Kiddushin 56: דּוֹרֵשׁ כׇּל אֶתִּין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה

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Shimon Ha’amsoni, and others say that it was Nechemia Ha’amsoni, would expound on every word es that was written in the Torah. (This means that he would teach what the word es was coming to include.) When he reached the verse that states you shall revere es Hashem your G-d, he stopped expounding on the word es.

Shimon Ha’amsoni felt that it is impossible to equate the reverence of Hashem to anything else, so he retracted from all of his previous interpretations of the word es. When questioned by his students what would happen to all the words es that he had expounded upon previously, Shimon Ha’amsoni replied, “Just as I received reward for expounding on those words, I will receive reward for retracting my interpretations.

Rabbi Akiva arrived later and expounded the verse to mean you shall revere es Hashem your G-d, to include Torah scholars. Just like one is obligated to revere Hashem, so too, one must revere Torah scholars.

We explore the hermeneutical approach of Rabbi Akiva (vs Rabbi Ishmael).

Kiddushin 55: מִירוּשָׁלַיִם וְעַד מִגְדַּל עֵדֶר

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Our Daf continues its discussion of the desacralizing of consecrated property. We learnedin a mishna there (Shekalim 20a): If there was an animal fit for the altar that was foundstraying, from Jerusalem and as far as Migdal Eder, and similarly if it was found within that distance from Jerusalem in any other direction, it is presumed that the animal came from Jerusalem. Most of the animals in Jerusalem were designated for offerings, and presumably this one was as well. Males are presumed to be burnt-offerings, as only males can be brought as burnt-offerings. Females are presumed to be peace-offerings, as it is permitted to bring a female peace-offering.

Where was Migdal Eder and how far from Jerusalem? How was it related to Rachel’s tomb and why did it become so central to the birthplace of Jesus?

Kiddushin 54: אַבְנֵי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם

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Our daf deals with further Mei'lah examples...Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yitzḥak said: With regard to stones of the walls and towers of Jerusalem that fell, one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, the use of even such stones renders one liable, despite the fact that it is not possible for people to avoid benefiting from them.

We explore symbolism of the stones of Jerusalem and the Kotel.

Kiddushin 53: מָעוֹת הֵיאַךְ יֵצְאוּ לְחוּלִּין

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The mishna teaches: And if he betrothed a woman with consecrated property belonging to the Temple treasury, if he does so intentionally, he has betrothed her, and if he does so unwittingly, he has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says the opposite: If he did so unwittingly, he has betrothed her, but if he does so intentionally, he has not betrothed her.

According to the Mishna (52b) a portion from an animal that was brought as a sacrifice in the Temple cannot be used as kesef kiddushin. This is true for both kodashei kodashim – sacrifices like a sin-offering where the meat is given to the kohanim – as well as for kodashim kalim – sacrifices like a korban shelamim, where the meat is divided between the kohanim and the owner of the sacrifice.

We review the THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF JEWISH MARRIAGE in the works of SAMUEL HOLDHEIM and Zecharia Fraenkel’s response from the more conservative position.

Kiddushin 52: מֵאִיר שָׁכַב, יְהוּדָה כָּעַס, יוֹסֵי שָׁתַק

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A number of rulings of the tanna, Rabbi Meir, are quoted by the Gemara, which leads Rabbi Aha bar Hanina to report that it was well-known that Rabbi Meir’s intellect towered over the rest of his generation.

Why then didn’t the Sages establish the halakha in accordance with his opinion? It is because his colleagues were unable to ascertain the profundity of his opinion.

He was so brilliant that he could present a cogent argument for any position, even if it was not consistent with the prevalent halakha…The Sages were unable to distinguish between the statements that were halakha and those that were not.

We explore further (see Daf Ditty Nazir 49) the literary and mythological figure of this great Tanna.

Kiddushin 51: קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה

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Will a marriage that cannot lead to a sexual relationship, referred to by the Gemara as kiddushin she-lo nimseru le-bi’ah, have any validity? The Talmudic sages Rava and Abaye disagree on this point. Abaye believes that such kiddushin will lead to marriage; according to Rava such kiddushin will have no significance.

Rava’s source is a teaching that he received from bar Ahina who pointed out that the Biblical passage describing marriage states clearly that a man takes a woman and sleeps with her (see Devarim 24:1), indicating that without the potential for a sexual relationship the marriage has no meaning.

We explore the history of courtly love including C.S. Lewis' analysis in the Allegory of Love.

Kiddushin 50: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁלַח סִבְלוֹנוֹת DONATIO PROPTER NUPTIAS

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Our mishnah talks about a man who performs an invalid act of kiddushin and then later on sends presents to the woman whom he tried to betroth. The question is, is the sending of presents equivalent to a renewed and now valid act of betrothal, or are the presents not considered as effecting betrothal?

If he betroths two women with the value of a perutah, or one woman with less than the value of a perutah, even if he subsequently sends gifts, she is not betrothed, because he sent them on account of the first kiddushin, for he has sent those presents only based on his earlier kiddushin (but they are not intended to effect a new kiddushin). The same halachah would apply to a minor who betroths a woman (and sends her bridal presents afterwards).

We explore Donations between spouses, prohibited at the time of Justinian Law called DONA´TIO PROPTER NU´PTIAS

And Kyle Harper’s analysis of marriage in the late antique period.

Kiddushin 49: עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים חׇכְמָה

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The Gemara relates that if a person, who until this time was wicked, betroths a woman on condition that he is righteous we are concerned with the possibility that he had thoughts of teshuvah.

Minchas Chinuch (1) questions whether teshuvah can be done without verbally confessing (וידוי) one’s sins. He cites our Gemara as proof that teshuvah without a verbal confession is effective.

Since the Gemara does not relate that he verbally confessed his sins, it would seem that his teshuvah is accepted and he can now be described as righteous by merely having thoughts of teshuvah.

We look at this notion of Teshuvah then review Shakespeare’s view of marriage.

Kiddushin 48: יַיִן וְנִמְצָא חוֹמֶץ

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The Mishna lists six cases. One is where a man says to a woman, “Be mekudeshes to me with this cup of wine,” and it ended up being honey. A man says to a woman, “Be mekudeshes to me with this cup of honey,” and it ended up being wine. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me with this silver dinar,” and it ended up being gold. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me with this golden dinar,” and it ended up being silver. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me on condition that I am rich,” and he is actually poor. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me on condition that I am poor,” and he is actually rich. In all of these cases, the kiddushin is invalid.

We continue the review of Laurie Novick’s analysis of Nissuin.

Kiddushin 47: בָּזוֹ וּבָזוֹ וּבָזוֹ

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The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me with the fruit of an oak tree, i.e., an acorn, with a pomegranate, and with a nut, or if he said to her: Be betrothed to me with these, if combined they are worth one peruta, she is betrothed.

Rav teaches that, “Ha-mekadesh be-milveh, einah mekudeshet – a marriage cannot be accomplished by means of a loan.” This means that if a man lends money to a woman, he cannot tell her that instead of paying back she can simply keep the money if she agrees to marry him. The explanation offered by the Gemara for this rule is that “Milveh lehotza’ah nitnah – a loan is meant to be spent by the borrower.”

We explore the means of Kiddushin via a loan with Rav Baruch Gigi’s analysis and Laura Novick’s majestic analysis.

Kiddushin 46: אָדָם יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין קִידּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ

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The very first Mishna in Massekhet Kiddushin taught that if marriage is to be carried out by an exchange of money (or an object of value), it must minimally be worth a peruta.

If a man says to a woman, “Become betrothed to me with this date” (which he gives her), and then (giving her another date), he says, “Become betrothed to me with this one,” if any one of the dates was valued as a perutah, she is mekudeshes. But if not, even if together they equal a perutah, she is not mekudeshes. If, however, he says, “Become betrothed to me with this, with this and with this,” if the dates combined are valued at a perutah, she is mekudeshes, but if not, she is not mekudeshes. If she was eating them one by one (as soon as one was given to her, she ate it), she is not mekudeshes unless one of the dates was valued at a perutah.

We explore the The historical context within which to read the Talmudic discussions of kiddushin by Prof. Michael L Satlow

And Rabbi Dov Linzer’s analysis.

Kiddushin 45: שְׁאֵרִית יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יַעֲשׂוּ עַוְלָה

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A father has the right to accept kiddushin on behalf of his daughter while she is underage (a ketana) and she will be married according to the halakha. Once she is a bogeret she makes her own decisions regarding marriage. What if a ketana accepts a marriage proposal?

Must we be concerned that the father agrees and that the girl is married, or perhaps the actions of a ketana have no halakhic significance?

What of betrothal by a Minor without the Knowledge of Her Father?

We examine Jewish marriage ages in Ashkenazi Jewry and similarly the

The Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 in the UK and its effect.

Kiddushin 44: הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה

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The Gemara on yesterday’s daf quotes a Mishna in Massekhet Gittin (64b) that teaches that in the case of a na’ara, both she and her father have the ability to accept a geṭ for her.

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, arguing that only the father has the ability to do so. All agree that a basic principle is that for a geṭ to work the woman receiving it must understand the significance of the geṭ and recognize the need to guard the document properly.

Does this same disagreement apply to kiddushin – marriage – as well as to giṭṭin? Reish Lakish believes that it does, but according to Rabbi Yohanan there is no argument with regard to the status of a na’ara accepting kiddushin; all agree that only the father can accept kiddushin for a na’ara.

We continue our exploration of childhood betrothal.

Kiddushin 43: אֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב

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The Mishnah had states that if a Shali'ach is instructed to kill a person the Tana Kama says that the Shali'ach is Chayav, while Shamai ha'Zaken says in the name of Chagai ha'Navi that the Meshale'ach is Chayav.

The Tana Kama holds that David was not punished for instructing Yo'av to kill Uriah ha'Chiti because he was Mored b'Malchus (insubordinate to the King).

We explore the tradition which presents two opinions: The first anonymous opinion states that the actual killer is the one responsible for the sin. Shammai’s opinion, on the other hand, points to the one who commissions the crime, like David, whom God blames for killing Uriah, even though Yoav actually stationed Uriah in the most dangerous position at the front lines of the battle.

What is the nature of the culpability for a killer for hire?

Kiddushin 42: אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה

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Our Mishna (41a) introduced us to the concept of shelihut to the extent that we say, “Sheliaḥshel adam ke-moto – when the messenger acts it is as though the person himself did the act.”

Is this true in all cases?

One situation where a sheliaḥ must take responsibility for the action that he does is if it was a forbidden act. There, the Talmudic principle “Ein sheliaḥ le-dvar aveirah” applies – that no one can appoint a messenger to commit a sinful act. The Gemara explains this by saying that the messenger’s true obligation is to follow the directions of God, not of another person: divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid, divrei me shom’im!

We explore the notion of “following orders” as an ethical defense.

Kiddushin 41: מִצְוָה בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִבִּשְׁלוּחָהּ

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We begin Perek II today, and we begin with a Mishna about agency in betrothal. Both men and women are permitted to appoint agents for the purpose of betrothal. They are also permitted to perform that action themselves.

Fathers are permitted to appoint agents to betroth their minor daughters.

R Yosef in the Gemara is quick to note that although marriage can be accomplished by means of a messenger, that is not the ideal situation, and that “mitzva bo yoter mi-bi-sheluho – it is a greater mitzva for a person to perform the act themselves,” rather than have someone else perform the mitzva for him.

We explore the issue of consent and child marriage.

Kiddushin 40: תַּלְמוּד מֵבִיא לִידֵי מַעֲשֶׂה

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Our Mishna states: One who is engaged in study of Bible and Mishna and derech eretz, the desired mode of behaviour, will not be quick to sin, for "a threefold cord is not quickly broken" (Ecclesiastes 4:12). One who does not engage in any of these is not considered to be a person deserving to be part of the community.

The Gemara shares analogies of righteousness and wickedness to trees. Rabbi Akiva argues with Rabbi Tarfon that study is greater than action because study leads to action. Other examples demonstrate that study is more important than action -- though the rabbis are clear that a mitzvah is performed immediately if Torah study would not facilitate its immediate performance.

We explore the conflict between study and praxis.

Kiddushin 39: הֵיכָן אֲרִיכוּת יָמָיו

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Mishna

Whoever performs one mitzvah is rewarded with good, his life is lengthened and he inherits the world. And whoever does not perform one mitzvah is not rewarded with good, his life is not lengthened and he does not inherit the world.

Rewards for a Mitzvah

The Gemora cites a Mishna which seems to contradict this one: The following matters allow one to enjoy their fruits in this world and the principle remains for him to enjoy in the World to Come.

These matters are: honoring one’s father and mother, acts of kindness, receiving visitors, facilitating peace between his fellow men, and the study of Torah is equivalent to all those mentioned.

The Gemora asks: What happened with Acher? Some say that he saw an incident similar to that of Rabbi Yaakov (and he concluded that there is no reward for good deeds). Others say that he saw the tongue of Chutzpis the spokesman (for Rabban Gamliel) as it was being dragged by “another thing” (a pig; after the Romans ripped it out).

We explore the notion of theodicy in the talmud and reward and punishment.

Kiddushin 38: טָעֲמוּ בָּהֶם טַעַם מָן

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The verse (Ex 16:35) lists two time periods at which the Jewish people stopped eating the Manna: when "they came to Eretz Noshaves" and when "they came to the edge of Eretz Kena'an.”

RASHI explains that the Jewish people arrived at the edge of Eretz Kena'an, a reference to Ever ha'Yarden (Transjordan), on the seventh of Adar, the day on which Moshe Rabeinu passed away and the Manna stopped falling.

They nevertheless continued to eat the Manna which they had collected and stored earlier until they arrived at "Eretz Noshaves," a reference to Eretz Yisrael proper, where they ate from the new produce on the sixteenth of Nisan.

We explore the pros cultural references to manna and the mystic interpretations of ingesting this bread from heaven.

Kiddushin 37: כֹּל שֶׁהִיא חוֹבַת הַגּוּף

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A new states that any mitzvah that is dependent on the ground itself, aretz, applies in Eretz Yisrael only.

Any mitzvah that is not dependent on the land applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael.

Two exceptions: the mitzvot of orla and of chilim, diverse kinds, which apply in all places.

Rabbi Eliezer says that this halacha applies regarding the prohibition to eat from the chadash, the new crop, before the omer offering has been brought on Nisan the 16th, as well.

The Gemara’s first suggestion of how to define the concept of mitzvot ha-teluyot ba’aretz is that it is based on whether or not the Torah discusses the mitzvot in the context of bi’ah – of coming into the land.

Explore these restrictions that are land based.