-10 – “Thus shall be done to the one who doesn’t build up his brother’s house. His name shall be called in Israel ‘the house of the one whose shoe was removed’” – is read and repeated by the yevama.

We explore the custom of spitting during Aleinu as well as the notion of ceremonial spitting in other cultures and the use of public spittoons in the last century to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.

Yevamot 105: Abba Yudan

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Our daf relates that Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi were discussing whether a person should look upwards during prayer (based on the passage in Eicha 3:41)

or downwards (based on the passage in I Melakhim 9:3).

Then an exchange occurs between Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yossi and a certain Avdan, one of Rabbi Yehuda’s HaNasi’s students also known as Abba Yudan.

We explore this person and his name elsewhere in midrash, and the use of the term Abba in antiquity including the NT and our liturgy (Avinu Malden)

ending with the Lacanian “Nom du Pere” and Yehudah Amichai’s poetry struggling with the transcendent theology of the rabbis.

Yevamot 104: Chalitzah and Amputee

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A widow without children must marry her brother-in-law via sexual intercourse, which is the yibum ceremony, or take off his shoe, which is the chalitzah ceremony, a type of divorce between the widow and the levir. It is written “And she shall remove his shoe from his foot” (Deuteronomy 25:9).

From the Torah’s use of foot the early stages (the Tanaaim) learned that if the brother-in-law is lame and his leg has been amputated below the knee, the widow cannot fulfill the chalitzah ceremony — for the part of the leg above the knee is not considered a foot; only the part below the knee is considered a foot.

We explore the halachic restrictions applying to the amputee including reference to Dr Fred Rosner and Rabbi Mordechai Tendler’s review of Reb moshe Feinstein’s rulings.

Yevamot 103: ארכובה

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It was taught in the mishna that if one’s leg was amputated from the knee down and his yevama performed ḥalitza with him, the ḥalitza is valid. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita that comments on the pilgrimage one makes to Jerusalem during a Festival requires both intact legs.

Because chalitza requires that the yavam 'stands', amputeeism is at issue. Certainly one need to be able to stand to perform chalitza. If he is missing a leg, does the wooden prosthesis stand in for his foot? What if the prosthesis extends past his knee? And what about those who cannot stand on their feet due to a condition like club foot? Their feet, including their heels, should be flat on the floor, the rabbis have determined. Do those who cannot put their feet on the ground forego the ritual of chalitza?

We explore the etymology of the knee joint as well as the history of knee pathology (and arthritis) from antiquity... and the stunning discovery In August 1995, Professor C. Wilfred Griggs from Brigham Young University, Utah, and a team of experts, carried out x-rays on six mummies housed in the Rosicrucian San Jose Museum, including the mummy of Usermontu. They were stunned when the x-rays revealed that one of the mummies had a 9-inch metal pin in its left knee.

Yevamot 102: אם יבא אליהו

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The centerpiece of the chalitzah ceremony – whose purpose is to embarrass the yavam who has chosen to avoid fulfilling his family obligation – is the removal of a shoe from the foot of the yavam by the widow.

Obviously, there is a wide variety of footwear. The Torah appears to require a shoe (na’al). Our Gemara discusses at length whether it must be a shoe, or can it be a sandal or a slipper?

What must it be made from? Because of the various demands, it has become accepted practice that we do not use a shoe that belongs to the yavam, but rather every Jewish bet din has a special “chalitzah shoe.”

In one revealing moment Rabba said that Rav Kahana said that Rav said: If Elijah the Prophet should come and say: One may perform ḥalitza using a soft leather shoe, the Rabbis would listen to him. But if he says: One may not perform ḥalitza using a hard leather sandal, they would not listen to him, for the people already have established the practice of performing ḥalitza using a sandal.

We explore the role of Elijah in the Rabbis’ decision making process and a review of Kristen H. Lindbeck’s work who reads all the Elijah narratives in the Babylonian Talmud and details the rise of a distinct, quasi-angelic figure who takes pleasure in ordinary interaction.

Yevamot 101: אנפיליא

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The 12th Perek begins:

If the woman performed the halitzah with a shoe, her halitzah is valid, [but if] with a felt sock נְפִּילְיָא it is invalid. If with a sandal to which a heel is attached it is valid, but [if with one] that has no heel it is invalid. [If the sandal was tied] below the knee the halitzah is valid, but if above the knee it is invalid.

What qualifies as a shoe is not something we often think about--except perhaps on Yom Kippur (and Tisha B'av)--but in the laws of chalitzah, the question carries great importance. Use the wrong type of shoe and the chalitzah is invalid and the widow is unable to marry. The chalitzah shoe must not go above the knee, is to be made of leather with a series of straps that make for easy removal, is to be worn on the right foot, and must have a heel. A wooden shoe would be acceptable (even if not ideal), whereas a slipper would not. A sandal is okay, provided it has a heel.

We explore the cultural meaning behind the sandals and shoes in general and their use in ritual and as a expression of class.

Yevamot 100: Moses of Oxford

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We have already learned the concept of havchanah – the requirement that a woman whose marriage ends must wait at least three months before marrying another man. The purpose of this rule is to ensure that, if the woman becomes pregnant during this period, we know who the father of the child is.

What if the woman does not wait the required period, and is pregnant with a child whose father is one of two people? The Mishnah on our daf relates to this question in a number of different settings, e.g. with regards to questions of yibum (levirate marriage), if one was a kohen and the other an ordinary Jew, and if they were both kohanim.

We explore Anat Feldman’s study of Jewish women who emigrated from Islamic countries to the State of Israel during the 1950s.

When they arrived in the country, they encountered a secular establishment that had originated in Europe (Ashkenazic) and possessed an entirely different culture than that of these women, who were religious and had come from Africa and Asia (Mizrahim). Alongside the secular establishment, they also encountered a small ultra-Orthodox community, which had its origins in Europe.

The religious customs of this group differed greatly from those of the émigrés from Africa and Asia.

We also review the life and work of Moses of Oxford one of the first English Tosafists, Born in Oxford, he resided in the Oxford Jewry, before moving to London, until he passed away in 1268.

Yevamot 99: Priestly Restrictions

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The rabbis continue to present case after case of far-fetched examples that might challenge the practice of yibum.

A yevama is bound either to marry one of her brothers-in-law or to participate in the ritual of chalitza, which releases her from this obligation.

In normal circumstances, marriage is forbidden between close family members, and so the rabbis are spending much energy on specifying the circumstances that permit yibum.

This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with a situation in which it was unclear whether a woman’s former husband or current husband is the father of her child.

We explore the restrictions of marriage for the kohen and the way differing denominations struggle with such priestly marriages in the contemporary scene.

Yevamot 98: Switched At Birth

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This mishnah and the following two mishnayoth deal with a favorite rabbinic topic, especially in seder Nashim: people getting mixed up and not knowing who they are.

We will see similar discussions in tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. In the case in our mishnah, five boys from five women got mixed up, and nobody knows for sure who belongs to which mother.

The problem is that should they die without children and they have brothers (or at least each woman has one other son who she knows is her son), they don’t know who is whose brother.

We examine cases of switched babies at birth the incidence and intriguing stories of discovery including the use of DNA technology.

Finally we cannot but ignore the wonderful tale of switched babies in Gilbert and Sullivan’s HMS Pinafore.

Yevamot 97: Rape Assumed

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The eleventh perek of Massekhet Yevamot deals with out of the ordinary family connections and relationships. While most of them focus on relationships in the context of yibum other relationships are dealt with, as well.

One example that is discussed is based on the fact that some issurei erva – incestuous relationships – take effect only when the man and woman involved were married, and not if their sexual relationship took place outside of marriage.

Thus, for example, the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna on our daf permits someone to marry a woman who his father had seduced or raped, even though that person would not have been allowed to marry her had she been his father’s wife.

We explore attitudes to rape in the talmud and rabbinic attitudes thereof, and Professor Judith Hauptman’s sensitive analysis of texts.