Kiddushin 19: אֵין יִעוּד אֶלָּא מִדַּעַת

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The Gemara wonders whether or not a master could designate his Hebrew maidservant to his minor son. I am guessing that the rabbis find this distasteful and are not merely arguing. However, there are previously discussed halachot, including a yevam who is nine years old and one day who has intercourse with his yevama.

One of the arguments against designating one's maidservant to a minor son is the issue of consent. The Gemara notes that a maidservant must consent to her designated husband. One rabbi argues that the maidservant's consent is not her acquiescence but her knowledge of the upcoming marriage arrangement before it occurs.

We present Jay Rosner’s article of rhetorical strategy and dialectical necessity in Kiddushin.

Kiddushin 18: יֵשׁ בָּעִבְרִי שֶׁאֵין בָּעִבְרִיָּה

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The Beraisa states that a Jewish servant goes free after 6 years or at Yovel or with the death of the master but a Jewish maidservant does not go free with these things.

The Gemara explains that a Jewish maidservant does not go free with these three things if her master did Yi'ud.

We see differences in our daf between the treatment of a Hebrew maidservant vs a Hebrew male slave.

Beyond the elements already mentioned in our last two dapim, the rabbis delve into the fact that a Hebrew maidservant is not sold a second time.

They walk us through the possible reasons that a Hebrew slave or a Hebrew maidservant might be sold twice.

We present the wonderful scholarship by Diane Krueger on THE SHIFḤAH NEḤEREFET OF LEVITICUS 19:20-22.

Kiddushin 17: שֶׁבָּרַח וּפָגַע בּוֹ יוֹבֵל

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Regarding severance gifts for servants: Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? This concerns a case where he fled and the Jubilee Year arrived immediately afterward, and therefore he did not complete the six years of servitude. The novelty of this halakha is as follows. Lest you say: Since the JubileeYear released him, he is considered sent away by you, the master, and therefore we should not penalize him but grant him the severance gift, the baraita teaches us that once he flees, he forfeits his right to the severance gift.

We explore essays by Rav Ammon Bazak comparing Midrsah Yotzer vs Midrash Mevakem and mere Asmachta in the force of law as well as claims of Jewish participation in the slave trade.

Kiddushin 16: בְּאִישׁוּת מִיהַת לָא אַשְׁכְּחַ

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We continue to learn about the rabbis’ understandings of our Mishna (Kiddushin 14).

The rabbis interpret the possible meaning of “She shall not go out as the men slaves.” For the rabbis, this refers to a Hebrew maidservant’s acquisition and release from slavery compared with those of a Canaanite slave.

They consider, for example, whether or not a document is required in all circumstances.

We continue exploring the Jewish Maidservant’s status and development as intrabiblical exegesis.

Kiddushin 15: וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת אׇזְנוֹ

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The second Mishna in Massekhet Kiddushin (14b) leaves the realm of marriage and focuses on the status of an eved ivri – a Jewish slave – and specifically on how such slaves are acquired and how they are granted their freedom.

Ordinarily, a male Jewish slave is acquired by means of kesef or shetar, and leaves slavery after six years of work, or when the yovel arrives or by paying back the value of his remaining years.

Although the common perception today is that slavery is inhumane, the situation of an eved ivri is more similar to a long-term contract, in that the slave must be treated with great respect.

We continue and exposition of Ex 21:6.

Kiddushin 14: מִכֶּסֶף מִקְנָתוֹ

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A new Mishnah states that an eved ivri (Jewish servant) is acquired through money and documents and acquires himself after serving the required years (six years), reaching yovel (the jubilee year), or redeeming himself for the amount of money he was sold for, minus the amount he worked (known as “gira’on kesef”).

A Jewish maidservant has the added method of acquiring herself when she has signs of maturity. A nirtza (Jewish servant who refuses to be freed after six years) is acquired through the nirtza process (his ear is pierced) and acquires himself through yovel and the death of the master.

We explore there development and relationship between slavery and the eved Ivri.

Kiddushin 13: שְׁקַלְתֵּיהּ וְאִישְׁתִּיקָה

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Our daf tells of a woman who was selling varshkhei. A man came and snatched some of the varshkhei. When she demanded that he return them he said, “If I return them will you marry me?” She took them back from him without saying anything. Rav Naḥman ruled that there was no marriage in this case, since the woman can claim that she was taking something that in any case belonged to her.

We explore the notion of qui tacet consentire videtur

And the wonderful discovery of Babatha in the Judeaen desert.

Kiddushin 12: אַבְנָא דְכוּחְלָא

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The Gemara relates an incident in which a man was Mekadesh a woman with a bundle of rags. Rav Shimi bar Chiya had the bundle appraised to determine whether it was worth a Perutah. According to Shmuel, why did he have it appraised? The Kidushin should have taken effect out of doubt even if its value was less than a Perutah! The Gemara answers that Rav Shimi wanted to know whether the Kidushin was Kidushei Vadai or Kidushei Safek.

The Gemara relates another incident in which a man was Mekadesh a woman with a piece of blue marble. Rav Chisda had it appraised to determine whether it was worth a Perutah. The Gemara again asks why he had it appraised; even if it is worth less than a Perutah the Kidushin should take effect out of doubt.

Rav gave lashes to one who would betroth a woman in the marketplace, and for one who betroths a woman with cohabitation (without giving money or a document beforehand), and for one who would betroth a woman without a prior arrangement to marry her, and for one who would nullify a get, and for one who would pronounce that the get is being written without his consent, and for one who is disrespectful towards a messenger from the Rabbis, and for one who has been under an excommunication for thirty days and does not come to Beis Din to have it nullified, and a groom who lives in his father-in-law’s house.

We explore Officer Immunity and Accountability in Jewish Law by David Polsky.

Kiddushin 11: אִשָּׁה מַקְפֶּדֶת עַל עַצְמָהּ

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According to the Mishna, when a man marries a woman by means of money, the minimum amount is, according to Beit Hillel, a peruta or, according to Beit Shammai, a dinar. While Beit Hillel‘s position is fairly easy to understand, Beit Shammai‘s position demands some explanation, and it is discussed on our daf.

Rabbi Zeira suggests that Beit Shammai is simply looking out for the honor of Jewish women, who demand more than a small denomination coin.

We examine the use of coins in the talmud and Palestine in the late antique period.

Kiddushin 10: הָאָב זַכַּאי בְּבִתּוֹ

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Our daf struggle with What does Cohabitation Accomplish?

The Gemora inquires: Does cohabitation effect marriage (nisuin), or does it affect only betrothal ()?

The difference would be whether he inherits her, can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a Kohen, who may only become impure to dead close relatives, and this would include a wife after nisuin), and annul her vows. If it effects nisuin, then he inherits her, he may become impure to her and he annuls her vows, while if it effects only erusin, he does not inherit her, he may not become impure to her and he may not annul her vows.

What is the law?

We explore ancient parallels as well as the insistence of virginity as a late antique construct.

Kiddushin 9: וּבְבִיאָה. מְנָא לַן

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The rabbis in our are concerned about betrothal through sexual intercourse alone. What about the transfer of documentation or of money? The rabbis discuss the intricacies of such a scenario. If a man has intercourse with a woman who is betrothed, he is liable to be stoned (Deuteronomy 22:23-24). But if he betroths her with money and not intercourse, is she fully betrothed? What if he betroths her with money and then engages in anal intercourse with her? Does anal intercourse affect her status as a virgin – and might it affect her status as betrothed?

Our view of bi'a maintained that bi'a, as well as kesef and shtar, is a ma'aseh kiddushin effecting the acquisition in an abstract manner through a symbolic act.

Might bi'a be something different? Might it not merely signal the start of a relationship but actually forge that VERY relationship?

Kiddushin 8: הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּמָנֶה

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The Gemara on our daf presents a series of cases where it appears that the woman is accepting kiddushin from the man, but upon closer examination of the case, she may be rejecting it.

For example, if a man hands a woman a coin and says, “Hitkadshi li be-maneh – marry me with this coin,” and she takes it from him and throws it into the ocean or into a fire, we interpret her actions to mean that she is rejecting his offer of marriage.

Rava quoted Rav Nachman who taught that if a man offers a particular sum for kiddushin and he gives a security item (משכון) in its place, the kiddushin is not valid. The reasoning is also presented.

The money for kiddushin is not here, and the security was never meant to be the item given for the kiddushin, it was only a placeholder. Therefore, nothing was given to the woman.

We explore these differences between money and merchandise in the act of kinyan.

Kiddushin 7: חֶצְיֵיךְ בַּחֲצִי פְרוּטָה

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Rava raises an apparent oddity in a situation of marriage. According to Rava, if a man says to a woman “you are betrothed to half of me” the marriage takes effect; if he says to her, however, “half of you is betrothed to me” the marriage does not work.

In response to Abaye’s objection that the Torah describes marriage in the words, “Ki yikah ish ishah – when a man takes a woman as his wife” – indicating that both husband and wife are full and complete, Rava explains that since according to the letter of the law a man can marry more than one woman, therefore the statement “you are betrothed to half of me” has meaning.

We present Boaz Cohen’s monograph (1948-9) of the development of Betrothal in Jewish and Roman Law.

Kiddushin 6: הָאוֹמֵר ״חֲרוּפָתִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת

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Our daf begins with a list of some of the many phrases a man might say when betrothing a woman. The rabbis note that different expressions might be used in different places, and these are valid if they are used in the appropriate context. For example, "You are hereby my helper" is generally considered to be a valid statement of betrothal. "You are my espoused one", however, is an expression used in Judea to refer to one's wife. Based on that local custom, as long as the couple was speaking about marriage or the process of betrothal, that expression is considered to be a valid statement of betrothal as well.

We review Rabbi Lamm’s review of recent additions to the Ketubah as well as sociological / cultural functions of marriage in history.

Kiddushin 5: כֵּיצַד בְּכֶסֶף

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The rabbis continue to discuss which actions can be affected by which means. Documents release women from marriage, for example, but they do not necessarily effect betrothal. The rabbis consider money, which does not allow the divorce of a husband and wife. Money can be used to redeem consecrated property and the second tithe. If acquisitions is effected by money, why isn't the release of property - including a wife - affected by money? One of the more interesting points is that both documents and coins are discrete items. Ultimately, the rabbis look to the requirement that not just a document but a document of severance is required to break the bond between husband and wife. Money might represent a document, but it cannot specifically represent a document of severance.

We explore the notion of kinyan.

Kiddushin 4: נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה

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The handiwork and the Kesef Kidushin of a Na'arah belong to her father…

The Gemara states that one may think that a father nay not sell his daughter who is an Ailonis for a maidservant. Tosfos asks that a maidservant is sold when she is a Ketanah and how is it possible for the father to know at that time that she is an Ailonis as she becomes an Ailonis if she has not develop the Simanim of a Na'arah by the age of 20.

Tosfos answers that that we may have thought that the master must return the handiwork to the father and the father must return the money he received for her sale to the master and if the master or his son did Yi'ud (married her) it would not be valid.

We review the scholarship regarding the laster editors (sevaroim) since these first few Blatt are clearly the work of a different (geological) strata of the Gemara.

Kiddushin 3: אִשָּׁה נָמֵי מִקַּנְיָא בַּחֲלִיפִין

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Much of the first two dapim of the Gemara in Massekhet Kiddushin deal with technical questions of language that are not the usual topics of discussion in the Gemara. In explanation of this odd dialogue, Rav Sherira Ga’on, as well as many of the rishonim explain that these pages are not part of the original Gemara , rather they are a later addition from the time of the savora’im – the sages who followed the amora’im of the Gemara – or, perhaps the early ge’onim.

The Gemara explains that according to Rav Huna, who maintains that Chupah is a valid form of Kidushin, the reason why the Mishnah mentions the number "three" when it lists the ways in which a woman becomes betrothed is that it seeks to exclude a fourth possible form of Kidushin, that of Chalifin. Chalifin may not be used for Kidushin because a Kinyan Chalifin may be performed with an object worth less than a Perutah, and a woman does not consent to become betrothed if she receives an object worth less than a Perutah.

We explore the Halacha of Kimyan through chalifin.

Kiddushin 2: הָאִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית

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The first perek of Massekhet Kiddushin focuses on “acquisitions” – beginning with “acquiring” a wife and continuing with discussion of other types of purchases. This stems from the fact that according to Jewish law, marriage is a type of kinyan, involving an act of acquisition. The Mishna teaches that a wife is “acquired” by her husband by means of three methods (the Talmud Yerushalmi makes clear that the intention is one of three methods.

We explore the talmudic view of marriage as an act of acquisition.

Gittin 90: אֲפִילּוּ מִזְבֵּחַ מוֹרִיד עָלָיו דְּמָעוֹת

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A Mishna appears on this, the last daf in Massekhet Gittin, that deals with one of the most basic questions about divorce. According to Jewish law, what are considered reasonable grounds for divorce? The Mishna brings three opinions on this matter:

Beit Shammai rules that a man can divorce his wife only if he found a devar erva – a promiscuous situation.

Beit Hillel permits divorce even in a case where the wife hikdihah tavshilo (literally “burned his food”).

Rabbi Akiva says that he can divorce her for any reason – even if he found another woman who he finds more attractive.

Each of these three tanna’im points to a biblical passage as a source for their positions.

We end the masechta with a review of modern no fault divorce.

Gittin 89: פְלַגּוֹת רְאוּבֵן

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The Mishna on the last daf discusses how we are to deal with rumors about a woman’s marital status. According to the Mishna, if there are rumors that a woman has gotten married we must take such statements seriously, at least to the extent that we will obligate her to get a divorce before allowing her to marry someone else. If the rumors indicate that she was divorced, we will trust those rumors, as well, and treat her as a divorced woman.

We explore the science and sociology of rumor mongering.