Nedarim 28: Church/State

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The Mishna states: If one says, “May these plants be a korban if they are not knocked down”, “This tallis should be a korban if it is not burned,” they must be redeemed (if the conditions are met, the value of these items becomes consecrated; the money from the redemption is used to purchase korbanos). If he declares, “May these plants be a korban until they are knocked down”; “This tallis should be a korban until it is burned,” they cannot be redeemed. 

The Gemora asks: But let the Mishna teach: [If the condition is fulfilled] they are consecrated, and [if they are not fulfilled] they are not consecrated? The Gemora answers: Since the latter part of the Mishna taught that they are not redeemed, the former part taught that they are redeemed. 

The Gemora asks: How did he vow? (All trees eventually fall down! Since the neder was dependent on the condition that they will not fall down, how can the neder take effect?) Ameimar answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where he said that they should be consecrated if they would not be knocked down today. The day passed and they were still standing. This is the reason why they are consecrated.

The Gemora asks: If so, what is the novelty of this case? The Gemora answers: There was a strong wind blowing at the time of his vow (he was assuming that the tree would fall and perhaps he did not intend to consecrate it if it did not fall). 

We continue the exploration of dina demalchuta with the conflict between church and state.

Nedarim 27: דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא

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Dina demalchuta Dina, the law of the land is the law, is one of the most famous teachings of Jewish jurisprudence. While ostensibly a law relating to the paying of taxes, it reflects the deep loyalty Jews are to have to their countries of residence. This idea was initially formulated by the prophet Yirmiyahu (see chapter 29), when the Jewish people were about to go into exile for the first time following the Babylonian conquest of Israel. 

Most interestingly, this law is not mentioned in the Mishnah but emerges from our daf's questioning of the Mishnah regarding the payment (or non-payment) of taxes.

 "One may take a vow to murderers, robbers, and tax collectors that it is terumah even though it is not terumah, that it is from the royal palace even though it is not from the royal palace" (Nedarim 27b). 

What the Gemara does question is why one can lie to a tax-collector and claim one's assets are not really his own. 

After all, Dina Demalchuta Dina obligates one to pay taxes. 

We explore the parameters of Dina demalchusa…and how it affects even our paying taxes.

Nedarim 26: וַהֲלֹא הַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב

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The mishna (66a) states that if one says: Onions are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, because onions are bad for the heart, and others said to him: But isn’t the kuferi onion good for the heart, the vow is dissolved with regard to kuferi onions, and not only with regard to kuferi onions is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of onions. The mishna relates that an incident of this kind occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved the vow with regard to all types of onions.

We explore the history of the onion in antiquity as well as a metaphor in rabbinic literature.

Nedarim 25: מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ כְּשֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעַ אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל

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One of the things that the Sages demanded of someone taking an oath is that they must mean what they say. The person is told that his statement must conform to the simple meaning of the words that he says without any secret meanings or intentions. 

Even though one might be telling the truth when he takes an oath, his oath must hold the same meaning to others - the court, the witnesses - that it holds for himself.  But don't people always make oaths according to their own understandings?  The rabbis go on to discuss the difficulty of defining what people hold in their hearts.  They find proof texts in the Torah that suggest that Moses helped us to understand this very point.

The Gemora asks: Let Moses make them swear to fulfill the Torah? The Gemora answers: This implies one Torah (and Moshe wanted them to fulfill the Written Torah and the Oral Torah). 

We explore the oaths Moses enjoined Am Yisrael to keep both the Oral and Written law, and how the oath at Sinai superseded subsequent later oaths.

Nedarim 24: Shumshemanei

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Our new Mishna teaches us about vows of exaggeration.  These vows are understood as either tools to explain something unusual, or complete fabrications.  

Rava asks: What is the necessity of teaching us this case (that such an oath is permitted)? Furthermore, the braisa said that we are comparing the cases of insignificant oaths to the cases of nedarim (and we are only stating one case)! 

Rava answers: The case is as follows: He said, “All the fruits in the world should be forbidden to me if I didn’t see on this road as many people as went out from Egypt at the time of the Exodus.” 

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: Perhaps he is referring to an anthill (shumshemanei ) and he gave them the name “those who went out of Egypt,” and the oath is a proper one? Rav Ashi answers: One swears according to our understanding of the words..  

How many did in fact emerge from Egypt? We cite Colin Humphreys mathematical postulation.

We explore the world of the shumshemanei….in antiquity Herodotus, and the medieval beastiary.

Nedarim 23: Intentionality

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The first four mishnayoth of this chapter deal with vows that use valid language but are nevertheless not valid because the person did not really intend for his vow to be valid.

"A woman who took a nazirite vow and was [illicitly] drinking wine and defiling herself with the dead she is to be punished with lashes.

[However] if her husband had annulled her vow but she did not know that he had done so and was drinking wine and defiling herself with the dead she is not to be punished with lashes”

By luck of the draw the woman escapes punishment. Tried as she may, she did nothing wrong.

After all are her actions or intent really any different just because her husband -unbeknownst to her - annulled the vow?

We explore the notion of intentionality in performance of Mitzvot including Don Seeman’s monograph on the RAMBAM and the need for ta’amei Mitzvot not merely performative,

and some recent theories regarding ethics and intention.

Nedarim 22: Rage

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Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Whoever gets angry enables all kinds of Gehinnom to rule over him, as it is stated: and remove anger from your heart and remove evil from your flesh. The term “evil” refers to nothing but Gehinnom, as it is stated: Everything Hashem made was for His sake, and even the wicked one for the day of evil.

Moreover, he will suffer from hemorrhoids, as it is stated: and Hashem will give you there an angry heart, a longing of the eyes and suffering of soul.

We explore the rabbinic attitudes towards anger as well as the neurobiology and social aspects of anger.

Nedarim 21: ?לֵב זֶה עָלֶיךָ

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Steinsaltz tells us:

In order for a neder (vow) to take effect, the individual who is taking the vow must have true intent, and a vow that is uttered without meaning does not obligate the person who made it. Nevertheless, a person cannot simply claim that he did not mean what he said; we always work with the assumption that what a person said is what he meant. Still, the Sages of the Talmud teach that there are some instances where it is clear to all that the person making the neder did not really mean to obligate himself, and in such cases the person is not obligated to keep his word – his vow notwithstanding.

Aruch Hashulchan  explains that there are two methods of releasing a person from a vow. The first method is to find an opening - פתח –and the second method is for the power to express regret – חרטה .

We explore the notion of regret as applied to vows including studies regarding regret in intimate relationships and divorce.

Nedarim 20: Shame

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The verse states, “In order that the fear of Hashem will be on your face so you will not sin.”

Our daf explains that a feeling of shame and modesty leads to fear of sin.

We explore the rabbinic attitudes to shame as well as modern scientific experiments identifying the source of shame.

Nedarim 19: ״הֲרֵינִי נְזִיר שִׁמְשׁוֹן״

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Our dad includes as description of how one might become a nazirite by making a conditional promise.

The rabbis seem to be helping each other understand the parameters of nazirut through their discussion.

What are the details how a nazirite deals with hair that is heavy? How would this or other uncertainties affect one's ability to bring offerings?

And if a person vows to be a nazirite like Samson, well, that is impossible - Samson's status was decreed. One cannot use a vow to create a status equivalent to that of Samson.

The rabbis end our daf with a continuation of their argument. Do we treat conditional vows regarding nazirut with leniency?

Can vows of nazirut be conditional at all?

We explore different views of the life of Shimshon and his the Nazirite injunctions against drinking alcohol and eating unclean food placed upon his mother since the child is to be a Nazirite “from birth” (Judges 13:5).

Nedarim 18: Stam Nedarim

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When discussing nedarim, how clear does a statement need to be in order for a person to become obligated in it? What if the statement that is made can be interpreted in more than one way?

When discussing nedarim, how clear does a statement need to be in order for a person to become obligated in it? What if the statement that is made can be interpreted in more than one way?When discussing nedarim, how clear does a statement need to be in order for a person to become obligated in it? What if the statement that is made can be interpreted in more than one way?

Although our Mishna rules that stam nedarim le-hahmir – that we will be stringent with regard to the interpretation of vows – the Gemara quotes a Mishna that states sfeik nezirut le-hakel, seemingly indicating that regarding the laws of a nazir we will tend towards leniency. 

How do we understand this contradiction?

We explore the notion of scholastic failure with Lynn Kaye’s article.

Nedarim 17: Vow Within a Vow

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Can we make two oaths, shavuot, at the same time? Can we make two vows, nedarim, at the same time?

The rabbis agree that two oaths cannot be made concurrently. However, vows seem to be more complicated. In the case of nazirut, vowing to become a nazirite, the rabbis suggest that two such vows might extend the nazirite's commitment. The minimum time to be a nazirite is 30 days. If a person makes this vow twice, s/he has promised at least two 30-day stints as a nazirite.

We examine the performative speech act in Jewish law as well as Jacob Mann’s monograph of oaths in the synoptic gospels and its attack on the pharisaic way of making vows.

Nedarim 16: 'מצות התורה לאו ליהנות נתנו'

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In continuing our discussion of the differences between a neder and a shevua, the Mishna teaches that nedarim can take effect on mitzvot while shevuot cannot. The example given by the Gemara is that a person who forbids on himself a sukka, a lulav or tefillin will be obligated to fulfill his neder even if he can no longer perform these commandments. If he takes an oath that he will not perform these mitzvot, however, he is still obligated to do them, since ein nishba’im la’avor al ha-mitzvot – a person cannot take an oath to abrogate a mitzva.

Rava said in objection to the explanation of Abaye: But were mitzvot given for the purpose of deriving benefit? The performance of mitzvot is not considered benefit. Why then would performance of the mitzva with the sukka be considered deriving benefit? Rather, Rava said a different explanation: This case is referring to one who said: Dwelling in a sukka is hereby prohibited to me, and that case is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not dwell in a sukka.

We explore the notion that : מצות התורה לאו ליהנות נתנו

From different perspectives.

Nedarim 15: Sleep Deprivation

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The Gemara points out another difficulty with a vow against sleeping.
If the person did not state a specific amount of time that he will not sleep, we know that Rabbi Yohanan teaches with regard to shevuot that a person who takes an oath not to sleep for three days is understood to have taken a false shevua – since it is impossible to go without sleep for 72 hours. 
Therefore, rather than forcing him to attempt the impossible we punish him immediately (for having made a false shevua) and allow him to sleep whenever he wants. 
We explore the rabbinic attitudes to sleep and napping
And the health effects of sleep deprivation ending with the use of sleep deprivation as a torture method.

Nedarim 14: קוֹנָם שֶׁאֲנִי יָשֵׁן

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Num 30:3 serves as a proof text for our

MISHNA:that states: With regard to one who says: Sleeping is forbidden for me as if it were an offering [konam], thereby prohibiting himself from sleeping; or: Speaking is konam for me; or: Walking is konam for me; or one who says to his wife: Engaging in sexual intercourse with you is konam for me, if he violates the vow he is in violation of the prohibition.

We review the commentators upon this critical verse and its application to our speech and language acts.

Nedarim 13: Vows of Charity

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Our daf quotes a baraita that compares a neder and a shevua. According to the baraita, each of them has a strength that the other does not possess. Specifically, nedarim can be made on mitzvot, as well as on things that are permissible, while shevuot are limited and can be made only on permissible things. On the other hand, shevuot can take effect even on things that have no physical characteristics (davar she-en bo mamash) while nedarim can only take effect on things that have physical characteristics (davar she-yesh bo mamash).

It was said in the name of Rebbi how we know that there is a mitzvah to verbally sanctify a bechor that was born in his home etc.

The Gemara makes it clear that even though a firstborn animal (בכור) is sanctified automatically, nonetheless, it is appropriate to formally declare its sanctity. 

Sefer Likutei Haze’evi  extrapolates from this that when giving tzedaka it is appropriate to declare, “I am giving this money for tzedaka.” Although the money is tzedaka without a declaration, nevertheless there is a mitzvah to make this declaration. 

Rav Moshe Alshich  writes at length against those who publicly give tzedaka for their personal honor or the like. 

We explore the tzedakah pledge and the status of charity in early rabbinic literature.

Nedarim 12: כְּיוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִי

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A vow can be made by a person who says, “I will not eat meat or drink wine, just like the day that my father died,” or, “…just like the day that Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed,” or “…just like the day that I saw Jerusalem destroyed.”

Shmuel clarifies that this is true if the person took a personal vow not to eat or drink on those days.

We explore the halachot of fasting on Yahrzeit and some customs regarding celebrations on the same day.

Also the tortured history of Holocaust Memorial Day in Israel which split those who considered it in a long line of Jewish suffering (Soloveitchik and Hutner) vs those who saw it as a unique event in Jewish history requiring its own day of memorial (Weinberg)

Nedarim 11: כִּתְנַאי בְּנֵי גָד וּבְנֵי רְאוּבֵן a Double Condition

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What is the meaning of the Mishnaic term laḥullin? The individual is saying: It shall not [la] be non-sacred [ḥullin] but rather it should have the status of an offering.

The Gemara says: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If you say it is that of Rabbi Meir, he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. As we learned in a mishna:(Kidushin 3:4) Rabbi Meir says that any condition that is not like the condition of the sons of the tribe of Gad and the sons of the tribe of Reuben, when Moses gave them land on the eastern bank of the Jordan River...is not a valid condition.

Moses phrased the agreement as a double condition, stating that if they would join the other tribes in battle they would receive their inheritance on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and if not, they would not receive that territory.

This mishnah contains a general principle of Rabbi Meir: any stipulation must be a double stipulation. This means that if I make a stipulation I must state both the consequences of the condition being fulfilled and the consequences of its not being fulfilled. For instance, if I want to say that I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake (and I would), I must say, “I will come to your house if you give me chocolate cake, and I will not come to your house if you don’t give me chocolate cake.”

Otherwise the stipulation is not legally binding, and even if you give me chocolate cake, I am not legally bound to come to your house (but I would never do such a thing). Rabbi Meir derives this principle from Moses’s words to the children of Gad and Reuben, as we shall explain below.

Because Rabbi Meir holds that only a condition expressed in this manner is valid, it is clear that he holds that one may not infer a negative statement from a positive one or vice versa.

We explore what was this “double condition” the Tnai Kaful?

And the events surrounding the historical deal made with the two and a half tribes in Transjordan.

Nedarim 10: חֲסִידִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים

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A number of pious men, chasidim, were alive during the time of the second Temple.

They were called chasidim because they went beyond observance of halacha.

Tzadikim, righteous people, are those who follow halacha to the letter of the law.

Who were these hasidim ha-rishonim?

Steinsaltz writes:

The concept of a hasid in the Talmud is a person on a particularly high religious level, who – in every aspect of his life – goes over-and-above what is required by the letter of the law (as opposed to someone who is scrupulous in his activities and does exactly what is required, who is referred to as a tzaddik).

It appears that during the Second Temple era, the hasidim were a loosely organized group. These hasidim were among the first supporters of the Hasmonean rebellion against Greek/Hellenist rule, but were also among the first to abandon the Hasmonean dynastic rule.

It is likely that the hasidim ha-rishonim mentioned here and in other places in the Talmud have their roots in this group.

According to Talmudic sources, the hasidim ha-rishonim devoted most of their lives to prayer and to developing a relationship with God, and they were careful in both mitzvot ben adam le-havero (between man and his fellow man) and ben adam la-Makom (between man and God).

We explore these pious hasidim and their morphing into medieval Chassidei Ashkenaz.

Nedarim 9: Narcissus

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Rabbi Shimon HaTzadik tells the story of the one time that he ate the guilt-offering of a nazirite who was ritually impure. This young man with beautiful eyes was very good looking and his fringe of hair showed curls. The Rabbi asked him what he saw that would convince him to cut those curls. The man explained that he was a shepherd and he saw his reflection while drawing water. At that point his yetzer hara, evil inclination, overtook him. Whatever that yetzer hara was telling him (to partake in forbidden sexual relations? to be vain? that he was too good looking to be a shepherd?), he believed that it would expel him from the world. He chided himself and reminded himself that eventually he too would be eaten by maggots in his grave. He swore that I would shave for the sake of Heaven. Shimon HaTzadik rose and kissed him on the head, marvelling at the purity of the young man's vows.

The “evil inclination” alluded to by the nazir is understood in a variety of different ways. The Rivan suggests that realizing how good looking he was made him think that he could have his way with women. The Arukh also connects it with sexual behavior, suggesting that seeing how attractive he was made him desirous of homosexual relations. The Maharsha and others argue that this is not necessarily an issue of sensuality, but rather that his appearance gave him the idea that he should abandon his father’s flocks since someone of his talents should not remain a simple shepherd.

We explore the similarity of this story with the legend of Narcissus.

As enshrined in the later Roman poet Ovid’s classic retelling, the young man selfishly spurns countless romantic suitors and friends. One such nymph, who had been cruelly rejected, turns heavenward and beseeches the Gods, “So may he himself love, and so may he fail to command what he loves.” Narcissus, in other words, ought to be punished measure for measure: he will fall in love with himself, yet, like his suitors, never see that love reciprocated. The Goddess Nemesis overhears the nymph’s just request and punishes Narcissus accordingly.

The boy views his reflection in a fountain and is inexplicably drawn to his own image. Infatuated with his beauty, Narcissus is unable to tear himself away from his own reflection.

We look at the deeper psychological implications of narcisism with the help of Rabbi YY Jacobson, Tzvi Sinensky and Dr. Moshe Halevi Spero, a noted Jerusalem psychoanalyst and scholar.