Zevachim 39: וְעָשָׂה כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה

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On daf 36b, the first Mishna in this perek taught a basic difference between the sin-offerings that were brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner, golden altar. Regarding those that were brought on the outer altar, like the sin-offerings of a nasi – a king – or an ordinary person (see Vayikra 4:22-35), even if the actual requirement was to sprinkle the blood of the sacrifice two times or four times, if one sprinkling was done, it would suffice.

On the other hand, those sin-offerings that were brought on the inner altar, like the sin-offering of the High Priest or the sin-offering brought by the great Sanhedrin on behalf of the entire congregation (see Vayikra 4:3-21), all of the sprinklings needed to be done properly, or else the sacrifice was invalid.

We explore the inner altar and its mystical dimensions.

Zevachim 38: שָׁלֹשׁ מַתָּנוֹת שֶׁבַּחַטָּאוֹת

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Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argue about how many blood applications are necessary for a sin offering. All agree that four applications are required, but Beit Shammai say that the offering is already valid after two such applications, while Beit Hillel maintain that even one is sufficient.

Beit Shammai rely on the phrase "on the horns" repeated three times. Since the minimum of the plural "horns" is two, altogether this counts as six. Four of these six teach the prescribed procedure, and the remaining two tell how many are absolutely necessary. Beit Shammai rely on the pronounced form of the word "horns".

The scriptural basis for the dispute lies in Leviticus chapter 4, which prescribes the ritual procedures for various categories of sin offerings. In verses 25, 30, and 34, the text commands that the priest shall take the blood of the sin offering and place it "on the horns of the altar" (Hebrew: קַרְנֹת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, karnot ha-mizbeach).

Beit Hillel point out that the written form for two of the three "horns" can be read as "one horn". Beit Hillel attach more importance to the written form of the word. This gives them four "horns", three for the prescribed after the first application, and one that is necessary for atonement. But Beit Hillel's count is inconsistent, they should use all four for the prescribed application, with none necessary to achieve atonement! They answer that we don't nowhere do we find atonement for nothing.

The interpretive challenge arises from both the repetition of this phrase across three verses and the grammatical form of the word "horns." Baruch Levine notes in his commentary on Leviticus that ancient Near Eastern altars typically featured four elevated corners or "horns," which held particular religious significance as points of sacred contact.

Archaeological evidence from various sites confirms this four-horned structure as standard for Israelite altars.

Zevachim 37: אַהֲנִי מִקְרָא, וְאַהְנִי מָסוֹרֶת

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Throwing the blood on the Altar is the fourth and final step of the sacrificial service. For the majority of offerings, the blood has to be thrown from a vessel twice, each time on the lower part of each of the two opposing corners.

As the blood is dashed on the corner, it spreads out on the adjacent sides, so that with two applications the blood falls on all four walls. This is called "two applications that are four.”

The phrase “Ahani Mikra, v’Ahani Masoret” from Zevachim 37 expresses the balance between two interpretive approaches in rabbinic study.

· Mikra (מִקְרָא) refers to the written biblical text—the fixed consonantal form (ketiv) that represents divine revelation in its permanent, textual form.

· Masoret (מָסוֹרֶת) refers to the oral reading tradition (qeri)—how the text was transmitted, pronounced, and interpreted through communal practice.

The Talmudic phrase teaches that both the written form and the oral reading are indispensable. The mikra anchors meaning in divine fixity, while the masoret sustains the living voice of interpretation. Together, they form a dynamic partnership—text and tradition, permanence and renewal—reflecting how Torah is both written revelation and ongoing dialogue.

Zevachim 36: כל הַנִּיתָּנִין עַל מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן

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Moshe was commanded to erect two altars in the Sanctuary. The first – “and you will make the altar of acacia wood…and cover it with copper” (Shemos 27:1-8) – and the second – “and you will make an altar for incense…and cover it with pure gold” (Shemos 30:1-10). In the Temple the copper altar was replaced by one of stone but the golden altar remained.

We explore the various altars.

Moshe was commanded to erect two altars in the Sanctuary. The first – “and you will make the altar of acacia wood…and cover it with copper” (Shemos 27:1-8) – and the second – “and you will make an altar for incense…and cover it with pure gold” (Shemos 30:1-10). In the Temple the copper altar was replaced by one of stone but the golden altar remained. Essential differences between the altars: Aside from being built of different materials, there are essential differences between the altars.

Zevachim 35: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין לֶאֱכוֹל שְׁלִיל אוֹ שִׁילְיָא בַּחוּץ

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that this law only applies in a situation where the inappropriate thought refers to something that is ordinarily eaten. If the inappropriate thought was about a part of the animal that is not normally eaten, e.g. bones, hooves, sinews, horns, etc., then the sacrifice would not be affected.

In the continuation of the Mishna we learn that if the sacrifice was a female and the inappropriate thought related to its unborn fetus or to the placenta itself, the korban is unaffected. Similarly, if the thought was to eat the unborn eggs of the sacrificial bird or drink the milk of the animal that was to be brought as a korban, it would not affect the sacrifice.

We explore the embryo and placenta in Ancient Near East and newer iterations.

Zevachim 34: בָּקָר וָצֹאן אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ, וְלֹא חַיָּה

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On our daf Reish Lakish is quoted as saying that someone who brings a non-kosher animal on the altar in the Temple is liable to receive malkot – lashes. Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees that it is forbidden to do but argues that there is no punishment for doing so. The source of their argument is how to extrapolate from the passage that requires sacrifices to be brought from kosher animals (see Vayikra 1:2).

Rabbi Yoḥanan views this as a mitzvat aseh – a positive commandment – and there is no formal punishment meted out for neglecting to fulfill a positive commandment. According to Reish Lakish this would be considered a lav ha-ba mikhlal aseh – a negative commandment derived from a positive one – which he considers equivalent to a negative commandment.

Zevachim 33: שֶׁהָיְתָה בְּשַׁעַר נִקָּנוֹר, שֶׁאֵין מְצוֹרָע יָכוֹל לִיכָּנֵס לְשָׁם

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One of the activities that were incumbent on the person who brought a sacrifice was semikha – laying hands on the animal that was to be sacrificed before its slaughter. The Gemara on our daf quotes a tosefta that teaches that tekef le-semikha, sheḥita – that this laying of hands was performed immediately prior to the slaughter of the animal. One exception was the case of a metzora – someone who had recovered from biblical leprosy and was obligated to bring a number of sacrifices to formally put an end to his ordeal. Since his status as someone who was ritually impure did not allow him to enter the Temple courtyard where the slaughter took place, he would perform it in sha’ar Nicanor – the Nicanor gate – at the entrance to the courtyard.

Sha’ar Nicanor served as the main entrance to the Temple courtyard from the outer precincts of the Temple Mount, at the top of a series of steps leading from the ezrat nashim. As our Gemara explains, one of its purposes was to allow someone who needed access to the Temple courtyard to get as close as possible without actually entering it.

Zevachim 32: שָׁאנֵי מְצוֹרָע, הוֹאִיל וְהוּתַּר לְצָרַעְתּוֹ הוּתַּר לְקִירְי

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The question of who may enter sacred space and under what conditions has profound implications that extend far beyond the realm of ritual law. The Talmudic discussion in Tractate Zevachim 32 concerning partial entry into the Temple courtyard by individuals in various states of ritual impurity reveals sophisticated rabbinic reasoning about boundaries, sanctity, and accessibility. 

Zevachim 31: שְׁחִיטָה בְּזָר כְּשֵׁרָה

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On our daf, the first Mishna in the third perek of Massekhet Zevaḥim teaches that although sheḥita is one of the requirements in the sacrificial service, it need not be performed by a kohen and will be considered valid if performed by an ordinary Jew.

According to the Mishna, it can even be done by a woman, a slave or a tameh – someone who is in a ritually defiled state.

With regard to women performing ritual slaughter, Tosafot point out that the statement in this Mishna is clear proof that women can act as ritual slaughterers, in contradiction to a teaching presented in the book Hilkhot Eretz Yisrael, which precludes them from acting as shoḥatim because nashim da’atan kalot – that halakha perceives women as being “lightheaded.” That work includes a number of other restrictions in the act of sheḥita; for example, sheḥita performed by someone who was not properly dressed or someone who did not recite the appropriate benediction at the time of slaughter will be invalid. Tosafot argue that in all of these cases, these are ḥumrot – stringencies – established by the author of that work that are not actually requirements of Jewish law.

We explore agency, authority Halacha and women.

Zevachim 30: הוּא שָׁאַל בִּי דְּבַר חָכְמָה, וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ מִשְׁנָתֵינו

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The Mishnah and Gemara in Zevachim 29–30 explore sacrifices brought with mixed or shifting intent: when a priest begins the act of slaughter or sprinkling with one purpose (e.g., for a sin-offering) but completes it with another (e.g., for a burnt-offering). The Rabbis recognize this as a liminal state — what Abaye calls beyn beyn (“in between”).

This “double consciousness” unsettles the clear categories that Halacha depends upon.

For Rabbi Meir, the first intention dominates; once the act has begun under a certain frame of mind, the subsequent change cannot retroactively purify or corrupt it. Rabbi Yose, however, insists that the decisive intention is the one present at the completion of the act. Both agree, however, that the sacrifice’s validity hinges on coherence of intent, revealing the halakhic need for unity between inner and outer action.

We explore the notion of akrasia versus ambivalence.

Zevachim 29: חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל

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The sugya in Zevachim 29b probes one of the most conceptually difficult corners of sacrificial law: how the intention (machshavah) of the officiant transforms or invalidates a korban. It does so by comparing two legal structures—temurah, the forbidden substitution of sanctity from one animal to another, and pigul, the invalidation of an offering through improper intention regarding time or place. Both appear, at first glance, to concern human interference with holiness. Yet only temurah incurs malkot (lashes), while pigul, though metaphysically severe, does not. The discrepancy invites a profound question about the boundaries of culpability in halakhic thought.

Reb Chaim Soloveitchik’s reading of this sugya, preserved in his Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi (1), provides a foundational model for what would become the derekh ha-Brisk—a method that conceptualizes halakhic phenomena through analytic dichotomies which we discuss.

Zevachim 28: כּוּלְּהוּ מִקְּרָא אֲרִיכָא אָתַיִין

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The primary biblical text states: "And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity" (Leviticus 7:18).(33) A seemingly parallel verse appears in Leviticus 19:7: "And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted."

The rabbinic tradition understood these verses not as addressing literal consumption on the third day but as legal categories concerning priestly intention (machshavah) during sacrificial rites.(34) Two types of improper intent were distinguished:

1. Temporal intent: Intending to consume the offering beyond its designated time (chutz li-zemano)

2. Spatial intent: Intending to consume the offering outside its designated area (chutz li-mekomo)

We explore the hermeneutics of interpretation.

Zevachim 27: עוֹר אַלְיָה כְּאַלְיָה דָּמֵי

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A new Mishnah states: If one slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of sprinkling its blood outside, or part of its blood outside, to burn its sacrificial parts outside, or part of its parts outside, to eat its meat outside, or an olive’s bulk of its meat outside, or to eat an olive’s bulk of the skin of the tail outside, it is invalid, but one does not incur kares (if he eats from it).

We explore the Halachot of cheilev and imurim.

Zevachim 26: מִשּׁוּם דִּפְסִיל בְּמַחְשָׁבָה

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Our new Mishna discusses cases where the blood was poured incorrectly, which renders the sacrifice invalid. Among the possible cases are

If the blood was placed on the kevesh – the ramp leading up to the altar, which is not part of the altar and is not a place for sprinkling blood for any sacrifice.

If the blood that should have been placed on the upper part of the altar was placed on the lower part or vice versa.

If the blood should have been placed on the inner altar and was placed on the outer altar or vice versa.

The Talmudic passage from our daf presents a sophisticated legal discussion concerning the validity of sacrificial offerings when procedural errors occur in the application of blood to the Altar. At its core lies a fundamental theological question: what constitutes the essential element that renders a sacrifice valid—the physical act performed correctly, or the proper intent accompanying that act? This question resonates powerfully with the first-century controversy between Paul and certain Pharisaic traditions regarding the relative importance of works (actions) versus faith (intentions, beliefs, and inner disposition) in achieving righteousness before God.

Zevachim 25: מִדַּם הַפָּר – מִדַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ

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Our Mishna is focused on the initial kabbalat ha-dam, and the Gemara quotes a baraita that teaches that the blood that is collected and used for sprinkling can only be dam ha-nefesh – the life-blood – and not blood of the skin or the draining blood. This is derived from the repeated use of the term middam happar – the blood of the bull – (see, for example, Vayikra 4:5) which is understood to mean that the requirement is the blood that comes directly from the bull at the moment of slaughter.

When an animal is slaughtered, the very first blood is dam ha-or – blood of the skin – meaning the blood that is part of the small blood vessels that carry nutrients to the skin. Once the slaughterer’s knife reaches the main arteries, the dam ha-nefesh – the life blood that flows as long as the pumping action of the heart continues – will be spilled. This blood is called dam ha-nefesh because it is the blood that keeps the animal alive and with its loss will bring about cessation of the activity of the heart and ultimately, death.

We explore the blood ritual and the transition from Bible to Talmud.

Zevachim 24: הוֹאִיל וְלֹא נֶאֶמְרָה יָד בְּקַבָּלָה – קִיבֵּל בִּשְׂמֹאל כָּשֵׁר

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Rabbah bar bar Chanah quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that anytime the verse uses the term “finger” and “Kohen,” it must be done with the right hand. The Gemora first assumes that both terms must be present to require the right, as the verse about the chatas uses both – and the Kohen will take from the chatas blood with his finger – and we learn that verse from the verse about a metzora, which explicitly refers to the right finger.

The Gemora challenges this, since kemitzah – scooping the minchah only mentions “Kohen,” yet the Mishna states that if a Kohen did it with his left hand it is invalid. Therefore, Rava says that Rabbi Yochanan means any verse that uses either term implies the right.

We explore handedness in Halacha and mythology of antiquity.

Zevachim 23: שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד

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One of the examples that appear in the Mishna is the case of yoshev – when the kohen is sitting at the time that the sacrifice is brought.

What is wrong with sitting while performing sacrificial service?

Rava quotes Rav Naḥman as saying that this is based on the passage (Devarim 18:5) that teaches that the kohanim were chosen by God to “stand and serve” in His name. We can conclude that only when they are standing are they chosen to serve as priests.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that suggests that this pasuk would only serve as a positive commandment; the requirement to do so that teaches that the sacrifice will be invalid if the kohen was not standing stems from the continuation of that discussion where the need to stand is repeated (see Devarim 18:7).

We explore this levitical priesthood role.

Zevachim 22: עָרֵל מְנָלַן

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The Mishna stated that an uncircumcised person invalidates a Temple service. The Gemora asks: How do we know this? Rav Chisda says: We did not learn this from the Torah of Moshe Rabbeinu but did learn it from the words of Yechezkel ben Buzi. The verse states: Any stranger, one of uncircumcised heart or flesh shall not come to My Temple to serve me. How do we know that they cause the service to be invalid?

This is as the verse says: When you bring strangers, the uncircumcised of heart or flesh to be in My Sanctuary, to desecrate My House.

The braisa states: Any stranger. One might think this is literally referring to a gentile. This is why the verse states: Uncircumcised of the heart (a sinner). Why, then, does it say any stranger?

This is referring to someone whose actions have become strange to his Father in Heaven. We only know this refers to someone with an uncircumcised heart. How do we know this also applies to someone of uncircumcised flesh? The verse states: And one of uncircumcised flesh. Both of these verses are needed.

We explore the status of the uncircumcised and the influence of jewish Christian polemics.

Zevachim 21: כִּיּוֹר שֶׁלֹּא שִׁקְּעוֹ מִבָּעֶרֶב

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As we learned on yesterday’s daf there was a daily requirement for the kohanim to begin their day of Temple service with ritual washing of the hands and feet every morning.

The Gemara on our daf asks whether it would suffice if a kohen bathed his hands and feet in the basin of the kiyor, rather than using the water from the faucets. While the passage commanding the kohanim to wash says that Aharon and his sons should wash their hands and feet mimenu – from it, from the kiyor (see Shemot 30:19) – perhaps placing hands and feet into the kiyor would accomplish the same thing.

We explore the unique status of the laver and the way midrash derives women’s resistance and power from the mirrors plating it.

Zevachim 20: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזוֹ כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזוֹ

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R’ Yochanan states that a kohen who washed his hands and feet to remove the ashes is not required to wash them again after daybreak since he already washed them for that day’s service even though the washing occurred at night.

A similar circumstance is mentioned in Shulchan Aruch. Shulchan Aruch (1) writes that in the morning one should wash his hands and recite the beracha of

In a second ruling, Shulchan Aruch (2) states that it is not clear whether a person who was awake all night is required to wash in the morning in order to remove the from his hands.

We explore the halachot of ritual washing.