Kiddushin 49: עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּים חׇכְמָה

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The Gemara relates that if a person, who until this time was wicked, betroths a woman on condition that he is righteous we are concerned with the possibility that he had thoughts of teshuvah.

Minchas Chinuch (1) questions whether teshuvah can be done without verbally confessing (וידוי) one’s sins. He cites our Gemara as proof that teshuvah without a verbal confession is effective.

Since the Gemara does not relate that he verbally confessed his sins, it would seem that his teshuvah is accepted and he can now be described as righteous by merely having thoughts of teshuvah.

We look at this notion of Teshuvah then review Shakespeare’s view of marriage.

Kiddushin 48: יַיִן וְנִמְצָא חוֹמֶץ

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The Mishna lists six cases. One is where a man says to a woman, “Be mekudeshes to me with this cup of wine,” and it ended up being honey. A man says to a woman, “Be mekudeshes to me with this cup of honey,” and it ended up being wine. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me with this silver dinar,” and it ended up being gold. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me with this golden dinar,” and it ended up being silver. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me on condition that I am rich,” and he is actually poor. A man says, “Be mekudeshes to me on condition that I am poor,” and he is actually rich. In all of these cases, the kiddushin is invalid.

We continue the review of Laurie Novick’s analysis of Nissuin.

Kiddushin 47: בָּזוֹ וּבָזוֹ וּבָזוֹ

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The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me with the fruit of an oak tree, i.e., an acorn, with a pomegranate, and with a nut, or if he said to her: Be betrothed to me with these, if combined they are worth one peruta, she is betrothed.

Rav teaches that, “Ha-mekadesh be-milveh, einah mekudeshet – a marriage cannot be accomplished by means of a loan.” This means that if a man lends money to a woman, he cannot tell her that instead of paying back she can simply keep the money if she agrees to marry him. The explanation offered by the Gemara for this rule is that “Milveh lehotza’ah nitnah – a loan is meant to be spent by the borrower.”

We explore the means of Kiddushin via a loan with Rav Baruch Gigi’s analysis and Laura Novick’s majestic analysis.

Kiddushin 46: אָדָם יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין קִידּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ

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The very first Mishna in Massekhet Kiddushin taught that if marriage is to be carried out by an exchange of money (or an object of value), it must minimally be worth a peruta.

If a man says to a woman, “Become betrothed to me with this date” (which he gives her), and then (giving her another date), he says, “Become betrothed to me with this one,” if any one of the dates was valued as a perutah, she is mekudeshes. But if not, even if together they equal a perutah, she is not mekudeshes. If, however, he says, “Become betrothed to me with this, with this and with this,” if the dates combined are valued at a perutah, she is mekudeshes, but if not, she is not mekudeshes. If she was eating them one by one (as soon as one was given to her, she ate it), she is not mekudeshes unless one of the dates was valued at a perutah.

We explore the The historical context within which to read the Talmudic discussions of kiddushin by Prof. Michael L Satlow

And Rabbi Dov Linzer’s analysis.

Kiddushin 45: שְׁאֵרִית יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יַעֲשׂוּ עַוְלָה

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A father has the right to accept kiddushin on behalf of his daughter while she is underage (a ketana) and she will be married according to the halakha. Once she is a bogeret she makes her own decisions regarding marriage. What if a ketana accepts a marriage proposal?

Must we be concerned that the father agrees and that the girl is married, or perhaps the actions of a ketana have no halakhic significance?

What of betrothal by a Minor without the Knowledge of Her Father?

We examine Jewish marriage ages in Ashkenazi Jewry and similarly the

The Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 in the UK and its effect.

Kiddushin 44: הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה

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The Gemara on yesterday’s daf quotes a Mishna in Massekhet Gittin (64b) that teaches that in the case of a na’ara, both she and her father have the ability to accept a geṭ for her.

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, arguing that only the father has the ability to do so. All agree that a basic principle is that for a geṭ to work the woman receiving it must understand the significance of the geṭ and recognize the need to guard the document properly.

Does this same disagreement apply to kiddushin – marriage – as well as to giṭṭin? Reish Lakish believes that it does, but according to Rabbi Yohanan there is no argument with regard to the status of a na’ara accepting kiddushin; all agree that only the father can accept kiddushin for a na’ara.

We continue our exploration of childhood betrothal.

Kiddushin 43: אֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב

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The Mishnah had states that if a Shali'ach is instructed to kill a person the Tana Kama says that the Shali'ach is Chayav, while Shamai ha'Zaken says in the name of Chagai ha'Navi that the Meshale'ach is Chayav.

The Tana Kama holds that David was not punished for instructing Yo'av to kill Uriah ha'Chiti because he was Mored b'Malchus (insubordinate to the King).

We explore the tradition which presents two opinions: The first anonymous opinion states that the actual killer is the one responsible for the sin. Shammai’s opinion, on the other hand, points to the one who commissions the crime, like David, whom God blames for killing Uriah, even though Yoav actually stationed Uriah in the most dangerous position at the front lines of the battle.

What is the nature of the culpability for a killer for hire?

Kiddushin 42: אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה

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Our Mishna (41a) introduced us to the concept of shelihut to the extent that we say, “Sheliaḥshel adam ke-moto – when the messenger acts it is as though the person himself did the act.”

Is this true in all cases?

One situation where a sheliaḥ must take responsibility for the action that he does is if it was a forbidden act. There, the Talmudic principle “Ein sheliaḥ le-dvar aveirah” applies – that no one can appoint a messenger to commit a sinful act. The Gemara explains this by saying that the messenger’s true obligation is to follow the directions of God, not of another person: divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid, divrei me shom’im!

We explore the notion of “following orders” as an ethical defense.

Kiddushin 41: מִצְוָה בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִבִּשְׁלוּחָהּ

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We begin Perek II today, and we begin with a Mishna about agency in betrothal. Both men and women are permitted to appoint agents for the purpose of betrothal. They are also permitted to perform that action themselves.

Fathers are permitted to appoint agents to betroth their minor daughters.

R Yosef in the Gemara is quick to note that although marriage can be accomplished by means of a messenger, that is not the ideal situation, and that “mitzva bo yoter mi-bi-sheluho – it is a greater mitzva for a person to perform the act themselves,” rather than have someone else perform the mitzva for him.

We explore the issue of consent and child marriage.

Kiddushin 40: תַּלְמוּד מֵבִיא לִידֵי מַעֲשֶׂה

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Our Mishna states: One who is engaged in study of Bible and Mishna and derech eretz, the desired mode of behaviour, will not be quick to sin, for "a threefold cord is not quickly broken" (Ecclesiastes 4:12). One who does not engage in any of these is not considered to be a person deserving to be part of the community.

The Gemara shares analogies of righteousness and wickedness to trees. Rabbi Akiva argues with Rabbi Tarfon that study is greater than action because study leads to action. Other examples demonstrate that study is more important than action -- though the rabbis are clear that a mitzvah is performed immediately if Torah study would not facilitate its immediate performance.

We explore the conflict between study and praxis.

Kiddushin 39: הֵיכָן אֲרִיכוּת יָמָיו

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Mishna

Whoever performs one mitzvah is rewarded with good, his life is lengthened and he inherits the world. And whoever does not perform one mitzvah is not rewarded with good, his life is not lengthened and he does not inherit the world.

Rewards for a Mitzvah

The Gemora cites a Mishna which seems to contradict this one: The following matters allow one to enjoy their fruits in this world and the principle remains for him to enjoy in the World to Come.

These matters are: honoring one’s father and mother, acts of kindness, receiving visitors, facilitating peace between his fellow men, and the study of Torah is equivalent to all those mentioned.

The Gemora asks: What happened with Acher? Some say that he saw an incident similar to that of Rabbi Yaakov (and he concluded that there is no reward for good deeds). Others say that he saw the tongue of Chutzpis the spokesman (for Rabban Gamliel) as it was being dragged by “another thing” (a pig; after the Romans ripped it out).

We explore the notion of theodicy in the talmud and reward and punishment.

Kiddushin 38: טָעֲמוּ בָּהֶם טַעַם מָן

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The verse (Ex 16:35) lists two time periods at which the Jewish people stopped eating the Manna: when "they came to Eretz Noshaves" and when "they came to the edge of Eretz Kena'an.”

RASHI explains that the Jewish people arrived at the edge of Eretz Kena'an, a reference to Ever ha'Yarden (Transjordan), on the seventh of Adar, the day on which Moshe Rabeinu passed away and the Manna stopped falling.

They nevertheless continued to eat the Manna which they had collected and stored earlier until they arrived at "Eretz Noshaves," a reference to Eretz Yisrael proper, where they ate from the new produce on the sixteenth of Nisan.

We explore the pros cultural references to manna and the mystic interpretations of ingesting this bread from heaven.

Kiddushin 37: כֹּל שֶׁהִיא חוֹבַת הַגּוּף

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A new states that any mitzvah that is dependent on the ground itself, aretz, applies in Eretz Yisrael only.

Any mitzvah that is not dependent on the land applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael.

Two exceptions: the mitzvot of orla and of chilim, diverse kinds, which apply in all places.

Rabbi Eliezer says that this halacha applies regarding the prohibition to eat from the chadash, the new crop, before the omer offering has been brought on Nisan the 16th, as well.

The Gemara’s first suggestion of how to define the concept of mitzvot ha-teluyot ba’aretz is that it is based on whether or not the Torah discusses the mitzvot in the context of bi’ah – of coming into the land.

Explore these restrictions that are land based.

Kiddushin 36: תְּנוּפָ֖ה לִפְנֵ֥י

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The Mishna on our daf teaches that many of the laws that relate to bringing sacrifices in the Temple apply to men and not to women. The exceptions are the mitzva of tenufa – lifting the minha (the meal offering) – brought by a sota (see Bamidbar 5:11-31) and a nezira (see Bamidbar 6).

The minha was brought by the person bringing the sacrifice in a basket. It was removed from the basket and placed in a keli sharet – a utensil belonging to the Temple – and was given to the woman to hold. As is generally the case with menahot, tenufa was then done, with the kohen placing his hands under the hands of the owner and lifting the minha up in the air. Afterwards it was brought to the altar and sacrificed, with the remainder given to the kohanim to eat.

We explore the wave offering ritual…

Kiddushin 35: זְקָנֶךָ, וְלֹא זְקַן אִשְׁתְּךָ

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The Mishna (29a) taught that women are obligated to refrain from all mitzvot lo ta’aseh – negative commandments – with the exception of three:

Bal takif (not to shaving their payot – the “corners” of the hair on one’s head – see Vayikra 19:27)

Bal tash’hit (not to shave one’s beard – according to the Gemara, with a razor – see Vayikra 19:27)

Bal titmah le-metim (a kohen cannot come into contact with a dead body – see Vayikra 21:1).

The Gemara argues that the law that applies to the beard also applies to the payot, and since women do not ordinarily have a beard, the prohibition against shaving one’s beard does not apply to them, thus the prohibition against cutting payot does not apply to them either.

We explore the biblical and rabbinic prohibitions around shaving.

Kiddushin 34: תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת

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The Mishna (29b) taught that women are not obligated in mitzvot aseh she-hazman geramah – positive commandments that are dependent on time. Our Gemara asks for a source that frees women from these commandments and presents tefillin as the archetype – just as women are not obligated to lay tefillin similarly all mitzvot aseh she-hazman geramah are not obligatory for women.

We further explore women and learning further.

Kiddushin 33: מִפְּנֵי שֵׂיבָה תָּקוּם

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The passage, “Mipnei seivah takum ve-hadarta penei zaken” commands us to stand up before an elderly person and revere the elder (see Vayikra 19:32). Nevertheless, the Gemara understands that honoring the zaken obligates us to stand before a Torah scholar.

Isi ben Yehuda comments that the obligation to stand before the elderly applies to all old people.

The Gemara records that Rabbi Yohanan who accepts Isi’s ruling made it his business to stand before elderly non-Jews, saying, “Kamah harpatkei adu alayhu d’hani – how many adventures this man must have experienced!”

We explore the ethics of elderly care.

Kiddushin 32: אַבָּא עָבַרְתָּ עַל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה

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Our Daf whose focus has been the mutual obligations of parents to their children and children to their parents, concludes that the obligation of morah – awe of one’s parents (see Vayikra 19:3) – forbids a child from sitting in his father or mother’s place, contradicting them, etc. while kibbud – honor (see Shemot 20:11) – obligates a child to feed and clothe his parents. Who must pay for this? Is the child obligated to do so, or should the funds come from the parents’ money?

Rav Yehuda rules that the child must pay; Rav Natan bar Oshaya rules that the parent must pay.

We explore further the limits of Kibbud Av.

Kiddushin 31: בֵּן מְכַבֵּד אֶת אִמּוֹ יוֹתֵר מֵאָבִיו

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It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that a son honors his mother more than he honors his father, because she persuades him with many statements of encouragement and does not treat him harshly.

Therefore, in the mitzva of: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), the Holy One, Blessed be He, preceded the mention of the honor due one’s father before mentioning the honor due one’s mother.

We explore the implications of this precedence as well as the limits of Kibud Av.

Kiddushin 30: סוֹפְרִים כׇּל הָאוֹתִיּוֹת

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A person should divide up his days and spend a third of his time on Mikra, a third on Mishnah and a third on Gemara.

The Torah consists of 5,888 Pesukim; Tehilim has eight more than that while Divrei ha'Yamim has eight less.

A person should divide up his learning into three; one third of his learning shall be the 24 Sefarim of the written Torah, one third shall be the Mishnah, which is the Oral Torah and the commentary on the written Torah, and one third of the time he shall learn the Talmud…

This only applies to a person who is starting to learn, but when his Torah learning is more developed and it is no longer necessary for him to learn the written and Oral Torah he shall put aside set times for the written and Oral Torah so that he does not forget any of the Dinim and he should spend the rest of his time on the Talmud.

We explore the mitzvah of chinuch as well as the differences in counting practices of letters and verses and the midrashim around the hinge verses such as my essay on Lev 10:16 וְאֵ֣ת ׀ שְׂעִ֣יר הַֽחַטָּ֗את דָּרֹ֥שׁ דָּרַ֛שׁ מֹשֶׁ֖ה