Ketubot 3: Droit du Seigneur

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Steinsaltz (OBM) writes:

We have learned that the Sages of the Mishna established Wednesday as the appropriate day of the week for the wedding of a virgin to take place. The Gemara on our daf brings a baraita that teaches that already in Mishnaic times, this practice ended. According to the baraita, from the time of sakana – danger – people began to make weddings on Tuesdays, with the tacit approval of the Sages.

What danger existed that changed the traditional day of marriage?

The Gemara rejects the possibility that there was a threat of death for those who married on Wednesdays and explains that there was a governmental decree that stated: “Betula ha-niset be-yom ha-revi’i, tiba’el la-hegmon tehilah – any virgin marrying on Wednesdays will first be deflowered by the prefect.”

Edicts like this one, whose purpose is to emphasize the total control that the local ruler has over his subjects, were commonplace in the ancient world. Even during medieval times, among the rights that the feudal lord had over his serfs was jus primae noctis, “right of the first night.” Several sources – whose reliability is subject to question – indicate that these types of edicts existed in the period prior to the Hasmonean revolution.

We explore the notion of Droit du seigneur with reference to Tal Ilan's examination of the Babatha Archive and how did the medieval myth develop…

Ketubot 2: שָׁקְדוּ

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According to the the first mishnah in Ketubot, a virgin is married on Wednesday so that if the husband wants to make a claim against her that she was not a virgin, he can come directly to the court which sits on Mondays and Thursdays and make a claim against her.

If his virginity claim against her is accepted by the court, he may divorce her without paying her the ketubah. The chapter will continue to discuss the issue of virginity claims and how the judge is to adjudicate them.

Rav Yosef quotes Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel who teaches that the reason one must get married on Wednesday and not on Sunday is the enactment of "Shakdu." The Rabanan were concerned for the honor of Jewish women, and they enacted that a man must get married on Wednesday so that he spends three days (Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday) preparing a respectable Se'udah for the wedding.

Since one is required to get married on Wednesday because of the enactment of "Shakdu," if an engaged couple's twelve-month period of Erusin ends on a Sunday, the man is not obligated to pay for his bride's support ("Mezonos"), since he can justifiably claim that he is not required to marry her until Wednesday due to the Takanah d'Rabanan.Rav Yosef quotes Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel who teaches that the reason one must get married on Wednesday and not on Sunday is the enactment of "Shakdu."

The Rabanan were concerned for the honor of Jewish women, and they enacted that a man must get married on Wednesday so that he spends three days (Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday) preparing a respectable Se'udah for the wedding.

We explore the THE "TAKANAH" OF “SHAKDU" and Solomon Zeitlin’s review article from 1933.

Yevamot 122: פּוּנְדָּקִית πανδοχεῖον THE INNKEEPER'S WIFE

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Our last Mishna in the masechat relates a story where a group of people who were traveling left one of their party behind in a pundak – an inn – when he became ill. Upon their return they inquired as to their comrade’s health, and the pundika’it – the woman who was in charge of the inn – responded that he had died and that she buried him. Based on her word, the Sages allowed his widow to remarry.

The Gemara relates that in this last case, the pundika’it was a non-Jewish woman, who was believed based on the fact that she was mesihach lefi tumah – she was telling a story, and she did not realize that she was offering testimony. The believability of a mesi’ach lefi tumo is accepted by the Sages because we assume that the person telling the story has no vested or personal interest, and no reason to lie.

What is the nature of the innkeeper’s wife and how does she fare in antiquity? Was she innkeeper or zonah? (Rahab) and how in Women and domestic economies in antiquity, Innkeepers, Ship-owners, Prostitutes were the Three ‘Female’ Business Activities.

We end with the use of the typology of the innkeeper in chassidic tales.

Yevamot 121: מים שאין להם סוף

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The penultimate Mishna in our masechta teaches us that if one falls into a body of water and he is not found, his wife is prohibited from marrying. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei share cases where a person (or a part of a person) emerges from water after three days.

The Mishna suggests that we need to distinguish between different types of bodies of water. When dealing with “מַיִם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם סוֹף” mayim she-en lahem sof – literally “water with no end,” i.e., a large body of water whose end cannot be seen – we must be concerned that he survived, while regarding mayim she-yesh lahem sof – when we can see the entire body of water – we can assume that he died.

Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between the two, arguing that even in “מַיִם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם סוֹף” mayim she-yesh lahem sof we must operate with the assumption that the person could survive.

The Gemara focuses on whether or not a body of water has an end or not. If we can see all possible exits from the water, a man missing in the water is considered dead after three days and his wife can remarry. However, if there is any escape from the water that cannot be seen - a distant shore, for example, the man is presumed missing, and his wife cannot remarry.

As we approach the end of our masechta we explore the cases of agunot during war as well as the controversial London Rabbi who freed agunot…using the gedolim of Europe fraudulently.

Yevamot 120: Forensic I.D.

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When witnesses come to testify that a person has died, it is obvious that they must be certain that they saw that person dead.

Thus, the Mishna on our daf rules that even if the witnesses saw someone being crucified or being mauled by a wild animal, they cannot testify unless they are sure that he was killed.

The Mishnah states that the testimony of a witness about the identity of a corpse is not acceptable unless he recognizes the forehead and nose of the dead person.

We learn that a witness must look upon the countenance (defined as the cheeks) of the face rather than other identifying marks or characteristics.

Even if an animal has begun to rip a person apart, the body must be identified within three days of dying.

Otherwise the face will have begun to change in early stages of decomposition.

This leads us to an exploration of the victim identification then and recently how ZAKA made such decisions as well as the Yad Vashem 2017 symposium on How to Deal with Holocaust Era Human Remains

Yevamot 119: יָצְתָה מְלֵיאָה "The Belly of a Pregnant Woman"

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Before a woman a whose husband and Tzarah went overseas, and who is told that her husband died, she needs to ascertain - that her Tzarah did not have a baby and that she is not pregnant.

She is not similarly obligated to desist from marrying if her mother-in-law too, went overseas, on the basis of the possibility that she had a baby, and that she (the daughter-in-law) is now obligated to perform Yibum - because even if she did have a baby, her daughter-in-law would be permitted to marry, since the child may have died, and even if it survived, it may have been a girl.

If however, her mother-in-law left pregnant, the term used is יָצְתָה מְלֵיאָה when, according to Rebbi Eliezer, she must wait until she discovers whether she is now Chayav Yibum or not.

According to Rebbi Yehoshua - it makes no difference. She is permitted to marry anyway.

We explore the dimensions of “showing” that have such legal ramifications and the cultural valences of pregnancy in the medieval period as well a fascinating personal archetypal odyssey…

Yevamot 118: טַן דּוּ

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Our daf contains 3 mishnayot, the third of which has a disturbing claim:

Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife through an agent in a situation when there was a quarrel between them, what is the halakha?

The Gemara explains both sides of the question: Since she has a quarrel with him, the bill of divorce might be considered for her benefit. Or perhaps, her physical comfort is preferable to her, as she prefers to remain married despite the quarrel between her and her husband.

Come and hear a resolution, as Reish Lakish said: There is a popular idiom among women:

It is better to sit as two [tan du] than to sit lonely as a widow, i.e., a woman prefers the companionship of any husband over being alone.

We explore this claim critically and the possibility that the fear of loneliness is less than enduring an abusive marriage

Yevamot 117: כמים הפנים לפנים

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A new Mishna teaches us that a woman can testify regarding her husband's death, and any other woman is believed with similar testimony, except for five women.

These are the widow's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her yavam, or the daughter of her yavam.

Any of these five women might hate the widow and would have reason to lie: they would like her to leave the family.

For the most part, though, women are said to hate other women because one woman likely will speak about another woman to a man - a husband or father or father-in-law - who will use that information against them.

The rabbis cite Proverbs 27:19, "As in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man" to explain that when hatred builds in one person, it will also build in the person who is hated.

The rabbis tell us that women have many reasons to lie about family relationships and they should not be trusted.

That is, if one person hates another, the feeling soon becomes mutual. Here too, there is no need for a separate reason in order that the hatred be reciprocated.

This famous verse is used for many kinds of mutual relationships including brotherly love and love of the divine.

We explore Maimonides' paradox of loving that which is infinite and compare with the Baal Shem Tov’s sense of the imminent divine.

Yevamot 116: קְטטָהָ בּיֵנוֹ לבְיֵנהָּ

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The Mishnah (114b) states that if a husband and his wife had been quarreling and the woman then testifies that her husband died, she is not believed. The Gemara defines a "quarrel" as any situation in which the woman exclaims, "You already divorced me," when in truth he did not divorce her. Her readiness to make such a false statement in order to get away from her husband indicates that they despise each other. Hence, if she later testifies that her husband died she is not believed.

The Amora'im disagree about why she is not believed. Rav Chanina says that Beis Din suspects that she will lie maliciously and claim that he is dead when he really is alive. Rav Shimi bar Ashi says that she convinces herself that he is dead ("bid'Dami") when he really is alive.

We explore the history of marital discord in the talmud and ancient Greece as well as the medieval notion of ‘Marital Debt” ending with modern sociological studies of ultra-orthodox marriage and the Netflix series “Shtisel” and its comfort with these mores.

Yevamot 115: Lost At Sea

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The fifteenth perek returns us to the discussion of the tenth perek and the question of what level of testimony is necessary to allow us to permit a woman to marry when her husband has disappeared.

As we have seen, the Sages found a number of ways to be lenient in such cases, both because of their desire to ease the suffering of the widow and because they rely on her to ascertain that her husband is truly dead before she marries another man.

Our daf speaks of a husband lost at sea which prompts a discussion of Yael levy’s comparison of Agunah with American Law, and a fragment from the Cairo Geniza regarding a woman whose husband was embarking on a journey and the t'shuva of the RADVAZ in the 16th century from a woman in Jerusalem whose husband went missing.

Yevamot 114: Parenting Limits

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What level of responsibility do adults have to keep children from transgressing halakhic prohibitions?

This question of whether katan okhel nevelot en bet din metzuvin lehafrisho – “if a minor is eating non-kosher food the Jewish court would not need to stop him from doing so” – is dealt with in our daf where a number of cases are brought that seem to offer different perspectives on this matter.

We explore further the halachic obligations of parenting as well as the legal parameters of parent-child privilege.

Yevamot 113: Divorcing an Incompetent Wife

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Our daf ends with a discussion about consent. We know that a competent woman is not required to consent to her divorce.

But a woman who is deaf and mute is not to be divorced at all. How does consent work in these cases, comparatively? The rabbis argue about who might be protected via consent.

Rabeinu Tam explains that inability to divorce a שוטה applies only where the insane woman has no father. If she does have a father, the divorce will be effective, because the father appreciates the value of the document, and he will also prevent her from returning to the former husband.

We further explore the notion of competence in divorce proceedings and an incapacitated spouse.

Yevamot 112: κωφὸν Deaf Wives, Then and Now

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The new perek is concerned with divorce or yibbum involving a deaf man and/or woman. As we have mentioned previously, according to the rabbis deaf-mutes lack “da’at”, which I translate as “awareness” and hence they cannot truly contract marriage. The marriage which they do contract is considered “derabbanan”, that is of rabbinic origin.

A deaf man can divorce a woman of sound senses by making gestures that make it clear that he wants to divorce her. Just as he can marry a woman by making gestures which make his intent clear, so too he can divorce her. A man of sound senses can divorce a deaf woman, even though she may not understand that she is being divorced. This is because a woman can be divorced against her will.

We explore the world of deafness in antiquity as well as Alexander graham Bell’s ambivalent views on deafness, as well as exciting new discoveries about light beams helping gerbils hear.

We end with the NAZI approach to deafness as a genetic flaw and the stories of deaf survivors.

Yevamot 111: A Woman's Voice

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A new Mishna walks right into the waters of who disqualifies whom from staying married to a yavam if that yavam has sexual intercourse with his yevama and then his rival wife.

Depending on the status, standing, etc. of the women in question, the yavam's greediness might lead him to lose his partner(s). Minor girls, deaf-mute women, and halachically incompetent women are compared to each other. If a yavam marries each one of these first and then has intercourse with the second, who is exempted from yibum? Who is encouraged to refuse? Who is told that they should divorce? Who stays married?

We explore Prof Judith Hauptman’s classical study of the status of women and THE PICTURE THAT EMERGES from many Talmudic passages, that society in the rabbinic period was both sex-segregated and patriarchal. Was it permissible, in such a society, for men and women to engage in social and intellectual exchange of ideas?

This leads us to the marvelous medieval “Sefer Ha'maasim” of The Poor Bachelor and His Rich Maiden Cousin” and its relation to the Romance of Tristan/Beroul (and it later music/operatic versions ending with Wagner’s monumental opera.

Yevamot 110: Stigma

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A new Mishna teaches about conditions for chalitza, yibum, rival wives, and divorce in cases where a man marries two minor girls, a minor girl and a "deaf-mute"(sic), a minor and a halachically competent adult woman. The Mishna suggests that consummation or chalitza will exempt the rival wife from yibum or chalitza if the wives are both minors or deaf and mute. However, if one wife is a minor or a deaf-mute and the other wife is a competent adult, chalitza/yibum cannot exempt the adult.

Part of these considerations focus on what is Torah law and what is rabbinic law.

We are discussing girls/women who were extremely vulnerable.

Today, there are many laws that have been created to protect women from these sorts of behavior, which often would lead to terrible harm.

We explore the nature of stigma, with reference to Prof jeffrey Rubinstein’s analysis of the Shaming of Avdan (see my Daf Ditty Yevamot 105) and his Ethics of Shame in the Bavli with a tribute to Prof Shama Friedman’s scholarship.

Yevamot 109: Marrying Off A Minor

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When a minor girl is married off by her mother or brothers and she refuses her husband, she is considered to be an orphan. She is no longer of her father's home, nor is she provided for by her ex-husband. In fact, because minor girls marrying and refusing is a rabbinic concept, it is subject to much debate. Does the girl who has refused and then remarried that husband partake in yibum if that husband dies?

Does that change if she is still a minor at that time?

What if her sister is married to her husband's brother?

We continue the expiration of miyun with Joshua Eater’s discussion of Jewish justice and #Me Too as well as Devorah Weisberg’s review of Rabbis and daughters in the talmud.

Yevamot 108: Underage Mi'yun

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Our Rabbis taught: What is regarded as mi’un? — If she said, ‘I do not want So-and-so my husband,’ or ‘I do not want the engagement that my mother or my brothers have arranged for me.’

Yet a minor girl can be married off by her mother or brothers. Our daf establishes the rabbis' opinions regarding her right to refuse that marriage. Her refusal can be to anyone, anywhere, any time - even after the marriage has been consummated. It is fascinating that the act of sexual intercourse, usually used to finalize the act of acquisition, is utterly meaningless in this one situation.

It is as if she were never married at all - she is able to go back to her family and partake of teruma if she was a priestess marrying an Israelite, for example.

We explore child custody in Jewish and Israeli law and how the legal rationale for the relationship between parent and child gradually evolved.

Yevamot 107: Pishon the Camel Driver

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Our daf begins Perek XIII with a new Mishna. We learn about a debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the right of refusal of a minor girl who has been betrothed through her mother or brothers to an adult male. Beit Hillel argues that she should be allowed to refuse that marriage whether she is

· betrothed or fully married

· in the presence of her husband or in his absence

· refusing her husband or her yavam

· without witnesses or the presence of a court

· refusing many times as a minor

§ It is taught in the mishna: Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in the presence of the husband, but Beit Hillel say: Either in his presence or in his absence. It is taught in a baraita: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But didn’t the wife of Pishon the camel driver refuse him in his absence? Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Pishon the camel driver measured using a defective standard, as he did not properly take care of the property she brought into the marriage, and therefore the Sages measured him with a defective standard [midda kefusha]. The marriage in that case was annulled by the Sages and the refusal was not treated as a standard refusal.

We explore the attitude to camel driving in the talmud as well as this curious fellow Pishon the camel driver, and the fake scholarship of his identity as possibly the writer of the NT!

Yevamot 106: Spitting

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We end the perek describing the actual Chalitzah ceremonial stages whereby the yevama stands and spits on the ground in front of the yavam’s face so that it can be seen by the judges.

Chalitzah requires that both parties stand when reciting their assigned parts and when she spits.

The judges must see the saliva that she expectorates.

Finally, the text from Deuteronomy 25:9-10 – “Thus shall be done to the one who doesn’t build up his brother’s house. His name shall be called in Israel ‘the house of the one whose shoe was removed’” – is read and repeated by the yevama.

We explore the custom of spitting during Aleinu as well as the notion of ceremonial spitting in other cultures and the use of public spittoons in the last century to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.

Yevamot 105: Abba Yudan

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Our daf relates that Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi were discussing whether a person should look upwards during prayer (based on the passage in Eicha 3:41)

or downwards (based on the passage in I Melakhim 9:3).

Then an exchange occurs between Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yossi and a certain Avdan, one of Rabbi Yehuda’s HaNasi’s students also known as Abba Yudan.

We explore this person and his name elsewhere in midrash, and the use of the term Abba in antiquity including the NT and our liturgy (Avinu Malden)

ending with the Lacanian “Nom du Pere” and Yehudah Amichai’s poetry struggling with the transcendent theology of the rabbis.