Ketubot 30: Heavenly vs Earthly Punishment

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On our daf the rabbis consider the argument about karet, death at the hand of heaven, vs. capital punishment, death at the hand of man.

Verses from Exodus 21:23 and Genesis 42:38 help us to understand each concept.

Since we know that fines are not honoured if they accompany capital punishment, do we extrapolate this to the payment of fines in other circumstances?

Perhaps these verses refer to what is controlled by G-d and what is controlled by man.

The rabbis describe tzinim pachim, cold and heat, which are argued to exist at the hand of Heaven and alternatively at the hand of man.

“Cold and heat are on the path of the crooked, he who guards his soul shall keep far from them” (Prov 22:5)

We explore the differences between death by court vs death by heaven, and Itamar Eldar’s analysis of the fear of heaven in the writings of Rebbe Nachman.

Ketubot 29: Consequences (Or Lack Thereof) For Rape

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According to the Torah, in the event that a na’ara betula – a young woman who was a virgin – was seduced (mefuta) or raped (ones), if the father agrees, the perpetrator will be obligated to marry the girl. There also is a monetary payment that is made to the father (in the case of seduction it is only if the father chooses to refuse the possibility of marriage; in the case of rape it is in addition to the marriage, which the rapist will not be allowed to end by means of divorce).

The first Mishna in the perek lists women who will receive kenas (the penalty mentioned in the Torah) if she is raped or seduced, which includes even women who the perpetrator cannot marry, like a mamzeret or an immediate relative or a Bibeonite (Netina)

Who were these Gibeonites ? and why were they eligible? We explore the scholarly work and the notion of their being a late talmudic construction.

We explore the recent discussions regarding marital rape and the consequences of the overturning of Roe on victims of rape.

Ketubot 28: False Memory

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The Mishna presents a list of statements about which an adult can testify based on what he witnessed as a child.

For example, a person can say that he recognizes the signature of his father, his teacher or his brother.

He is also believed to attest to the fact that someone would leave school to immerse in the mikveh so that he could eat teruma that is permitted only to a kohen, or that he received teruma that was distributed at the granary.

We explore the reverse , the testimony of minors, then the concept of false memories and the science behind eyewitness testimony and memory biases.

In light of the above, how do we represent trauma and memory, and their influence on history and testimony specifically in relation to the Shoah.

Ketubot 27: Sexual Violence During Shoah

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The Gemara had presented an inconsistency regarding how we evaluate the actions of enemy soldiers during war.

Our Mishnah taught that the women in the city which was overrun by enemy soldiers are all disqualified from marrying any kohanim, as we are concerned that the non-Jewish soldiers had relations with them.

We see that even during war, the soldiers find time to indulge in “other" actions.

We explore the use of sexual violence during the Shoah and the way Rashi interpreted Rav Yitzchok bar Elazar's answer (that the difference is whether the invading army is from a local area or from a distant country.)

Rashi explains that if the attackers are from a nearby country, they have an interest in preserving the property of the local residents, as the invaders wish to have the local residents continue with their commerce in order to pay taxes and tribute to the new rulers.

After the Shoah and the behavior of the Nazis this distinction seems naive.

Ketubot 26: Hostages

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A woman was imprisoned by non-Jews: if for the sake of money, she is permitted to her husband, and if in order to take her life, she is forbidden to her husband.

Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-katzav said: “By this temple! Her hand did not move out of my hand from the time that the non-Jews entered Jerusalem until they departed.”

When a woman is imprisoned by non-Jewish authorities, there may be a fear that she had relations with one of them. According to our mishnah, if she was taken in order to collect money, the captors assumedly did not have relations with her, because they will fear that if they rape her they will not get the money they want. In this case, she is not prohibited to her husband, even if he is a priest.

However, if they took her and intended to execute her, and then she somehow escapes or is let free, she is prohibited to her husband, even if he is an Israelite.

We explore the history of hostage taking and wartime rape in the Roman Empire including Josephus’ War, The First Jewish revolt...

Ketubot 25: Challah

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But if we can't allow men who call themselves priests to claim their priestly lineage, then what good is the notion of presumptive status?

The rabbis argue about the determining factors.

What is decreed by Torah law and what is decreed by the rabbis?

Are we only speaking about the very special parts of an animal, or are we referring to access to all teruma?

And what about in other places, where taking challah from bread or raising ones hands offers priest full access to priestly benefits?

We explore the mitzvah of taking challah , the appropriate nature of a Kohein taking challah and the deeper mystical meanings for women.

Ketubot 24: Kohein Credentials

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One of the subjects our daf addresses is how we can establish a person’s lineage.

How can we be certain that someone is a kohen, for example?

If he regularly eats teruma, does that prove that he is a kohen?

If he does nesi’ut kapayim – blesses the people with birkat kohanim – will that prove that he is a kohen?

And what if we have a shtar – a document signed by witnesses – in which an individual is referred to as a kohen?

Will that document be accepted as proof that he is a kohen?

We explore all manner of items concerning the kohein, duchening and the halachot of non kohein who duchens.

And the reliability of lineage.

Ketubot 23: נִשְׁבֵּיתִי וּטְהוֹרָה אֲנִי

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Following the principle of ha-peh she-asar hu ha-peh she-hitir the Mishna (our daf) teaches that a Jewish woman who was held captive is believed when she says, “Nishbeti u’tehorah ani –

I was held as a prisoner, but I am pure [I was never sexually molested].”

We explore the representation of molestation in the Bavli and more recently by Prof Tamar Herzig who exposed previously unknown evidence of the organized gang rape of a group of enslaved Moroccan Jewish girls and women in Livorno – a port city on the Ligurian Sea – at the beginning of the 17th century.

Ketubot 22: Credibility

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The Mishna on our daf introduces us to the halakhic argument: “Ha-peh she-asar hu ha-peh she-hitir – the voice that forbade is the voice that permitted.”

In other words, when we are only aware of a potentially problematic situation because of someone’s admission, we trust that person to explain why the situation is, in fact, not a problem at all.

Thus, if a woman walks into court and says “I was married, but have received a divorce,” we will accept her story and allow her to marry with no need for her to prove that she is now single.

If, however, we knew that she was married based on other evidence, we cannot accept her word that she is divorced without some proof to that effect.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that goes one step further. The baraita teaches that a woman who says “I am married” can come to court afterwards and say “I am single” and will be believed if she gives an amatla – a convincing rationale for why she originally said what she did.

We continue our exploration of the credibility of women to give testimony with Prof Judith Hauptman’s work, followed by a review of the conservative movement’s struggle between tradition and change allowing for more latitude when it comes to women’s rights and equal participation in the legal process.

Ketubot 21: Notarizing Documents

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On our daf we struggle with the following issues: If a person testifies that a signature on a document is indeed his/her own, is s/he simultaneously testifying to the monetary agreement written into the contract? And if one witness dies, can the surviving witness testify to the validity of both signatures? Can a witness sign a shard of earthenware in the court to demonstrate the validity of his signature? In a pinch, can a judge and one witness combine their testimony so that the case can move forward? IF there are three judges, can the third judge ratify the testimony of the other two judges if they affirm that they recognize a witness' signature?

We explore the history of notarizing documents and notaries as well as the attitude to women’s testimony in Jewish law (By Ilan Fuchs).

Ketubot 20: Forgeries

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In the next mishnah we continue the struggle with the validity of documents and signatories.

If a shtar is fundamentally testimony, then the laws of testimony will apply to it, including the rule of ‘if one of the witnesses was found to be a relative or invalid, their testimony is cancelled’;

while if a shtar is not testimony, but rather an obligation of one party to another, it seems that there is less to apply the rule of ‘if one of the witnesses was found to be a relative or invalid...,’

since this rule is embedded in the creation of a set of witnesses with the authority of testimony.

We explore the history of forged documents, paintings and antiquities including the talmud itself.

Ketubot 19: Signatures כתב ידם

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As we learned in the Mishna (18b), when a signed document needs to be authenticated, under certain circumstances the original witnesses who are brought in are believed if they say: “anusim hayinu – we were coerced,” “ketanim hayinu – at the time we were minors” or “pesulim hayinu – we were disqualified witnesses.” 

Our daf presents a baraita in which Rabbi Meir disagrees with this ruling, and argues that even with these explanations, we can never allow witnesses to deny their original testimony.

When arguing over the validity of a legal document, two witnesses must agree that a handwritten signature was not forged, coerced, or in any way invalidating the document.  Those signatures were often signatures of witnesses - the rabbis use the example of a contract describing money lent from the lender to the borrower.    

We review the illustrious history of Volozhyn and the reign of the Netziv.

The Netziv used to sign his name connecting the words Zvi and Yehuda using the letter Yud for both names. 

This custom once saved his life. People who were opposed to his yeshiva informed on him to the secret police and presented forged letters as evidence that he received counterfeit coins from England and distributed them in the local market. They brought a letter all in the Netziv's handwriting. The forgery was so superior that even the Netziv admitted that it was his handwriting but that he did not write the content. 

The Netziv used to sign his name connecting the words Zvi and Yehuda using the letter Yud for both names. This custom once saved his life. People who were opposed to his yeshiva informed on him to the secret police and presented forged letters as evidence that he received counterfeit coins from England and distributed them in the local market. They brought a letter all in the Netziv's handwriting. The forgery was so superior that even the Netziv admitted that it was his handwriting but that he did not write the content. 

After an investigation, it became clear that the signature of the Netziv in the forgery had the letter Yud written twice and the Netziv always signed Zvi Yehuda with one Yud connecting both words, and this was how the falsehood came to light.   

We describe the interaction between Reb Itsele Volyzhiner and the maskil  Max Lillianthal in attempts to bringing secular studies into the yeshivah world and specifically Volzhyn, leading eventually to its closing.

Ketubot 18: Coercion, Consent, and Power

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that when a signed document that needs to be authenticated, under certain circumstances the original witnesses who are brought in can say “yes, they are our signatures, but…

we were forced, [or] we were minors, [or] we were disqualified witnesses” they are believed.

In this scenario, a person comes to court with a document signed by witnesses. When his opponent claims that the document is a forgery, the witnesses are summoned to the court to testify to their signatures. The witnesses state that the signatures are indeed their signatures, but that nevertheless the document should not be upheld. This is for one of three reasons: they were forced to sign, they were minors when they signed, or they were disqualified witnesses (see Sanhedrin 3:4). In this case they are believed, and the document is invalid. This is because of the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”.

We continue our exploration of consent, coercion, power and sexuality, including Jeffrie Murphy’s critique of Locke and Hume regarding will, freedom and binding agreements.

Ketubot 17: Joy and Grief

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The Sages taught: One reroutes the funeral procession for burial of a corpse to yield before the wedding procession of a bride.

And both this, the funeral procession, and that, the wedding procession, yield before a king of Israel.

Why can't a king waive the honor to which he is entitled? The Rishonim suggest several approaches to the issue, which touch upon the foundations of kingdom in Israel.

How is the king's waiver of his honor for the sake of a mitzva understood?

Is there a difference between the king's waiver in favor of a bride and his waiver in favor of ordinary people?

We explore the nature of joy and grief that occur simultaneously as well as the scandal of modern funeral practices.

Ketubot 16: Flattering The Bride כיצד מרקדין לפני הכלה

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Our daf records a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel about how we are to praise the Kalah when we dance before her ("Keitzad Merakdim Lifnei ha'Kalah"). The simple understanding of the Gemara is that the Mitzvah is to make the Kalah happy.

What if she does not deserve praise? According to our interpretation, Beit Shammai favors truth, whereas Beit HiIlel prefers peace.

We explore the conflict between truth telling vs flattery, and rabbinic notions of truth and truthfulness.

Samuel Leiter examines the semantic and literary notions of acclamation and worthiness in the talmud and the notion of beauty in contrast to the Greeks.

Despite the arguments and academic discussions, the children of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel would nevertheless marry suggesting the mutual respect between scholars trumped local theory and praxis.

Ketubot 15: שהפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר

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A ketuba is effectively a contract – an agreement between husband and wife. What happens if this document is lost or misplaced? Our Gemara takes for granted that the obligation remains. In the event that death or divorce causes the ketuba to be enforced, then the only question is how much money was guaranteed at the time of the wedding. If the wife brings evidence that she was a betula – a virgin – she will receive the 200 dinar that is appropriate in such a case. Otherwise she will have to settle for 100 dinar, which a widow receives.

The new perek discusses situations as to who is to be believed.

We discuss further ethnographic cases of virginity tests inf VIRGIN RECORDS IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ASHKENAZI PROTOCOLS OF AMSTERDAM by Tzila Radecker as well as more recent cases of white sheet testing in India.

Finally we look at Shakespeare’s attitude to virginity in Much ado About Nothing as a window into Elizabethan mores.

Ketubot 14: Maiden Raped By The Well

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Our daf discusses a case where a couple who had had kiddushin but not nissuin came before Rav Yosef.

The woman – who was pregnant – stated that her betrothed was the father, a claim corroborated by the man.

This discussion in our Gemara is connected with a parallel discussion in a Gemara in Yevamot where we find the possibility raised that a betrothed, pregnant woman may be suspected of having committed adultery.

Two possibilities are offered by the Gemara there.

According to one, this suspicion is raised only if there were rumors that the woman had been sleeping with other men; according to the second, this is a matter of concern even if such rumors did not exist.

We review Prof Jeffrey Tigay’s examination of Qumran scroll’s demand for forensic examination of brides accused of premarital intercourse and Howard Zvi Edelman’s analysis of the anthropology of the cultural notion of virginity in the antique period.

Since our mishnah discusses the case of a "maiden raped by the well" we visit a Second Temple (apocrypha) story of how Daniel used his knowledge of Torah to save Susannah, a righteous woman from wicked judges who falsely accused her of adultery.

Ketubot 13: מה טיבו של איש זה

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Our daf introduces two Mishnayot with describing three distinct cases. In each of these cases, the wife is being accused of something; she claims her innocence. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer agree that she is credible. However, Rabbi Yahoshua says that we do not conduct our lives based upon her mouth. Rather, she retains her presumptive status until she can provide proof of her claim.

According to Zeiri, the case of our Mishnah is where an unmarried woman was witnessed speaking to a man.

It is clear from the rishonim that even according to Rabban Gamiel, we do not fully accept her testimony, and we are not convinced that the specific person who she points to is the father. Thus, even though she claims that the father was a kohen, we will not allow her child to eat teruma (which is permitted only to kohanim), nor will we allow the child to perform the sacrificial service in the Temple.

The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that the argument between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel is based on the particular concern that Rabbi Yehoshua has with people who engage in sexual relations outside the framework of marriage. (Steinsaltz).

We review Michael Rosenberg’s work:

Unlike the authors of earlier Rabbinic and Christian texts, who modified but fundamentally maintained and even extended the Deuteronomic ideal, the Babylonian Talmud and Augustine both construct alternative models of female virginity that, if taken seriously, would utterly reverse cultural ideals of masculinity, encouraging men to be gentle, rather that brutal, in their sexual behavior.

and Julia Lilli’s work on Configuring Female Virginity in Early Christianity and Gail Labowitz’s work on female labor, gender and family economy in rabbinic culture.

Ketubot 12: שׁוֹשְׁבִינִין

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Our Mishna states: One who eats. It can be inferred from there that there are places also in Judaea where one does not eat and seclude himself with his wife after betrothal. Abaye said: Conclude from this that in Judaea, too, the places differ in their custom, as it was taught in the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: Originally, in Judaea they would leave the groom and the bride alone one hour before their entry into the bridal chamber, so that he may become intimate with her, but in Galilee, they did not do so. Originally, in Judaea they would put up two witnesses, one for him and one for her, in order to examine the groom and the bride when they enter the bridal chamber (so that they should not deceive one another regarding the signs of virginity), but in Galilee they did not do so.

The baraita continues. In Judea, at first the groomsmen would sleep in the house in which the groom and bride sleep, in order to examine the sheet on which the marriage was consummated immediately following intercourse. This was in order to ensure that the groom would not attempt to obscure the blood of the rupture of the hymen and claim that the bride was not a virgin. And in the Galilee they would not do so.

The aramaic for groomsman is “shushvinin” ..

We explore Karnafogel’s paper on

Opposing rabbinic conceptions of marriage and matchmaking in Ashkenaz and Sepharad

as well as Parkin’s review of matchmaking in different cultures.

Ketubot 11: Minor Conversion, הִגְדִּילוּ — יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת

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One who wishes to convert to Judaism must undergo circumcision and immersion in water.

This conversion process requires intent.

A minor (under thirteen years of age) may be converted by his father.

Our daf discusses a case where a fatherless minor wishes to convert; what can be done is such a situation?]

Rav Huna said: A minor convert (he wishes to convert, and he has no father) is immersed by the direction of Beis Din (the court).

We discuss the conversion of minors and Rav Yosef ’s opinion that when they become of age, they can protest against their conversion (and return to their former religion).