Kiddushin 12: אַבְנָא דְכוּחְלָא

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The Gemara relates an incident in which a man was Mekadesh a woman with a bundle of rags. Rav Shimi bar Chiya had the bundle appraised to determine whether it was worth a Perutah. According to Shmuel, why did he have it appraised? The Kidushin should have taken effect out of doubt even if its value was less than a Perutah! The Gemara answers that Rav Shimi wanted to know whether the Kidushin was Kidushei Vadai or Kidushei Safek.

The Gemara relates another incident in which a man was Mekadesh a woman with a piece of blue marble. Rav Chisda had it appraised to determine whether it was worth a Perutah. The Gemara again asks why he had it appraised; even if it is worth less than a Perutah the Kidushin should take effect out of doubt.

Rav gave lashes to one who would betroth a woman in the marketplace, and for one who betroths a woman with cohabitation (without giving money or a document beforehand), and for one who would betroth a woman without a prior arrangement to marry her, and for one who would nullify a get, and for one who would pronounce that the get is being written without his consent, and for one who is disrespectful towards a messenger from the Rabbis, and for one who has been under an excommunication for thirty days and does not come to Beis Din to have it nullified, and a groom who lives in his father-in-law’s house.

We explore Officer Immunity and Accountability in Jewish Law by David Polsky.

Kiddushin 11: אִשָּׁה מַקְפֶּדֶת עַל עַצְמָהּ

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According to the Mishna, when a man marries a woman by means of money, the minimum amount is, according to Beit Hillel, a peruta or, according to Beit Shammai, a dinar. While Beit Hillel‘s position is fairly easy to understand, Beit Shammai‘s position demands some explanation, and it is discussed on our daf.

Rabbi Zeira suggests that Beit Shammai is simply looking out for the honor of Jewish women, who demand more than a small denomination coin.

We examine the use of coins in the talmud and Palestine in the late antique period.

Kiddushin 10: הָאָב זַכַּאי בְּבִתּוֹ

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Our daf struggle with What does Cohabitation Accomplish?

The Gemora inquires: Does cohabitation effect marriage (nisuin), or does it affect only betrothal ()?

The difference would be whether he inherits her, can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a Kohen, who may only become impure to dead close relatives, and this would include a wife after nisuin), and annul her vows. If it effects nisuin, then he inherits her, he may become impure to her and he annuls her vows, while if it effects only erusin, he does not inherit her, he may not become impure to her and he may not annul her vows.

What is the law?

We explore ancient parallels as well as the insistence of virginity as a late antique construct.

Kiddushin 9: וּבְבִיאָה. מְנָא לַן

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The rabbis in our are concerned about betrothal through sexual intercourse alone. What about the transfer of documentation or of money? The rabbis discuss the intricacies of such a scenario. If a man has intercourse with a woman who is betrothed, he is liable to be stoned (Deuteronomy 22:23-24). But if he betroths her with money and not intercourse, is she fully betrothed? What if he betroths her with money and then engages in anal intercourse with her? Does anal intercourse affect her status as a virgin – and might it affect her status as betrothed?

Our view of bi'a maintained that bi'a, as well as kesef and shtar, is a ma'aseh kiddushin effecting the acquisition in an abstract manner through a symbolic act.

Might bi'a be something different? Might it not merely signal the start of a relationship but actually forge that VERY relationship?

Kiddushin 8: הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּמָנֶה

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The Gemara on our daf presents a series of cases where it appears that the woman is accepting kiddushin from the man, but upon closer examination of the case, she may be rejecting it.

For example, if a man hands a woman a coin and says, “Hitkadshi li be-maneh – marry me with this coin,” and she takes it from him and throws it into the ocean or into a fire, we interpret her actions to mean that she is rejecting his offer of marriage.

Rava quoted Rav Nachman who taught that if a man offers a particular sum for kiddushin and he gives a security item (משכון) in its place, the kiddushin is not valid. The reasoning is also presented.

The money for kiddushin is not here, and the security was never meant to be the item given for the kiddushin, it was only a placeholder. Therefore, nothing was given to the woman.

We explore these differences between money and merchandise in the act of kinyan.

Kiddushin 7: חֶצְיֵיךְ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה

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Rava raises an apparent oddity in a situation of marriage. According to Rava, if a man says to a woman “you are betrothed to half of me” the marriage takes effect; if he says to her, however, “half of you is betrothed to me” the marriage does not work.

In response to Abaye’s objection that the Torah describes marriage in the words, “Ki yikah ish ishah – when a man takes a woman as his wife” – indicating that both husband and wife are full and complete, Rava explains that since according to the letter of the law a man can marry more than one woman, therefore the statement “you are betrothed to half of me” has meaning.

We present Boaz Cohen’s monograph (1948-9) of the development of Betrothal in Jewish and Roman Law.

Kiddushin 6: הָאוֹמֵר ״חֲרוּפָתִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת

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Our daf begins with a list of some of the many phrases a man might say when betrothing a woman. The rabbis note that different expressions might be used in different places, and these are valid if they are used in the appropriate context. For example, "You are hereby my helper" is generally considered to be a valid statement of betrothal. "You are my espoused one", however, is an expression used in Judea to refer to one's wife. Based on that local custom, as long as the couple was speaking about marriage or the process of betrothal, that expression is considered to be a valid statement of betrothal as well.

We review Rabbi Lamm’s review of recent additions to the Ketubah as well as sociological / cultural functions of marriage in history.

Kiddushin 5: כֵּיצַד בְּכֶסֶף

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The rabbis continue to discuss which actions can be affected by which means. Documents release women from marriage, for example, but they do not necessarily effect betrothal. The rabbis consider money, which does not allow the divorce of a husband and wife. Money can be used to redeem consecrated property and the second tithe. If acquisitions is effected by money, why isn't the release of property - including a wife - affected by money? One of the more interesting points is that both documents and coins are discrete items. Ultimately, the rabbis look to the requirement that not just a document but a document of severance is required to break the bond between husband and wife. Money might represent a document, but it cannot specifically represent a document of severance.

We explore the notion of kinyan.

Kiddushin 4: נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה

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The handiwork and the Kesef Kidushin of a Na'arah belong to her father…

The Gemara states that one may think that a father nay not sell his daughter who is an Ailonis for a maidservant. Tosfos asks that a maidservant is sold when she is a Ketanah and how is it possible for the father to know at that time that she is an Ailonis as she becomes an Ailonis if she has not develop the Simanim of a Na'arah by the age of 20.

Tosfos answers that that we may have thought that the master must return the handiwork to the father and the father must return the money he received for her sale to the master and if the master or his son did Yi'ud (married her) it would not be valid.

We review the scholarship regarding the laster editors (sevaroim) since these first few Blatt are clearly the work of a different (geological) strata of the Gemara.

Kiddushin 3: אִשָּׁה נָמֵי מִקַּנְיָא בַּחֲלִיפִין

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Much of the first two dapim of the Gemara in Massekhet Kiddushin deal with technical questions of language that are not the usual topics of discussion in the Gemara. In explanation of this odd dialogue, Rav Sherira Ga’on, as well as many of the rishonim explain that these pages are not part of the original Gemara , rather they are a later addition from the time of the savora’im – the sages who followed the amora’im of the Gemara – or, perhaps the early ge’onim.

The Gemara explains that according to Rav Huna, who maintains that Chupah is a valid form of Kidushin, the reason why the Mishnah mentions the number "three" when it lists the ways in which a woman becomes betrothed is that it seeks to exclude a fourth possible form of Kidushin, that of Chalifin. Chalifin may not be used for Kidushin because a Kinyan Chalifin may be performed with an object worth less than a Perutah, and a woman does not consent to become betrothed if she receives an object worth less than a Perutah.

We explore the Halacha of Kimyan through chalifin.

Kiddushin 2: הָאִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית

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The first perek of Massekhet Kiddushin focuses on “acquisitions” – beginning with “acquiring” a wife and continuing with discussion of other types of purchases. This stems from the fact that according to Jewish law, marriage is a type of kinyan, involving an act of acquisition. The Mishna teaches that a wife is “acquired” by her husband by means of three methods (the Talmud Yerushalmi makes clear that the intention is one of three methods.

We explore the talmudic view of marriage as an act of acquisition.

Gittin 90: אֲפִילּוּ מִזְבֵּחַ מוֹרִיד עָלָיו דְּמָעוֹת

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A Mishna appears on this, the last daf in Massekhet Gittin, that deals with one of the most basic questions about divorce. According to Jewish law, what are considered reasonable grounds for divorce? The Mishna brings three opinions on this matter:

Beit Shammai rules that a man can divorce his wife only if he found a devar erva – a promiscuous situation.

Beit Hillel permits divorce even in a case where the wife hikdihah tavshilo (literally “burned his food”).

Rabbi Akiva says that he can divorce her for any reason – even if he found another woman who he finds more attractive.

Each of these three tanna’im points to a biblical passage as a source for their positions.

We end the masechta with a review of modern no fault divorce.

Gittin 89: פְלַגּוֹת רְאוּבֵן

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The Mishna on the last daf discusses how we are to deal with rumors about a woman’s marital status. According to the Mishna, if there are rumors that a woman has gotten married we must take such statements seriously, at least to the extent that we will obligate her to get a divorce before allowing her to marry someone else. If the rumors indicate that she was divorced, we will trust those rumors, as well, and treat her as a divorced woman.

We explore the science and sociology of rumor mongering.

Gittin 88: גּוֹיִם בְּנֵי עַשּׂוֹיֵי נִינְהוּ

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Throughout Massekhet Gittin, according to Torah law only the husband can act to divorce his wife; the wife does not have the power to create a divorce. Are there any situations where she can appeal to the courts to force her husband to offer her a divorce?

The Mishna on our daf teaches that if a beit din compels the husband to give his wife a geṭ, the divorce will take effect. If it is a non-Jewish court that forces him to give a geṭ, no divorce takes place. If, however, the Jewish court rules that the husband should divorce his wife, but they do not have the power to force him to present a geṭ, they can turn to the secular courts and arrange for them to force him to follow their ruling.

We explore the troubling history of wife beating in Halacha and antiquity.

Gittin 87: עֵד אֶחָד יְוָנִי

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The Mishna on our daf discusses a situation where two giṭṭin are written on a single parchment, one next to the other, and are signed by two groups of witnesses. The case presented by the Mishna raises questions about the witnesses’ signatures, and, in particular, the issue of witnesses who sign in Greek.

According to the Mishna, if we have two signatures in Hebrew, one after another, and then two signatures in Greek, one after another, each geṭ would be fine. If, however, there was a mix between Hebrew names and Greek names, then the document cannot be used.

We explore the use of Greek in Palestine and recent archeological finds.

Gittin 86: מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם

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The Mishna on our daf teaches us that there are three gittin that are invalid but the children resulting from a subsequent marriage are not classified as mamzerim. These three gittin are:

· a get written in the husband's handwriting with no witness signatures.

· a get with witnesses but no date.

· a get with a date but only one witness.

The rabbis consider possible cases that would explain why children in these circumstances would not be considered mamzerim. They consider when a wife must leave her second husband and when she would be allowed to stay.

We explore the loads behind the famous Tzfat get of 2014 with the help of Rabbi Jachter of Kol Torah.

Gittin 85: הֲרֵי אַתְּ לְעַצְמָךְ

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In the Mishna on our daf, the central statement of the divorce document is the idea that, “Harei at muteret le-khol adam – you are hereby permitted to any man,” a statement that breaks the bonds of the existing marriage.

Rabbi Yehuda says that it must say that this geṭ will act as a scroll of divorce; a letter of leave and a bill of dismissal, permitting the woman to marry any man that she desires.

We explore the notion of divorce as emancipation with review of the civil code and its development in the US.

Gittin 84: מִשּׁוּם גְּזֵרָה לָא מַפְּקִינַן

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Our daf continues the discussion of how to deal with a divorce that is given predicated on various conditions made by the husband. What if he makes the divorce conditional on actions that his wife cannot possibly perform? Among the examples offered by the baraita are that the geṭ is given –

On the condition that you climb up to the sky

On the condition that you go down to the deepest depths

On the condition that you swallow a reed that is four cubits long

On the condition that you cross the ocean by foot

In all of these cases the Tanna Kamma rules that since the condition cannot be fulfilled, the geṭ cannot take effect.

We examine whether verbal declarations can violate halachic norms and review the infamous case of the Get of Cleves.

Gittin 83: אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת

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When a man writes a geṭ to divorce his wife, he can make the divorce conditional on a specific thing that the woman will do, but the divorce cannot allow him to retain any level of involvement in her life. Thus, if the husband makes the divorce conditional by saying, “This is your geṭ, on the condition that you do not go to your father’s house for the next thirty days,” the geṭ will be a good one, assuming that the wife fulfills the condition and does not go to her father’s house for thirty days. If, however, the condition was open-ended – the husband said that the geṭ was conditional on her refraining from going to her father’s house forever – then the geṭ cannot work, since the husband would still be in control of his wife’s activities even after the divorce.

We continue our exploration of the Sefer Krisus as a metaphor.

Gittin 82: חוּץ מֵאוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ

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If someone divorces his wife and says, “You are permitted to any man besides So-and-so,” Rabbi Eliezer permits this.

The Chachamim forbid it. What should the person do? He should take the Get back, given to her anew, and merely say, “You are permitted to any man.” If the above condition was written in the Get itself, even if it was later erased, the Get is invalid.

We continue our exploration of conditional divorces.