Ketubot 60: Milk of Kindness

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The Mishna (59b) teaches that one of the obligations that a wife has to her husband is to nurse his newborn child.

This is a responsibility that exists even after her husband dies.

According to the baraita brought by our Gemara, should her husband pass away while she is nursing, the widow cannot marry for a year and a half (Rabbi Yehuda) or two years (Rabbi Meir) lest she become pregnant and lose her ability to produce milk.

Women are encouraged to nurse their children until the children are at least 24 months and not significantly beyond four or five years.

The rabbis discuss how long a woman should wait before remarrying if she is divorced or widowed while her child is an infant.

The rabbis move into a conversation about the milk of humans and the milk of other animals.

Humans are not permitted to suckle from animals unless they are very ill, it is Shabbat, and there is no other way to access that 'treatment'.

In that case, suckling is an unusual way to get milk.

Eating blood is discussed as well. In contrast to breast milk, blood is not allowed to be eaten if it has left the body.

We explore the history of breastfeeding in Tanach and its poetic references in rabbinic literature and the history of human milk in antiquity.

Ketubot 59: Kaloskagathos אֵין אִשָּׁה אֶלָּא לְיוֹפִי

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Our Mishnah lists a wife's obligations: grind grain into flour, bake the bread, do laundry, cook, nurse her child and work with wool. However, the more maidservants she brings into marriage, the less she has to work, and with four maidservants she just sits in an easy chair.

Rabbi Eliezer says that she always needs to work, at least with wool, for idleness leads to unchastity, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that idleness brings to insanity.

Rabbi Chiya disagrees and says that a wife is only for beauty, and she should not do any work that diminishes her beauty.

We explore the concept of beauty in Talmud and Midrash comparing to Platonic ideals of beauty in the west.

Ketubot 58: וּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה

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A woman is supposed to be sustained by her husband - this is the priority.

If she does not want her earnings to go to her husband, she is permitted to state that she does not wish to work.

However, the rabbis are aware that if the woman works and insists on keeping her wages to sustain herself while her husband is working to sustain her, animosity will develop.

The rabbis seem to believe that husbands would not be willing to understand a woman's need for savings and sustenance beyond the basics.

We explore the idea of “mishum eivah” in the marital and broader societal context of darchei shalom.

Ketubot 57: אירכס כתובתה Loss of Ketubah and Loss of Innocence

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Our daf discusses a lost ketubah followed by a new mishnah discusses the waiting period between betrothal and marriage.

A virgin is given twelve months from the [time her intended] husband claimed her, [in which] to prepare herself for marriage. Just as [such a period] is given to the woman, so is it given to the man to prepare himself. A widow is given thirty days.

Betrothal may occur at an early age, but that doesn’t mean that marriage will necessarily occur any time close to the betrothal. There are two steps described by our mishnah that occur before the marriage. The first is that the husband tells the woman whom he betrothed that he wishes to marry her, or the woman tells the man to whom she is betrothed that she wishes to get married. From that point on, if this is a first marriage, there can be up to a twelve-month period in which the couple prepare for the wedding and the marriage.

This would include time to prepare for the wedding, and more importantly, time to prepare the new house and the things that will go into it.

We explore the issues regarding lost ketubot as well as the space/time between kiddushin and nissuin, and the dual nature of the ritual compared with Islamic law.

Finally we open the thorny issue of spiritual abuse following Get refusals.

Ketubot 56: Birchat Besulin

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Our daf considers the following scenario:

What if the betrothed couple had entered the chupa, the wedding canopy, but they had not consummated the marriage?

When is the moment at which a woman's legal claims change? The rabbis argue about another scenario

What if a woman is menstruating and the couple does not consummate the marriage (chupas niddah) after the first night, then the husband dies,

is she still considered to be a betrothed woman, entitled to the 200 zuz only, or is she considered to be a married woman, entitled to both sums?

We explore the historical Birchas besulin by Ruth Langer, and the struggle the conservative movement has with intermarriage.

Ketubot 55: שְׁכִיב מְרַע Donatio Mortis Causa

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A matnat shekhiv mera is a present given by an individual who is on his death bed. Unlike other examples of property transfer where the most basic requirement demands that a formal kinyan take place, in the case of matnat shekhiv mera the Sages ruled that no such kinyan is necessary. This rule was established in order to ease the concerns that rest on a dying person who wants to be sure that his will is carried out prior to his death.

We explore the notion of “donatio mortis causa” and the halachic and modern legal ramifications thereof.

Ketubot 54: Value of Ketubah

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As we see from many Gemaros in our maseches, men often added extra to the kesuvah to demonstrate how beloved their bride was in their eyes.

Once, a chosson wrote the correct amount on the actual kesubah, but on the back added a sentence, “I am adding on an additional 500 gold pieces beyond that which is written on the front of this paper. The entire sum of comes to 1000 gold pieces.”

We review the “tosefes Kesubah” and the archeology of the language of the kesubah from ancient Mesopotamia through the Middle ages with the money clause in Ashkenaz.

Ketubot 53: מִבְּרָא בִּישָׁא לִבְרָא טָבָא

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Our daf mentions that:

Do not be present when an inheritance is transferred even from a bad son to a good son

Rav Moshe Sofer, the Chasam Sofer, explains that the bad son does not refer to a son who is a heretic; rather it refers to one who is either not so careful in his fulfillment of mitzvos or is disrespectful to his father.

The implication of this comment is that it would be permitted to transfer property away from a child who is a heretic so that he should not receive anything as an inheritance.

We explore the good son/bad son spectrum from different perspectives ending the the famous story of StrubelPeter the slovenly son, adapted by Mark Twain and appropriated by the Nazis and parodied by the Allies.

Ending with Yehoshua Haparu’a in Israel.

Ketubot 52: Lieberman Clause

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A new Mishna teaches us a number of things about the ketubah. Usually, the ketubah mentioned a number of stipulations. They were assumed to be in effect even if the actual clauses were omitted from the ketubah:

· Males from the marriage inherit the ketubah

· In Judea males from the marriage are entitled to give the ketubah amount to their mother and to leave her to find her own care and lodging

· Females from the marriage were to be sustained by the father's movable property until they were married

The Gemara suggests that this was stated to encourage fathers to leave as much to their daughters as to their sons.

We explore Aryeh Cohen’s thesis regarding Rashi’s (as opposed to the later Tosafists) concept of marriage and the incentive built in to the ketubah.

This leads us to the Lieberman Clause that reflected more political (US) denominational biases rather than purely halachic differences.

Ketubot 51: Odaenathus בן נצר

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Rav Yehuda teaches that women who were kidnapped are permitted to return to their husbands after they are released, even if they engaged in sexual relations with their captors, since we assume that they were forced into such a situation against their will.

One case that does not fit into this category, according to the Gemara, was when a woman was being held by “ben Netzer.”

In such a case, a woman who slept with her captors was considered to have done so willingly and would be forbidden to her husband.

“Ben Netzer” was the family name of the man who became known as Odenathus, who ruled the city of Tadmor (Palmyra, Syria) in the third century of the Common Era. (Lieberman and Graetz)

He took advantage of the long and difficult war being waged between the Romans and the Persians to enhance his own position and influence well beyond the boundaries of the oasis that he called his capital city.

We explore the history of Hadron/Palmyra and this exceptional “king” considered the third horn in Daniel 9:8 (Gen Rabba) :

8 “While I was thinking about the horns, there before me was another horn, a little one, which came up among them; and three of the first horns were uprooted before it.

This horn had eyes like the eyes of a human being and a mouth that spoke boastfully.

Ketubot 50: יוֹרֵד עִמּוֹ לְחַיָּיו Filiation

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Our daf opens a conversation on parenting.

Should one treat his young sons gently even if they do not wish to study Torah?

The rabbis share different opinions. Should one treat his young sons gently even if they do not wish to study Torah?

The rabbis share different opinions.

R. Yitzhak relates that in Usha a rabbinic ordinance was established that a parent should be lenient with his son regarding his studies until he is 12 years old, at which point he should force him to attend school.

This stands in contrast with the statement that Rav made to Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat (who was a prominent elementary school teacher at that time) that he should not accept students younger than six, but he should begin teaching children from age six onward and “stuff them like an ox.”

One resolution that the Gemara offers is the statement of Abaye, who quotes his foster mother as teaching that a child should begin the study of Torah at age six and of Mishna when he is ten.

We explore the childrearing practices and rabbinic views on pedagogy including Rav Lichtenstein’s approach, ending with a cultural literary analysis by Charlotte Fonrobert.

Ketubot 49: Gender Inequality

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According to the mishna, “A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance,” and the Gemara draws the obvious corollary: “It is with regard to providing his daughter’s sustenance that he is not obligated, but with regard to providing his son’s sustenance, he is obligated.” This looks like another glaring example of gender inequality in the Talmud: Sons have a greater claim on their father’s resources than daughters.

But the ensuing discussion suggests that things are not so clear-cut. Indeed, according to several authorities, including Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, sons too do not have a legal claim for sustenance from their father. Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says, “During their father’s lifetime both these and those,” that is both sons and daughters, “are not sustained.” Paradoxically, as it might seem, children have a legal claim on their father’s property only after he is dead.

We explore gender inequality with a focus on the writings of Daniel Boyarin whose erudition in midrash and talmudic hermeneutics allows us a glimpse into a unique scholar with a sensitivity to gender bias.

Ketubot 48: Domain of Father to Husband

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According to the mishna, “A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance,” and the Gemara draws the obvious corollary: “It is with regard to providing his daughter’s sustenance that he is not obligated, but with regard to providing his son’s sustenance, he is obligated.” This looks like another glaring example of gender inequality in the Talmud: Sons have a greater claim on their father’s resources than daughters.

But the ensuing discussion suggests that things are not so clear-cut. Indeed, according to several authorities, including Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, sons too do not have a legal claim for sustenance from their father. Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says, “During their father’s lifetime both these and those,” that is both sons and daughters, “are not sustained.” Paradoxically, as it might seem, children have a legal claim on their father’s property only after he is dead.

We explore gender inequality with a focus on the writings of Daniel Boyarin whose erudition in midrash and talmudic hermeneutics allows us a glimpse into a unique scholar with a sensitivity to gender bias.

Ketubot 47: תִּיקְּנוּ מָצוּי לְמָצוּי

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The Sages instituted a common obligation in exchange for a common right, and they instituted an uncommon obligation in exchange for an uncommon right. In other words, the Sages instituted a husband’s obligation to provide his wife with sustenance, which is relevant on a regular basis, in exchange for his right to her earnings, which also applies regularly. The other obligations and rights of a husband are relevant less frequently.

On our daf we learn that although many of these rights belong to the father based on interpretations of biblical passages by the Sages, in the relationship between husband and wife, many of the rights and responsibilities are related to each other. Thus, the wife’s earnings belong to her husband in exchange for his feeding her (mezonot), he must redeem her from captivity in exchange for the rights that he receives to derive benefit from her property (peirot), and he is obligated to ensure a proper burial in exchange for the dowry that she brings into the household (ketuba).

Once we understand this relationship, the logical conclusion is that upon agreement between husband and wife it is possible that these relationships can be broken, i.e. since the central concern of the Sages is to ensure that the wife is fed, a woman will be able to say eini nizonet ve-eini osa – I choose not to receive food from my husband, and I will keep my earnings for myself.

We explore the rights and obligations In Islam and Halachah as well as secular case law of contract law vs property law.

Ketubot 46: Father's Rights vs Obligations

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A new Mishna teaches us about a father's legal rights over his daughter while she is betrothed.

He has authority over her entrance into betrothal through money, the ketubah, or intercourse.

He owns whatever she finds, her earnings, and the right to nullify her vows.

He acts on her behalf if she divorces after betrothal but before marriage.

He inherits her property (inherited from her mother's family) if she dies, but he cannot use the produce of that property while she is alive.

We struggle with the status of a daughter in antiquity and modern legal rights and obligations of fatherhood.

Ketubot 45: Death By Stoning

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Our daf questions how the punishment for adultery is meted out. One of the larger questions that the rabbis explore is how an adult is punished for a crime that s/he committed as a minor.

The Gemora cites a Baraisa: A betrothed na’arah who committed adultery is stoned at the entrance of her father’s house.

If she does not have an entrance of her father’s house (for he has no house), she is stoned at the entrance of that city’s gate.

In a city where there are mostly idolaters, she is stoned at the gates of Beis Din.

The rabbis share proof texts to better understand why women must be stoned at the entrance to the gates of the city.

They determine that women who commit adultery while betrothed are similar to those who worship idols.

We explore a Comparative Study of Stoning Punishment in the Religions of Islam and Judaism by Sanaz Alasti. and modern versions of stoning in our time.

Ketubot 44: Conversion of Minors

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Our new Mishna teaches that if the daughter of a woman who converted while she was pregnant is found to be sexually licentious (read: not a virgin) after betrothal, she is not punished as a woman born Jewish might be punished. Instead of being strangled at the gates of her father's home, she may be stoned at the gates to the city.

The Gemara discusses a number of different contributing possibilities, including what to do if the girl is born at slightly different times, what to do if the girl is an orphan, a minor, an older young woman, what to do if her father is opposed to the marriage or if she is opposed to the marriage, etc.

We explore the halachic ramifications of conversion of minors both then and in modern times.

Ketubot 43: Unfit to Parent?

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Our daf presents a new Mishna. It discusses who receives the ketubah money if a father marries off his daughter and she is divorced, and then he marries her off again and she is widowed.

Does the ketubah from both marriages belong to her father?

Or does she retain rights t the second ketubah?

We explore the responsibility of parents and their rights following injury to a daughter then the reverse when the child is delinquent (Deut 22).

What are the conceptions of childhood in antiquity and what are the legal ramifications of court determined unfitness to parent from modern legal vs Jewish perspectives.

Ketubot 42: אָנַסְתָּ וּפִיתִּיתָ אֶת בִּתִּי

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Our daf discusses considers what should be done if a father accuses a man of seducing or raping his daughter. In the first discussions, the accused denies the accusation. The father of the woman victimize then administers an oath. Responding with "amen", the accused confirms that he did indeed commit this crime.

He then pays the fine for rape or seduction plus one fifth, and he brings a guilt-offering for swearing falsely.

In the second discussion, the father accuses a man of the rape or seduction of his daughter, of going to court and being found guilty of the crime, and of not paying the penalty. In this case, again an oath is administered. With his response of "amen", the accused must pay the penalty.

We explore the horrific notion of a man confronting another about his daughter…and the defamation for survivors of assault…then we review the literary history of sexual violence (Christine Foula) including th literary history of narrative rape in Gen 34 (Sandie Gravett) ending with Andre Peto’s look at rape in the aftermath of WWII.

Ketubot 41: חצי נזק

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Our daf ends as we begin Perek IV with a new Mishna.  It teaches that if a young woman was seduced, she is entitled to the fine for seduction and to the additional compensation for degradation, humiliation (and pain, if she was raped).  

If she goes to court to sue the offender for this crime and she is a minor or still under her father's authority, the money goes to her father.  If her father has died, the money goes to her brothers, her father's heirs.  

We examine the concept of chazi nezek whereby a person’s property causes damage, obviously there is a need to pay restitution. Nevertheless, the Torah teaches that we distinguish between a shor mu’ad – an ox that has gored in the past – for which one pays full damages (nezek shalem), and a shor tam – an ox with no violent history – for which one pays for only half of the damage (hatzi nezek) that he caused.

We explore Deborah Greniman’s essay on The Origins of the Ketubah: Deferred Payment or Cash up Front? as well as Michael Satlow’s distinction between the biblical “mohar” bride price vs the talmudic ketubah or nedunia.