Ketubot 90: נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים

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The tenth perek, called Mi she-hayah nassuy, deals with an issue that first appeared in the last perek: How the estate should be divided in a case where a man was married to more than one woman and has children with each wife. Clearly, if the estate has enough money to pay all its obligations, there is no problem. What happens, however, when the ketubot of the women amount to more than the money that was left?

We explore the cultural history of two wives from a biblical perspective through the Aliyah of Yemenite Jewry.

Ketubot 89: Damnatio Memoriae

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If a  woman comes to court and presents a Get with which her husband divorced her. Then she wants him to pay the amount of the Ketubah. However, she does not have the Ketubah document itself, claiming that it was lost. Normally, she should not be able to collect anybody who wants to collect a payment should present a loan document (in this case it is the Ketubah). If it is lost, his money is lost.
However, here - since the Ketubah is the enactment of the court - it has the same power as though the document was present, and so she can collect the money. Her former husband's claim that he paid the Ketubah is not believed. If he did, they should have torn the Get, given him her Ketubah or the payment receipt.

We explore the cancellation of debt in antiquity then examine the history of Damnatio memoriae and how we eradicate memory especially in monuments, coins and other art forms.

Ketubot 88: כּוֹתְבִין שׁוֹבָר

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According to the Mishna, in a case where a woman demands payment of her ketuba based on the fact that she was divorced, but she could not produce her geṭ, if her husband claimed that he paid it (even though he admits that he cannot produce a receipt for payment), he will not have to pay the money.

Similarly, if a man produces a promissory note but cannot produce a prosbol, and the Sabbatical year has passed, the borrower will not have to pay.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that from the time of the Roman government’s decrees against religious practice, both the wife and the lender would be believed, since it would be dangerous to keep the geṭ or the prosbol.

We explore the constitutional accommodation of Jewish contractual obligations in civil law with Jodi Solovy’s analysis.

Ketubot 87: כַרְגָא

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Our daf asks: What is the purpose of mentioning the past? What oath would they have wanted a wife to take with regard to the past? 

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is referring to a woman who became a steward during her husband’s lifetime. 

Rav Mattana said: Even concerning her actions between her husband’s death and his burial, they cannot administer an oath to her, as the Sages of Neharde’a say: For the purpose of paying head tax [karga], and for payment to provide for children’s sustenance, and for burial, we sell property inherited by orphans without an announcement. In these urgent matters, the court is not particular about a possible loss incurred by the heirs.   

In the event that a divorced woman comes to court and demands that she be paid her ketuba, but she admits that part of what was owed to her was already paid, if her husband claims to have paid the full amount we will not allow her to collect unless she takes an oath indicating how much she is still owed.

We explore the history of the poll tax in antiquity as well as the role of Jews’ status on Roman Antiquity.

Ketubot 86: Enforcing and Oath

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We begin with a conversation regarding the promissory notes that were spoken of in our last Mishna. The piece of this debate that relates directly to Masechet Ketubot is the argument that we are discussing oaths made by women when they receive their gets, divorce contracts.
What if a husband dies or divorces his wife leaving both his wife and a creditor owed money? The rabbis teach us that creditors get money and women get land in these circumstances for women don't care about whether they get money or land; they want to stay married. What if there isn't enough to pay both the creditor and the wife? The creditor gets the money or land in this case.

The Mishna on our daf teaches that this rule also applies to a wife who works in her husband’s store or is put in charge of his investments. Rabbi Eliezer extends this even to everyday household tasks. If the husband suspects that she is taking dough or wool that she is working with for herself, he can demand that she take an oath that she has not taken what does not belong to her.

We discuss the GEZERTA, term used by the geonim for the oath of imprecation that they instituted in place of the oath by God's name or by a divine attribute (kinnuy). And women’s rights in medieval society.

Ketubot 85: Single Witnessing

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Our daf begins with a case that helps to explain whether property can be seized after someone has died.  

The Gemara wonders when one witness might be sufficient to affect the outcome of a case.  The first example is not only a single witness, but that witness is a woman.  Rav Chisda's daughter, Rava's wife - and Rava was the judge listening to her opinion.  

When questioned about valuing her words as an individual witness, Rava said that he knew her well and she would not lie; he did not know another Rabbi as well and he could not comfortably trust that single witness in a case.  Other examples of single witnesses are shared in the text.

We explore the hierarchy of witnesses vis a vis women  as well as the evolution of women learning talmud over the last decades. 

Ketubot 84: Ona'ah

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Steinsaltz tells us:

An example that is brought by our is the case of ona’ah – unfair business practices. According to the Torah (See Vayikra 25:14, 17) business transactions must be fair and one side cannot take advantage of another. Thus, overcharging or underpaying is forbidden by the Torah, and the forbidden profits will need to be returned or the transaction voided. What would be the halakha if someone said to his friend “I am selling this to you on the condition that the rule forbidding ona’ah does not apply”? Here we find a disagreement between Shmuel who permits such a condition, permitting the sale and Rav who insists that ona’ah still applies.

The source for this discussion of ona’ah appears in Massekhet Bava Metzia (51a). In truth, it is not only a question of whether a person can make an agreement to dispense with the rules of the Torah about money matters, but also a more basic question of how to define the law of ona’ah. Some argue that ona’ah has two sides to it. On the one hand there is a question of money, on the other hand there are elements of issur – of forbidden practices – involved, as well. It is therefore possible that even if a person can choose to forgo the Torah rules about money, his agreement to forgo the rule of ona’ah will have no legitimacy because of the issur involved.

We review the Halacha of overreaching and the science behind deception .

Ketubot 83: בּוּצִינָא טָב מִקָּרָא

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Steinsaltz tells us:

Aside from the personal relationship that is created between husband and wife at the time of their marriage, the marriage agreement involves agreement between them in other areas, as well. The economic union that the marriage creates is largely open to definition between the two parties. Thus, for example, the husband can choose to concede some of the obligations that his wife has towards him. Ha-kotev le-ishto, the ninth chapter in Massekhet Ketubot, which begins on our daf, deals primarily with two such concessions. The first is a situation where the husband agrees to concede – entirely or partially – his rights to derive benefit from his wife’s property. The second is when he agrees not to demand an oath from her should she demand payment of her ketubah.

We explore the Halachic and legal implications of joint ownership and its iteration in Roman law (the 12 Tables).

Ketubot 82: Takkana

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The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract.

“ Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract. "
"Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that they would place it in her father-in-law’s house, i.e., in her husband’s house. And wealthy women would craft their marriage contract money into baskets of silver and of gold, while poor ones would craft it into a large vessel for the collection of urine, as their marriage contract was large enough only for a small vessel.”We look at the history of Takanot and rabbinic authority as well as Hershey Friedman’s description of how the sages of the Talmud recognized the danger of making religion rule-based and therefore came up with several legal devices to improve the law and make it more ethical.
Indeed, the Talmud blamed the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Temple by the Romans on the fact that people insisted on following the strict letter of Torah law and not doing more than the law required.

Ketubot 81: Drink or Collect!

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The Torah uses the word “wife” (alternatively translated as woman) in summarizing the laws of the Sotah. From here the rabbis deduce that she must have the status of full wife in order to drink the bitter waters. A betrothed woman does not have such a status and hence, even if her fiancé forbids her from being secluded with a certain man and afterwards she is secluded with him, she does not undergo the sotah ordeal.

Similarly, a “shomeret yavam”, a woman whose husband died childless and is waiting for either levirate marriage (yibbum) or the release from levirate marriage (halitzah), does not drink the bitter waters. This refers to a case where the yavam, her brother-in-law, warned her not to be secluded with a certain man. Both of these women do lose their ketubah, since they were secluded after being warned; however, neither is allowed to undergo the sotah ordeal.

We explore the themes of adultery and passion in the English Patient  by Michael Ondaatje, 

Ketubot 80: NAZI Loot

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Our daf focuses more deeply on the details of land brought into the marriage by the kalah. While the chatan is permitted to use the produce of her land, there are limitations on what he can do. The rabbis are concerned, for example, that a man might take care of the land carelessly because he assumes that he will be divorced.

When working with nikhsei melug – which remain the property of the wife even as her husband derives benefit from it – there is a need to protect the interests of the wife in making sure that the property will not be destroyed, as well as the interests of the husband so that he will take care of the property, even though it does not belong to him.

Our daf ends with a new Mishna that discusses how a woman's property might be inherited if that property belongs to a yevama who dies while waiting for her yavam. Does his family inherit the property? Do her heirs, i.e.. her father and his heirs inherit the property? Should it be split? The rabbis are clearly protective of a woman's property to some degree according to today's debate.

We explore the history of NAZI looted art and how cases brought by children of those murdered owners came to light and were litigated decades later.

Ketubot 79: Fetal Abduction וְלַד הַגּוֹנֵב

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The general rule regarding nikhsei melug, or usufruct property (legal term meaning the right to the fruits of another’s property, without damage or destruction of that property), is that the property remains in the woman’s possession, but her husband is okhel peirot – literally, he “eats the fruit.” 

In other words, she owns the property, but as long as they are married the profits accrued by the property belong to the husband.    

The Gemara asks, if one steals the offspring of an animal of a woman’s usufruct property must pay payment of double the principal to the woman.

Apparently this ruling is based on the assumption that the offspring is not treated as the produce of her property but as the principal, which belongs to the woman.

We explore the history of fetal burial practices as well as modern versions of the status of children in the UK as well as state sponsored fetal abduction in China.

Ketubot 78: Shame אָנוּ בּוֹשִׁים

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If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid.

Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: 

Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? 

Why, then, is her transaction valid? 

Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property that she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed, because it is unclear why she cannot sell it, as it is hers; and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand?
The Gemara wonders who has rights to this property.  Exactly when is she given the property?  Perhaps the timing of her acquisition will determine the status of his acquisition.  If they are betrothed, should he be allowed to access her property?   

We explore the notion of shame….both in historical terms and psychologically (freudian theory) and  in terms of toxic shame for those with addiction

ending with a Kabalistic essay on its usefulness in spiritual practice.  

Ketubot 77: πολύποδας

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This mishnah lists defects in a husband (either physical defects or ones related to his profession) that allow the woman to demand a divorce and receive her ketubah. 

These are the ones who are forced to divorce [their wives]: one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer [of dog feces for the treatment of hides], a coppersmith or a tanner whether they were [in such a condition] before they married or whether they arose after they had married.

The wife of any husband who has one of the below-listed defects can demand a divorce, whether or not he had them before he was married.

We explore the history of polyps in antiquity from Galen to the medieval period.

Ketubot 76: Polydactyly

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The rabbis discuss courses of action when a husband discovers this blemish. One example is a husband who finds that his wife has an extra toe. Should he not have examined her for such a blemish before engaging in intercourse with her?

And how could she have 'grown' an extra toe after the betrothal?

Does her father have proof that the groom accepted the extra toe?

Or was this part of the body hidden and not known or at least not discussed?

We explore the syndrome of polydactyly and its ancient description in culture and texts.

Ketubot 75: Cosmetic Reasons for Divorce

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The rabbis are discussing blemishes: if a woman discloses that she has a blemish and the man accepts that blemish before the betrothal and/or before the marriage, he cannot claim later that the blemish is cause for divorce.  But what is a blemish?  

The rabbis discuss blemishes of women's bodies: moles on the face, moles with hairs, and low speaking voices. 

We explore moles and their consequences,  as well as the halachic controversy surrounding cosmetic surgery.

Ketubot 74: אֵצֶל רוֹפֵא וְרִיפֵּא אוֹתָהּ

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The Mishna (72b) offered two cases where a husband stipulates a condition before marriage. In one, he makes the marriage conditional on the fact that his wife has not taken vows upon herself; in the other his condition is that she does not have any blemishes.

The baraita brought by the Gemara on our daf discusses a woman who accepted these conditions and following the kiddushin goes to the Sage to have her vows rescinded or to a doctor to have her blemish healed. In such cases, the condition will be considered to have been fulfilled when the vows were removed by the Sage, but not when the blemish was healed by the doctor.

the Gemara explains that the Sage voids the vow retroactively, and we discover that at the moment of marriage the wife really was unburdened by vows. In the case of the doctor, however, the blemish was only healed from the time that the medical procedure was performed, so at the moment that the kiddushin was to take effect, the condition was not fulfilled.

we explore the status of physicians and healing and they relative weight in deciding halachic conflicts.

Ketubot 73: בְּעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת Civil Marriage

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Today, conditional marriages are discouraged, if not entirely disallowed. The Mishna (72b), however, discusses cases where a person made the marriage conditional on the fact that his wife does not have vows that she has taken on herself or physical deformities. In such cases, if the woman is found to have such vows or physical deformities there is no need for a divorce, since the condition upon which the marriage was based was not fulfilled.

If, for example, the husband marries her with stipulations regarding preexisting vows, the couple can be divorced. Of course it is understood that a man would not engage in licentious sexual intercourse knowingly.

In other words, he would not engage in intercourse with his wife if he knew that she had made a vow that forbade their intimacy.

We explore the halacha of civil unions in galut and in Israel.

We also visit the history of civil unions following the French Revolution as well as the tragic consequences of the Nuremberg laws for civil unions.

Ketubot 72: דָּת מֹשֶׁה vs וִיהוּדִית

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The Mishna on our daf lists situations where a woman can be divorced without receiving her ketuba.

These include a woman who transgresses “the law of Moses” or “Jewish practice.”

According to the Mishna, transgressing the “law of Moses” includes:

• feeding her husband untithed food,

• engaging in relations while she is a niddah (during the period of her menstruation)

• not setting apart her dough offering,

• making vows and not fulfilling them.

According to the Mishna, transgressing the “law of Moses” includes:

• going out with an uncovered head,

• spinning wool in the street,

• conversing with every man.

We explore the history of women’s head covering form a halachic and cultural perspective.

Ketubot 71: "Like Towers"

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A new Mishna looks at husbands who vow unreasonably, according to the rabbis.

If husbands vow that their wives cannot visit their families or that they cannot visit houses of mourning, they must divorce their wives within specific time frames.

Likewise, if they have their wives perform chores that are then ridiculed (filling a bucket of water and then throwing it into the garbage), they are to divorce.

Rabbi Yochanan comments on two verses (song 10:8 and Hosea 2:18) to underscore the motivation behind the wife’s eagerness to return to her home. His interpretation is in line with the long tradition of non-literal interpretation of the erotic love poetry in Song of Songs.

We explore the traditions of interpretation of the Song of Songs from the literal to the midrashic and literary.