Shavuot 49: אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין הֵן

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The first mishnah in the last chapter was taught in its entirety in Bava Metziah 7:8. It is repeated here as an opening to the rest of the chapter which discusses when a guardian is liable to bring a sacrifice for having sworn a false oath. There are certain types of guardians who under circumstances if not able to return the object under their guard may take an oath and thereby exempt themselves from having to pay back the owner. Our chapter will teach that they are liable to bring a sacrifice only if they take an oath that exempted them from paying back the owner. The type of oath described here is an “oath of deposit”, discussed above in chapter five. The punishment for intentionally swearing a false oath of deposit is a guilt offering.

According to the Torah (Ex 22:6-12), the level of responsibility for which a shomer – someone who accepts responsibility to guard his friend’s object – is liable, depends on the personal gain that the shomer receives. The Mishna on our daf enumerates four types of shomrim and their level of responsibility. They include:

A shomer ḥinam (unpaid bailee) – who does not derive any personal gain or benefit from watching the object. In the event that the shomer ḥinam performs his duty responsibly and the object is lost or stolen, he can take an oath that he guarded it properly and he will be free of any further responsibility (see Shemot 22:6-7).

A sho’el (borrower) – who borrows the object for his own use, without payment. He is responsible for anything that happens to the animal and will have to pay full restitution to the owner (see Shemot 22:13). Only if the animal died in the course of normal work will he be free of responsibility to pay, if he takes an oath that that is what happened.

A shomer sakhar (paid bailee) – who gets paid for watching the object, and

A sokher (renter) – who pays rent to use the object.

Shavuot 48: יָפֶה כֹּחַ הַבֵּן מִכֹּחַ הָאָב

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Rav Shemaya said: The mishna is in accordance with Rav and Shmuel’s ruling because it teaches the administration of an oath disjunctively. The heirs can administer an oath to her when she is receiving payment of her marriage contract as a widow, or they can administer an oath to her heirs when she is a divorcée who died after the divorce and before her husband died. Since she died first, her heirs were not bequeathed an oath to her husband’s heirs.

Rav Natan bar Hoshaya raises an objection from a baraita: Sometimes the power of the son is greater than the power of the father,

יָפֶה כֹּחַ הַבֵּן מִכֹּחַ הָאָב

How can a legal system maintain fidelity to its foundational sources while adapting to new circumstances and evolving moral sensibilities? This question haunts both secular legal theory and religious jurisprudence, manifesting in debates about constitutional interpretation, the role of precedent, and the nature of legal authority itself (3,4).

The Talmudic principle "יָפֶה כֹּחַ הַבֵּן מִכֹּחַ הָאָב" (the strength of the son is greater than that of the father) offers a unique lens through which to examine this paradox. Far from being merely a technical rule of halakhic interpretation, this principle embodies a sophisticated understanding of how legal systems evolve through what we might call "generative fidelity"—a process by which later developments not only remain faithful to their sources but actually enhance and fulfill them.

Shavuot 47: שְׁבֻעַת ה׳ תִּהְיֶה בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם

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Shimon ben Tarfon says: With regard to the prohibition of following after an adulterer,i.e., providing him with assistance in carrying out adultery, from where is it derived? The verse states:

“You shall not commit adultery [lo tinaf ]” (Exodus 20:13). If the verse is vocalized slightly differently, it may be read: You shall not cause adultery [lo tanif ].

Commenting on the verse describing the response of the Jewish people to the spies’ slander of Eretz Yisrael: “And you murmured [vatteragenu] in your tents and said: Because the Lord hated us, He has brought us forth out of the land of Egypt, to deliver us into the hand of the Amorites, to destroy us” (Deuteronomy 1:27), Shimon ben Tarfon says:“Teragenu” is interpreted as though it is composed of two Hebrew expressions: You explored [tartem] the land, and: You disparaged [ginnitem] it, in the tent of the Omnipresent.

A King’s Servant Is Like the King

“If you touch someone anointed with oil, you will also be anointed.” With this statement Shimon ben Tarfon explains why the Torah defines the Euphrates as “the big river” (Deut. 1:7) despite its relative smallness (Rashi, Gen 15:18), because it borders on Eretz Yisroel. On the other hand, according to Rabbi Yishmael, the Euphrates is called “big” because “a king’s servant is like the king.” In other words, the servant – the Euphrates – is regarded like the king – Eretz Yisroel.

We explore the issue of Critical Analysis of Hermeneutics of Subtlety and Wordplay and Rabbi Shimon ben Tarfon's Interpretive Method in Comparative Perspective.

Shavuot 46: ״אוֹכַל״ וְ״לֹא אוֹכַל״; ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״

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If witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole, but left injured, the injured party may take an oath and receive compensation. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught that he needs to take an oath in order to receive compensation only if he was injured in a place where he is able to injure himself, but if he was injured in a place where he is unable to injure himself, he receivescompensation without taking an oath.

The Gemara challenges: And let us be concerned that perhaps he scraped against a walland caused the injury himself. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a case where, for example, he has a bite on his back or on his elbows, which must have been caused by someone else.

We explore the notion of personal injury and fraudulent claims.

Shavuot 45: לְהָפִיס דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת

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On yesterday’s daf, the beginning of a very long mishnah that continues most of the way down the first side of today’s daf stated that oaths required by Torah can exempt people from payment. By contrast, oaths instituted by the rabbis can compel a party to hand over property. The mishnah goes on to list a number of scenarios in which this can happen, including: a hired worker who sues his employer for unpaid wages (and then takes an oath and receives them), a victim of theft who sues the robber (and then takes an oath and recovers their stolen goods), someone who seeks compensation from another who injured them (who takes an oath and receives damages) and: “a storekeeper relying on his ledger.”

We explore the Talmudic principle of lehafis da’ato shel baal habayit (appeasing the homeowner) in its legal, ethical, and theological dimensions. Beginning with its appearances in Shavuot 45a, Pesachim 86b, and Berakhot 46a, we examine how this phrase operates within Halachic discourse to mediate between rigid legalism and social harmony.

Shavuot 44: כׇּל הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה

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Although the only oaths that we find in the Torah are those that allow a defendant to swear and free himself from a monetary obligation (see Shemot 22:10), nevertheless the Sages of the Mishna established oaths that would allow a plaintiff to swear and by doing so, to receive payment. These oaths are described in Perek Kol HaNishba’im, the seventh chapter of Massekhet Shevuot, which begins on our daf.

There are a number of categories of people who are nishba ve-notel – who take an oath and collect their claim. One such situation is when there are raglayim la-davar – when there are strong reasons to think that the claim of the plaintiff has merit. Such cases include situations like an employee who claims his wages or a storekeeper whose records show that money is owed to him.

Shavuot 43: קַתָּא דְּמַגָּלָא

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We have already established that a modeh be-miktzat – a defendant who admits to part of a monetary claim made by the plaintiff – will have to pay what he admits that he owes, and in addition will have to take a Biblical oath that he does not owe the part that he denies.

According to the Mishna (42b) there are certain limitations to this rule. Specifically, it only applies to claims that are measurable by size, weight or amount. On our daf Rava adds that not only the claim made by plaintiff, but also the admission of the defendant must meet this requirement.

We explore Collateral Responsibility from Talmudic Law to Modern Secured Transactions.

Shavuot 42: חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ

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The Gemara answers:Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to a part of the claim must take an oath? It is because there is a presumptionthat a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor, who did him a favor by lending money to him. And this person who denies part of the claim actually wants to deny all of the debt, so as to be exempt, and this fact, i.e., that he does not denyall of it, is because a person does not exhibit insolence in the presence of his creditor.

We explore the notion of self interest and the frailty of virtue.

Shavuot 41: מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין שְׁבוּעָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לִשְׁבוּעָה דְּרַבָּנַן

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Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This sanction is no less severe than entering his property and collecting the debt; it is like grabbing him by his testicles [bekhuveseih] until he surrenders his cloak. Rather, what do we do to him? Rav Ashi said to him: We excommunicate him until the time to flog him comes, i.e., for thirty days, and if he still refuses to take an oath or reach a settlement with the claimant, we flog him and then leave him alone.

In antiquity, the testicles were imbued with deep symbolic significance, representing not merely biological reproductive power but also masculinity, social authority, and the integrity of lineage.

Shavuot 40: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין, וְקָדַם וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין

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As we learned above (daf 38) the halakha is that a kofer bakol – a defendant who totally denies a monetary claim made against him – is believed without being required to bring any further proof; if he is modeh be-miktzat – he denies that he owes all of the money, but admits that he owes part of it – then he must pay the amount that he admits to and then take an oath that he does not owe any more.

According to Shmuel, this ruling applies even in cases where the plaintiff demands two different things; for example, if he claimed that the defendant owed him wheat and barley and the defendant admitted only to the claim that he owed him wheat. Shmuel rules that he will have to pay the wheat that he owed and take an oath that he did not owe the barley.

We explore the legal ramifications of half vs full denial and plausible deniability.

Shavuot 39: וְשַׂמְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת פָּנַי בָּאִישׁ הַהוּא וּבְמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ

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Regarding all other sins he is punished, but here both he and his family are punished. Is this true? Doesn’t the verse say (regarding one who passes his children over to Molech) and I will put My face in that man and his family? The braisa states: If he sinned, why should his family be punished? This teaches that there is no family that has a tax collector (i.e. collects taxes to receive profit) which is not a family of tax collectors.

The concept of collective family punishment presents one of the most challenging theological problems in biblical literature. When Joshua 7:24-25 describes the destruction of Achan's entire household—including children who bore no direct responsibility for their father's transgression—it raises profound questions about divine justice and the nature of moral accountability. This phenomenon, where punishment extends beyond the primary offender to encompass innocent family members, appears repeatedly throughout biblical narratives and demands careful theological examination.

Shavuot 38: בָּעֵינַן שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד

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The sixth perek of Massekhet Shevuot, Perek Shevuat HaDayyanim, begins on our daf. The focus of this perek is those oaths that the beit din will impose on a defendant in situations where we do not have two reliable witnesses testifying against him.

The most common case of such an oath is when the defendant offers only a partial denial to the claim made against him.

One enigmatic rule in Jewish law is the law that distinguishes between two different responses to an accusation that one person owes money to another. The halakha is that if the defendant denies it entirely we believe him without requiring him to bring any further proof; if he denies that he owes all of the money, but admits that he owes part of it, then he must pay the amount that he admits to and then take an oath that he does not owe any more.

Why do we trust the individual who denies it all, while making the person who admits that he owes some of the money take an oath?

Shavuot 37: רַבָּנַן דָּרְשִׁי כְּלָלֵי וּפְרָטֵי

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf according to the Torah (Sefer Vayikra 5:21-26), if someone has received something to watch and denies having it when the owner asks to get it back, swearing falsely, he will be obligated not only to return the object, but he will also have to pay an additional 20% as a penalty, and bring an asham (guilt) sacrifice in addition.

This Torah law is particularly unusual because these punishments – including the 20% penalty and the asham sacrifice – will be applied even in cases where the perpetrator has taken the false oath on purpose, while sacrifices for atonement are usually brought only when the sin was done accidentally. The Gemara on today’s daf quotes Rav Kahana as asking whether in a situation where all of the requirements were in place for actual punishment – where the witnesses warned the perpetrator that his action is forbidden and that he will be punished for it – will the sacrifice to suffice, or perhaps it will be replaced by malkot – lashes – that are the ordinary punishment for such an act, or perhaps we should require both malkot and korban.

Shavuot 36: הַמְקַלֵּל עַצְמוֹ וַחֲבֵירוֹ

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This teaches that if someone curses his father and mother, he is only liable (to be killed) if he uses the Name of Hashem. The Mishna discusses someone who curses himself or a friend.

Rabbi Yannai says: Everyone agrees to this. One is liable for cursing himself, as the verse says: Just guard yourself, and watch your soul carefully. This is like the statement of Rabbi Avin in the name of Rabbi Illa that whenever the verse uses the words, “hishamer” -- “guard,” “pen” -- “lest” and “al” - - “do not” (the unconventional form of “lo”) it means that this is a negative prohibition. This is also true regarding one’s friend, as the verse says: do not curse a deaf person.

The Mishna says that saying, “Hashem should strike you down,” whether in the singular or plural (you), is the alah written in the Torah. Rav Kahana sat before Rav Yehudah and quoted this Mishna as it is written. Rav Yehudah said to him, switch the word (i.e. do not say you, as you are saying Hashem should strike me down).

We explore the biblical notion of cursing vs the rabbinic.

Shavuot 35: יש שמות שנמחקין, ויש שמות שאין נמחקין

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The verse (Vayikra 19:12) says, “Do not swear with My name falsely.”

This teaches that an oath in the Torah is generally administered using the name of God. Rashi (see Ra”n to Ri”f) and Rambam write that this applies to all types of oaths. The Mishnah presents the various forms of God’s name which effect a shariah.

The Mishnah also teaches the halacha regarding the names of God for which a person would be liable if they were used to curse another person. The halacha at the end of the Mishnah mentions that if someone says cid:clip_image001.pngGod should smite you), this is an expression of cursing.

We discuss what is shem hamalchus (Rav Lichtenstein) as well as Prof Kimelman’s landmark Birchas Haminin.

Shavuot 34: שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי

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R’ Acha’s opinion is that a court may judge a case using strong indications of fact, even without solid proof.

For example, the Gemara cites the case of R’ Shimon ben Shetach, who one time saw a person chasing after another with a knife to kill him. As the two ran into an abandoned building, R’ Shimon ben Shetach chased after them, only to find the pursuer coming out carrying the knife dripping with blood, and the victim still laying in death throes on the ground.

R’ Shimon ben Shetach cried out, “You evil one! You killed this person, but I cannot judge you, because the Torah requires two witnesses to bring someone to justice. Nevertheless, Hashem will avenge this person’s blood from you!”

The story concluded with R’ Shimon’s words coming true, as a snake came and bit the murderer and killed him. In any case, if R’ Acha’s approach was accepted, we would have judged a case similar to that of R’ Shimon ben Shetach, where the circumstances were those of strong indications of guilt.

Though he is clearly disturbed by the scene, R. Shimon ben Shetah does not actually kill the murderer, and we need not read his story as implying that he should have. Instead, we can read him as arguing that the problem is the willingness to just accept the legal restrictions without a word of moral dismay.

We explore the enduring tension between moral certainty and legal proof through the lens of both ancient rabbinic jurisprudence and contemporary legal philosophy.

Shavuot 33: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וּפִתָּה אֶת בִּתּוֹ

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According to the Mishna on our daf the halakhot of shevuat ha-eidut – the laws governing cases where a person refuses to offer testimony, swearing that he does not have information that would be useful in court – only apply to monetary cases. Thus, were someone to swear that he had no information about whether someone was a kohen or a levi, even if he was lying, the laws of shevuat ha-eidut would not apply.

A new Mishnah states "“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a Kohen, or, that I am a Levi, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a chalutzah; that so-and-so is a Kohen, or, that so-and-so is a Levi, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a chalutzah; that so-and-so violated another's daughter, or seduced his daughter; that my son injured me; that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on Shabbos,” — they are exempt “

We explore marital rape in talmud and scholarship.

Shavuot 32: שְׁנֵיהֶן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר

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The Gemora (Nedarim 87a) issues a halachic ruling: The halachah is that a statement which follows another statement within the period of an utterance is regarded as if it were made together with the first one except in the case of blasphemy, idolatry, betrothal and divorce. (If one commits blasphemy or practices idolatry, and immediately, within the period of utterance, retracts, his retraction is unavailing, and he will still incur the death penalty. If a man betroths a woman or divorces her, and immediately thereafter changes his mind, such withdrawal is invalid.)

The Ran comments that he doesn’t know why these cases are different and from where did the Rabbis derive this. It would seem, he says, that in regard to other things that are not as serious, when a person does them, he doesn’t do them with absolute intent.

We explore the Halachic and linguistic aspects of “toch kedei dibbur”

Shavuot 31: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת

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Mi-devar sheker tirḥak – “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Shemot 23:7).

The Gemara on our daf offers a series of applications of this passage.

Among them we find:

When a teacher says to his student “you know that I would not lie, even if I was offered money; I have only a single witness to a loan that I made – please join the witness in testifying on my behalf” – how do we know it is forbidden to do so?

Mi-devar sheker tirḥak

When a judge hears testimony and know that the witnesses are lying, how do we know that he should not say “since the witnesses are testifying, I will rule accordingly and the responsibility will rest on their shoulders” (the language of the Gemara is that the kolar will be hung on the necks of the witnesses – a kolar being a metal chain that was put around the neck of prisoners)?

Mi-devar sheker tirḥak

We explore oath taking and compare to its New Testament refusals.

Shavuot 30: וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים

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The fourth perek of Massekhet Shevuot begins on today’s daf, and – as its name Shevuat HaEdut (The Oath of Testimony) indicates – its focus is on oaths taken in response to a demand that someone testify about something that he witnessed, and he refuses to testify. This law is based on the passage in Sefer Vayikra (5:1).

The Mishna opens by listing who is included in this law and who is exempt from it. Thus, the law applies only to men and not to women, it does not apply to relatives who cannot testify nor to people who are removed from testimony because of forbidden acts that they committed (e.g. if they are robbers).