Bava Batra 50: אֵין מַחֲזִיקִין בְּנִכְסֵי אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ

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The Gemara attempts to differentiate the current assertion - that a woman can void the sale of her field even if she previously consented in certain situations - from other rulings that suggest that such a sale is always valid. There are a number of statements describing the use of usufruct property, the property that belongs to a woman because she brought it into her marriage.

We explore the laws of usufruct halachic and secular.

Bava Batra 49: ״נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי״!

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According to Jewish law, what are some of the mutual responsibilities of husbands and wives?

This question is discussed by the Gemara in response to the Mishna’s teaching (see daf 42a) that ba’al be-nikhsei ishto – a husband working his wife’s property – will not gain a ḥazaka (presumption of ownership) on the field. Since the husband has legitimate reason to be on the field – he has rights to the produce – there is no reason for his wife to complain about his presence there, so his being there cannot support a claim that the field had been purchased by him.

The Gemara suggests: By inference, the husband has the ability to bring proof that he purchased the field from his wife or received it as a gift from her and consequently be regarded as the owner of the field.

The Gemara asks: Why is this proof decisive? Let her say: I did it, i.e., I gave or sold the field to my husband, only to please my husband, but I did not mean it.

We explore marriage in Greece and Rome and the modern concept of co-dependance and “husband pleasing”!

Bava Batra 48: אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גָּמַר וּמַקְנֵה

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While discussing the validity of a sale when the original owner was coerced to sell, the Gemara suggests comparing it to a case of divorce.

According to Torah law only the husband can act to divorce his wife; the wife does not have the power to create a divorce. The Gemara in Gittin (88b) teaches that there are exceptions. If a beit din forces the husband to give a get (write of divorce), the divorce will take effect. If it is a non-Jewish court that forces him to give a get, no divorce takes place. If, however, the Jewish court rules that the husband should divorce his wife, but they do not have the power to force him to give a get, they can turn to the secular courts and arrange for them to force him to follow their ruling.

We explore the legal ramification of coercion (Hobbes) with a review of the work of Rabbi Emanuel Rackman.

Bava Batra 47: שָׁאנֵי אוּנְסָא דְנַפְשֵׁיהּ

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Steinsaltz "Generally speaking, in order for a kinyan – a transfer of ownership – to take place, Jewish law requires gemirut da’at – knowledge and agreement on the part of both the buyer and the seller. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to hear Rav Huna’s teaching – talyuhu ve-zabein, zevinei zevini – if someone is “hung,” i.e. if he is forced to sell something, the sale takes effect.

In answer to the Gemara’s query of why this would be true, we are told that everyone who sells really is doing it against his will, yet we accept that he agrees to the sale. Here, too, we view him as having accepted the sale.

We explore involuntary alienation in law and talmud.

Bava Batra 46: רַמָּאֵי דְפוּמְבְּדִיתָא

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From the death of Rava in 352 until the first half of the geonic period, the Pumbedita academy did not occupy a central place in the scholastic and halakhic world. It was subordinate to *Sura, which was granted more privileges than Pumbedita.

Life in a large, bustling, commercial city full of connections with foreign merchants had a deleterious influence on the character of the Jews of Pumbedita.

The Babylonian Talmud has preserved many adverse evaluations of their moral character. Mention is made of the cheating by workers (BB 46a; Ḥul. 127a), and Rava refers to the thieves who would come to the city, as well as the resident thieves (Av. Zar. 70a).

We explore the ancient history of Falluja (Pumpedita) then move on to merchants and thieves elsewhere in the diaspora.

Bava Batra 45: הַנּוֹתֵן טַלִּיתוֹ לְאוּמָּן

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The rabbis move on to discuss the Mishna's earlier comment regarding craftspeople having no chazakah. Is this only when a witness sees an owner pay a craftsperson. Otherwise the craftsperson benefits from the principle of migo: he could have benefited from denying having received payment. Then again, migo could be used to explain other possible events. Rabba says that one who accepts a deposit in front of witnesses must return it in front of witnesses as well.

A question is raised, against Abaye. A person gave his garment to a craftsperson who said that he was hired for two while the person says that the craftsperson was hired for one. If the craftsperson has the garment, the person must bring proof of his claim or pay for two.

We explore the notion of mintage vs Halacha/din from differences between ethnic groups in Judaism as well as feminist perspective (the work of Dr Tamar Ross).

Bava Batra 44: : עָשָׂה עַבְדּוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי וּמְכָרוֹ (ἀποθήκη)

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf someone with a personal, vested interest in a disputed property will not be permitted to testify about that case. Our Gemara examines what might be considered a personal interest in property.

Ravin bar Shmuel quotes Shmuel as saying that if someone sells a field to his friend and stipulates that he does not take responsibility for the sale (she-lo be-aḥarayut, i.e. should the land be taken from him for any reason, he will not return the purchase price), if someone else comes and claims the land, the seller cannot testify on behalf of the purchaser.

We continue our exploration of movables vs property as liens.

Bava Batra 43: שָׁאנֵי סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה, דְּלִשְׁמִיעָה קָאֵי

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Our daf appears to assume that a person can remove his self-interest and be able to testify about real estate, but there is a baraita that appears to contradict this.

According to the baraita, if a Sefer Torah is stolen in a city, the thief who is caught cannot be tried by residents of the city, nor can they testify against him. The reason for this is, apparently, because the Sefer Torah is communal property; since everyone in the city has a share in it, they cannot testify about it.

According to the Gemara’s reasoning, however, shouldn’t two people be able to renounce their share of the Sefer Torah and act as witnesses? In response the Gemara says that a Sefer Torah is unique because it is used for public readings in the synagogue. Therefore, even someone who does not have ownership of it still has a personal interest in it.

We explore the history of stolen Sefer torah’s including the ambivalent find of Cecil Roth’s “sole" Torah in Greece.

Bava Batra 42: בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי

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We have learned earlier that if a man injures a woman and causes her to miscarry, whether or not he intended to harm her or the fetus, he is liable to pay damages as the woman's husband sees fit. The potential life that was lost might have been anyone, might have done anything - there is no way to determine the true value of that potential person. But what if an ox causes a woman to miscarry? Does it make a difference whether or not the ox intended to harm the woman? Does it matter whether the ox was tam or mu'ad? Is the ox's owner liable to pay for damages that might be incurred?

The Torah is emphatic that injuries done to men and women will be punished the same way (see, for example Shemot 21:28 and 21:29). In discussing this point, the Gemara brings a baraita that teaches that if a pregnant woman is injured, leading her to miscarry, the woman will receive payments of nezek and tza’ar (damage to her as well as pain and suffering) while her husband will receive the penalty meted out for the loss of the unborn child – known as demei veladot – as stipulated in the Torah (see Shemot 21:22).

We continue to explore the philosophical notions of animal consciousness.

Bava Batra 41: מִשּׁוּם יְרוּשָּׁה – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ טַעֲנָה

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Our Mishna teaches about a case where someone approaches a person and says, “what are you doing on my land?!” and the accused person responds, “no one ever told me that I could not be here.” Without a claim of purchase, the accused will lose his claim to the land.

As we have learned (see daf 28), according to Jewish law, just because someone has possession of property and lives or works it, he cannot claim ownership of it. A person only becomes an owner if he receives that status from the original owner through a sale or by receiving a present, or if he claims an object that is hefker, performing a formal act of possession (a kinyan).

We continue our exploration into Possession and legal theories behind the need for documentation.

Bava Batra 40: יָדְעִינַן בֵּיהּ בְּאוּנְסָא דִפְלָנְיָא

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Abaye and Rava both say: A preemptive declaration may be written even concerning someone who is law abiding, such as for me and for you, as not every issue can be settled through the courts. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Any preemptive declaration that does not have written in it the formulation: We are aware of so-and-so’s duress, i.e., we are aware of the nature of the coercion that forced him to enter this arrangement against his will, is not a valid preemptive declaration.

On occasion someone might be in a situation where he is forced to agree to participate in an act of halakhic significance, but he tells the witnesses that he is being forced to do this against his will. Such a statement – referred to by the Gemara as a moda’a (preemptive declaration) – may be written down by the witnesses and used to prove that the action was not one that he really agreed to.

We explore duress as a criminal defense and coercions and compulsions with reference to a bodily function!

Bava Batra 39: לֵית בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם לִישָּׁנָא בִּישָׁא

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We have learned that someone working or living on land for three years has a ḥazaka (presumptive ownership) – he can claim to have purchased the land without having to produce proof – since if he had not obtained the land legally, the true owner should have objected during those three years.

Our Gemara offers a number of different approaches to this argument, the first of which suggests that the question is whether Rabba bar Rav Huna’s rule about lashon ha-ra – libelous statements – is accepted.

According to Rabba bar Rav Huna, once a statement is made in front of three people it is assumed to be known and widespread, so a statement that is made in front of three people can be repeated without concern for the laws prohibiting lashon ha-ra.

We explore the parameters of “lishna bisha” and its far reaching application in the age of technology.

Bava Batra 38: אֵין מַחְזִיקִין בְּנִכְסֵי בוֹרֵחַ

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A new Mishnah states:

There are three independent lands in Eretz Yisrael with regard to establishing presumptive ownership: Judea, and Transjordan, and the Galilee. If the prior owner of the field was in Judea and another took possession of his field in the Galilee, or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession of his field in Judea, the possessor does not establish presumptive ownership until the one possessing the field will be with the prior owner in one province.

Since travel between these areas was difficult, someone who lived or worked the land in one area would only get a ḥazaka in the field if the claimant had been with him in that area during that time. If the claimant was in one of the other areas, it is possible that he never found out that someone was working his land, and he had no reason – and no way – to object.

We explore the topography of Palestine in the tannaitic period.

Bava Batra 37: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר

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If one person claims the trees on a field and the other one claims the land, Rav Zevid rules that each one owns the thing that he claims. Rav Pappa objects to this ruling, since the owner of the land can insist that the owner of the trees remove them from his property! Therefore Rav Pappa suggests that we must view the person who claims the trees as owning a share of the land, as well.

We explore the science of trees and the effects of deforestation.

Bava Batra 36: רְבוּתָא לְמִיחְשַׁב גַּבְרֵי

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Although we have learned that someone who lives or works on land for three years can claim to have a cḥazaka (presumption of ownership) – he will no longer need to produce a document showing that he bought the land, since his presence on the land for three years with no objection from the owner will serve to support his claim of purchase – our Gemara lists a number of exceptions.

We explore the claim that plowing effects chazakah and the earliest agricultural pioneers in Palestine, fin de siecle.

Bava Batra 35: שׁוּדָא דְּדַיָּינֵי

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The Gemara on our daf raises the case of two contracts that have the same date, and there is no way of telling which one was written first. Both litigants claim that they bought the field and that it belongs to them. In such a situation, Rav says yaḥloku – they should divide the field between them; Shmuel rules shudda d’dayanei – it is left to the discretion of the judges.

Understanding the ruling of shudda d’dayanei is subject to different interpretations by the commentaries.

Rashi and the Rashbam explain that shudda d’dayanei means that the judges must do their utmost to determine which one of the two claimants is most likely right, and the property should be given to him. In our case, where the contracts seem to carry equal weight, the court will need to investigate which one the seller was friendly with and did more business with.

We explore the notion of judicial discretion.

Bava Batra 34: כֹּל דְּאַלִּים גָּבַר

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Does Jewish law ever recommend to two litigants to “fight it out” between them?

The Gemara on our daf appears to offer this ruling when it states kol d’alim gvar – whoever is stronger prevails – in a case where two people each claim a piece of land, and neither of them has a proof that is stronger than the other’s.

The Rosh explains that this ruling is based on the assumption that the one who exerts himself more powerfully is more likely the true owner, and we will work with that assumption unless the other party brings a proof to court.

We explore “might vs right” theory with specific attention to the Einstein-Freud letters 1932.

Bava Batra 33: חֲצִיף אִינִישׁ

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Sometimes, the certainty of a claim is enough to make the court believe someone.

The Gemara on our daf quotes Rav Yehuda as teaching that if a man goes by carrying his magala and tovelaya, saying “I will go and cull the dates from the date palm that I purchased from so-and-so” we will believe him. The Gemara explains that this is based on the assumption that no one would have the gall to publicly harvest a date palm that was not his.

We explore the ethics of squatting, and policies regarding homeless squatters.

Bava Batra 32: שְׁטָרָא זַיְיפָא הוּא

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The Gemara on our daf presents two similar cases but offers two different rulings in them.

In the first case, one person said to another “what do you want with my field?” The second one answered, “I purchased it from you, and here is the bill of sale.” The first replied “that bill of sale is a forgery!”

The second leaned over to Rabba who was presiding over the court and said, “It really is a forgery, but the real contract was lost, so I thought that I would produce this one in order to bolster my claim.”

We continue our exploration of the rules of ownership vs possession and chazakah.

Bava Batra 31: מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר

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The Gemara on our daf continues discussing how we deal with competing claims to property.

If two people both claim shel avotai – that a piece of land belonged to their ancestors – and in an attempt to buttress their claims, one brought witnesses that it had belonged to his ancestors, while the other brought witnesses that he had lived there for three years, and therefore had a ḥazaka (presumption of ownership), Rabba rules that we believe the one who has lived there for three years because of the principle mah lo le-shaker – what interest does he have in lying? Specifically, if he wanted to lie he could have done so in a more convincing manner, by saying that he had purchased it and had lived there for three years – a claim that would have been accepted by the courts. Abaye disagrees, arguing that witnesses are always more powerful that a claim based on mah lo le-shaker.

We explore the law regarding adverse possession and it contrast with chazakah.