Yevamot 100: Moses of Oxford

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We have already learned the concept of havchanah – the requirement that a woman whose marriage ends must wait at least three months before marrying another man. The purpose of this rule is to ensure that, if the woman becomes pregnant during this period, we know who the father of the child is.

What if the woman does not wait the required period, and is pregnant with a child whose father is one of two people? The Mishnah on our daf relates to this question in a number of different settings, e.g. with regards to questions of yibum (levirate marriage), if one was a kohen and the other an ordinary Jew, and if they were both kohanim.

We explore Anat Feldman’s study of Jewish women who emigrated from Islamic countries to the State of Israel during the 1950s.

When they arrived in the country, they encountered a secular establishment that had originated in Europe (Ashkenazic) and possessed an entirely different culture than that of these women, who were religious and had come from Africa and Asia (Mizrahim). Alongside the secular establishment, they also encountered a small ultra-Orthodox community, which had its origins in Europe.

The religious customs of this group differed greatly from those of the émigrés from Africa and Asia.

We also review the life and work of Moses of Oxford one of the first English Tosafists, Born in Oxford, he resided in the Oxford Jewry, before moving to London, until he passed away in 1268.

Yevamot 99: Priestly Restrictions

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The rabbis continue to present case after case of far-fetched examples that might challenge the practice of yibum.

A yevama is bound either to marry one of her brothers-in-law or to participate in the ritual of chalitza, which releases her from this obligation.

In normal circumstances, marriage is forbidden between close family members, and so the rabbis are spending much energy on specifying the circumstances that permit yibum.

This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with a situation in which it was unclear whether a woman’s former husband or current husband is the father of her child.

We explore the restrictions of marriage for the kohen and the way differing denominations struggle with such priestly marriages in the contemporary scene.

Yevamot 98: Switched At Birth

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This mishnah and the following two mishnayoth deal with a favorite rabbinic topic, especially in seder Nashim: people getting mixed up and not knowing who they are.

We will see similar discussions in tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. In the case in our mishnah, five boys from five women got mixed up, and nobody knows for sure who belongs to which mother.

The problem is that should they die without children and they have brothers (or at least each woman has one other son who she knows is her son), they don’t know who is whose brother.

We examine cases of switched babies at birth the incidence and intriguing stories of discovery including the use of DNA technology.

Finally we cannot but ignore the wonderful tale of switched babies in Gilbert and Sullivan’s HMS Pinafore.

Yevamot 97: Rape Assumed

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The eleventh perek of Massekhet Yevamot deals with out of the ordinary family connections and relationships. While most of them focus on relationships in the context of yibum other relationships are dealt with, as well.

One example that is discussed is based on the fact that some issurei erva – incestuous relationships – take effect only when the man and woman involved were married, and not if their sexual relationship took place outside of marriage.

Thus, for example, the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna on our daf permits someone to marry a woman who his father had seduced or raped, even though that person would not have been allowed to marry her had she been his father’s wife.

We explore attitudes to rape in the talmud and rabbinic attitudes thereof, and Professor Judith Hauptman’s sensitive analysis of texts.

Yevamot 96: The Nine-Year-Old Groom

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The Mishnah discusses a case in which a nine-year-old boy lives with his Yevamah, and then his nine year-old brother also lives with her. The Tana Kama rules that the woman becomes prohibited to both brothers. Rebbi Shimon rules that she remains permitted to the first Katan.

RASHI asks, why does she remain permitted to the first Katan? When the second Katan lives with her she becomes a Sotah, for she committed adultery with him! Rashi adds that although the adulterer was a Katan, nevertheless his Bi'ah is considered a valid act of Bi’ah, and her act is punishable with Misah. Rashi answers that when she lives with the second Katan, she does so b'Shogeg (inadvertently), unaware that the boy is not her husband, or unaware that the act is prohibited. Therefore, she does not become a Sotah, and she remains permitted to her husband.

Rashi apparently follows his own opinion as expressed in Kidushin (19a, DH d'mid'Oraisa;) that an act of Yibum performed by a nine-year-old is considered a valid Yibum mid'Oraisa. Consequently, his act of Yibum creates a bond of Kidushin with the woman, who will become a Sotah if she lives with another man after she does Yibum with the nine-year-old.

We examine the sexuality of a nine year old and the implication of his marrying and yibum status.

Yevamot 95: Mothers in Law

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The rabbis struggle with what we should do if a husband has intercourse with his mother-in-law.

Their examination takes a somewhat circuitous path. At the beginning of our daf, the rabbis walk through who is forbidden to whom based on prohibited sexual relationships.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, that he renders his wife disqualified from remaining married to him.

With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, as Beit Shammai say that he renders his wife disqualified, and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

Rabbi Yosei said: Not so, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to one who has relations with his wife’s sister, that he does not render his wife disqualified from remaining married to him.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who has relations with his mother-in-law, as Beit Shammai say he renders his wife disqualified and Beit Hillel say he does not render her disqualified.

We explore mothers in law and taboos thereof.

Yevamot 94: כל עריות שבתורה

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This mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive.

In a braita we learn : None of those with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law require a bill of divorce from him, even if he married them in a proper manner, apart from a married woman who married by mistake by permission of the court. And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also a brother’s wife and a wife’s sister. Since it is possible that these two women could become permitted to him, by levirate marriage in the case of a brother’s wife, or a wife’s sister after his wife’s death, they too require a bill of divorce.

This notion of כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה leads to explore the notion of incest and talmudic examples derived thereof….

Yevamot 93: דבר שלא בא לעולם

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One of the basic questions that comes up regarding issues of ownership in Jewish law is whether or not adam makneh davar she-lo ba la-olam – whether a person can buy or sell an object that is not in existence right now. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak believes that according to Rabbi Akiva a person has the ability to do so, and lists tanna’im and amora’im who follow that approach.

The rabbis consider an entity that has not yet come into the world. For example, the fruit that will grow on fruit trees or the earnings that one will collect in the coming months and years. The rabbis share their different thoughts about whether or not a woman can make a vow that would exclude her husband from benefiting from the work done with her hands - vowing that her hands are sanctified.

They also consider contracts based on this approach. How should we understand the sale of a field that is not yet harvested, for example. One example shows Rabbi Yannai separating tithes from his own garden just in case the fruit plate that regularly arrives before Shabbat should in fact show up on Shabbat itself. This action allows him and his family to have access to the fruit plate on Shabbat.

We explore the notion of legal ownership of objects not yet in existence…

Yevamot 92: Beit Din Errors

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The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error.

Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering. And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

Rambam (1) cites the two examples of mistaken rulings mentioned in our Gemara, namely, incorrectly declaring that Shabbos ended and granting a woman permission to remarry based on the testimony of two witnesses.

The Noda B’Yehuda introduces a fundamental query and based upon it he establishes a famous rule.

Why is it, he asks, that a person is obligated to bring an offering when he acts in error due to his relying upon Beis’s din? What blame should he bear in this case? In fact, there are several other cases where a person errs, but because he did so while following halachic guidelines there is no blame associated to the person at all. In these other cases he is considered an אנוס.

We explore cases of batei Din who err including the struggle about agunot following the world trade disaster leaving some 15 women in this tragic situation.

Yevamot 91: מאי הוה לה למיעבד

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The Mishnah (87b) states that when a woman marries another man under the assumption that her first husband died abroad, and then her first husband returns alive, she is prohibited to both men. The Mishnah adds that if either man dies with no children, the brother of that man must perform Chalitzah with the woman, and he may not perform Yibum.

The Gemara explains that the brother of the first husband must perform Chalitzah because he is the brother of her real husband, and thus the Mitzvah d'Oraisa to perform Chalitzah or Yibum takes effect. He cannot perform Yibum, however, because the Rabanan penalized the woman and gave her the status of a Sotah mid'Rabanan (a Sotah, or woman who is suspected of being unfaithful to her husband, may not do Yibum when her husband dies). The brother of the second husband performs Chalitzah only mid'Rabanan; mid'Oraisa there is no need for Chalitzah since the second husband was never really married to her.

The Gemara adds that for the brother of the second husband, Yibum is "not mid'Oraisa [because she was not really married to the second husband], and not mid'Rabanan [because the Rabanan do not allow her to marry the brother of the second husband].”

One of the arguments that is made on behalf of a woman who received permission from the beit din to remarry, only to discover that her husband was still alive, is presented by Rav Sheshet.

The argument is a simple one – mai havei lah le-me’evad? – what could she possibly have done to protect herself?

The daf proceeds to kvetch reasons the we need to still punish her….

We explore the testimony and value of women’s eidus…

Yevamot 90: שב ואל תעשה

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Can rabbinical law uproot Torah law? The rabbis continue to argue this question.

Today they begin with a case where one provides payment in teruma to a kohen. The teruma is ritually impure.

The rabbis consider intentionality: did he mean to give ritually impure (ie. forbidden) teruma to the priest? Or was it an accident?

The rabbis are stringent in their rulings: the teruma must be replaced by ritually pure teruma. Torah law is more lenient.

A kohen is even allowed to marry a woman using this ritually impure payment!

And so, the rabbis argue, this is a case where rabbinical halacha uproots Torah halacha.

We continue this exploration with Rav Lichtenstein’s essay on egalitarianism as well as Chaim Trachtman’s Rabbinic Moral Psychology.

Yevamot 89: Power of Beis Din

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The Gemara on our daf suggests that we find a case of this in the first Mishnah of our perek. The Mishnah teaches that in a case where a man travels overseas and is reported dead, and the widow remarries based on the permission that she gets from the bet din, should the husband reappear, she is forbidden to them both, and both husbands must write her a get (a divorce). Furthermore, children that she has with either of these men will be considered mamzerim – children born from an adulterous relationship.

There are differences, however. It is clear that any child born from the second husband is a mamzer, since he was living with a married woman – albeit based on misinformation. Future children who are born from the first husband, however, should not be considered mamzerim – after all, the woman did not engage in forbidden relations on purpose.

Thus, the ruling that these children are mamzerim is only rabbinic.

The Gemara on our daf argues that declaring someone to be a mamzer when this is not true on a Torah level is effectively giving the Sages power to uproot a Biblical law.

We explore the power of the Beit Din including in modern states where church and state separate religious law such as in the UK and States and how this plays out beyond family and ritual law.

Yevamot 88: One Witness

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(Steinzaltz OBM writes:) What if we get word that one spouse has died, but that testimony is later contradicted?

Under such circumstances we may find that the alleged widow will marry, even as she is still a married woman.

Similarly, the husband may find himself in a forbidden relationship with his wife’s sister, who he married while under the misimpression that his wife had passed away. Even though these marriages may have taken place with the permission of the Jewish courts, under most circumstances, a mistaken ruling by those batei din cannot permit this forbidden relationship.

One circumstance that can lead to this type of situation is when a single witness comes and testifies that the husband is dead and based on this testimony the courts permit the alleged widow to remarry.

Ordinarily halakha demands that two witnesses testify in order to clarify a situation.

Why is this case different?

We review the unique case requiring only one witness then compare with the Qumran rule for three witnesses as described by Prof Lawrence Schiffman the Qumran Halacha scholar and Prof Steven Fraade the midrash Halacha expert.

Yevamot 87: Darchei Noam

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The Gemara notes that Proverbs 3:17 states: Her ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace”. 

 The rabbis use this to mean that all women should be treated with consideration.  

Women should not force women who are already married to then perform chalitza; she should not be demeaned in front of her new husband. 

 Our notes teach that "pleasantness" does not mean that the Torah's halachot are pleasant.  

However, they are fair and without discrimination.  

We explore the ramifications of this concept in Halacha in general and when’re ethical and halachic spheres intersect ending with  

Reb Aron Lichtenstein’s meditation on the human and social factors in Halacha.

Yevamot 86: Levitical Priests

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The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi who says that in 24 places the Torah refers to Kohanim as "Leviyim." RASHI in Chulin (24b) suggests that they are called "Leviyim" because they perform the Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash, as the word "Levi" also means "those who help serve" (as in Bamidbar 18:2). The Gemara cites one example of such a verse (Yechezkel 44:15).

What are the other 23 places in which the Torah refers to Kohanim as "Leviyim"? The Acharonim discuss this question and have great difficulty identifying all 24 places.

The BEN YEHOYADA in Bechoros (4b) writes that he searched and found only eleven places where the word "Leviyim" refers to Kohanim and not to Leviyim. However, RAV DAVID COHEN shlit'a (in OHEL DAVID, end of volume 1) writes that he counted the places where the word "Leviyim" refers either to Kohanim by themselves or to Kohanim and Leviyim together, and he found 76 places where the Torah refers to Kohanim as "Leviyim.”

We explore the history and scholarship on the levitical priesthood and how it developed

Yevamot 85: Genealogical Classes

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The Torah teaches that a kohen cannot marry a halala – a woman who is the product of a forbidden sexual relationship or one who has engaged in a forbidden sexual relationship. The question with which our Gemara grapples is whether the daughter of a kohen a similar prohibition from has marrying a halal. 

Rav Pappa suggested that the answer can be learned from our Mishna, where it lists which groups of people can marry one another. Since the Mishna does not specifically permit this case, we can conclude that it is forbidden. 

Rav Huna disagreed, arguing that the Mishna proves nothing, since it is only teaching about groups of people whose relationships will be the same no matter whether the man and woman are from one group or the other. 

Given the fact that a kohen cannot marry a halala, even if the daughter of a kohen is allowed to marry a halal, it would not appear on this list.

Our Gemara recalls the Mishnah that discusses ten levels of family heritage which journeyed from Bavel with Ezra HaSofer in an effort to determine whether or not כשרות are forbidden to marry 

We explore how rabbinic literature is concerned with lineage and the different terminologies for classes of Jews.

Yevamot 84: Ben ish Mitzri...Then and Now

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The ninth perek of Masechet Yevamot begins on our daf, and offers a list relationships, including women who are:

permitted to their husbands, but not to their yavam (e.g. a widow who is married to a regular kohen, whose brother is the kohen gadol),

permitted to their yavam, even though they were forbidden to their husbands (e.g. a widow married to the kohen gadol whose brother is a regular kohen),

forbidden to both (e.g. a regular woman who is married to a mamzer, whose brother is a mamzer, as well),

permitted to both (e.g. most normal cases of marriage).

One of the objections to the Mishnah comes from : Rav Pappa who objects to the mishna: "If it is so, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that in the case of a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, her son is considered a second-generation Egyptian, as the child’s status in this matter is determined according to the mother.”

We have had this issue of a ben mitzri before in Parshas Emor regarding the Blasphemer….

We explore the entire midrashic backstory of Shlomit bat Divri his tragic mother, raped by the very Egyptian Moshe Rabbeinu killed (Ex 2)

and the possible zoharic references thereof…

Yevamot 83: טומטום

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The Gemara describes a tumtum as someone whose gender cannot be determined. Under certain circumstances, the physical covering that hid the sexual organ may be removed (in the language of the Gemara it is nikra, or “torn” off) and the individual can be identified as male or female. Nevertheless, the likelihood that a man whose testicles have developed within his body will be able to have children is slim at best. This is certainly the case in someone who was truly a tumtum, that is to say that their sexual organs did not develop because of a low level of hormones. In such a case, even if the person’s physical situation improves, he will not be able to father children. (Steinzaltz)

During the last 40 years, Jewish legal discourse has confronted new uncertainties about the assignment of gender because surgery and hormonal treatments have made it increasingly possible to modify sex organs and sexual characteristics. Specifically, rabbinic authorities have rendered opinions about two kinds of people with atypical gender situations: transsexuals and people with intersex conditions. While intersex births are quite rare, they pose precisely the kind of rabbinic decision making needed.

We explore the syndrome of atypical (formerly ambiguous) genitalia and the cultural biases brought to the intersex conditions we encounter in modernity.

Yevamot 82: Seder Olam Chronology Conflicts

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Our Daf introduces us to a baraita that appears in Seder Olam that teaches that the passage in Sefer Devarim (30:5) asher yarshu avotekha ve-yerishtah indicates that there are only two times that the Land of Israel is sanctified in history. In other words, aside from the sanctification that took place when Yehoshua brought the children of Israel in from the desert, the only other sanctification that was necessary occurred when Ezra brought the Jews back from exile. That second sanctification lasts forever.

Seder Olam is an ancient book compiled in Hebrew by Babylonian talmudists about 160 CE.

It gives a chronology of the history of the Jewish people and the world around them since the first man Adam until the Great Revolt against the Roman rule. Seder Olam means Order (or Chronology) of the World. Some 450 years later, another book called Seder Olam Zutta (the Small Seder Olam) was issued in Babylone to complete the former work until their time.

Mitchell First published a book, Jewish History in Conflict, describing rabbinic responses to the disagreement between rabbinic chronology in Seder Olam and that which emerges from Greek historians (and other sources).

Depending on how you look at it, there are approximately 160 years missing from rabbinic history, mainly during the rebuilding and early years of the Second Temple.

In particular, Seder Olam lists three Persian kings while Greek sources list over 10 kings.

We explore the recent scholarship on possible polemical reasons for these differences and the way Jews and Christians differed in their respective chronologies.

Yevamot 81: Androgyne

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Among the halakhot presented in our Mishnah, Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi Shimon teach that a woman who marries an androgynous kohen will be permitted to eat terumah, i.e. that we view the marriage as a legitimate one, even though the status of an androgynous – who has both male and female sexual organs – as a man who can marry is questionable.

Given the questionable status of this marriage, the Gemara searches for an explanation of this ruling. One suggestion that is made is that we only permit her to eat terumah d’rabbanan – produce that is only considered terumah on a Rabbinic level – since terumah in our day-and-age is only a Rabbinic mitzvah.

We explore the biological characteristics of hermaphroditism, androgyne in Ancient Greece ending with the use of bisexuality in kabbalistic metaphors of the “nesirah” or splitting of Adam into two sexually gendered beings.