Yevamot 40: Gluttony

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Wasn’t it taught by Reish Lakish that one who eats gluttonously on Yom Kippur is exempt from liability for violating the prohibition of “… that shall not afflict…”

Our daf’s conclusion is clear; namely, one who eats gluttonously on Yom Kippur does not violate the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur, because gluttonous eating is not defined as eating.

Tosafos answers (3) that there are two types of gluttonous eating; the more severe type of gluttonous eating is when one is full to the point that the thought of additional eating is reviled. Eating under this condition is not defined as eating, as implied by our Gemara.

The less severe form of eating, which is defined halachically as eating, is when a person is not interested in eating because he is full but has not yet reached the point that the thought of eating makes him ill.

These guidelines are cited by Mishnah Berurah which rules that if a person eats when feeling full he is still obligated to make a beracha before and after he partakes.

If, however, he is full to the point that food appears disgusting he does not make a beracha before or after eating, since that act of gluttonous eating is not defined as eating.

We explore the halachic parameters of eating the Afikomen when full and the notion of gluttony.

Yevamot 39: Which is Preferable?

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In earlier periods when the yavam and yevamah had pure intentions, and performed yibum with the intention of fulfilling the mitzvah, yibum was preferable.

In later years, when people could no longer be relied upon to have the proper intent, chalitzah became the preferred option.

This most basic question is discussed on our daf, where we find a disagreement between Abba Shaul and the Chachamim.

Abba Shaul argues that a person who performs yibum because he finds the yevamah beautiful, because he wants to be married to her or for some other reason (the Rivan suggests that this refers to monetary gain), it is as though he engaged in a forbidden sexual act.

The Hakhamim point to the passage (Devarim 25:5) that commands the yavam to “come upon” her, and see no qualifications in the performance of the mitzvah.

We explore the notion of intent and heterodox opinions regarding yibbum and Chalitzah and which is preferable nowadays.

Yevamot 38: Women's Inheritance

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It was traditional for the wife to also bring financial assets into the marriage, which were divided into two –

Nikhsei melug, which are possessions that remain the property of the woman. While the couple is married, the husband can derive benefit from this property. When the marriage ends, they remain hers, in whatever condition they may be.

Nikhsei tzon barzel, which are possessions that become the property of the husband. Their value is written into the ketubah, and in the event that their marriage comes to an end – if the husband dies or if they become divorced – the wife will be reimbursed for the full amount, either from the estate if he died or from him if they divorced.

When it is uncertain whether or not a grown man is the child of a deceased father or the child of a yavam (because the man's mother may have become pregnant before or after participating in yibum), we run into many problems.

Today we focus in on inheritance.

The rabbis discuss a number of different cases. Each case allows us to understand the intricacies of decision-making in uncertain circumstances.

Halachot of inheritance teach that inheritance is given to heirs. Without heirs, it is split within the family along generational lines. For example, a father's inheritance is split between his sons.

Would the heir in question (the son of the deceased father or possibly the son of the yavam) be given a larger portion of his deceased father's inheritance, for he is that man's son, or should he receive a smaller portion of inheritance only after the yavam and his other brothers have split the wealth?

We explore the nature of women’s inheritance rights from biblical times until modern.

Yevamot 37: Mutah, Temporary Marriages

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"Married Jewish male seeks company of Jewish single female for purposes of short-term marriage."

According to a report that appears in our daf, the equivalent of the above personal ad was published by, Rav and Rav Nahman, in the course of their travels.
The former, when journeying to Dardashir, and the latter when going to Shekhansib, would announce: "Who will be my wife for the day?”

In order to arrange for temporary marriages that would be in force only for the duration of their sojourns.

We explore the notion of temporary marriage in halacha and the Mutah in Islamic law.

Yevamot 36: Fetal Viability

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All of our discussions in Masechet Yevamot open with the premise that the brother who passed away had no children; if he did have children, the mitzva of yibum would never come into effect. The first Mishnah in the fourth perek (35b) presents a situation where the widow is left pregnant. In such a case, we must wait and see whether the unborn child is viable. If she gives birth to a child who lives, there is no need for yibum; if the child does not survive, then the normal rule of yibum will apply.

We explore posthumous paternity in halacha (R. David Bleich) as well as Schenker’s article on the status of an embryo in halacha.

as well as a legal analysis of the notion of viability:Viability is an incoherent legal concept as it is currently featured in US law and in the legal framework in England and Wales.

Viability is frequently ill-defined and presumed from a point in gestation before the fetus has a reasonable chance of survival, thus undermining the (limited) logic behind the use of viability in determining the protection afforded to unborn entities.

Yevamot 35:Defining Paternity

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The new Perek begins with the following Mishnah: If a man dies and leaves a pregnant wife, the yet-to-be born fetus is still the seed of the father.

And if such a fetus survives thirty days, the woman is free to marry whomever she pleases, without the need for chalitzah; and the brother of the deceased is forbidden to marry her on the penalty of karet.

If the brother marries his pregnant sister-in-law--deliberately or unknowingly--whether such is a grievous sin, or the retroactive performance of a "mitzvah" will not be known for many months.

While our rabbis forbade such a marriage, the Sages of the Mishnah would allow the marriage to continue if and when the woman either miscarries or gives birth to a baby who dies within thirty days.

We explore the notion of paternity and the new technologies such as DNA and HLA testing and how the Israeli courts struggle with the halacha vs science when applying this to paternity.

How the World Trade Disaster and search for DNA remains (and developments in the science) to free women from being agunot has influenced the rabbinic t’shuvot.

Yevamot 34: Conception in Antiquity

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Our Gemara questions why a period of three months (havchanah) would be considered necessary before remarriage, since it is known that a woman will not become pregnant the first time she engages in sexual relations.

Rav Nachman suggests that the couples engaged in more than one act of relations and that the suspicion is that conception took place in a later act of relations.

Rava questions the very basis of the question, pointing out that there are known cases of virgins who had become pregnant the first time they engaged in sexual relations.

Rav Nahman responded with the explanation that these women prepared themselves in advance by removing their hymen, which allowed them to become pregnant the first time they engaged in relations.

The example of Tamar is brought to disprove the notion of the impossibility of pregnancy after a single act of cohabitation, which allows us to explore further the concepts of conception in antiquity.

The Noda B’Yehudah writes in his responsa נודע יהודה קמא אה"ע סימן כ"ב that nowadays it is possible for women to become pregnant the first time they have relations.

Furthermore, even in the time of Chazal the principle did not indicate that it was impossible for a woman to become pregnant the first time she had relations, rather the principle was stated with regards to the majority.

Yevamot 33: Epikleros

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Our Mishna presents a uniquely disturbing case that stems from the following situation.

Two men offer kiddushin to two women, but at the time of the nesu’im the women are switched and each ends up sleeping with the wrong spouse.

In such a case, they would all need to bring a korban chatat – a sin-offering.

We continue our exploration of marriage in the late antique period with a comparison with cases in Attic law, where there were sons in the family, the daughter exhausted her rights, including those of inheritance, with the dowry, and was then known as epiproikos.

But in a case where there was no son, she was known as epikleros and had the right to the whole estate, as sole descendant of an oikos with no males.

City law did not however allow the wife to be the possessor of the kleros. She therefore functioned as conveyor of the kleros, and it was via her that it was passed on to her sons.

But so that the kleros should not disappear from the family, the law laid it down that the epikleros, along with the kleros, should pass over to the male relative nearest in the lateral branch.

Should he refuse her, she came to the immediately next, and so on.

This nearest blood relative (anchisteas) could marry her, provided she was unmarried; or could proceed to aphaeresis epiklerou, if she was already married.

Yevamot 32: Ain Issur Chal al Issur

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Rebbi Shimon maintains "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur" -- once an object is prohibited with one Isur, it cannot become prohibited again with another Isur.

Accordingly, when two brothers were married to two sisters and one brother died, if the surviving brother does Yibum with his brother's wife (to whom he is prohibited because of "Achos Ishto"), he is liable for transgressing only one Isur: If the first brother was married first the Isur of "Eshes Ach" took effect, and when the second brother marries the sister of his brother's wife the Isur of "Achos Ishto" cannot take effect.

If, however, the second brother married first and his wife's sister became forbidden to him as "Achos Ishto," when his brother marries the second sister the Isur of "Eshes Ach" cannot take effect.

Do we say issur ḥal al issur – that one prohibition can be added to another prohibition – or not?– it is not clear how far this idea applies.

Thus we find that Rabbi Yosei understands ein issur ḥal al issur to mean that there is no punishment for the second prohibition, but it still exists and the perpetrator of such a crime would be deemed a rasha – an evil person – who would not be buried in the Jewish cemetery.

Rabbi Shimon takes a simpler view of the ruling and argues that ein issur ḥal al issur means that there is no place for the second prohibition to be applied and it does not exist at all.

The Gemara in Yevamot adds that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the first prohibition no longer exists, the second one would take its place.

We explore the notion of levirate marriage in the late antique period.

What happened to biblical law when it was transferred into the new world of late antiquity? How was it understood, and what were the reasons for this particular interpretation? Answering these questions can provide a paradigm to help explain the development of late antique Christian legal traditions and discourse in their Greco-Roman and Jewish contexts.

Yevamot 31: Levirate v Agnate Marriages

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When a bet din – a Jewish court – needs to establish facts in order to make a decision, the preferred method is to listen to the testimony of eyewitnesses and rule according to the statement that they make. The principle taught by the Torah is that testimony of two witnesses is accepted as definitive (see Devarim 19:15), and in the words of the Talmud, trei ke-me’ah – if two witnesses testify, it is as though one hundred did.

What if two pair of witnesses come into court and each tells a different, conflicting story?

In such a case the Gemara rules that we must use other methods in order to reach a conclusion on how to decide the case.

The Gemara’s suggestion is to rely on chazaka – we accept the status quo ante, i.e. that the situation has not changed – until we find compelling evidence that suggests otherwise.

We continue to explore the difference between Levirate and Agnate marriages with the work of Dr Samuel Belkin.

Yevamot 30: Conversos

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There are two Mishnayot on today’s daf that are almost identical. In both of them, the scenario opens with three brothers, two of whom are married to sisters, while the third brother is married to an unrelated woman.

The Gemara asks the obvious question – why do we need both of these Mishnayot? Aren’t the cases so similar that there is no need to repeat the rule a second time?

The Gemara’s response is that we really do not need both, and that the rule of the second Mishna can be understood from the first.

Nevertheless, once it was taught, Mishna lo zaza mimkoma – the Mishna is not moved from its place.

We continue our exploration of levirate marriage, today regarding the conversos especially the work of the history Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi.

Yevamot 29: Ruth and Boaz

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The commandment of yibum that we have been discussing throughout Massekhet Yevamot is carried out by an act of sexual relations between the brother (the yavam) and the widow (the yevama). According to the Torah, there is no need to first offer a ring or a marriage contract, as in a regular wedding, since this is effectively a continuation of the first brother’s marriage. Nevertheless, if one of the surviving brothers offers a betrothal ring to the widow – an act referred to in the Mishna as ma’amar – at least on a Rabbinic level, the yibum process is considered to have begun.

The Mishna on our daf offers a scenario in which there are three brothers, two of whom are married to sisters, while the third one is single. One of the married brothers dies, and the brother who is single offers ma’amar to the widow. Then the second married brother dies, as well.

We explore the levirate marriage of Ruth in our tradition and from the scholarly perspectives.

Yevamot 28: Marrying Two sisters...Yaakov a Model for Polygamy

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that although the Tanna Kamma requires that both widows receive halitza, there is an opinion – Rabbi Shimon – that rules that these two sisters are permitted to marry whoever they want without a need for halitza (the brother certainly cannot marry both sisters, a relationship that is forbidden by the Torah).

The Gemara  suggests that Rabbi Shimon does not require halitza for these sisters because of his reading of the passage in Vayikra (18:18) that forbids marrying two sisters. He understands that the pasuk teaches that when sisters somehow gain the status of tzarot (rival wives), as they do in our case, neither of them will be permitted. 

We explore the biblical origin of polygamy and the way chazal explain Yaakov Avinu’s marrying two sisters. from a halachic standpoint.We then examine a modern society (Mormons) who used the biblical narrative of Jacob to rationalize their practice.

Yevamot 27: Divorce or Levirate betrothal?

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The concept of zika – the almost marital relationship that exists between the yavam and the yevama before they have had the opportunity to fulfill the mitzva of yibum or halitza (see Yevamot 18).

The discussion of zika is revived on our daf in the context of the following case:

There were three brothers and two of them were married to two sisters. The married brothers died, and both widows become potential yevamot to the surviving brother. In this case he certainly cannot marry (i.e. perform yibum with) both sisters, a relationship that is forbidden by the Torah. Can he marry one of them?

The rabbis also turn their attention to which should be considered first, a woman who holds a get, a divorce certificate, or a woman who has been betrothed in levirate marriage.

We explore further examples of Chalitzah as practiced in the Sephardic community as well as a famous responsa of the RADVAZ in the 16th century concerning an Agunah in Jerusalem.

Yevamot 26: Karaite Halacha

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We begin Perek III with another new Mishna. It teaches about the case of four brothers, two of whom married two sisters and then died, leaving them childless. The levirate bond that exists between each brother and sister precludes them from marrying, due to the forbidden sexual relationships between brothers and their wives' sisters (the levirate bond serves as a reminder of the sexual bond between the brothers and both women). Thus the women must perform chalitza; if they married before consulting the court, they must divorce.

Rav rules that when three sisters fall to Yibum to two brothers, one brother does Chalitzah with one sister, the other brother does Chalitzah with the second sister, and then both brothers must do Chalitzah with the third sister.

Our Daf infers from this ruling that Chalitzah with one's "Achos Chalutzaso" (the sister of a woman with whom he did Chalitzah) is considered a "Chalitzah Pesulah," and whenever a Chalitzah Pesulah is performed it must be done by all of the brothers in order to take effect and release the woman from the requirement of Yibum (because the bond of Zikah is too strong to be broken by a Chalitzah Pesulah).

A "Chalitzah Pesulah" is defined as a Chalitzah done by a brother who was not permitted to do Yibum.

The Rambam (Yibum 7:10) describes another case of chalitza pesulah. A man dies and leaves two wives, and one is forbidden to his brother with the strength of a lav. If he does chalitza to that wife, it is not good enough to work for the wife who was permitted to him, and he has to do chalitza to her as well.

We explore Karate traditions and levirate marriage and the remarkable fact that marriages between Karaites and Rabbinates continued as late as the RAMBAM who paskened their marriages were kosher but their gitten were not.

How does their exegesis regarding yibum differ from the rabbinic tradition and how much closer were they to the pshat?

Yevamot 25: Self Incrimination

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If a man reports to the beit din (the Jewish court) that a certain man has died, based on that testimony the beit din will act to allow the dead man’s wife to marry.

The Mishna on our daf teaches that if the man testified that a man had died, or if he said that he had killed a certain person, or that he was involved in the murder, the beit din will accept his testimony and permit the wife to marry. Nevertheless, the witness (or, perhaps, the murderer) will not be allowed to marry the widow himself.

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in the case where the man testifies that he was the murderer and says that in such a case we cannot accept his testimony at all, since we do not allow a person to incriminate himself.

Therefore the woman cannot marry him or anyone else, since we must assume that her husband is still alive

By dint of the fifth amendment to the Constitution, US citizens are protected from being forced to give self-incriminating testimony; pleading the fifth is a common refrain in many a courtroom.

Jewish law goes one step further; it forbids the giving of self-incriminating evidence. Ein adam masshem aztmo rasha, a person cannot turn himself into an evil person.

Thus, one who admits to having killed someone cannot be convicted based on his own testimony.

While we cannot convict based on self-incriminating evidence, may we accept his testimony regarding others?

We explore the legal/halachic notion o self incrimination auth how it compares with American Law.

Yevamot 24: Legislating Motive

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Prospective converts are first discouraged from converting. Only after being told of the difficulties of life as a member of the Jewish community will the convert be accepted, once they have convinced the Beis Din of their sincerity.

Our daf teaches that someone who has a relationship with a non-Jewish woman should not marry her after she converts.

Nevertheless, if he does marry her, we do not obligate him to divorce her.

We explore the possible scenarios where motives are impugned and some historical examples (Spain 1391) of forced conversions.

And the halachic ramifications of a conversion obtained through deceit.

Yevamot 23: גֵר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּיר כְּקָטָן שֶׁנּוֹלַד דָּמֵי

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Rav Naḥman said: Since the issue of converts and their relatives has come to hand and is the topic of discussion, let us say a matter of halakha: Maternal half-brothers who both convert may not testify together as a pair of witnesses before the court, but if they did testify, their testimony is valid. Although blood relatives are invalid as witnesses, converts are considered as though they have no relations. Paternal half-brothers who both convert may testify together ab initio, since the halakha does not consider paternal half-brothers of gentiles to be true relatives. Ameimar said: Even maternal half-brothers may also testify together ab initio.

In what way is this case different from forbidden relations, where a convert may not marry his maternal sister due to rabbinic decree? The halakhot of forbidden relations are handed over to all, and every individual chooses his own wife. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree to prevent confusion between the status of a convert and that of a born Jew. However, testimony is handed over to the court, and the court knows to distinguish between the status of a born Jew and that of a convert. And the legal status of a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all previous family ties become irrelevant.

We explore the notion of being born again and how this notion affects halachic practice and how ambivalent Halacha is regarding attraction of converts.

Yevamot 22: The Curse That Keeps On Giving

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The two components are for a married man to die with no offspring, and to have a living brother who can marry his widow, thus fulfilling the mitzva of Yibum.

The Mishna on our daf teaches that having any brother will allow the commandment to take effect, except for a brother that was born to a non-Jewish woman or slave;

similarly, having any child will keep the commandment from taking effect, except for a child that was born from a non-Jewish woman or slave.

Our daf interprets the use of the expression “any brother” and “any child” to include even the case of a brother or child who was a mamzer– who ordinarily is not allowed to marry into the Jewish community

We explore the cultural history of mamzerut with Professor Meir bar Ilan’s paper on Attitudes in Late Antiquity,

and a review of recent Israeli court struggles with the rights of citizens labeled mamzerim with human rights.

Yevamot 21: Shlomo תִּקֵּן מְשָׁלִים הַרְבֵּה

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Our daf explains how we learn the law of secondary relationships from the Torah as follows:

Rav Yehuda said from here: with regard to King Solomon:

ט וְיֹתֵר, שֶׁהָיָה קֹהֶלֶת חָכָם: עוֹד, לִמַּד-דַּעַת אֶת-הָעָם, וְאִזֵּן וְחִקֵּר, תִּקֵּן מְשָׁלִים הַרְבֵּה.

9 And besides that Koheleth was wise, he also taught the people knowledge; yea, he pondered, and sought out, and set in order many proverbs.

Eccl 12:9

“He weighed [izzen] and sought out, and set in order many proverbs” and Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: Before Solomon came, the Torah was like a basket [kefifa] without handles [oznayim], until Solomon came and made handles for it.

By means of his explanation and proverbs he enabled each person to understand and take hold of the Torah, fulfill its mitzvot, and distance himself from transgressions.

We examine the traditional midrashic material concerning Shlomo Hamelech’s wisdom and use of the parable as a tool to make lofty spiritual concepts accessible.