Kiddushin 5: כֵּיצַד בְּכֶסֶף

For the source text click/tap here: Kiddushin 5

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The rabbis continue to discuss which actions can be affected by which means. Documents release women from marriage, for example, but they do not necessarily effect betrothal. The rabbis consider money, which does not allow the divorce of a husband and wife. Money can be used to redeem consecrated property and the second tithe. If acquisitions is effected by money, why isn't the release of property - including a wife - affected by money? One of the more interesting points is that both documents and coins are discrete items. Ultimately, the rabbis look to the requirement that not just a document but a document of severance is required to break the bond between husband and wife. Money might represent a document, but it cannot specifically represent a document of severance.

We explore the notion of kinyan.

Kiddushin 4: נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה

For the source text click/tap here: Kiddushin 4

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The handiwork and the Kesef Kidushin of a Na'arah belong to her father…

The Gemara states that one may think that a father nay not sell his daughter who is an Ailonis for a maidservant. Tosfos asks that a maidservant is sold when she is a Ketanah and how is it possible for the father to know at that time that she is an Ailonis as she becomes an Ailonis if she has not develop the Simanim of a Na'arah by the age of 20.

Tosfos answers that that we may have thought that the master must return the handiwork to the father and the father must return the money he received for her sale to the master and if the master or his son did Yi'ud (married her) it would not be valid.

We review the scholarship regarding the laster editors (sevaroim) since these first few Blatt are clearly the work of a different (geological) strata of the Gemara.

Kiddushin 3: אִשָּׁה נָמֵי מִקַּנְיָא בַּחֲלִיפִין

For the source text click/tap here: Kiddushin 3

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Much of the first two dapim of the Gemara in Massekhet Kiddushin deal with technical questions of language that are not the usual topics of discussion in the Gemara. In explanation of this odd dialogue, Rav Sherira Ga’on, as well as many of the rishonim explain that these pages are not part of the original Gemara , rather they are a later addition from the time of the savora’im – the sages who followed the amora’im of the Gemara – or, perhaps the early ge’onim.

The Gemara explains that according to Rav Huna, who maintains that Chupah is a valid form of Kidushin, the reason why the Mishnah mentions the number "three" when it lists the ways in which a woman becomes betrothed is that it seeks to exclude a fourth possible form of Kidushin, that of Chalifin. Chalifin may not be used for Kidushin because a Kinyan Chalifin may be performed with an object worth less than a Perutah, and a woman does not consent to become betrothed if she receives an object worth less than a Perutah.

We explore the Halacha of Kimyan through chalifin.

Kiddushin 2: הָאִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית

For the source text click/tap here: Kiddushin 2

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The first perek of Massekhet Kiddushin focuses on “acquisitions” – beginning with “acquiring” a wife and continuing with discussion of other types of purchases. This stems from the fact that according to Jewish law, marriage is a type of kinyan, involving an act of acquisition. The Mishna teaches that a wife is “acquired” by her husband by means of three methods (the Talmud Yerushalmi makes clear that the intention is one of three methods.

We explore the talmudic view of marriage as an act of acquisition.

Gittin 90: אֲפִילּוּ מִזְבֵּחַ מוֹרִיד עָלָיו דְּמָעוֹת

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 90

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A Mishna appears on this, the last daf in Massekhet Gittin, that deals with one of the most basic questions about divorce. According to Jewish law, what are considered reasonable grounds for divorce? The Mishna brings three opinions on this matter:

Beit Shammai rules that a man can divorce his wife only if he found a devar erva – a promiscuous situation.

Beit Hillel permits divorce even in a case where the wife hikdihah tavshilo (literally “burned his food”).

Rabbi Akiva says that he can divorce her for any reason – even if he found another woman who he finds more attractive.

Each of these three tanna’im points to a biblical passage as a source for their positions.

We end the masechta with a review of modern no fault divorce.

Gittin 89: פְלַגּוֹת רְאוּבֵן

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 89

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on the last daf discusses how we are to deal with rumors about a woman’s marital status. According to the Mishna, if there are rumors that a woman has gotten married we must take such statements seriously, at least to the extent that we will obligate her to get a divorce before allowing her to marry someone else. If the rumors indicate that she was divorced, we will trust those rumors, as well, and treat her as a divorced woman.

We explore the science and sociology of rumor mongering.

Gittin 88: גּוֹיִם בְּנֵי עַשּׂוֹיֵי נִינְהוּ

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 88

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Throughout Massekhet Gittin, according to Torah law only the husband can act to divorce his wife; the wife does not have the power to create a divorce. Are there any situations where she can appeal to the courts to force her husband to offer her a divorce?

The Mishna on our daf teaches that if a beit din compels the husband to give his wife a geṭ, the divorce will take effect. If it is a non-Jewish court that forces him to give a geṭ, no divorce takes place. If, however, the Jewish court rules that the husband should divorce his wife, but they do not have the power to force him to present a geṭ, they can turn to the secular courts and arrange for them to force him to follow their ruling.

We explore the troubling history of wife beating in Halacha and antiquity.

Gittin 87: עֵד אֶחָד יְוָנִי

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 87

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf discusses a situation where two giṭṭin are written on a single parchment, one next to the other, and are signed by two groups of witnesses. The case presented by the Mishna raises questions about the witnesses’ signatures, and, in particular, the issue of witnesses who sign in Greek.

According to the Mishna, if we have two signatures in Hebrew, one after another, and then two signatures in Greek, one after another, each geṭ would be fine. If, however, there was a mix between Hebrew names and Greek names, then the document cannot be used.

We explore the use of Greek in Palestine and recent archeological finds.

Gittin 86: מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 86

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf teaches us that there are three gittin that are invalid but the children resulting from a subsequent marriage are not classified as mamzerim. These three gittin are:

· a get written in the husband's handwriting with no witness signatures.

· a get with witnesses but no date.

· a get with a date but only one witness.

The rabbis consider possible cases that would explain why children in these circumstances would not be considered mamzerim. They consider when a wife must leave her second husband and when she would be allowed to stay.

We explore the loads behind the famous Tzfat get of 2014 with the help of Rabbi Jachter of Kol Torah.

Gittin 85: הֲרֵי אַתְּ לְעַצְמָךְ

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 85

To download, click/tap here: PDF

In the Mishna on our daf, the central statement of the divorce document is the idea that, “Harei at muteret le-khol adam – you are hereby permitted to any man,” a statement that breaks the bonds of the existing marriage.

Rabbi Yehuda says that it must say that this geṭ will act as a scroll of divorce; a letter of leave and a bill of dismissal, permitting the woman to marry any man that she desires.

We explore the notion of divorce as emancipation with review of the civil code and its development in the US.

Gittin 84: מִשּׁוּם גְּזֵרָה לָא מַפְּקִינַן

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 84

To download, click/tap here:  PDF

Our daf continues the discussion of how to deal with a divorce that is given predicated on various conditions made by the husband. What if he makes the divorce conditional on actions that his wife cannot possibly perform? Among the examples offered by the baraita are that the geṭ is given –

On the condition that you climb up to the sky

On the condition that you go down to the deepest depths

On the condition that you swallow a reed that is four cubits long

On the condition that you cross the ocean by foot

In all of these cases the Tanna Kamma rules that since the condition cannot be fulfilled, the geṭ cannot take effect.

We examine whether verbal declarations can violate halachic norms and review the infamous case of the Get of Cleves.

Gittin 83: אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 83

To download, click/tap here: PDF

When a man writes a geṭ to divorce his wife, he can make the divorce conditional on a specific thing that the woman will do, but the divorce cannot allow him to retain any level of involvement in her life. Thus, if the husband makes the divorce conditional by saying, “This is your geṭ, on the condition that you do not go to your father’s house for the next thirty days,” the geṭ will be a good one, assuming that the wife fulfills the condition and does not go to her father’s house for thirty days. If, however, the condition was open-ended – the husband said that the geṭ was conditional on her refraining from going to her father’s house forever – then the geṭ cannot work, since the husband would still be in control of his wife’s activities even after the divorce.

We continue our exploration of the Sefer Krisus as a metaphor.

Gittin 82: חוּץ מֵאוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 82

To download, click/tap here: PDF

If someone divorces his wife and says, “You are permitted to any man besides So-and-so,” Rabbi Eliezer permits this.

The Chachamim forbid it. What should the person do? He should take the Get back, given to her anew, and merely say, “You are permitted to any man.” If the above condition was written in the Get itself, even if it was later erased, the Get is invalid.

We continue our exploration of conditional divorces.

Gittin 81: וְלָנָה עִמּוֹ בְּפוּנְדְּקִי

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 81

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Mishna tells of a couple who was divorced but then spent the night together at an inn. Are they assumed to have had sexual intercourse? If so, do they need a second divorce? Or are they assumed to be partaking in licentious sexual intercourse?

The Gemara argues both sides of this question. Because sexual intercourse is a form of betrothal, the couple could be remarried and thus requiring another divorce. However, if they were only betrothed to begin with, they might not have had intercourse since the husband was not "accustomed to her”.

We explore the issue of post divorce relationships halachically and psychologically.

Gittin 80: מַלְכוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ הוֹגֶנֶת βασιλεία

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 80

To download, click/tap here: PDF

As we learned on yesterday’s daf, the date written in the geṭ is an essential part of the document.

The Mishna on our daf discusses the date and how it must be written. While today the Jewish calendar begins its count from the time of Creation, and the secular (Gregorian) calendar is based on a count that begins with the birth of the founder of Christianity, throughout history different calendars were used.

Our Mishna was written at a time when the common practice was to count from the time of the ruling king of a given country, and the Sages established a rule that religious documents like a get should include that date as well, mishum shalom malkhut – in order to keep the peace with the governing body.

The Mishna teaches that it is essential for the date to accurately reflect the ruling monarchy’s current reign. In the event that the date refers to another government or to some historical event (e.g., the building of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple) the geṭ will be invalid.

When discussing other governments whose rule cannot be used as the dating source on a document like a geṭ, as one example the Mishna mentions malkhut she-ainah hogenet – an “inappropriate” kingdom. The Gemara explains that this refers to Rome, and it is labeled with this epithet because it does not have its own writing or language, rather it borrowed its language from others.

Gittin 79: ְגֵט יָשָׁן

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 79

To download, click/tap here: PDF

As is the case with all legal documents, the date that appears on a geṭ is one of the basic requirements for the document to be valid. Somewhat surprisingly, the geṭ need not be delivered on the date that is written in the document, and it will be a valid geṭ even if it is given some time later. This is only true if the couple did not continue to live in close proximity after the geṭ was written. If after the geṭ was written the husband and wife were together (i.e., they could have slept together) then the geṭ is considered a geṭ yashan – an old geṭ – which the Mishna teaches cannot be used according to Beit Hillel, although Beit Shammai permits its use.

We further explore mediation in divorce.

Gittin 78: מֶחֱצָה עַל מֶחֱצָה

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 78

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Steinsaltz informs us "How aware does the woman need to be that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Since, according to the Torah, a woman can be divorced even against her will (a law that has not been in practice since the enactments of Rebbeinu Gershom Me’or ha-Golah in the 10th century), is it necessary for the husband to inform his wife of the divorce, or can he hide the true significance of the paper until it is already in her possession?

The Mishna on our daf teaches that a man cannot say to his wife “hold this promissory note for me” and hand a geṭ to her; similarly, he cannot slip it into her hands while she is sleeping. The geṭ will not be valid until it is given to her together with the statement “here is your divorce.”

We further explore the metaphor of marriage and divorce in our relationship with the Divine.

Gittin 77: לְתוֹךְ חֵיקָהּ אוֹ לְתוֹךְ קַלְתָּהּκάλαθος

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 77

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The eighth perek of Massekhet Gittin begins on our daf. Entitled ha-Zorek – i.e. someone who throws a geṭ – its main focus is on the method used for transferring a writ of divorce from husband to wife. Although the Torah appears to require that the geṭ actually be placed in the wife’s hand (ve-natan be-yadah – Devarim 24:1), the tradition that the sages had was that that passage was not to be taken literally, rather that it had to be placed in her possession and control.

We explore the agunot issue further.

Gittin 76: Αντιπατρίς

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 76

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a man says to his wife, “Here is your get, but the paper belongs to me, she is not divorced (for he did not give her anything). If, however, he said, “Here is your get on condition that you return the paper to me,” she is divorced (provided that she returns him the paper). The Gemora asks: What is the difference between the two cases?

[The Gemora assumes that we are following the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the get can only be effective upon the fulfillment of the condition, and therefore, the Gemora asks: How can she become divorced after the get is returned to her husband?]

Abaye explains that the braisa is following Rabbi Meir’s opinion, who holds that a condition must be doubled (i.e., “if the condition will be fulfilled, this will result, and if it will be violated, this will result”) in order for it to be binding (derived from the condition mentioned in the Torah concerning the Tribes of Reuven and Gad before they entered Eretz Yisroel; Moshe specifically spoke out both sides of the condition).

We explore the fateful decision by Moshe to allow them to remain with conditions…

Gittin 75: דְּמַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לִתְנַאי

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 75

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Gemora cites a braisa: If a man says to his wife, “Here is your get, but the paper belongs to me, she is not divorced (for he did not give her anything). If, however, he said, “Here is your get on condition that you return the paper to me,” she is divorced (provided that she returns him the paper). The Gemora asks: What is the difference between the two cases?

[The Gemora assumes that we are following the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the get can only be effective upon the fulfillment of the condition, and therefore, the Gemora asks: How can she become divorced after the get is returned to her husband?]

Abaye explains that the braisa is following Rabbi Meir’s opinion, who holds that a condition must be doubled (i.e., “if the condition will be fulfilled, this will result, and if it will be violated, this will result”) in order for it to be binding (derived from the condition mentioned in the Torah concerning the Tribes of Reuven and Gad before they entered Eretz Yisroel; Moshe specifically spoke out both sides of the condition).

We explore the fateful decision by Moshe to allow them to remain with conditions…