Bava Metzia 98: הַכִּישָׁהּ בְּמַקֵּל וְהִיא תָּבֹא

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The Mishna discusses cases of a mixed custodianship, with part rental, and part lending. The custodianship is split either in time (some time rental, some time lending), or in items (one item rented, one item lent). The Mishna detailed the rules when a cow of such a custodianship dies, and the owner and custodian dispute whether it fell under the rental or borrowing section. The Gemora quotes a statement of Rava to explain this case. Rava says that if one claims that someone owes him 100 zuz, and the defendant responds that he is certain that he owes 50, but doesn’t know about the other 50, he must pay the full 100.

In light of recent events I was watching Sir Simon Schama’s historical view (BadChaps, Jews and the Failure of British Decency: Antisemitism in Historical Perspective) and came across the life of Dr Roderigo Lopez the physician to Queen Elizabeth I.

Bava Metzia 97: הַשּׁוֹאֵל אֶת הַפָּרָה

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As we have learned (daf 95), a borrower will not be obligated to pay damages for an animal as long as the owner is with him. Furthermore we learned that this rule applies only if the owner was hired before the animal was borrowed or if both relationships were created simultaneously. If, however, the animal was borrowed first and the owner was only hired later on, then the borrower will be held liable for anything that happens to the animal, even if the owner is working for the borrower at that point in time.

We explore Uri Weiss’ review of the new area of scholarship, that of Talmud and game theory.

Bava Metzia 96: הַשּׁוֹאֵל אֶת הַפָּרָה

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If one borrowed an item, not to use it but to be seen with it, so that people will assume that he is wealthy, what is the halakha? In order for him to be liable, do we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth from which he also derives tangible benefit, and that does not exist in this case.

We explore the attitude to poverty in the Talmud as well as how women were able through their wits to support their children if not employ subterfuge as in a close (feminist) reading of Eyshes Chayil.

Bava Metzia 95: וְנִשְׁבַּ֣ר אוֹ־מֵ֑ת בְּעָלָ֥יו

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One of the most intriguing payment exemptions is the rule of “ba'alav imo.” If the owner of a deposited item HIMSELF services the shomer (watchman) of the item, the latter is excused from all payments in cases of loss. This de-oraita petur is a sweeping exemption that applies to all shomrim, and potentially even to cases of gross negligence (see the two opinions in our daf)

The gemara dictates certain parameters to this rule, but never articulates the logic of it. In fact, its basis is so elusive that Tosafot (Bava Metzia 97a) claim that it is a non-logical gezeirat ha-katuv (which therefore cannot be independently applied to broader contexts).

We explore the ramifications of Ex 22:13 as part of civil laws from Sinai and the halachot of bringing suit in a secular courts of law.

Bava Metzia 94: עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעֲלִי לָרָקִיעַ

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The eighth perek of Masechet Bava Metzia, ha-Sho’el et ha-parah, begins on our daf, and its focus is on the responsibilities of someone who rents (socher) or borrows (sho’el) an animal or an object from his friend.

Borrowing and renting are qualitatively different than acting as a guard whose job is to watch something for his friend, since the borrower or the renter receives the object with the understanding that he will use it. Thus the owner accepts the fact that there will be normal wear-and-tear on the object. At the same time, the level of responsibility that the borrower or the renter takes upon himself will be greater than that accepted by a normal guard or watchman.

The Torah law with regard to a socher is unclear (see Shemot 22:14), and the tanna’im disagree as to his level of responsibility, although all agree that the Torah intends to free the socher from the high level of responsibility that rests on a sho’el.

We explore the notion of Rabbinic Authority as well as “Da’as Torah” in light of recent pronouncements on the Gaza War.

Bava Metzia 93: אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים הֵן

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According to the Torah (Shemot 22:6-12), the level of responsibility for which a shomer – someone who accepts responsibility to guard his friend’s object – is liable, depends on the personal gain that the shomer receives. The Mishnah on our daf enumerates four types of shomrim and their level of responsibility.

We explore the legacy of Reb Aharon Lichtenstein through the lens of his talmud Elyakim Krumbein.

Bava Metzia 92: מָצָאתִי מְגִילַּת סְתָרִים

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The Gemara also quotes a discovery made by Rav, who found a megillat setarim in Rabbi Hiyya‘s house, where the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda appears.

Basing himself on the simple reading of the passage in Sefer Devarim (23:25)

Isi rules that anyone who passes a field is allowed to eat from it. Rav objects to this ruling, saying that no farmer would be able to function under those circumstances.

Steinsaltz claims:

A megillat setarim – hidden scroll – is a collection of notes taken by students during Talmudic times. For generations it was accepted practice that Torah she-ba’al peh – the oral tradition – was not set in writing, and only later was writing allowed due to difficult circumstances (i.e. there was a fear that the oral traditions would be forgotten). Nevertheless, students did take notes on the lectures and discussions for their own use. Since these notes were not publicized, they were referred to as megillat setarim.

We explore instances of the term including the recently discovered hidden scroll of Rebbe nachman by Prof Zvi Mark.

Bava Metzia 91: ״אֶתְנַן״ אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בָּא עַל אִמּוֹ

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The Sages taught: One who muzzles a cow and threshes with it is flogged, and in addition he must pay the owner of the cow four kav for a cow, the usual amount it consumes while threshing, and three kav for a donkey.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a principle that an offender is not flogged and also punished by death, and likewise he is not flogged and rendered liable to pay? One who transgresses a prohibition is liable to receive only one punishment for a single offense.

Rava said that there is a difference between the transgression itself, which is between the offender and God, for which he is liable to be flogged, and the loss he caused the owner of the cow, for which he must pay restitution.

The Torah prohibits one from bringing as an offering an animal given as the payment to a prostitute for services rendered: (Deuteronomy 23:19); and this prohibition applies even if the man in question engaged in intercourse with his own mother, which is a capital offence.

Although this man would certainly not be rendered liable to pay compensation by a court, as he is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, nevertheless, since he is technically liable to pay compensation, the money is subject to the prohibition as well.

In this case too, despite the fact that the court cannot compel one to pay for the produce his cow ate, he does owe this sum. Furthermore, if the owner of the produce were to seize this sum from him, the court would not force him to return the money.

Bava Metzia 90: בְּנֵי נֹחַ מְצֻוִּוין עַל הַסֵּירוּס

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They sent to Shmuel’s father a halakhic inquiry with regard to these oxen which gentiles steal and castrate. Since it is prohibited for Jews to castrate animals, they would sometimes arrange for a gentile to pretend to steal the animal and subsequently return it after castrating it, as it is easier to handle a castrated animal.

What is the halakha with regard to a case of this kind? Shmuel’s father sent to him: They used artifice; therefore, you should use artifice with them and make them sell it as a punishment. This shows that it is prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform a prohibition on one’s behalf.

Rav Pappa said: This provides no conclusive proof, as the inhabitants of the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, who are the ones who raised this question, hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥideka, who says: The descendants of Noah are commanded with regard to castration. They too are prohibited from performing this practice.

We explore the Noachide laws and their application.

Bava Metzia 89: לֹא תַחְסֹם שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ

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More on laborers rights to eat on the job:

All matters, i.e., all animals, are included in the halakha of muzzling, as we derive a verbal analogy between the term “an ox” stated here and the term “an ox” stated with regard to Shabbat. Just as the prohibition against having one’s animal perform labor on Shabbat applies not only to oxen but to all animals, as explicitly stated in the Torah: (Deuteronomy 25:4),

לֹא תַחְסֹם שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ״

You shall not thresh while muzzling; why do I need the word “ox” that the Merciful One writes?

It serves to juxtapose and compare the one who muzzles to the muzzled animal, and likewise to compare the muzzled animal to the one who muzzles: Just as the one who muzzles, a person, may eat from produce attached to the ground, so too the muzzled animal may eat from attached produce. And just as the muzzled animal may eat from detached produce, so too the one who muzzles may eat from detached produce.

We explore the ethics of animal pain and halachic parameters of muzzling.

Bava Metzia 88: חֲנוּיוֹת שֶׁל בֵּית הִינוֹ Βηθανια

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Our Gemara quotes a baraita that asks why the markets of Beit Hino were destroyed three years prior to the destruction of Jerusalem. Its answer was that they were careful only with regard to the biblical requirements of tithes, saying that the passage in Sefer Devarim (14:22-23) discusses harvest and subsequent consumption of one’s own harvested fruit, thereby excluding a seller or a buyer from the obligation of separating terumot and ma’aserot.

Beit Hino was, apparently, the village that is referred to by the name Bethania, or Beit Ḥanan, just outside of Jerusalem, not far from the Mount of Olives. This village was destroyed in the very first days of the Great Revolt, while the siege and battle for Jerusalem lasted a lengthy period of time, explaining the baraita‘s contention that Beit Hino fell three years prior to Jerusalem.

We explore the connection between Bet Hino and Bethany.

Bava Metzia 87: יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד מִזְבֵּחַ

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We look in greater detail at the laws regarding a worker who labors in the field surrounded by food. What is this person permitted to eat?

A new Mishna teaches us that one is permitted to eat from food that is ready to be harvested and attached to the ground; food that will not be tithed. Food that is not yet ripe or food that is detached from the ground and food that is to be tithed may not be eaten.

When walking through your friend’s orchard, would it be appropriate to pick fruits and eat them? Although our immediate reaction is that it would be forbidden to do so, the simple reading of the passages in the Torah that discuss this would seem to permit such behavior.

The passages in Sefer Devarim (23:25-26) speak simply about someone who finds himself walking in his friend’s field or in his friend’s vineyard, and clearly permit him to sample the grapes or the grain. Nevertheless, the Mishna on our daf teaches that it is only a field worker who is allowed to eat.

Bava Metzia 86: אַשְׁרֶיךָ רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי

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The Gemara relates that while Rabah bar Nachmeni was fleeing for his life from the Persian authorities, an argument was taking place in the Yeshiva in Shamayim. The argument involved the Halachah in the case of a white hair and a Baheres spot that appear on one's skin, but there is a doubt which appeared first. Hash-m, as it were, ruled that it is Tahor, while all of the members of the heavenly Yeshiva ruled that it is Tamei. They asked who could decide the matter conclusively, and they answered that Rabah bar Nachmeni could decide the matter since he was the greatest expert on Nega'im and Ohalos.

They sent a Shali'ach to bring Rabah to them, but the Mal'ach ha'Maves could not take him from this world because he did not stop learning Torah. At that moment, a wind blew and made the reeds move and make noise. Rabah heard the noise and thought that the Persian legions were coming to kill him. He prayed that he should die at that moment rather than be taken by the authorities. At the moment that he died he declared, "Tahor! Tahor!”

We explore the extraordinary tale of his martyrdom and clarify its site I’m level with other Syriac/Persian martyrology stories with the help of Simcha Gross.

Bava Metzia 85: חֲבִיבִין יִסּוּרִין

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Rebbe said: Suffering is beloved. Thereupon, he undertook to suffer for thirteen years, six through tzemirta (stones in the kidneys) and seven through tzefarna (disease in the mouth). Others reverse it that it was seven through tzemirta and six through tzefarna. The Gemora relates that Rebbe’s stableman was wealthier (from selling the manure from all of Rebbe’s horses) than the King of Persia.

When he placed fodder for the animals,their noises could be heard for three mils, and he intentionally threw it before them just when Rebbe entered the bathroom (in order that the noises emanating from Rebbe, due to his pain, would not be heard). Yet even so, his cry was louder than theirs, and was heard even by the seafarers.

Nevertheless, the sufferings of Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon were superior in virtue to those of Rebbe.

We explore the possible nature of his disease(s) as well as other agaric pearls on this amazing daf.

Bava Metzia 84: אֲנָא אִשְׁתַּיַּירִי מִשַּׁפִּירֵי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם

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Two of the great Sages of Eretz Yisrael were Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, first generation amora’im. The Gemara on our daf describes each of them, how they met and their unique relationship.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish – Reish Lakish – was, apparently, from a poor but important family. Because of the financial situation at home, Reish Lakish searched for employment and because of his great physical strength trained to become a gladiator.

Rabbi Yohanan was considered one of the most handsome men in the Jewish community in Israel, although it should be noted that looks and appearance is something that is dependent on cultural norms. Aside from stating that he was handsome, the Gemara also describes Rabbi Yohanan as being obese.

Bava Metzia 83: אָגְרִיתוּ לִי כְּפוֹעֵל דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא

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Most of the laws that regulate relationships between employer and employee are discussed in the sixth perek of Massekhet Bava Metzia. The seventh perek – ha-Sokher et ha-Po’alim – which begins on our daf, focuses on the rights of the worker as regulated by the Torah or by common practice in the community, e.g. the right that a worker in the field has to eat the fruit that he is harvesting (see Devarim 23:25-26).

The first Mishna teaches that the employer must follow the accepted practice that is common in a given community – hakol ke-minhag ha-medina. The Gemara explains that even in situations where workers commonly were fed breakfast at the home of the employer, he cannot feed them breakfast in the field.

We review the perek and explore the story of Rabbi Elazar who encountered a laundryman who vilified him by using the same epithet of vinegar the son of wine. This time, though, the disrespectful remark was perceived by Rabbi Elazar as an insult to the office of rabbi rather than merely a personal slight. He thought the person wicked and had the offender arrested. In doing so, he veered from his usual ethic of only arresting those he was certain committed a crime. He later regretted his peremptory decision and sought to ransom the individual, but to no avail. The ethical implications of arbitrary use of peer are discussed.

Bava Metzia 82: ?נִתְקַל לָאו פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא

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What level of responsibility does someone have when they are holding collateral for a loan?

According to the Mishnah (80b) if one person lends money to another and accepts collateral to guarantee the loan, he is considered a shomer sachar – a paid watchman – who has a fairly high level of responsibility for the object, i.e. he is liable to pay for the object if it is lost or stolen.

Our daf continues with Rabi Yehudah who says: A shomer chinam should take an oath, while a shomer sachar should pay. Each (of the guardians) pay according to their laws (he holds that tripping is not negligence, thereby exempting the shomer chinam).

Even if he was not negligent, he still should be liable to pay (for tripping is similar to it getting stolen)!?And even a shomer chinam (it can be asked); it is understandable if he tripped in a sloping area (for then he will be exempt, since it is close to unavoidable), but when he tripped in a place that was not sloping at all, how can he take an oath that he was not negligent (it most definitely was a negligence)?

We explore the notion of exemption from liability for slip and falls as well as the ethics and halacha of collateral damage in war.

Bava Metzia 81: הִלְוָהוּ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן

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§ The mishna teaches: One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee for the collateral. The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance withthe opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who lends to another based on collateral and the collateral was lost, the lender take an oath that he was not negligent in his safeguarding, and then he may take his money that he lent him.

We explore the history of collateral loans.

Bava Metzia 80: επιλαμβάνειν

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In selling a cow the seller specified one blemish and said that there were others as well (but he did not mention them by name), the halachah is that (if it emerged that the animal did have the specified blemish) the sale is valid (for the buyer obviously accepted to purchase the animal with that particular blemish).

The Gemara finds a support in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Batra 4:3): With regard to one who sells a maidservant to another and says to him: This maidservant is an imbecile, she is epileptic, she is crazy [meshuamemet]; but in reality she had only one defect and he inserted it among the other defects, this is a mistaken transaction. But if the seller stated: The maidservant has this defect, i.e., the defect that she in fact has, and other defects, without specifying what they were, this is not a mistaken transaction.

We explore the history of epilepsy or epilambanein in antiquity.

Bava Metiza 79: מִשּׁוּם שִׁינּוּי דַּעְתָּא

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The braisa states: If someone rented a boat and it sank midway through the journey, Rabbi Nassan says that if the owner of the boat already collected the rent, the renter cannot claim anything. If the renter did not yet pay, he does not have to pay.

The Gemora asks: What are the details of the case? If one asked to rent a specific boat and said he was going to transport wine on it to his destination, why can’t he have a claim? He should say, “Give me a boat that will transport my wine!”

Rather, the case must be that he rented a boat in general in order to transport specific cases of wine.

We explore ancient maritime trading and harbors especially in the Levant.