Yevamot 109: Marrying Off A Minor

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When a minor girl is married off by her mother or brothers and she refuses her husband, she is considered to be an orphan. She is no longer of her father's home, nor is she provided for by her ex-husband. In fact, because minor girls marrying and refusing is a rabbinic concept, it is subject to much debate. Does the girl who has refused and then remarried that husband partake in yibum if that husband dies?

Does that change if she is still a minor at that time?

What if her sister is married to her husband's brother?

We continue the expiration of miyun with Joshua Eater’s discussion of Jewish justice and #Me Too as well as Devorah Weisberg’s review of Rabbis and daughters in the talmud.

Yevamot 108: Underage Mi'yun

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Our Rabbis taught: What is regarded as mi’un? — If she said, ‘I do not want So-and-so my husband,’ or ‘I do not want the engagement that my mother or my brothers have arranged for me.’

Yet a minor girl can be married off by her mother or brothers. Our daf establishes the rabbis' opinions regarding her right to refuse that marriage. Her refusal can be to anyone, anywhere, any time - even after the marriage has been consummated. It is fascinating that the act of sexual intercourse, usually used to finalize the act of acquisition, is utterly meaningless in this one situation.

It is as if she were never married at all - she is able to go back to her family and partake of teruma if she was a priestess marrying an Israelite, for example.

We explore child custody in Jewish and Israeli law and how the legal rationale for the relationship between parent and child gradually evolved.

Yevamot 107: Pishon the Camel Driver

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Our daf begins Perek XIII with a new Mishna. We learn about a debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the right of refusal of a minor girl who has been betrothed through her mother or brothers to an adult male. Beit Hillel argues that she should be allowed to refuse that marriage whether she is

· betrothed or fully married

· in the presence of her husband or in his absence

· refusing her husband or her yavam

· without witnesses or the presence of a court

· refusing many times as a minor

§ It is taught in the mishna: Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in the presence of the husband, but Beit Hillel say: Either in his presence or in his absence. It is taught in a baraita: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But didn’t the wife of Pishon the camel driver refuse him in his absence? Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Pishon the camel driver measured using a defective standard, as he did not properly take care of the property she brought into the marriage, and therefore the Sages measured him with a defective standard [midda kefusha]. The marriage in that case was annulled by the Sages and the refusal was not treated as a standard refusal.

We explore the attitude to camel driving in the talmud as well as this curious fellow Pishon the camel driver, and the fake scholarship of his identity as possibly the writer of the NT!

Yevamot 106: Spitting

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We end the perek describing the actual Chalitzah ceremonial stages whereby the yevama stands and spits on the ground in front of the yavam’s face so that it can be seen by the judges.

Chalitzah requires that both parties stand when reciting their assigned parts and when she spits.

The judges must see the saliva that she expectorates.

Finally, the text from Deuteronomy 25:9-10 – “Thus shall be done to the one who doesn’t build up his brother’s house. His name shall be called in Israel ‘the house of the one whose shoe was removed’” – is read and repeated by the yevama.

We explore the custom of spitting during Aleinu as well as the notion of ceremonial spitting in other cultures and the use of public spittoons in the last century to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.

Yevamot 105: Abba Yudan

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Our daf relates that Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi were discussing whether a person should look upwards during prayer (based on the passage in Eicha 3:41)

or downwards (based on the passage in I Melakhim 9:3).

Then an exchange occurs between Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yossi and a certain Avdan, one of Rabbi Yehuda’s HaNasi’s students also known as Abba Yudan.

We explore this person and his name elsewhere in midrash, and the use of the term Abba in antiquity including the NT and our liturgy (Avinu Malden)

ending with the Lacanian “Nom du Pere” and Yehudah Amichai’s poetry struggling with the transcendent theology of the rabbis.

Yevamot 104: Chalitzah and Amputee

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A widow without children must marry her brother-in-law via sexual intercourse, which is the yibum ceremony, or take off his shoe, which is the chalitzah ceremony, a type of divorce between the widow and the levir. It is written “And she shall remove his shoe from his foot” (Deuteronomy 25:9).

From the Torah’s use of foot the early stages (the Tanaaim) learned that if the brother-in-law is lame and his leg has been amputated below the knee, the widow cannot fulfill the chalitzah ceremony — for the part of the leg above the knee is not considered a foot; only the part below the knee is considered a foot.

We explore the halachic restrictions applying to the amputee including reference to Dr Fred Rosner and Rabbi Mordechai Tendler’s review of Reb moshe Feinstein’s rulings.

Yevamot 103: ארכובה

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It was taught in the mishna that if one’s leg was amputated from the knee down and his yevama performed ḥalitza with him, the ḥalitza is valid. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita that comments on the pilgrimage one makes to Jerusalem during a Festival requires both intact legs.

Because chalitza requires that the yavam 'stands', amputeeism is at issue. Certainly one need to be able to stand to perform chalitza. If he is missing a leg, does the wooden prosthesis stand in for his foot? What if the prosthesis extends past his knee? And what about those who cannot stand on their feet due to a condition like club foot? Their feet, including their heels, should be flat on the floor, the rabbis have determined. Do those who cannot put their feet on the ground forego the ritual of chalitza?

We explore the etymology of the knee joint as well as the history of knee pathology (and arthritis) from antiquity... and the stunning discovery In August 1995, Professor C. Wilfred Griggs from Brigham Young University, Utah, and a team of experts, carried out x-rays on six mummies housed in the Rosicrucian San Jose Museum, including the mummy of Usermontu. They were stunned when the x-rays revealed that one of the mummies had a 9-inch metal pin in its left knee.

Yevamot 102: אם יבא אליהו

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The centerpiece of the chalitzah ceremony – whose purpose is to embarrass the yavam who has chosen to avoid fulfilling his family obligation – is the removal of a shoe from the foot of the yavam by the widow.

Obviously, there is a wide variety of footwear. The Torah appears to require a shoe (na’al). Our Gemara discusses at length whether it must be a shoe, or can it be a sandal or a slipper?

What must it be made from? Because of the various demands, it has become accepted practice that we do not use a shoe that belongs to the yavam, but rather every Jewish bet din has a special “chalitzah shoe.”

In one revealing moment Rabba said that Rav Kahana said that Rav said: If Elijah the Prophet should come and say: One may perform ḥalitza using a soft leather shoe, the Rabbis would listen to him. But if he says: One may not perform ḥalitza using a hard leather sandal, they would not listen to him, for the people already have established the practice of performing ḥalitza using a sandal.

We explore the role of Elijah in the Rabbis’ decision making process and a review of Kristen H. Lindbeck’s work who reads all the Elijah narratives in the Babylonian Talmud and details the rise of a distinct, quasi-angelic figure who takes pleasure in ordinary interaction.

Yevamot 101: אנפיליא

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The 12th Perek begins:

If the woman performed the halitzah with a shoe, her halitzah is valid, [but if] with a felt sock נְפִּילְיָא it is invalid. If with a sandal to which a heel is attached it is valid, but [if with one] that has no heel it is invalid. [If the sandal was tied] below the knee the halitzah is valid, but if above the knee it is invalid.

What qualifies as a shoe is not something we often think about--except perhaps on Yom Kippur (and Tisha B'av)--but in the laws of chalitzah, the question carries great importance. Use the wrong type of shoe and the chalitzah is invalid and the widow is unable to marry. The chalitzah shoe must not go above the knee, is to be made of leather with a series of straps that make for easy removal, is to be worn on the right foot, and must have a heel. A wooden shoe would be acceptable (even if not ideal), whereas a slipper would not. A sandal is okay, provided it has a heel.

We explore the cultural meaning behind the sandals and shoes in general and their use in ritual and as a expression of class.

Yevamot 100: Moses of Oxford

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We have already learned the concept of havchanah – the requirement that a woman whose marriage ends must wait at least three months before marrying another man. The purpose of this rule is to ensure that, if the woman becomes pregnant during this period, we know who the father of the child is.

What if the woman does not wait the required period, and is pregnant with a child whose father is one of two people? The Mishnah on our daf relates to this question in a number of different settings, e.g. with regards to questions of yibum (levirate marriage), if one was a kohen and the other an ordinary Jew, and if they were both kohanim.

We explore Anat Feldman’s study of Jewish women who emigrated from Islamic countries to the State of Israel during the 1950s.

When they arrived in the country, they encountered a secular establishment that had originated in Europe (Ashkenazic) and possessed an entirely different culture than that of these women, who were religious and had come from Africa and Asia (Mizrahim). Alongside the secular establishment, they also encountered a small ultra-Orthodox community, which had its origins in Europe.

The religious customs of this group differed greatly from those of the émigrés from Africa and Asia.

We also review the life and work of Moses of Oxford one of the first English Tosafists, Born in Oxford, he resided in the Oxford Jewry, before moving to London, until he passed away in 1268.

Yevamot 99: Priestly Restrictions

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The rabbis continue to present case after case of far-fetched examples that might challenge the practice of yibum.

A yevama is bound either to marry one of her brothers-in-law or to participate in the ritual of chalitza, which releases her from this obligation.

In normal circumstances, marriage is forbidden between close family members, and so the rabbis are spending much energy on specifying the circumstances that permit yibum.

This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with a situation in which it was unclear whether a woman’s former husband or current husband is the father of her child.

We explore the restrictions of marriage for the kohen and the way differing denominations struggle with such priestly marriages in the contemporary scene.

Yevamot 98: Switched At Birth

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This mishnah and the following two mishnayoth deal with a favorite rabbinic topic, especially in seder Nashim: people getting mixed up and not knowing who they are.

We will see similar discussions in tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. In the case in our mishnah, five boys from five women got mixed up, and nobody knows for sure who belongs to which mother.

The problem is that should they die without children and they have brothers (or at least each woman has one other son who she knows is her son), they don’t know who is whose brother.

We examine cases of switched babies at birth the incidence and intriguing stories of discovery including the use of DNA technology.

Finally we cannot but ignore the wonderful tale of switched babies in Gilbert and Sullivan’s HMS Pinafore.

Yevamot 97: Rape Assumed

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The eleventh perek of Massekhet Yevamot deals with out of the ordinary family connections and relationships. While most of them focus on relationships in the context of yibum other relationships are dealt with, as well.

One example that is discussed is based on the fact that some issurei erva – incestuous relationships – take effect only when the man and woman involved were married, and not if their sexual relationship took place outside of marriage.

Thus, for example, the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna on our daf permits someone to marry a woman who his father had seduced or raped, even though that person would not have been allowed to marry her had she been his father’s wife.

We explore attitudes to rape in the talmud and rabbinic attitudes thereof, and Professor Judith Hauptman’s sensitive analysis of texts.

Yevamot 96: The Nine-Year-Old Groom

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The Mishnah discusses a case in which a nine-year-old boy lives with his Yevamah, and then his nine year-old brother also lives with her. The Tana Kama rules that the woman becomes prohibited to both brothers. Rebbi Shimon rules that she remains permitted to the first Katan.

RASHI asks, why does she remain permitted to the first Katan? When the second Katan lives with her she becomes a Sotah, for she committed adultery with him! Rashi adds that although the adulterer was a Katan, nevertheless his Bi'ah is considered a valid act of Bi’ah, and her act is punishable with Misah. Rashi answers that when she lives with the second Katan, she does so b'Shogeg (inadvertently), unaware that the boy is not her husband, or unaware that the act is prohibited. Therefore, she does not become a Sotah, and she remains permitted to her husband.

Rashi apparently follows his own opinion as expressed in Kidushin (19a, DH d'mid'Oraisa;) that an act of Yibum performed by a nine-year-old is considered a valid Yibum mid'Oraisa. Consequently, his act of Yibum creates a bond of Kidushin with the woman, who will become a Sotah if she lives with another man after she does Yibum with the nine-year-old.

We examine the sexuality of a nine year old and the implication of his marrying and yibum status.

Yevamot 95: Mothers in Law

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The rabbis struggle with what we should do if a husband has intercourse with his mother-in-law.

Their examination takes a somewhat circuitous path. At the beginning of our daf, the rabbis walk through who is forbidden to whom based on prohibited sexual relationships.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, that he renders his wife disqualified from remaining married to him.

With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, as Beit Shammai say that he renders his wife disqualified, and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

Rabbi Yosei said: Not so, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, that he does not render his wife disqualified from remaining married to him.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, as Beit Shammai say he renders his wife disqualified and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

We explore mothers in law and taboos thereof.

Yevamot 94: כל עריות שבתורה

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This mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive.

In a braita we learn : None of those with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law require a bill of divorce from him, even if he married them in a proper manner, apart from a married woman who married by mistake by permission of the court. And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also a brother’s wife and a wife’s sister. Since it is possible that these two women could become permitted to him, by levirate marriage in the case of a brother’s wife, or a wife’s sister after his wife’s death, they too require a bill of divorce.

This notion of כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה leads to explore the notion of incest and talmudic examples derived thereof….

Yevamot 93: דבר שלא בא לעולם

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One of the basic questions that comes up regarding issues of ownership in Jewish law is whether or not adam makneh davar she-lo ba la-olam – whether a person can buy or sell an object that is not in existence right now. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak believes that according to Rabbi Akiva a person has the ability to do so, and lists tanna’im and amora’im who follow that approach.

The rabbis consider an entity that has not yet come into the world. For example, the fruit that will grow on fruit trees or the earnings that one will collect in the coming months and years. The rabbis share their different thoughts about whether or not a woman can make a vow that would exclude her husband from benefiting from the work done with her hands - vowing that her hands are sanctified.

They also consider contracts based on this approach. How should we understand the sale of a field that is not yet harvested, for example. One example shows Rabbi Yannai separating tithes from his own garden just in case the fruit plate that regularly arrives before Shabbat should in fact show up on Shabbat itself. This action allows him and his family to have access to the fruit plate on Shabbat.

We explore the notion of legal ownership of objects not yet in existence…

Yevamot 92: Beit Din Errors

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The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.

Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

Rambam (1) cites the two examples of mistaken rulings mentioned in our Gemara, namely, incorrectly declaring that Shabbos ended and granting a woman permission to remarry based on the testimony of two witnesses.

The Noda B’Yehuda introduces a fundamental query and based upon it he establishes a famous rule.

Why is it, he asks, that a person is obligated to bring an offering when he acts in error due to his relying upon Beis’s din? What blame should he bear in this case? In fact, there are several other cases where a person errs, but because he did so while following halachic guidelines there is no blame associated to the person at all. In these other cases he is considered an אנוס.

We explore cases of batei Din who err including the struggle about agunot following the world trade disaster leaving some 15 women in this tragic situation.

Yevamot 91: מאי הוה לה למיעבד

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The Mishnah (87b) states that when a woman marries another man under the assumption that her first husband died abroad, and then her first husband returns alive, she is prohibited to both men. The Mishnah adds that if either man dies with no children, the brother of that man must perform Chalitzah with the woman, and he may not perform Yibum.

The Gemara explains that the brother of the first husband must perform Chalitzah because he is the brother of her real husband, and thus the Mitzvah d'Oraisa to perform Chalitzah or Yibum takes effect. He cannot perform Yibum, however, because the Rabanan penalized the woman and gave her the status of a Sotah mid'Rabanan (a Sotah, or woman who is suspected of being unfaithful to her husband, may not do Yibum when her husband dies). The brother of the second husband performs Chalitzah only mid'Rabanan; mid'Oraisa there is no need for Chalitzah since the second husband was never really married to her.

The Gemara adds that for the brother of the second husband, Yibum is "not mid'Oraisa [because she was not really married to the second husband], and not mid'Rabanan [because the Rabanan do not allow her to marry the brother of the second husband].”

One of the arguments that is made on behalf of a woman who received permission from the beit din to remarry, only to discover that her husband was still alive, is presented by Rav Sheshet.

The argument is a simple one – mai havei lah le-me’evad? – what could she possibly have done to protect herself?

The daf proceeds to kvetch reasons the we need to still punish her….

We explore the testimony and value of women’s eidus…

Yevamot 90: שב ואל תעשה

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Can rabbinical law uproot Torah law? The rabbis continue to argue this question.

Today they begin with a case where one provides payment in teruma to a kohen. The teruma is ritually impure.

The rabbis consider intentionality: did he mean to give ritually impure (ie. forbidden) teruma to the priest? Or was it an accident?

The rabbis are stringent in their rulings: the teruma must be replaced by ritually pure teruma. Torah law is more lenient.

A kohen is even allowed to marry a woman using this ritually impure payment!

And so, the rabbis argue, this is a case where rabbinical halacha uproots Torah halacha.

We continue this exploration with Rav Lichtenstein’s essay on egalitarianism as well as Chaim Trachtman’s Rabbinic Moral Psychology.