Gittin 46: שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל פְּרוּצוֹת

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 46

To download, click/tap here: PDF

It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 3:4) Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: For what reason did they say that a man who divorces his wife due to her bad reputation may not remarry her, and one who divorces his wife due to a vow may not remarry her? So that Jewish women will not be licentious with regard to forbidden sexual relations or lax with regard to vows.

(The reason for this halacha is as follows: According to one opinion, it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Chacham the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and he might claim that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed. Consequently, this might impair the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that “he may not remarry her,” a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then claim that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion, the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows.)

We review Approaches to the Representations of Women in Rabbinic Literature from various scholars.

Gittin 45: אֵין פּוֹדִין אֶת הַשְּׁבוּיִין

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 45

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna on our daf teaches that a Jewish person who is being held captive should not be ransomed for more than his worth, mipnei tikkun ha-olam.

The Gemara offers two possibilities in an attempt to understand why this rule was established. Was it tikkun ha-olam inasmuch as the community would find it difficult to pay larger sums than normal, or was it to discourage kidnappers from capturing more people by ensuring that they would not find it lucrative enough?

We explore the historical aspects of pidgin sh’vuyim from the Maham Mi'Rotenburg to hostage taking in modern day Israel.

Gittin 44: לֹא בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא בְּדִינֵי אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 44

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The rabbis consider what should be done if a slave runs to serve with another army. They also consider the differences between slaves and animal who have been purchased by someone other than the rightful master.

Captives must be redeemed, even at a greater cost than market value.

However, a slave or an animal do not necessarily have to be redeemed.

The rabbis also consider whether or not a master who dies passes on to his son the responsibility of redeeming a slave.

We further explore slavery in Palestine.

Gittin 43: אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּךְ

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 43

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Mishna teaches that a slave who is sold outside of Israel to Jews, or inside of Eretz Yisroel, is emancipated. The Gemara tells us that this is proven by Torah texts.

It goes on to teach that one who borrows on the bases of that slave also emancipates that slave. The rabbis attempt to understand how such a transaction might have worked.

They speak about the exemption from tithing, and about the notion of "time" as a defining measure for a slave's move to another household.

We explore the deeper notions of morality slavery and modern issues regarding homosexuality and how we are to relate to others with differing worldviews, looking to the writings of the Klausenberger Rebbe.

Gittin 42: הוֹאִיל וּמִדְרַשׁ חֲכָמִים הוּא

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 42

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A slave can be freed through a letter of manumission. But we learn about half-slaves.

What happened to them? They might have been bought by two people.

Alternatively, an owner might have freed half of a slave to facilitate a negotiation with someone else.

Regardless, it is clear that the rabbis have concerns about a half-freed slave. Would he work for his master one day and for himself the next?

How could he marry (other than marrying another slave and relegating himself to slavery for the rest of his life)?

We explore further Jewish slavery during Roman times.

Gittin 41: נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם אֶלָּא לִפְרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 41

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Someone who is half-slave and half-free man (he was owned by two partners, and one of them emancipated him), he works for his master one day and for himself one day; these are the words of Beis Hillel.

Beis Shamai, however, says: You have created a solution for the master (for he does not lose out through this division), but you have not solved anything for the slave. He may not marry a slavewoman, for he is half-free. He cannot marry a free woman for he is half-slave.

If you will say that such a person should refrain from marrying, that cannot be, for the world was created for the purpose of propagation, as it is written: He did not create it to be desolate; He formed it to be inhabited. Rather, to benefit the public (this slave), we force his master to make him a free man, and the slave writes a document for his value. Beis Hillel later retracted and ruled in accordance with Beis Shamai.

We explore the mitzvah of procreation…

Gittin 40: אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 40

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Mishnah states: A slave whose master pledged him to others as an apotiki (A person may designate any type of property as security to the creditor without placing it in the possession of the creditor. The creditor has a lien on this property, and if the debt is not otherwise repaid, the creditor can collect his debt from the security. This security is called an apotiki.) and freed him, according to the letter of the law, the slave is not liable for anything, but for the benefit of the public, they force his master to make him a free man, and the slave writes a document for his value. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slave does not write it, but rather, the one who frees him.

We explore bills of manumission in history.

Gittin 39: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 39

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The rabbis consider what happens when a slave is freed by his master who then dies. Is this like other cases of death before one is released, like a man who has written a get for his wife but has not yet delivered it to her hand when he then dies?

We are given an example of one of their questions via the rabbi's story of a maidservant whose master was dying. She came to him in tears, begging to be freed from servitude. He threw his hat to her and said that she should acquire the hat and with it her freedom. Sounds terrific -- except that a court denied the relevance of his actions: "He did nothing". This is because he act was one of transfer of ownership, which is different from an act releasing one from ownership.

We explore acts of manumission in history.

Gittin 38: עֶבֶד שֶׁבָּרַח מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִים

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 38

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Rav Shemen bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A Canaanite slave who (was imprisoned after being captured by idolaters) escapes from prison becomes a free man, and not only that, but his master is also forced to write an emancipation document for him.

The Gemora asks from our Mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: It makes no difference what the purpose of the ransom was for; he can anyway be enslaved.

Our daf notes according to Abaye (that the Mishna is referring to a case where the master has not yet given up hope of recovering the slave, there is no difficulty), we can answer that the case of the escaped slave is referring to a master who has given up hope on recovering his slave (and that is why he gains his freedom).

We explore escaped slaves prior to emancipation.

Gittin 37: וּמַפְקִיעַ עַצְמוֹ מִיָּד רַבּוֹ

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 37

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our new Mishnah states: If a Canaanite slave was taken captive and a Jew ransomed him, if he was ransomed for the purpose of being a slave, he is enslaved. If, however, he was ransomed for the purpose of becoming free, he is not enslaved. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: It makes no difference what the purpose of the ransom was for; he can anyway be enslaved.

The Gemara wonders if the slave's owners are despairing over their slave. They wonder about ownership at all if this person was captured. They note that it is a mitzvah to redeem both slaves and freemen. Different rabbis share different opinions about whether or not this man should be a slave; whether or not he should belong to the first or second owner.

We examine the history of slave emancipation.

Gittin 36: פְּרוֹסְבּוּל אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 36

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The remainder of our daf focuses on the prosbol initiated by Rabbi Hillel the Elder. Although lending and borrowing was excused for individuals over the Sabbatical year, shemita, courts could continue to demand payment of loans. If loans were granted to those who were very poor/needy close to shemita, lenders were afraid that they would not receive back their payments. Thus, the prosbol allowed the courts to continue paying out/following up with the poor close to shemita.

The Gemara goes on to discuss whether Hillel instituted the prosbol only for his generation or for all generations. To this end, the rabbis discuss what is done with ownerless property, when courts can nullify the decisions of other courts (when they are greater in number and in wisdom), and whether or not courts are collecting money when that is in fact prohibited.

We explore the rabbinic loophole subverting the Shmittah Mitzvah.

Gittin 35: הַנּוֹשֵׂא נָשִׁים בַּעֲבֵירָה

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 35

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna states that a widow who comes to collect the money guaranteed to her by her late husband in the ketuba, can only do so if she takes a shevu’a – an oath that she had not received any payment up until that point.

As the Gemara points out, this is the normal rule for anyone who wants to collect money from the orphans. The Mishna teaches that at some point the courts refused to allow widows to takes oaths, and replaced them with a neder that the widow would accept upon herself not to partake of something that was important to her if she had already been paid the ketuba.

We continue our exploration of Tikkun Olam and how different groups have interpreted and appropriated the term for different meanings way beyond its biblical or mystical intent.

Gittin 34: הָא דְּאִתַּחְזַק, הָא דְּלָא אֶתַּחְזַק

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 34

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Our new Mishnah states:

Initially, a person used to change his name and her name (they wrote the names in the get according to the way they were called in the place where the get was written, even though different names were used in their place of residence), the name of his city and the name of her city,

and Rabban Gamliel the Elder enacted for the benefit of the public that he should write, “This man So-and-so and every name that he has,” “This woman So-and-so and every name that she has.”

How does this solve the problem of multiple names? The Mishnah's concern is that we will not be able to identify the husband -- based on the name written in the Get -- in a city in which he is called by a different name. If every Get includes the words "and every other name that he has," the concern remains; we still will not be able to identify the husband.

We explore divorce in antiquity in Greece and Rome.

Gittin 33: כל דמקדש-אדעתא דרבנן מקדש

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 33

To download, click/tap here: PDF

In the ongoing discussion of Rabban Gamliel the Gemora on our daf objects to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s position, arguing that the Sages do not have the power to uproot a clearly established marriage.

If the husband has the power to annul the geṭ and chooses to wield that power, the divorce is never carried out and his wife is still married to him.

How can the Rabbis undo the marriage?!

In answer, the Gemara points out that every Jewish marriage is predicated on the agreement of the Rabbis, and the couple effectively agrees to abide by rabbinic rulings on the matters of marriage.

“Anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, andwhen one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively."

The language used at the wedding ceremony is that the wedding is being done ke-dat Moshe ve-Yisra’el – according to the statutes of Moses and the Jewish people. Should one party attempt to break these regulations, the Rabbis have the authority to dissolve the marriage.

We explore this authority.

Gittin 32: תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 32

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The fourth perek of Massekhet Gittin begins on our daf and deals with a wide variety of rabbinic enactments that were made for the betterment of society: mipnei tikkun ha-olam.

As we have learned, a geṭ can be sent by a husband to his wife by means of a messenger. Since the geṭ is only meaningful if the husband desires that the divorce take place, in theory up until the time that the geṭ is actually delivered, the husband can choose to nullify the geṭ – even without the knowledge of the messenger and without notifying his wife.

Thus, a situation could be created where the woman may enter unknowingly into an adulterous relationship, thinking that she can remarry, unaware that she is legally still her first husband’s wife. To avoid this situation, the Sages decreed that a person cannot nullify a geṭ unless he is in the presence of the messenger.

As we have learned, the Mishna quotes Rabban Gamliel as forbidding a husband to nullify the geṭ unless he does so in the presence of the messenger.

We explore this unique Rabbi and his interactions with Rome, Christianity and his appropriation by the church as a convert to Christianity.

Gittin 31: אַרְבַּע רוּחוֹת

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 31

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah says: At three seasons (during the year) they examine the wine (to see if it turned into vinegar, for if so, it cannot be separated as terumah or ma’aser for wine): during the time that the east wind blows at the conclusion of the Festival of Sukkos, and when the blossom fall off and the grapes begin to appear in the clusters, and when the water enters the unripe grapes.

We learned in a braisa: It is when the east wind blows at the conclusion of the Festival of Sukkos, but only in the new season (in the autumnal equinox, but if it was still in the summer season, we would have no need to be concerned that it turned into vinegar).

The rabbis seem to believe that there are four winds: the north, south, west, and east winds. The east wind seems to hold great power, both figuratively and practically speaking. At the end of today's daf the rabbis discuss wind, heat, and the effects of these elements on people and upon objects.

We explore the mythology of the four winds in antiquity, native culture and Kabbalah.

Gittin 30: אֵין אוֹנֶס בְּגִיטִּין

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 30

To download, click/tap here: PDF

A new Mishna continues an earlier conversation about the effects of the death of one party on a gift or a loan. An example is the provision of a loan for a Kohen, a Levite or a poor person. If those people change status in some way, the original loan agreement holds.

If one of them dies, the lender must contact his heirs to ensure that other laws are not forgotten.

The Gemara discusses laws around poor people and how they might differ for Jews, Samaritans and other Gentiles. Part of the determination of whether to continue to separate tithes and teruma in the case of a death of the receiver has to do with what is 'common’.

We explore the rules of charity and inheritance as well as the history of priests and indulgences and the abuse thereof.

Gittin 29: שָׁלִיחַ דְּשָׁלִיחַ

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 29

To download, click/tap here: PDF

Steinsaltz writes:

The Mishnayot on our daf discuss cases where an agent who was sent to deliver a geṭ became ill and could not fulfill his mission. When the geṭ was sent in Israel, the Mishna teaches that the messenger can pass on the responsibility to another; if it was sent from the Diaspora to Israel – a situation where the messenger is obligated to testify that the get had been written and signed in his presence – then the messenger would need to appear before a beit din, which would appoint a messenger to replace the first one.

The Gemara emphasizes that the messenger can only turn over his responsibilities to another if he becomes unable to fulfill them himself, i.e., he becomes sick or suffers some other ones – something beyond his control. According to Rabbi Abbahu, if necessary, the second messenger can appoint a third, and the third can appoint a fourth – as many as are necessary to deliver the geṭ.

In response to Rabbi Abbahu’s ruling, Rav Ashi teaches that if the first messenger dies, the power of all of later messengers to carry out the mission is lost, and the geṭ cannot be delivered.

Apparently, Rav Ashi’s original approach viewed the creation of a messenger as handing over all rights with regard to this issue to him, thus with his demise the mission cannot be fulfilled.

We explore the nature of court appointed officers and in light of recent police officer abuses, the Torah view on excessive use of force by David Polsky.

Gittin 28: בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 28

To download, click/tap here: PDF

According to the Mishna on our daf, if a man sends a messenger to deliver a geṭ the messenger is obligated to do so, even if the person sending the geṭ is elderly or ill. Simply put, we do not assume that someone who was alive in the recent past has passed away. This rule holds true not only for divorces, but also with regard to other laws.

Rava limits the rule presented by the Mishna to ordinary cases only – for instance, to an elderly person or to someone who has an illness from which most people recover, but not to someone who has reached 80 years old. Were the person who sent the messenger older than 80 or if he appeared to be on his death bed at the time, then we cannot assume that he remains alive for a significant period of time. Abaye counters Rava’s ruling by quoting a baraita which states that even someone who has reached 100 years old is assumed to be alive and his messenger would be obliged to hand the get to his wife as instructed.

We explore the notion of longevity in the talmud as well as presumption of life חֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים

Gittin 27: בַּחֲפִיסָה אוֹ בִּדְלוֹסְקָמָא

For the source text click/tap here: Gittin 27

To download, click/tap here: PDF

The Mishna teaches that a messenger who loses the geṭ that he was sent to deliver can still hand it over to the wife if he locates it straightaway. If, however, he does not find it immediately then we fear lest the get that he finds might not be the one that he lost – perhaps it is another one that has the same names, which could not be used for this couple.

The Mishna concludes, however, that if he recognizes the document then he would be allowed to complete his obligation and deliver it.

We explore the notion of the lost self in both cases of aphasia as well as spiritual loss and recovery