Sanhedrin 35: כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּשׁוּב חֲרוֹן אַף מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל

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Our daf focuses on death. Well, not death, exactly, but on the death penalty. The rabbis want to understand more about what to do with a verdict that requires capital punishment. The gemara notes that monetary sins are begun and finished their trials during the day. Only one capital case can be heard on the same day.

The Gemara explains that the need for many courts to be established did not stem from a technical rule that forbids a court from judging two people on a given day, since Rav Ḥisda taught that many people can be tried on the same day if it is for the same offense. Rather the need for many courts was to “remove God’s anger” (as indicated in the closing words of Num 25:4).

We explore midrasnhic indeterminacy as well The Sin of Protesting God in Rabbinic and Patristic Literature.

Sanhedrin 34: וּכְפַטִּישׁ יְפֹצֵץ סָלַע

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Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.

The Gemara expounds the verse, "uch'Fatish Yefotzetz Sala" (Yirmeyahu 23:29), which describes the words of Hashem. D'Vei Rebbi Yishmael derives from this verse that "just as a hammer divides into many sparks, so, too, one verse teaches many lessons."

The subject and object of the verse are unclear. Do the words "uch'Fatish Yefotzetz Sala" mean that Hashem's words are "like a hammer that shatters a stone into many fragments," with the stone the object, which is shattered by the hammer, or does the verse mean "like a hammer that is shattered to pieces when it strikes the hard stone," with the hammer the object that is shattered by the stone?

Sanhedrin 33: הֵיכִי דָּמֵי שִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת

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One of the differences between dinei mamonot (monetary cases) and dinei nefashot (capital cases) that is taught in the Mishna (32a) is whether we will reopen a case when someone suggests that new evidence is available. In dinei mamonot we will always be willing to reopen a case; in dinei nefashot we will only do so if the original decision found that the defendant was guilty. If he had been found innocent we will not reconsider the case, even if new evidence is forthcoming.

We explore this idea of justice and being equable.

Sanhedrin 32: מִי בָּעֵינַן דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה

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The fourth perek of Massekhet Sanhedrin begins on today’s daf. Entitled Eḥad dinei mamonot…, the first Mishna continues …ve-eḥad dinei nefashot b’derisha u-vaḥakira – teaching that according to halakha, judgment of both monetary claims and capital crimes require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses.

Thus the fourth perek moves beyond the teachings of the third perek that focused on general laws regarding the Jewish court system. This perek begins the examination of the laws regarding capital crimes, which is the main topic of Massekhet Sanhedrin.

Sanhedrin 31: דַּיְּינוּהּ אַתּוּן

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The Gemara on our daf deals with a situation where one litigant says, “I would like the case to be heard here” and the other one wants the case to be taken to the makom ha-va’ad – the place of the Assembly.

The concept of a makom ha-va’ad is explained by the Meiri as referring to any place where there are judges sitting in courts that were established by the community, and did not establish themselves as judges on their own. Such courts had more power to enforce their rulings.

Sanhedrin 30: דִּבְרֵי חֲלוֹמוֹת לֹא מַעֲלִין וְלֹא מוֹרִידִין

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The Tashbatz (II § 128) takes issue with this statement, for we find many other places in Shas which clearly indicate that Chazal gave credence to dreams (to name a few; Nedarim 8a, Brachos 55a, Yevamos 93b).

The Shulchan Aruch (O”C 220:1) rules that one who had a disturbing dream and it distresses him, he should make a hatavas chalom in front of three friends, and they should tell him “you dreamt a good dream....” This recital, in which the potency of the bad dream is nullified, is printed in many siddurim.

This should be done in the morning, and during the recital he should remind himself of the dream. When one has a bad dream, it is a mitzvah to recite the hatavas chalom, even on Shabbos.

Sanhedrin 29: וְאֵין טוֹעֲנִין לַמֵּסִית

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A new Mishna teaches about how to interrogate witnesses. They are brought to a room and threatened, and then everyone leaves except for the most significant witness. They are asked how they know what they say that they know. This is done with the second witness. If the testimonies match, the three judges debate. If two decide that he is zakai, innocent, he is exempt. If two decide that he is chayav, guilty, he is guilty. If one judge is undecided, another judge is called in. Immediately after their decision, the judges inform of the outcome.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived thatthe judges do not advance a claim on behalf of an inciter? It is derived from the incident of the primordial snake who tempted Eve; he was the first inciter. As Rabbi Simlai says: The snake could have advanced many claims on its own behalf, but it did not claim them. And for what reason did the Holy One, Blessed be He, not advance these claims for it,deeming the snake exempt from punishment? Because the snake did not advance these claims itself.

We explore the notion of “primordial serpent" from the plain meaning, midrasnhic and kabbalistic perspectives.

Sanhedrin 28: לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים וּבָנִים

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The Mishnah (27b) teaches that people who are closely related – by blood or by marriage – will be disqualified from testifying about one another. Thus a person cannot testify for or against his brother or his sister’s husband, similarly he cannot be a witness regarding a case involving his uncle, whether it is his mother’s brother or his father’s brother, or, for that matter his mother’s sister’s husband or his father’s sister’s husband.

Why are relatives limited in this way?

The Gemara quotes Devarim 24:16 as a pasuk that can be interpreted to serve as the source for this law.

We explore personal vs inherited responsibility.

Sanhedrin 27: מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוּלָּן עֲרֵבִים זֶה בָּזֶה

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The Sages say that Jews are not suspected of false testimony due to love nor hatred.

The rabbis discuss the potential sources of this statement.

There are competing proof texts suggesting that sons will only die for the sins of their fathers when they continue those sins (or when they could have stopped but did not), and that one will be punished for his brother's sins. In this last case we are all responsible for each other.

We explore the notion of vicarious suffering by children for the sins of the fathers.

Sanhedrin 26: שֶׁנִּיתְּנָה בַּחֲשַׁאי מִפְּנֵי הַשָּׂטָן

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Our Daf struggles with morals.

The gemara (Sanhedrin 27a) suggests that Abbaye’s position disqualifying a le-hakhis sinner from testifying is based on R. Meir’s logic. Just as R. Meir was concerned that witnesses would escalate their lies even in more severe cases, Abbaye was similarly concerned with a sinner escalating and lying. Even though he has not been caught lying, we worry that his infraction indicates inferior moral character and increases the chances of future false testimony. This association between Abbaye and R. Meir indicates that Abbaye’s disqualification of a le-hakhis sinner from testifying is not based on his formal status as a rasha, but rather on the concern that he will escalate into a liar.

We explore various opinions on the topic.

Sanhedrin 25: מַאי מַפְרִיחֵי יוֹנִים

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The Mishna on yesterday’s daf listed people who are disqualified as witnesses in a Jewish court, because they are involved in activities that are forbidden by the Sages. Included in the list were mafriḥei yonim – “people who make birds fly.”

Why are those who fly pigeons not permitted to be judges? First we are told that this is because they are actually racing pigeons for money. Then it is suggested that this is because they have trained pigeons to find and bring back other pigeons. But is this actually stealing?

Pigeons choose where to roost. They are not property that can be contained. Even though people might make money from these transactions, like gamblers, the pigeons are making up their own minds about where to go.

We explore the history of racing pigeons/doves.

Sanhedrin 24: וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַפְּסוּלִין: הַמְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא

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The Mishna on our daf lists people who will not be accepted as witnesses in a Jewish court, because they are involved in monetary shenanigans that are forbidden by the Sages.

These people include dice players, money lenders who take interest, people who gamble on pigeon races, and those who market produce from the Sabbatical year. Rabbi Yehuda says: ba-meh devarim amurim – “under what circumstances is this rule taught?” When this is their livelihood.

If a person has another occupation and participates in these activities only occasionally, then he still could be trusted as a witness in court.

Sanhedrin 23: זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד

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Perek II begins with a new Mishna. It teaches that in cases of monetary law, three judges must be chosen where each litigant chooses one judge and then they agree on the third or those two judges choose the third. Perhaps judges can be disqualified, particularly if they are not qualified to judge or if they are a relative of the litigant. There is also the question of whether or not one litigant can disqualify the others' witnesses.

We explore court jurisdictions and powers.

Sanhedrin 22: וַתָּבֹא בַת שֶׁבַע אֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ הַחַדְרָה

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The rabbis discuss marriage and divorce. King David was permitted to be alone with Avishag. Was this because he was weak? He was not permitted to divorce one of his wives so that so that he could marry Avishag. Rabbi Yochanan states that a wife dies only if a man cannot pay what he owes. He also teaches that if a man's first wife dies, it is like the Temple was destroyed in his lifetime.

Rabbi Alexander says that the world darkens for a man whose wife dies. Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina says that his step gets shorter. Rabbi Avahu says that his advice will not be valuable. Rabba bar bar Chana changes the topic, turning to the difficulty of matchmaking: it is as difficult as splitting the sea. Rav Yehudah taught about the creation of new people: forty days before a fetus is formed, a Heavenly voice announces a new match. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachman teaches that everything has a substitute except for the wife of one's youth. Rav Yehudah tells us that one feels contented only with his first wife.

We explore various topics on the subject of matchmaking and marriage.

Sanhedrin 21: פִּלַגְשִׁים – בְּלֹא כְּתוּבָּה וּבְלֹא קִידּוּשִׁין

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Our last Mishna taught that a king may not have too many wives. But what does this mean? It is understood to mean that a king must limit himself 18 wives. Rabbi Yehuda said that he could have more as long as they did not divert his heart from God. Rabbi Shimon said that he does not marry even one who would divert his heart from G-d. Avigail was said to be a good influence in this way, but even she should not be a wife if she diverts the king from God.

The Gemara attempts to understand why 18 is the number of wives allowed by looking at King David's wives.

In explanation of the pasuk‘s reference to nashim (wives) and pilagshim (concubines), Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as explaining that nashim are properly married with ketuba and kiddushin, while pilagshim have neither ketuba nor kiddushin.

We explore concubinage and the character of Abigail.

Sanhedrin 20: שׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ

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Jewish law recognizes the unique position of the King, who has special laws and dispensations that apply only to him. Does the halakha view the institution of a Jewish monarchy as the ideal state of affairs for governing the Jewish people?

The Gemara discusses the verses in Sefer Shmuel I (ch. 8) which describe the appointment of a Jewish king. When the nation asked that a king be appointed over them, the prophet Shmuel told them that they did not realize how much power the king would wield over them, and he warned them of the king's many harsh powers, such as the ability to take away their children forcibly to serve him.

The Gemara cites a dispute between the Amora'im, who argue about whether the king indeed all of the powers has mentioned by Shmuel, or whether Shmuel mentioned them only to frighten the Jewish people and deter them from their request.

Sanhedrin 19: ינאי המלך, עמוד על רגליך

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The Gemara on our daf clarifies that the limitation on being judged does not apply to Jewish kings from the Davidic monarchy; it only applies to other kings. The fact that kings from King David’s family do judge is based on a clear passage in Sefer Yirmiyahu (21:12) that charges those kings with meting out justice and protecting the oppressed in the courtroom.

The Gemara relates further that the law limiting a Jewish king who is not from the House of King David from being judged or acting as a judge is based on a story that took place with King Yannai.

We examine the literary production of this legend from its textual forebears in Midrash and Josephus.

Sanhedrin 18: איהו היכי דיין

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The second perek of Massekhet Sanhedrin begins on our daf.

Entitled Kohen Gadol, this chapter focuses on some of the unique laws affecting the High Priest and the anointed King of Israel.

The general principle in Jewish law is that all are equal before the law, as evidenced by the passage that forbids a judge from recognizing the higher status of any person (see Vayikra 19:15).

We explore the the oration of Moshe Rabbeinu in Devorim.

Sanhedrin 17: בקלפי נשתיירו

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Moshe is commanded to choose 70 elders, and the Gemara explains that including Moshe we find 71 judges in the group.

Our Gemara continues and explains the process that took place when Moshe chose the elders, and specifically the enigmatic story regarding two of the elders – Eldad and Medad – who, according to the Torah (see Bamidbar 11:26-29) remained removed from the rest of the group, and nevertheless prophesied in a manner that brought Yehoshua to demand that they be shut up.

We explore the curious history of unauthorized prophecy.

Sanhedrin 16: לכו פשטו ידיכם בגדוד

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The rabbis then consider how many judges are required to grant smicha to other judges. It was understood that three judges were needed, but the rabbis cannot find a proper proof text for this custom. In their search for the origin of this practice, the rabbis find proofs for other possible numbers of judges.

According to the Mishna, among the ceremonies that require the participation of three judges is semikhat zekenim – rabbinic ordination.

In searching for a source for this requirement, Abaye points out a difficulty – if the source is the passage (Bamidbar 27:23) where Moshe lays his hands on Yehoshua to declare him his successor, then it would appear that a single judge would suffice. And if we saw that Moshe embodies the Sanhedrin and is considered the equivalent of its 71 members, then we should need a full Sanhedrin to confer rabbinic ordination.

We explore the ordination process then and now.