Yevamot 96: The Nine-Year-Old Groom

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 96

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishnah discusses a case in which a nine-year-old boy lives with his Yevamah, and then his nine year-old brother also lives with her. The Tana Kama rules that the woman becomes prohibited to both brothers. Rebbi Shimon rules that she remains permitted to the first Katan.

RASHI asks, why does she remain permitted to the first Katan? When the second Katan lives with her she becomes a Sotah, for she committed adultery with him! Rashi adds that although the adulterer was a Katan, nevertheless his Bi'ah is considered a valid act of Bi’ah, and her act is punishable with Misah. Rashi answers that when she lives with the second Katan, she does so b'Shogeg (inadvertently), unaware that the boy is not her husband, or unaware that the act is prohibited. Therefore, she does not become a Sotah, and she remains permitted to her husband.

Rashi apparently follows his own opinion as expressed in Kidushin (19a, DH d'mid'Oraisa;) that an act of Yibum performed by a nine-year-old is considered a valid Yibum mid'Oraisa. Consequently, his act of Yibum creates a bond of Kidushin with the woman, who will become a Sotah if she lives with another man after she does Yibum with the nine-year-old.

We examine the sexuality of a nine year old and the implication of his marrying and yibum status.

Yevamot 95: Mothers in Law

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 95

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The rabbis struggle with what we should do if a husband has intercourse with his mother-in-law.

Their examination takes a somewhat circuitous path. At the beginning of our daf, the rabbis walk through who is forbidden to whom based on prohibited sexual relationships.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, that he renders his wife disqualified from remaining married to him.

With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, as Beit Shammai say that he renders his wife disqualified, and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

Rabbi Yosei said: Not so, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, that he does not render his wife disqualified from remaining married to him.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, as Beit Shammai say he renders his wife disqualified and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

We explore mothers in law and taboos thereof.

Yevamot 94: כל עריות שבתורה

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 94

To download, click/tap here: PDF

This mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive.

In a braita we learn : None of those with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law require a bill of divorce from him, even if he married them in a proper manner, apart from a married woman who married by mistake by permission of the court. And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also a brother’s wife and a wife’s sister. Since it is possible that these two women could become permitted to him, by levirate marriage in the case of a brother’s wife, or a wife’s sister after his wife’s death, they too require a bill of divorce.

This notion of כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה leads to explore the notion of incest and talmudic examples derived thereof….

Yevamot 93: דבר שלא בא לעולם

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 93

To download, click/tap here: PDF

One of the basic questions that comes up regarding issues of ownership in Jewish law is whether or not adam makneh davar she-lo ba la-olam – whether a person can buy or sell an object that is not in existence right now. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak believes that according to Rabbi Akiva a person has the ability to do so, and lists tanna’im and amora’im who follow that approach.

The rabbis consider an entity that has not yet come into the world. For example, the fruit that will grow on fruit trees or the earnings that one will collect in the coming months and years. The rabbis share their different thoughts about whether or not a woman can make a vow that would exclude her husband from benefiting from the work done with her hands - vowing that her hands are sanctified.

They also consider contracts based on this approach. How should we understand the sale of a field that is not yet harvested, for example. One example shows Rabbi Yannai separating tithes from his own garden just in case the fruit plate that regularly arrives before Shabbat should in fact show up on Shabbat itself. This action allows him and his family to have access to the fruit plate on Shabbat.

We explore the notion of legal ownership of objects not yet in existence…

Yevamot 92: Beit Din Errors

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 92

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.

Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

Rambam (1) cites the two examples of mistaken rulings mentioned in our Gemara, namely, incorrectly declaring that Shabbos ended and granting a woman permission to remarry based on the testimony of two witnesses.

The Noda B’Yehuda introduces a fundamental query and based upon it he establishes a famous rule.

Why is it, he asks, that a person is obligated to bring an offering when he acts in error due to his relying upon Beis’s din? What blame should he bear in this case? In fact, there are several other cases where a person errs, but because he did so while following halachic guidelines there is no blame associated to the person at all. In these other cases he is considered an אנוס.

We explore cases of batei Din who err including the struggle about agunot following the world trade disaster leaving some 15 women in this tragic situation.

Yevamot 91: מאי הוה לה למיעבד

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 91

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishnah (87b) states that when a woman marries another man under the assumption that her first husband died abroad, and then her first husband returns alive, she is prohibited to both men. The Mishnah adds that if either man dies with no children, the brother of that man must perform Chalitzah with the woman, and he may not perform Yibum.

The Gemara explains that the brother of the first husband must perform Chalitzah because he is the brother of her real husband, and thus the Mitzvah d'Oraisa to perform Chalitzah or Yibum takes effect. He cannot perform Yibum, however, because the Rabanan penalized the woman and gave her the status of a Sotah mid'Rabanan (a Sotah, or woman who is suspected of being unfaithful to her husband, may not do Yibum when her husband dies). The brother of the second husband performs Chalitzah only mid'Rabanan; mid'Oraisa there is no need for Chalitzah since the second husband was never really married to her.

The Gemara adds that for the brother of the second husband, Yibum is "not mid'Oraisa [because she was not really married to the second husband], and not mid'Rabanan [because the Rabanan do not allow her to marry the brother of the second husband].”

One of the arguments that is made on behalf of a woman who received permission from the beit din to remarry, only to discover that her husband was still alive, is presented by Rav Sheshet.

The argument is a simple one – mai havei lah le-me’evad? – what could she possibly have done to protect herself?

The daf proceeds to kvetch reasons the we need to still punish her….

We explore the testimony and value of women’s eidus…

Yevamot 90: שב ואל תעשה

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 90

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Can rabbinical law uproot Torah law? The rabbis continue to argue this question.

Today they begin with a case where one provides payment in teruma to a kohen. The teruma is ritually impure.

The rabbis consider intentionality: did he mean to give ritually impure (ie. forbidden) teruma to the priest? Or was it an accident?

The rabbis are stringent in their rulings: the teruma must be replaced by ritually pure teruma. Torah law is more lenient.

A kohen is even allowed to marry a woman using this ritually impure payment!

And so, the rabbis argue, this is a case where rabbinical halacha uproots Torah halacha.

We continue this exploration with Rav Lichtenstein’s essay on egalitarianism as well as Chaim Trachtman’s Rabbinic Moral Psychology.

Yevamot 89: Power of Beis Din

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 89

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara on our daf suggests that we find a case of this in the first Mishnah of our perek. The Mishnah teaches that in a case where a man travels overseas and is reported dead, and the widow remarries based on the permission that she gets from the bet din, should the husband reappear, she is forbidden to them both, and both husbands must write her a get (a divorce). Furthermore, children that she has with either of these men will be considered mamzerim – children born from an adulterous relationship.

There are differences, however. It is clear that any child born from the second husband is a mamzer, since he was living with a married woman – albeit based on misinformation. Future children who are born from the first husband, however, should not be considered mamzerim – after all, the woman did not engage in forbidden relations on purpose.

Thus, the ruling that these children are mamzerim is only rabbinic.

The Gemara on our daf argues that declaring someone to be a mamzer when this is not true on a Torah level is effectively giving the Sages power to uproot a Biblical law.

We explore the power of the Beit Din including in modern states where church and state separate religious law such as in the UK and States and how this plays out beyond family and ritual law.

Yevamot 88: One Witness

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 88

To download, click/tap here: PDF

(Steinzaltz OBM writes:) What if we get word that one spouse has died, but that testimony is later contradicted?

Under such circumstances we may find that the alleged widow will marry, even as she is still a married woman.

Similarly, the husband may find himself in a forbidden relationship with his wife’s sister, who he married while under the misimpression that his wife had passed away. Even though these marriages may have taken place with the permission of the Jewish courts, under most circumstances, a mistaken ruling by those batei din cannot permit this forbidden relationship.

One circumstance that can lead to this type of situation is when a single witness comes and testifies that the husband is dead and based on this testimony the courts permit the alleged widow to remarry.

Ordinarily halakha demands that two witnesses testify in order to clarify a situation.

Why is this case different?

We review the unique case requiring only one witness then compare with the Qumran rule for three witnesses as described by Prof Lawrence Schiffman the Qumran Halacha scholar and Prof Steven Fraade the midrash Halacha expert.

Yevamot 87: Darchei Noam

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 87

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara notes that Proverbs 3:17 states: Her ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace”. 

 The rabbis use this to mean that all women should be treated with consideration.  

Women should not force women who are already married to then perform chalitza; she should not be demeaned in front of her new husband. 

 Our notes teach that "pleasantness" does not mean that the Torah's halachot are pleasant.  

However, they are fair and without discrimination.  

We explore the ramifications of this concept in Halacha in general and when’re ethical and halachic spheres intersect ending with  

Reb Aron Lichtenstein’s meditation on the human and social factors in Halacha.

Yevamot 86: Levitical Priests

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 86

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi who says that in 24 places the Torah refers to Kohanim as "Leviyim." RASHI in Chulin (24b) suggests that they are called "Leviyim" because they perform the Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash, as the word "Levi" also means "those who help serve" (as in Bamidbar 18:2). The Gemara cites one example of such a verse (Yechezkel 44:15).

What are the other 23 places in which the Torah refers to Kohanim as "Leviyim"? The Acharonim discuss this question and have great difficulty identifying all 24 places.

The BEN YEHOYADA in Bechoros (4b) writes that he searched and found only eleven places where the word "Leviyim" refers to Kohanim and not to Leviyim. However, RAV DAVID COHEN shlit'a (in OHEL DAVID, end of volume 1) writes that he counted the places where the word "Leviyim" refers either to Kohanim by themselves or to Kohanim and Leviyim together, and he found 76 places where the Torah refers to Kohanim as "Leviyim.”

We explore the history and scholarship on the levitical priesthood and how it developed

Yevamot 85: Genealogical Classes

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 85

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Torah teaches that a kohen cannot marry a halala – a woman who is the product of a forbidden sexual relationship or one who has engaged in a forbidden sexual relationship. The question with which our Gemara grapples is whether the daughter of a kohen a similar prohibition from has marrying a halal. 

Rav Pappa suggested that the answer can be learned from our Mishna, where it lists which groups of people can marry one another. Since the Mishna does not specifically permit this case, we can conclude that it is forbidden. 

Rav Huna disagreed, arguing that the Mishna proves nothing, since it is only teaching about groups of people whose relationships will be the same no matter whether the man and woman are from one group or the other. 

Given the fact that a kohen cannot marry a halala, even if the daughter of a kohen is allowed to marry a halal, it would not appear on this list.

Our Gemara recalls the Mishnah that discusses ten levels of family heritage which journeyed from Bavel with Ezra HaSofer in an effort to determine whether or not כשרות are forbidden to marry 

We explore how rabbinic literature is concerned with lineage and the different terminologies for classes of Jews.

Yevamot 84: Ben ish Mitzri...Then and Now

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 84

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The ninth perek of Masechet Yevamot begins on our daf, and offers a list relationships, including women who are:

permitted to their husbands, but not to their yavam (e.g. a widow who is married to a regular kohen, whose brother is the kohen gadol),

permitted to their yavam, even though they were forbidden to their husbands (e.g. a widow married to the kohen gadol whose brother is a regular kohen),

forbidden to both (e.g. a regular woman who is married to a mamzer, whose brother is a mamzer, as well),

permitted to both (e.g. most normal cases of marriage).

One of the objections to the Mishnah comes from : Rav Pappa who objects to the mishna: "If it is so, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that in the case of a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, her son is considered a second-generation Egyptian, as the child’s status in this matter is determined according to the mother.”

We have had this issue of a ben mitzri before in Parshas Emor regarding the Blasphemer….

We explore the entire midrashic backstory of Shlomit bat Divri his tragic mother, raped by the very Egyptian Moshe Rabbeinu killed (Ex 2)

and the possible zoharic references thereof…

Yevamot 83: טומטום

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 83

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemara describes a tumtum as someone whose gender cannot be determined. Under certain circumstances, the physical covering that hid the sexual organ may be removed (in the language of the Gemara it is nikra, or “torn” off) and the individual can be identified as male or female. Nevertheless, the likelihood that a man whose testicles have developed within his body will be able to have children is slim at best. This is certainly the case in someone who was truly a tumtum, that is to say that their sexual organs did not develop because of a low level of hormones. In such a case, even if the person’s physical situation improves, he will not be able to father children. (Steinzaltz)

During the last 40 years, Jewish legal discourse has confronted new uncertainties about the assignment of gender because surgery and hormonal treatments have made it increasingly possible to modify sex organs and sexual characteristics. Specifically, rabbinic authorities have rendered opinions about two kinds of people with atypical gender situations: transsexuals and people with intersex conditions. While intersex births are quite rare, they pose precisely the kind of rabbinic decision making needed.

We explore the syndrome of atypical (formerly ambiguous) genitalia and the cultural biases brought to the intersex conditions we encounter in modernity.

Yevamot 82: Seder Olam Chronology Conflicts

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 82

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our Daf introduces us to a baraita that appears in Seder Olam that teaches that the passage in Sefer Devarim (30:5) asher yarshu avotekha ve-yerishtah indicates that there are only two times that the Land of Israel is sanctified in history. In other words, aside from the sanctification that took place when Yehoshua brought the children of Israel in from the desert, the only other sanctification that was necessary occurred when Ezra brought the Jews back from exile. That second sanctification lasts forever.

Seder Olam is an ancient book compiled in Hebrew by Babylonian talmudists about 160 CE.

It gives a chronology of the history of the Jewish people and the world around them since the first man Adam until the Great Revolt against the Roman rule. Seder Olam means Order (or Chronology) of the World. Some 450 years later, another book called Seder Olam Zutta (the Small Seder Olam) was issued in Babylone to complete the former work until their time.

Mitchell First published a book, Jewish History in Conflict, describing rabbinic responses to the disagreement between rabbinic chronology in Seder Olam and that which emerges from Greek historians (and other sources).

Depending on how you look at it, there are approximately 160 years missing from rabbinic history, mainly during the rebuilding and early years of the Second Temple.

In particular, Seder Olam lists three Persian kings while Greek sources list over 10 kings.

We explore the recent scholarship on possible polemical reasons for these differences and the way Jews and Christians differed in their respective chronologies.

Yevamot 81: Androgyne

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 81

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Among the halakhot presented in our Mishnah, Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi Shimon teach that a woman who marries an androgynous kohen will be permitted to eat terumah, i.e. that we view the marriage as a legitimate one, even though the status of an androgynous – who has both male and female sexual organs – as a man who can marry is questionable.

Given the questionable status of this marriage, the Gemara searches for an explanation of this ruling. One suggestion that is made is that we only permit her to eat terumah d’rabbanan – produce that is only considered terumah on a Rabbinic level – since terumah in our day-and-age is only a Rabbinic mitzvah.

We explore the biological characteristics of hermaphroditism, androgyne in Ancient Greece ending with the use of bisexuality in kabbalistic metaphors of the “nesirah” or splitting of Adam into two sexually gendered beings.

Yevamot 80: Aylonit/Turner’s Syndrome

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 80

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The gemara kiddushin (4a) derives that a Jewish maidservant must be freed both at the initial phases of physical maturity, called na'arut (puberty), as well as at the more advanced stage of maturity - bagrut, which takes place six months later. The gemara poses the obvious question: If the maidservant was previously set free at na'arut, the requirement to free her at bagrut is irrelevant. Abbaye responds that the relevance of this halakha is limited to the special case of a girl who fails to mature physically - called an aylonit. Such a girl achieves the status of bagrut directly, without passing through the initial phase of na'arut.

Secondly, there is a controversy between Rav and Shmuel on our daf, regarding the culpability of an aylonit who transgresses the law prior to the age of twenty. Their argument revolves around the determination of the exact point at which an aylonit is designated an adult. According to Shmuel, she enters adulthood from the time she is recognized to be an aylonit, namely at the age of twenty, whereas prior to that she retains the status of a minor. Rav argues that an aylonit achieves the halakhic status of adulthood retroactively.

We explore the medical correlates of this condition most likely that of Turner’s syndrome, only described as recently as 1938!

Yevamot 79: Ethnic Character

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 79

To download, click/tap here: PDF

In our daf King David used three verses to describe traits of the Jewish people. They are merciful, shamefaced, and kind.

If a person is converting to Judaism, they must embody these characteristics.

A note suggests that rabbis reinterpreted this idea. They do not believe that Jews embody these traits.

Instead, they suggest that G-d gave those gifts to us to do with what we will.

The subtle difference between these two descriptions of Jewish traits is quite fascinating. Are we different innately? Did G-d bestow these differences upon us? Do these traits occur independent of our relationships with G-d, or with our religion?

We explore the notion of ethnic character and the science of race, those describing Jews from the outside (1892) from a Christian perspective down to the Tibor Egervari’s post-Auschwitz adaptation of Shakespeare’s anti-Semitic comedy The Merchant of Venice.

Yevamot 78: Ritzpah and David

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 78

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our daf looks at the prohibitions facing the Gibeonites.

It is suggested that this originates in the times of King David, where there was a three-year long famine (II Samuel 21).

David blamed the people of Israel: in the first year, for worshipping idols, in the second year, for sexual impropriety, in the third year, for promising charity publicly then giving nothing.

When no transgressors were found, David blamed himself and turned to speak with G-d through the Umim V'Tummim.

These were the stones in the breastplate of the High Priest. G-d told David that the famine was because Saul put the Gibeonites to death.

The Lord’s response is: “It is because of the bloodguilt of Saul and [his] house, for he put some Gibeonites to death.”

The Rabbis list two reasons for the famine. One was because the Israelites did not properly eulogize Saul, while the other was Saul’s killing of some Gibeonites.

As for the Gibeonites, he summoned them to effect a reconciliation. He sought to appease them, but they would not be placated until seven of Saul’s sons, including Rizpah’s two sons, were handed over to them. How did David choose them? He had Saul’s sons pass before the Ark; whoever adhered to the Ark and could not move, was chosen to die, while those who passed by it were chosen to live.

The Rabbis relate that Rizpah was not angry at God; to the contrary, she justified His actions and recited the verse (Deut. 32:4): “The Rock! His deeds are perfect, yea, all His ways are just; a faithful God, never false, true and upright is He.” For seven months Rizpah guarded the corpses—during the day from the birds of the sky, and at night, from the wild beasts.

We explore this tragic mother and how she was immortalized by Tennyson.

Yevamot 77: Doeg

For the source text click/tap here: Yevamot 77

To download, click/tap here: PDF

King David was a descendant of Rut ha-Mo’aviah – Ruth the Moabite (see Ruth 4:17).

Our Gemara relates that when King Saul was concerned that David would claim the monarchy, his advisor, Do’eg ha-Edomi argued – convincingly – that David should be forbidden from being considered a true member of the Jewish people, due to this ancestry.

Based on our daf (Yevamos 77a) on the basis of the question regarding the prohibition of a Moavite woman,

Doeg HaEdomi very nearly managed to invalidate Dovid HaMelech altogether.

When Doeg asked Avner why the Moavite women didn’t meet the Jewish women with food and drink, since by anyone’s standards that could still be considered modest, no one could answer.

It was just then that Amasha girded his sword and said, ‘I will run through anyone who doesn’t wish to accept this ruling. I received from the beis din of Shmuel HaRamasi that the language of the verse is Amoni and Moavi—in the masculine—and it excludes the women of either nation!’

This dramatic Haggadah forms part of a genre of Dovid Hamelech legends which we investigate with particular attention to the character of Doeg.