Bava Batra 43: שָׁאנֵי סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה, דְּלִשְׁמִיעָה קָאֵי

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Our daf appears to assume that a person can remove his self-interest and be able to testify about real estate, but there is a baraita that appears to contradict this.

According to the baraita, if a Sefer Torah is stolen in a city, the thief who is caught cannot be tried by residents of the city, nor can they testify against him. The reason for this is, apparently, because the Sefer Torah is communal property; since everyone in the city has a share in it, they cannot testify about it.

According to the Gemara’s reasoning, however, shouldn’t two people be able to renounce their share of the Sefer Torah and act as witnesses? In response the Gemara says that a Sefer Torah is unique because it is used for public readings in the synagogue. Therefore, even someone who does not have ownership of it still has a personal interest in it.

We explore the history of stolen Sefer torah’s including the ambivalent find of Cecil Roth’s “sole" Torah in Greece.

Bava Batra 42: בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי

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We have learned earlier that if a man injures a woman and causes her to miscarry, whether or not he intended to harm her or the fetus, he is liable to pay damages as the woman's husband sees fit. The potential life that was lost might have been anyone, might have done anything - there is no way to determine the true value of that potential person. But what if an ox causes a woman to miscarry? Does it make a difference whether or not the ox intended to harm the woman? Does it matter whether the ox was tam or mu'ad? Is the ox's owner liable to pay for damages that might be incurred?

The Torah is emphatic that injuries done to men and women will be punished the same way (see, for example Shemot 21:28 and 21:29). In discussing this point, the Gemara brings a baraita that teaches that if a pregnant woman is injured, leading her to miscarry, the woman will receive payments of nezek and tza’ar (damage to her as well as pain and suffering) while her husband will receive the penalty meted out for the loss of the unborn child – known as demei veladot – as stipulated in the Torah (see Shemot 21:22).

We continue to explore the philosophical notions of animal consciousness.

Bava Batra 41: מִשּׁוּם יְרוּשָּׁה – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ טַעֲנָה

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Our Mishna teaches about a case where someone approaches a person and says, “what are you doing on my land?!” and the accused person responds, “no one ever told me that I could not be here.” Without a claim of purchase, the accused will lose his claim to the land.

As we have learned (see daf 28), according to Jewish law, just because someone has possession of property and lives or works it, he cannot claim ownership of it. A person only becomes an owner if he receives that status from the original owner through a sale or by receiving a present, or if he claims an object that is hefker, performing a formal act of possession (a kinyan).

We continue our exploration into Possession and legal theories behind the need for documentation.

Bava Batra 40: יָדְעִינַן בֵּיהּ בְּאוּנְסָא דִפְלָנְיָא

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Abaye and Rava both say: A preemptive declaration may be written even concerning someone who is law abiding, such as for me and for you, as not every issue can be settled through the courts. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Any preemptive declaration that does not have written in it the formulation: We are aware of so-and-so’s duress, i.e., we are aware of the nature of the coercion that forced him to enter this arrangement against his will, is not a valid preemptive declaration.

On occasion someone might be in a situation where he is forced to agree to participate in an act of halakhic significance, but he tells the witnesses that he is being forced to do this against his will. Such a statement – referred to by the Gemara as a moda’a (preemptive declaration) – may be written down by the witnesses and used to prove that the action was not one that he really agreed to.

We explore duress as a criminal defense and coercions and compulsions with reference to a bodily function!

Bava Batra 39: לֵית בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם לִישָּׁנָא בִּישָׁא

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We have learned that someone working or living on land for three years has a ḥazaka (presumptive ownership) – he can claim to have purchased the land without having to produce proof – since if he had not obtained the land legally, the true owner should have objected during those three years.

Our Gemara offers a number of different approaches to this argument, the first of which suggests that the question is whether Rabba bar Rav Huna’s rule about lashon ha-ra – libelous statements – is accepted.

According to Rabba bar Rav Huna, once a statement is made in front of three people it is assumed to be known and widespread, so a statement that is made in front of three people can be repeated without concern for the laws prohibiting lashon ha-ra.

We explore the parameters of “lishna bisha” and its far reaching application in the age of technology.

Bava Batra 38: אֵין מַחְזִיקִין בְּנִכְסֵי בוֹרֵחַ

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A new Mishnah states:

There are three independent lands in Eretz Yisrael with regard to establishing presumptive ownership: Judea, and Transjordan, and the Galilee. If the prior owner of the field was in Judea and another took possession of his field in the Galilee, or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession of his field in Judea, the possessor does not establish presumptive ownership until the one possessing the field will be with the prior owner in one province.

Since travel between these areas was difficult, someone who lived or worked the land in one area would only get a ḥazaka in the field if the claimant had been with him in that area during that time. If the claimant was in one of the other areas, it is possible that he never found out that someone was working his land, and he had no reason – and no way – to object.

We explore the topography of Palestine in the tannaitic period.

Bava Batra 37: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר

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If one person claims the trees on a field and the other one claims the land, Rav Zevid rules that each one owns the thing that he claims. Rav Pappa objects to this ruling, since the owner of the land can insist that the owner of the trees remove them from his property! Therefore Rav Pappa suggests that we must view the person who claims the trees as owning a share of the land, as well.

We explore the science of trees and the effects of deforestation.

Bava Batra 36: רְבוּתָא לְמִיחְשַׁב גַּבְרֵי

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Although we have learned that someone who lives or works on land for three years can claim to have a cḥazaka (presumption of ownership) – he will no longer need to produce a document showing that he bought the land, since his presence on the land for three years with no objection from the owner will serve to support his claim of purchase – our Gemara lists a number of exceptions.

We explore the claim that plowing effects chazakah and the earliest agricultural pioneers in Palestine, fin de siecle.

Bava Batra 35: שׁוּדָא דְּדַיָּינֵי

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The Gemara on our daf raises the case of two contracts that have the same date, and there is no way of telling which one was written first. Both litigants claim that they bought the field and that it belongs to them. In such a situation, Rav says yaḥloku – they should divide the field between them; Shmuel rules shudda d’dayanei – it is left to the discretion of the judges.

Understanding the ruling of shudda d’dayanei is subject to different interpretations by the commentaries.

Rashi and the Rashbam explain that shudda d’dayanei means that the judges must do their utmost to determine which one of the two claimants is most likely right, and the property should be given to him. In our case, where the contracts seem to carry equal weight, the court will need to investigate which one the seller was friendly with and did more business with.

We explore the notion of judicial discretion.

Bava Batra 34: כֹּל דְּאַלִּים גָּבַר

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Does Jewish law ever recommend to two litigants to “fight it out” between them?

The Gemara on our daf appears to offer this ruling when it states kol d’alim gvar – whoever is stronger prevails – in a case where two people each claim a piece of land, and neither of them has a proof that is stronger than the other’s.

The Rosh explains that this ruling is based on the assumption that the one who exerts himself more powerfully is more likely the true owner, and we will work with that assumption unless the other party brings a proof to court.

We explore “might vs right” theory with specific attention to the Einstein-Freud letters 1932.

Bava Batra 33: חֲצִיף אִינִישׁ

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Sometimes, the certainty of a claim is enough to make the court believe someone.

The Gemara on our daf quotes Rav Yehuda as teaching that if a man goes by carrying his magala and tovelaya, saying “I will go and cull the dates from the date palm that I purchased from so-and-so” we will believe him. The Gemara explains that this is based on the assumption that no one would have the gall to publicly harvest a date palm that was not his.

We explore the ethics of squatting, and policies regarding homeless squatters.

Bava Batra 32: שְׁטָרָא זַיְיפָא הוּא

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The Gemara on our daf presents two similar cases but offers two different rulings in them.

In the first case, one person said to another “what do you want with my field?” The second one answered, “I purchased it from you, and here is the bill of sale.” The first replied “that bill of sale is a forgery!”

The second leaned over to Rabba who was presiding over the court and said, “It really is a forgery, but the real contract was lost, so I thought that I would produce this one in order to bolster my claim.”

We continue our exploration of the rules of ownership vs possession and chazakah.

Bava Batra 31: מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר

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The Gemara on our daf continues discussing how we deal with competing claims to property.

If two people both claim shel avotai – that a piece of land belonged to their ancestors – and in an attempt to buttress their claims, one brought witnesses that it had belonged to his ancestors, while the other brought witnesses that he had lived there for three years, and therefore had a ḥazaka (presumption of ownership), Rabba rules that we believe the one who has lived there for three years because of the principle mah lo le-shaker – what interest does he have in lying? Specifically, if he wanted to lie he could have done so in a more convincing manner, by saying that he had purchased it and had lived there for three years – a claim that would have been accepted by the courts. Abaye disagrees, arguing that witnesses are always more powerful that a claim based on mah lo le-shaker.

We explore the law regarding adverse possession and it contrast with chazakah.

Bava Batra 30: זִיל בְּרוֹר אֲכִילְתָךְ

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As we discussed, a claim that one has purchased a field coupled with evidence that one has occupied the field for three years is enough to grant one presumptive ownership of the field – despite the fact that there is no other evidence that the field was purchased.

The rabbis offer a number of cases which demonstrate the variation possible within the halacha of chazaka.

Next we are told about a field that has been bought from someone who claimed to have bought it from someone else with no proof. In such a case the original owner can take back the field even after three years of chazaka.

We explore the use of Talmud order Nezikin in preparing students (even for secular law careers).

Bava Batra 29: קַמַּיְיתָא לָא קָפֵיד אִינִישׁ

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Why have the rabbis understood that chazaka, presumptive ownership, is established after three years? The Gemara uses a number of examples to illustrate the rabbis' reasoning. It explains that after one year, an owner might let it go when another person profits from use of his land. After two years he might do the same. But after three years had passed, an owner would stand up and claim his land.

Rav Yosef said that it is written in the verse detailing the purchase of a field from Hanamel by Jeremiah, his cousin, during the time of the siege of Eretz Yisrael:

“Men shall buy fields for money, and subscribe the deeds, and seal them” (Jeremiah 32:44).

This describes the writing of a bill of sale to serve as proof of ownership of the field, since he was unable to remain living there for three years to establish the presumption of ownership. As the prophet Jeremiah stood in the tenth year of King Zedekiah’s reign and warned people to write bills of sale for the eleventh year, when Eretz Yisrael would be overrun.

Consequently, despite the fact that one purchasing a field there would be able to live on the land for two years, this would not be sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership, which is why he said that they should have bills of sale written.

We explore the rhetoric and historicity of the book of Jeremiah.

Bava Batra 28: וְהַבּוֹרוֹת חֶזְקַת הַבָּתִּים

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According to Jewish law, just because someone has possession of property and lives or works it, he cannot claim ownership of it. A person only becomes an owner if he receives that status from the original owner through a sale or by receiving a present, or if he claims an object that is hefker, performing a formal act of possession (a kinyan). Thus, there can be no claim of ownership based on “squatters’ rights” and if someone else comes with proof of ownership, the person living or working the land will have to prove that he bought it.

We explore the groundbreaking work of Prof Dovid West Halivni and his theory of talmud composition using this first Mishnah as an example.

Bava Batra 27: כּל הָאִילָן כְּנֶגֶד הַמִּשְׁקוֹלֶת

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With regard to a tree that extends into the public domain, one cuts its branches so that a camel can pass beneath the tree with its rider sitting on it. Rabbi Yehuda says: One cuts enough branches that a camel loaded with flax or bundles of branches can pass beneath it. Rabbi Shimon says: One cuts all branches of the tree that extend into the public domain along the plumb line, so that they do not hang over the public area at all.

While the Talmud doesn't specify the kind of tree that must be distanced from others, in Mesopotamia the most likely candidate was the Date Palm, Phoenix dactylifera.

We cite Psalm 92:13 צַ֭דִּיק כַּתָּמָ֣ר יִפְרָ֑ח כְּאֶ֖רֶז בַּלְּבָנ֣וֹן יִשְׂגֶּֽה׃

And explore the phenomenon of the “zaddik" in our times.

Bava Batra 26: כִּ֤י הָֽאָדָם֙ עֵ֣ץ הַשָּׂדֶ֔ה

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How much does one need to distance his tree from another’s property? One reason for the distance is to leave room for the neighbor to plow. If one’s roots grow into a neighboring field, one can cut them to a certain distance depending on why one is cutting them (what one needs the space for).

Rava bar Rav Chanan refused to cut down his fig trees because Rav Chanina’s son died because he cut down a fig tree. There is a prohibition from the Torah to cut down fruit bearing trees. It is not clear, however, that the prohibition should apply in this case.

We explore the prohibition Deut 20 in the context of war and seagoing a city, which brings to just war theory and the ethics of collateral civilian casualties.

Bava Batra 25: עוֹלָם לְאַכְסַדְרָה הוּא דּוֹמֶה

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The Gemara records a conversation regarding the movement of the sun across the sky. The rabbis suggest various theories to explain why the sun is in the sky for less time during the winter months and more time in the summer months.

Rabbi Eliezer says that the world resembles a porch, a structure which lacks a fourth wall (Rashi, s.v. Le’achsadrah), and the north side is not enclosed.

The fact that the earth is a globe was known in the Talmudic era and anyone learning the book of Yeshayahu would surely notice the verse “He who sits on the circle of the earth” (40:22).

How are we, then, to interpret Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that the world lacks one side?

We explore ancient cosmology and the rabbinic attempts to refute the findings of Copernicus.

Bava Batra 24: מִשּׁוּם נוֹיֵי הָעִיר

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The Mishna on our daf discusses cases where a person is limited in the kinds of building that he can do on his property if it may disturb the needs of the larger community.

The Mishna also forbids planting trees near the city, which is explained by Ulla in the Gemara as a concern with noyei ha-ir – the beauty of the city. Part of the attractiveness of a walled city is having its walls exposed on the outside.

The Gemara asks why this explanation is necessary, given the biblical principle that the cities of the Levites are surrounded by an empty area of 1,000 amot and a further 2,000 amot that are left available for planting vegetation (see Num 35:1-8), and explains that we might have thought that there were exceptions to this rule, but the concern with noyei ha-ir trumps any possible exceptions.

We explore the biblical notion of beauty and comparison with Greek ideals.

The concept of the beauty of Jerusalem and its appropriation by William Blake in his poem.